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Résumé 
 
 Cette thèse étudie les transitions de l'autoritarisme vers la démocratie. La question à 
laquelle elle tente de répondre est: quelles sont les conditions nécessaires à l'instauration d'une 
démocratie minimale? Notre réponse est qu’ un processus de démocratisation réussi dépend de 
deux facteurs essentiellement: (1) la pression exercé sur le regime autoritaire par des 
mobilisations d’opposition de masse; (2) la volonté d’une partie des élites au pouvoir de 
procéder à des réformes, mise en évidence par une crise du régime autoritaire. D’un côté, les 
mobilisations de masse indiquent clairement au régime qu’une libéralisation est inévitable. 
Elles ébranlent l'unité du bloc au pouvoir et assument une fonction importante de "surveillant" 
de la transition en cours. D’un autre côté, les réformes sont possibles uniquement si des forces 
modérées, qui embrassent l'idée d'ouvrir l'espace politique, réussissent à s'approprier "les rênes 
du pouvoir" au sein du régime autoritaire. Ces deux éléments sont les clés qui permettent de 
comprendre pourquoi, et comment les pays se démocratisent. Afin de démontrer notre 
hypothèse, nous avons réalisé vingt-cinq études qualitatives de transitions survenues entre 
1973 et 2004. Nous avons ensuite testé ces dernières à l'aide d'une analyse qualitative 
comparative (QCA) à valeur multiple et illustré nos résultats à l’aide d’une étude de trois cas 
types de transitions réussies ou avortées: ceux de la Tanzanie, du Togo et de l'Indonesie. Cette 
thèse apporte une contribution nouvelle et importante à l’étude des transitions vers la 
démocratie, dans la mesure où elle démontre que le succès de ces dernières ne peut être 
expliqué uniquement, ni par les mouvements de contestation de la société civile, comme le 
prétend la théorie des transitions from below, ni par une crise du regime autoritaire, comme le 
soutient la théorie des transitions from above. La prise en compte de ces deux theories est 
essentielle à la compréhension de ce phénomène. 
    
 
 
 
Mots-clés: transition démocratique; transitions "from above"; transitions "from below"; crise 
du régime autoritaire; mobilisations de masse; démocratie minimale 
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Abstract 
 
 This thesis studies transitions from authoritarianism that lead to democracy. We ask: 
Which conditions are necessary for the instauration of a minimally democratic regime? Our 
answer to this question is that successful democratization hinges on the presence of essentially 
two factors: (1) pressure "from below" in the form of mass mobilization; and (2) willingness 
"from above" to carry out reforms, evidenced by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. On one 
hand, mass mobilization is an unmistakable indicator to rulers that liberalization is inevitable. 
It shakes up the internal unity of the ruling block and fulfils a crucial watchdog function 
throughout the transition process. On the other hand, reform is only possible if moderate 
forces embracing the idea of opening up the political space manage to grab "the reins of 
power" within the authoritarian regime. Both elements are thus key to understanding why and 
how countries democratize. To demonstrate our argument we examine twenty-five transition 
cases between 1973 and 2004 using multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and 
supplement our results with three illustrative case studies of Tanzania, Togo and Indonesia. 
The central contribution of our thesis is to reconcile the two main theoretical debates in the 
democratization literature by showing the complementarity of theories on transitions "from 
above" and transitions "from below".  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: transitions to democracy; transitions "from above"; transitions "from below"; 
authoritarian regime crisis; mass mobilization; minimal democracy 
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Introduction 
 
 
Why do some countries democratize whereas others do not? That is the $3,1bn 
question – at least to the US government, which spent that amount in 2013 to promote 
democracy, human rights and good governance around the world (USAID 2013). Yet, 
despite significant sums being devoted to advancing that mission, authoritarianism seems 
to be on the rise. In its annual report on democracy in the world, Freedom House (2015, 1) 
stated that global freedom "declined for the ninth consecutive year in 2014", the longest 
period of decline since the organization’s start in 1972. Decision-makers are at a loss at 
these developments, which so obviously run counter to what Diamond (1996, 29) calls "the 
ideological hegemony of democracy": to live under autocracy, or even be an autocrat, is 
considered backward and uncivilized. And whereas there is now indeed hardly any world 
region that has not been touched by what Huntington has labeled "the Third Wave of 
democratization" (Huntington 1991), probably less than half of these transitions from 
authoritarianism have actually led to democracy1. How can we explain this puzzle? This is 
the subject of our thesis. 
 
In fact, why should we study transitions to democracy? Why should they attract our 
attention? Well, as we already hinted at, a look at the budget of virtually every Western 
government and major international organization today should convince us that transitions 
from authoritarianism on one hand, and the conditions of such transitions leading to a 
democratic outcome on the other hand, is indeed a topic worth investigating. In fact, the 
last three decades have seen a veritable democracy promotion industry come into being 
(Carothers 2007, 112 – 113), which was fuelled primarily by the successes of the early 
democratizers of the 1970s and the magnitude of the transition wave in the 1990s. At the 
time, the idea that somehow the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992) with democracy as the 
final form of human government (Sen 1999) had come gave rise to downright euphoria, 
prompting even critical scholars such as Larry Diamond (2003) to proclaim that the whole 
world could become democratic. However, the hope driving the Third Wave never !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In fact, according to Geddes (1999a, 115 – 116), among the 85 regimes that initiated a transition from either 
autocracy or some form of authoritarianism during the Third Wave, only 30, or roughly one-third, became 
stable democracies. 
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materialized. Practicioners and scholars alike soon realized that what they were 
experiencing on the ground did not fit the standard transition blueprint; that is to say, most 
of these transitions did not bring about regimes with frequent, fair, free, and competitive 
elections and respect for political rights and civil liberties. Instead, it became clear that 
more and more countries that were thought to be on the way to democracy were in fact 
either stagnating, developing into some kind of authoritarian hybrid, or outright returning 
to sometimes even harsher forms of authoritarianism. Diamond (2002, 27) was then forced 
to draw the frustrating conclusion that "authoritarian forms of multiparty electoral 
competition have increased during the third wave much more rapidly than democratic 
ones". 
 
 When historicizing the literature on democratization, we can see that the 
investigative focus of researchers reflects these changes. After spending many years 
analyzing the causes of democratic stability following the breakdown of the German and 
Italian Republics in the 1920s/30s, scholars successively directed their interest at the 
determinants of democratization in the context of the Third Wave (1973 – 1995); at the 
factors that favor democratic consolidation (during the 1990s); and at the causes of hybrid 
regime proliferation since the end of the Cold War (during the years 2000 – 2010). Finally, 
in light of the disappointing results of the Third Wave transitions and the increasing power 
of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China, the focus of the present decade are 
questions relative to the causes of authoritarian resilience and hybrid regime consolidation 
(Ethier 2014). They all form a logical sequence of scientific inquiry.  
 
 Why then have scholars not been able to predict the limits of democratization? The 
answer to this question is related to the way democratization specialists have approached 
the study of transitions since 1973. In fact, there are only a handful of theories that try 
identifying the causes of success or failure of transitions from authoritarianism2, and they 
either concentrate their explications on the attitudes of elites (transitions "from above", 
proposed first by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986)) or the mobilization of mass actors 
(transitions "from below", proposed by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Most existing theories either investigate issues prior to the actual transition dynamics – the so-called 
"preconditions literature"- or questions related to democratic consolidation and stability, which become 
salient once a transition process has been successfully concluded. 
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(2003))3. However, there is a growing consensus in the scholarly community that neither 
approach taken alone is able to adequately explain why certain transitions succeed while 
others fail. Collier’s (1999) case study on Spain, Wood’s (2000) case studies on El 
Salvador and South Africa, Bermeo’s (1997) study on Eastern Europe, Shin’s (2008) study 
on East Asia and Denny’s (2006) case study on Indonesia are only some examples of an 
emerging corpus of literature evidencing that elements of both approaches – "top down" 
and "bottom-up" – might be required for transitions to result in democracy. On one hand, 
these studies contest interpretations of transitions that are too elite-centered, claiming that 
mass movements play a much bigger role in determining the outcome of a transition 
project than assumed by "top-down" theorists. On the other hand, they also demonstrate 
that intra-elite dynamics, most often in the form of divisions between the authoritarian 
ruler and its coercive apparatus, are crucial to many transitions "from below" (McGowan 
2003, 339; Morency-Laflamme 2014; forthcoming 2016). In our opinion, this shows that 
the strict separation of transitions "from above" and "from below" leads to a false debate 
between approaches that are, in essence, complementary. Hence, there is a clear need to 
revise and integrate theoretical frameworks. 
 
Our central research question is: did democratization in Third-Wave transitions 
happen "from above", like O’Donnell and Schmitter claim; "from below", like Bratton and 
Van de Walle/Bunce envision; or did it result from a combination of these two scenarios, 
like certain case studies seem to demonstrate?   
 
Adopting a conciliatory spirit, our hypothesis postulates that transition outcomes 
are decisively shaped both by intra-elite dynamics and mass action, and thus combine 
elements from both "top-down" and "bottom-up" theories. In other words, democracy is 
the result of both a conflict within the authoritarian regime between reformist and 
conservative forces and large popular protest movements pushing for the extension of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Theories "from above" argue that the critical causes of democratic success are located in the realm of 
reformist ruling elites. Popular participation in the transition process is viewed with suspicion, and is 
generally considered to diminish the chances of producing a successful transition outcome. By contrast, 
theories "from below" argue that mass actors are the dominant force behind successful transitions. 
"Democracy results from, mobilizes, and reshapes popular contention", writes McAdam (2001, 269). "The 
former does not occur without the latter." There is also a third category, "transitions imposed by foreign 
actors". However, there is no serious study on this kind of transitions, and authors have tended to ignore 
them. They have generally been associated with the 2nd wave regime changes that resulted from the Allied 
victory over the Axis powers or the struggle for national liberation of former British colonies (Ethier 2010). 
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political rights. These “defining features" of each mode of transition will be elaborated on 
in detail in Chapter two. We will show that analyzing individual transitions in light of the 
presence, or absence, of a previously established and clearly defined set of characteristics 
allows us to carry out relatively objective comparisons of democratization attempts both in 
a cross-regional and cross-temporal perspective. Thus, the objective of our thesis is 
twofold: On one hand, we aim at testing the validity of the existing theories on transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy. More importantly, however, we attempt to surpass the 
sterile academic debate between transitions "from below" and "from above" and to 
reconcile two seemingly incompatible positions.  
 
To our knowledge, no prior research has attempted the systematic comparison of 
the determinants of successful democratic transitions across a large number of cases and 
various world regions. This might seem surprising at first, given that the study of political 
regime change is such a large subfield in Comparative Politics. When taking a closer look, 
however, it becomes clear that democratization studies have been highly empirically 
driven, and new subjects of interest often replaced older questions even before they were 
satisfyingly answered. The question of what causes transitions to succeed might have 
fallen victim to that dynamic, because it is likely that seeing so many Third Wave 
transitions fail prompted many researchers to move on to "greener pastures" instead of 
going over old theories again to see whether an adjustment could more adequately account 
for what was happening on the ground. Moreover, democratization specialists most often 
only focused their work on a single world region, ignoring those parts of the globe where 
authoritarianism is still the most common regime type (such as Africa and Asia). So, while 
we do not pretend to "re-invent the wheel", we do think that our thesis offers an important 
contribution to the existing pool of scholarly knowledge.  
 
On one hand, our contribution is methodological and relates to the number of cases 
used in this analysis, and the way our explanatory variables are constructed. Existing 
studies on democratic transitions are for the most part single case studies or area-bound 
comparisons of a small number of cases, primarily due to the complexity of the concepts 
and the difficulty of representing strategic dynamics in standard statistical frameworks. 
Moreover, in identifying their explanatory variables, authors often do not agree on what 
exactly constitutes a transition "from above" or "from below", which led to many 
! 5!
competing explanations for Third Wave transitions. Both these facts hamper what is 
considered by many to be the primary goal of scientific enquiry: to formulate generalizable 
propositions.  Our thesis, by contrast, compares twenty-five cases of transitions in a cross-
regional setting and uses coding criteria that are clearly defined and grounded in theory. By 
doing so we provide a road-map for comparing democratization that can be applied to any 
individual transition attempt irrespective of temporal and regional context, and thus we 
offer much more fertile ground for generalization.4  
 
On the other hand, we also offer a theoretical contribution, specifically with regards 
to the relative importance of our explanatory variables for democratization success. 
Although one would be hard pressed today to find researchers who profess their loyalty 
solely to one variable (either the nature and extent of divisions within the authoritarian 
regime or the strength of social movements) without granting the other at least some 
explanatory weight, the reality is that most scholars have rallied behind either one or the 
other of the competing theories on transitions. As Foweraker (1994, 218 – 19) notes, there 
is a top-down and a bottom-up approach, but "ne’er the twain do meet". More importantly, 
both factors have yet to be established as being either necessary or sufficient for a 
transition to end in democracy. Our research methodology offers both: on one hand, it 
treats the crisis of the authoritarian regime and mass mobilization as equally important, 
with no bias in the analysis towards either variable. On the other hand, it is specifically 
designed to test whether either of these conditions alone, or in combination, is necessary 
for a successful transition to democracy. Such knowledge could prove crucial particularly 
for the improvement of potential democracy promotion programs, which have traditionally 
focused more on civil society actors than on intra-regime dynamics. 
 
Ultimately, the main "plus value" of our thesis is to offer an integrated theory of 
transitions that combines the strongest explanatory elements of the two main theoretical 
contenders (transitions "from above", and transitions "from below") and tests them over a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This statement has to come with a qualifying remark. There is nothing that indicates that our way of 
analyzing transitions could be applied successfully to transitions of the First, or the Second Wave. Most 
scholars would agree that the dynamics of these transitions differed markedly from those found in Third 
Wave transitions and beyond. Therefore we hold that our analysis is valid primarily for transitions within the 
Third Wave timeframe, but could also conceivably be applied to later transitions (for example the Arab 
Spring transitions, which certain scholars consider to be the beginning of a "Fourth Wave".)   
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large number of cases for their explanatory value. Whatever the outcome of our analysis 
may be, we hope it enhances our understanding of how and why countries democratize 
either by demonstrating the superior relevance of one theory over the other, or by showing 
their complementarity and thus the relative futility of the debate that has been dividing the 
scientific community for decades.  
 
With regard to the methodological foundations of our thesis, we opt for a "Third 
Way" between quantitative (variable-oriented) and qualitative (case-oriented) techniques. 
Firstly, we define our explanatory variables and establish the conditions of their 
occurrence. Our variable "mass mobilization" is coded using an adapted version of the 
Transitional Mass Mobilization Index (TMMI) of Soe (2009) that is based on the Cross-
National Time Series (CNTS) dataset. Using that index, it is possible to identify the event 
count data of mobilization on a per annum basis for any one of our individual transition 
cases and compare it with regards to other transition cases in the same, or different world 
regions. Our variable "crisis of the authoritarian regime", on the other hand, needs to be 
coded manually according to carefully selected and theoretically sound indicators, because 
there is currently no index in the literature that would allow an easy identification of 
transitions that experienced splits between regime reformers and conservatives. To create 
such an index we use qualitative case studies whose presentation follows the structured and 
focused method as described by George and Bennett (2004, 67). The method is structured 
insofar as the empirical material in each case is gathered with a view to answering the 
same generic questions ("Are there softliners within the regime?"; "Do they have a 
majority within the regime?"). It is focused in the sense that specific aspects of the political 
history in each country are examined based on the identification of a small number of 
precise indicators. The intent is to standardize the way to report facts in order to make it 
possible to compare findings, not only within our sample but potentially also for scholars 
wishing to do further research on the subject.  
 
Secondly, in order to test our hypotheses we employ multi-value qualitative 
comparative analysis (mvQCA), a set-theoretic method which forms part of what 
Cronqvist (2007) calls "configurational-comparative methods". In their origin, set-theoretic 
methods follow Mill’s (1858) methods of agreement and difference, and are presented as a 
"synthetic strategy" to "integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the 
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best features of the variable-oriented approach" (Ragin 1987, 84). mvQCA, a variant of the 
traditional QCA technique, is based on Boolean algebra and addresses the presence or 
absence of conditions under which a certain outcome is obtained. It is thus well placed to 
investigate whether one or both of our explanatory variables are necessary for successful 
democratization.  
 
Our research asks big questions and tries hard to provide parsimonious answers. In 
that sense, we found it useful to support our QCA analysis with illustrative cases so that 
the nuances of our line of reasoning can be captured and our readers are provided with a 
better understanding about how our explanatory variables were ascertained. The cases for 
this demonstration were chosen with a view to their potential as "ideal types" representing 
each one of the theories our thesis set out to test: Tanzania as example for "transitions from 
above", Togo as example for "transitions from below" and Indonesia as example for our 
own hypothesis combining both theories "from above" and "from below". We do not 
pretend that these cases are a representative sample of all transitions over the period 
covered; nor do we claim that our results automatically apply to all countries undergoing 
some sort of transition. The idea is not to ask if another case could have been selected, but 
if collectively the three cases provide a sufficient empirical basis to gauge the relevance of 
our statistical results.   
 
Our case sample of twenty-five (25) transition attempts spans the timeframe 
between 1973 and 2004, with the Portuguese transition as the arguably first transition 
belonging to the Third Wave, and the Indonesian transition being the last. Our thesis 
therefore belongs to the "middle N"-studies, for which QCA is considered to be at its 
strongest. We use a combination of random and purposeful selection to obtain our case 
sample: we first identify the total number of transition attempts in the period under review 
by help of Freedom House and Polity databases. In a subsequent step we exclude all 
transitions that are unfit for this study on theoretical and methodological grounds; and 
finally we select our cases by the help of a random number generator. This method ensures 
that, within limits, the selection process remains relatively objective and unbiased.  
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Finally, the information used to conduct the research in this thesis is mostly 
qualitative with data collection based on secondary sources: that is, transnational, 
international and national organizations, media and scholarly publications. Primary sources 
such as semi-structured interviews, surveys or participant observation are sidelined for two 
reasons. For one, we believe that enough information already exists in the specialized 
literature to provide a solid empirical basis for the identification of our variables and the 
creation of our index. For two, given our sample size, the fieldwork required to gather the 
necessary information would involve significant resources and an overly time-consuming 
effort.  
 
In practical terms, the thesis is divided as follows. The first chapter entitled 
"Democratization: The State of the Discipline" opens with a review of the main theoretical 
debates in the democratization literature since the inception of the discipline in the 1960s. 
It distinguishes structural approaches to regime change from process-oriented approaches, 
and presents the different facets- economic, cultural, institutional, and international- of the 
so-called "preconditions"-literature, before explaining why these types of explanation are 
largely deemed unsuitable to explain transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. 
Subsequently, the chapter turns to process-oriented approaches to regime change and 
introduces the two principal contending theories in the field: transitions "from above", 
formulated by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and transitions "from below", represented 
by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce (2003). Obviously there are also other 
authors whose works contributed to defining and refining these theories, but no 
explanation of transitions from authoritarianism could be valid without references to these 
three core authors. Following a critical assessment of the explanatory power of either 
theory is the presentation of a third, more recent body of literature that attempts to connect 
both approaches. It is used as anchor point to frame our research question and introduce 
our own take on the debate: "What factors are necessary for a successful transition to 
democracy?" This last section explains the logic behind our hypotheses, spells out our 
research objectives, and puts them in perspective to the existing literature in order to show 
the originality of our academic contribution.  
 
The second chapter entitled "Explaining Regime Change: Moving Beyond the 
Theoretical and Methodological Divide" presents the reader with an overview of the 
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methodological basis of this thesis. It comprises three sections. The first is dedicated to 
explaining our choice of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research approach 
and a technique. It will show that QCA is, so to speak, a synthesis between the statistical 
and the comparative approach and demonstrate its fit with the eclectic character of our 
argument. The second section presents an overview of the concepts used in this thesis. It 
includes a definition of what democracy and democratization is, an introduction and 
definition of our two main explanatory factors ("crisis of the authoritarian regime" and 
"mass mobilization") and an explanation of how they are made operational. Finally, the 
last section spells out the rationale behind our choices in terms of types of data, size of 
case sample and case selection procedure. 
 
The third chapter entitled "Testing Transition Theories: Assessing Their 
Explanatory Power" represents the core of our thesis. It serves to test the explanatory value 
of the hypotheses we constructed on the basis of the various theories on transitions: (1) 
democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime WITHOUT mass mobilization 
(transitions "from above"); (2) democracy results from mass mobilization WITHOUT a 
regime crisis (transitions "from below"); and (3) democracy results from both mass 
mobilization AND a regime crisis (our own hypothesis). These hypotheses are tested using 
the Tosmana software for multi-value QCA, with consistency and coverage scores being 
calculated manually. The first part of the chapter will show that only an integrated theory 
of transitions combining both explanatory variables (i.e. our hypothesis 3) can adequately 
explain why some transitions lead to democracy while others do not. The second part is 
dedicated to discussing these results, how they relate to the principal contending theories in 
the literature, and what limitations need to be accounted for.    
 
Finally, the fourth chapter entitled "From Theory to Practice: An Empirical 
Demonstration of Our Argument" contains the empirical demonstration of the findings of 
our QCA analysis. It serves to deepen our understanding of the political dynamics of 
transitions to democracy by the help of case studies that each represent one of our original 
hypotheses. The cases chosen for this demonstration are Tanzania (1), Togo (2), and 
Indonesia (3). Each case study is organized the same way: In a first step, we establish the 
level and nature of mass mobilization and assess its impact on the transition dynamics of 
our specific case. In a second step, we verify whether these mobilizations were preceeded, 
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or accompanied by, a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In order to do so, we first clarify 
whether or not softliners existed within the regime by the help of previously defined 
indicators. Subsequently, we determine whether these softliners were majoritarian, and 
thus able to influence the transition dynamics according to their preferences 
(liberalization). Lastly, we compare the respective transition outcomes in light of the 
presence or absence of our two variables to show their impact on the democratization 
process.   
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1  
Democratization: The State of the Discipline 
 
 
 What do we know about democratization, and what do we yet have to learn? The 
main purpose of this chapter is to present our argument and our research goals by the help 
of a literature review. To this end, we first introduce the theoretical framework our thesis is 
built on, with the objective of showing that our argument derives from a critique of the 
existing approaches to transitions. This section essentially aims at providing the reader 
with a state of the art on the subject. It will be shown that studies on transitions have been 
treated, in the vast majority of cases, as belonging into one of three categories: transitions 
"from above", with O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) as their main defenders; transitions 
"from below", proposed by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce (2003); and 
"hybrid" transitions that combine both approaches. The third category is a relatively new 
field of literature that inspired both qualitative and quantitative scholars, but which has 
also important shortcomings that our thesis wishes to address.  
 
 In a second step we frame our research problem and introduce our hypotheses. 
With a view to the existing literature, it will be shown that our research fulfils three 
objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on 
democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below 
are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the 
scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute 
to the overarching goal of generalization. 
 
 A critical assessment closes the chapter. The idea is to pinpoint what the literature 
on transitions from authoritarianism says about the elements that account for success or 
failure of transitions, and what research avenues this literature has neglected. By doing so 
we will allow the problematic of our thesis to stand out, while at the same time 
demonstrating the originality of our contribution.!!!!
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1.1.  Literature Review 
 
 In the history of democratization studies, a major part of the discussion has been 
empirically driven. Whereas at the beginning of the Third Wave in 1974 only a few 
countries had moved towards democratization, the 1980s and 1990s saw many more 
countries initiate transitions, which often occurred under very different circumstances and 
also yielded differing results. By extension, explanations for these transitions – and 
transition outcomes – have also evolved over time. At the broadest level, understanding 
democratization was seen as hinging on two distinct questions: (1) What are the conditions 
for a transition from some form of authoritarianism to democracy? and (2) What are the 
factors that account for the durability, or endurance of democracy5? (Munck 2011). The 
first question was further disaggregated into two separate study fields, the conditions for a 
transition from authoritarianism, and for a transition to democracy. This distinction 
underscores that a theory of the demise of authoritarian rule is not, by itself, a theory of 
democratic transitions and grew important only very recently, when scholars, in light of the 
disappointing developments of the post-Third Wave era, proposed to abandon research on 
theories of democratic transitions altogether and focus instead on theories explaining 
authoritarian resilience6 or the proliferation of hybrid regimes7. Generally speaking, 
however, the study of the evolution of political regime change can be described as a 
paradigm shift between essentially two approaches with distinct modes of explanation: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 As this question relates to the consolidation of an already democratic regime, it is beyond the scope of our 
thesis, and shall therefore not be treated in our literature review.  
6 Works focusing on authoritarian stability are, for example, Dimitrov’s (2013) and Saxonberg’s (2013) 
studies on the resilience of Communist regimes in Asia and Central America (for a critical review see Ethier 
2014). The main idea of these studies is that authoritarian regimes, at some point in their existence, suffer a 
legitimacy crisis, and only those able to respond adequately to these challenges (via reforms, or repression) 
manage to survive. If those regimes do not find an appropriate answer to the legitimacy issues, they break 
down and a transition to some other form of government can ensue. However interesting, these theories are 
not relevant for our thesis, principally for two reasons : (1) Firstly,  the subject of our thesis are transitions to 
democracy, and efforts that aim at identifying the conditions that lead, or do not lead, to the initial breakdown 
of an authoritarian regime are therefore located outside of (and prior to) our research framework. (2) 
Secondly, none of these studies has conclusively demonstrated why certain authoritarian regimes were able 
to adopt reforms that allowed them to remain stable, whereas other authoritarian regimes underwent a 
transition. Moreover, these studies do not provide an answer to the question of why some of these transitions 
ended in democracy, and others did not. Therefore, they are not useful for answering our research question, 
which aims at clarifying exactly this point. 
7 Theories on hybrid regimes are not relevant for our thesis. In fact, Levitsky and Way (2010), their main 
defenders, primarily intended to explain the causes of  the stability of such regimes, investigating why some 
evolved into democracies while others did not. Their explanatory focus is principally on external factors such 
as the geographic proximity with Western states, as well as their economic and commercial interdependence. 
They thus focus on the conditions that could prompt a hybrid regime to move towards democratization, but 
do not explain the process of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, the subject of our thesis. For 
further review of the literature on hybrid regimes see Gagné (2012). 
! 13!
structural theories and process-oriented theories, or "causes" versus "causers" of regime 
change (Huntington 1991).8  
 
 1.1.1.  Preconditions to Democratization 
 
 Structural theories dominated mainly the initial phase of the study of regime 
change, although some of their explanatory variables seem to be making a comeback in 
recent years. These theories are concerned primarily with factors that make a transition 
process more likely to occur, rather than the process that leads to a new (democratic) 
regime. As Shultziner (2010, 14) puts it, structural approaches  attempt to explain, or at 
least indirectly account for, why, how and when people develop political attitudes 
congenial to democratic progress. They conceptualize democratic pressures as outcomes of 
macro-factors that lead to transitions, and try to understand which general factors create, 
enable, or enhance such pressures9. Inconveniently enough, however, there is a consensus 
that "transitions have no single precipitating cause" (Friedheim 1993, 489). By consequent, 
structural approaches have variedly stressed economic, cultural, institutional, and 
international "generative forces" (Mahoney and Snyder 1999) to explain why countries set 
out to democratize.    
 
 Economic explanations to regime change have centered mainly around the 
relationship between development measured in terms of economic growth and 
democratization. The alleged connection, coined "Modernization theory", was first 
formally articulated in the 1950s (Lipset 1959) but its roots lie earlier, particularly in the 
works of Max Weber who connected economic modernization with cultural and value 
change. The basic tenet of modernization theory is that growth favors changes in class 
structure, particularly through increased industrialization, urbanization, communication, 
education10 and literacy. As countries modernize and education spreads, the political 
interests and values of key actors, particularly the new middle classes, become more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See for example Levine 1988, Bermeo 1990, Karl 1990, Remmer 1990, Kitschelt 1993 and Munck 1994. 
9 Compare, for instance, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 210 – 230; Tilly 2007; and Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006, 65 – 80) 
10 Education occupies a special place in modernization theory, as it is seen to increase people’s capacity for 
rational electoral choice. The benefits are twofold: Increasing literacy fosters a population’s interest and 
capability in political participation, and thus engenders pressure for democratization from below (Cutright 
and Wiley 1969). However, it may also lead the elite to initiate, rather than oppose, democratization, and 
therefore favour democratization from above (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). 
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liberal, in the sense of favoring greater political participation and government 
responsiveness to the entire population. Lipset thought that such a change in cultural 
values could promote democratic stability; later defenders of the theory, however, most 
often focused on how the level of wealth of a nation could help "predict which countries 
are most likely to become democratic" (Inglehart 1997). The positive relationship between 
development and democracy has been consistently replicated in quantitative studies on 
democratization11, indicating that the correlation is not simply "a spurious effect of flawed 
methods" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 4). Details, however, are still hotly debated 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003), as the 
relationship seems to depend greatly on the definition of democracy employed (Epstein et 
al. 2006). Therefore, more recent research turned away from the impact of aggregate 
economic growth to focus more on the political consequences of equal versus unequal 
growth12.  
 
By contrast, institutional explanations focus on variables such as the strength of the 
state, and the role of the previous authoritarian regime. The explanatory logic is that strong 
systems can repel pressures for democratic progress, suppress dissatisfied social classes 
and prevent reform, whereas weak states are less capable of meeting such challenges 
(Skocpol 1985; Bellin 2004; Sandoval 1998; Goldstone 2003). Furthermore, authors 
contend that different types of authoritarian regimes show different propensities to 
democratize: while personalist dictators are said to cling to power as long as possible, 
systems that already have some form of electoral contestation, even if phony, are 
considered most likely to become "stepping stones to democracy" (Lussier and Fish 2012; 
Brownlee 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2006; 2007; Geddes 1999b; Howard and Roessler 
2006; Lindberg 2006; 2007). The logic behind that assumption is that authoritarian regimes 
with more open electoral systems generally have lower levels of repression, which in turn !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See, for example, Cutright 1963; Jackman 1973; Coulter 1975; Bollen & Jackman 1995; Muller 1988, 
Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Vanhanen 1997; Barro 1999.  
12 On one hand, the redistributive approach (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Zak and Feng 2003) 
suggests that democratization is more likely when income distribution is more equal, because the median 
voter's preference with regard to taxes will then be less confiscatory. The basic claim is that elites are willing 
to cede some power rather than risk the costs of revolution when they expect democracy not to lead to 
extremely redistributive taxation. On the other hand, the contractarian approach (Ansell and Samuels 2010) 
suggests that elites’ fear of the coercive and expropriative authority of the state itself is the primary factor 
driving calls for political liberalization. 
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offers greater potential for the emergence of movements, protests, strikes and underground 
resistance networks that can push for liberalization and, eventually, democratization (Linz 
and Stepan 1996).  
 
Finally, while the primacy of domestic variables for regime change is still a widely 
accepted fact in the scholarly community (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 
1991), research on democratization after the end of the Cold War suggests that 
international "effects" have grown relatively more important for domestic-level regime 
change. Empirical research is particularly rich (Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Gleditsch 
and Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Wejnert 2014) and variedly stress the 
importance of diffusion (Levitsky and Way 2006; Gleditsch 2002; Weyland 2009); 
political conditionalities (Baylies 1995; Burnell 1994; Kubicek 2003; Ethier 2003; 
Carothers 2004, 2007); membership in regional organizations and transnational networks 
(Whitehead 1996; Finnemore 1996; Schimmelfennig 2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Pevehouse 
2002); democratization by imposition (Ethier 2010); and foreign aid (Djankov, Montalvo, 
and Reynal- Querol 2008; Dunning 2004; Bermeo 2011; Brautigam and Knack 2004; 
Knack 2004; Easterly et al. 2004). Of these factors, the conditionality applied by the 
European Union to certain Eastern and Central European countries in the framework of 
their accession to the European Union was long considered the most important predictor of 
democratization; this conclusion, however, has recently been disputed by studies that seem 
to demonstrate that the efficiency of EU conditionality has varied from one candidate 
country to another in function of the attitude – conciliatory or refractory- of elites in power 
(Pridham 2005; Grabbe 2006; Vachudova 2006, 2007; Ethier 2006, 2008).  
 
Theories postulating pre-conditions to democracy have been largely abandoned 
since the arrival of the Third Wave. Whereas it is still accepted that structural factors play 
a role in the emergence of democracies, scholars tend to converge around "pluralist" 
explanations like the theories of Dahl (1971) and Huntington (1991) who stress a 
combination of factors (historical sequences, levels of socio-economic development, the 
concentration of power, socio-economic inequalities, cultural cleavages, political beliefs 
and foreign domination) that help or hinder democratization. On one hand, this is a 
consequence of the excessive determinism of structural approaches. As Przeworski (1991, 
96) once remarked, in the works of Lipset, Moore and others, outcomes were "uniquely 
! 16!
determined by [macrosocietal] conditions, and history . . . [went] on without anyone ever 
doing anything." As such, structural theories offered no guidance to political actors, or 
even worse, seemed to invite quiescence towards the authoritarian status quo13. On the 
other hand, the predictions made by structural approaches often turned out to be false, 
particularly when faced with empirics from African and Asian democratization eperiences. 
If, as scholars alleged, certain macro-societal elements such as wealth, equality, or a 
democratic international environment needed to be in place for democracy to emerge, how 
could one explain that countries that did not feature any of these elements could so rapidly 
democratize? Most important, however, is in our opinion the fact that structural approaches 
could not adequately explain the outcomes of regime change, since the impact of their 
explanatory variables most often played out prior to the transition process itself. As such, 
they were able to explain the origins of transitions from authoritarianism, but remained 
silent on why some transitions were successful whereas others failed14. In the words of 
Huntington (1991, 106 - 107) the general causes of the third wave did not make 
democratization a necessary outcome: "A democratic regime is installed not by trends but 
by people." He, along with many others (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; 
Bermeo 1990; Bellin 2000), therefore suggested that research be shifted from the causes to 
the "causers of democratization".  
 
Process-oriented studies on regime change emphasize the crucial role of agency in 
determining transition outcomes. This "is not to deny that the macrostructural factors are 
still there", but rather "those [structural] mediations are looser, their impacts more 
indeterminate, than in normal circumstances" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 5). From 
such a perspective, regime transitions are special times when the causal impact of 
structural factors is temporarily relaxed. Most process-oriented studies on democratic 
transition between 1973 and 2004 fall into one of two categories: transitions "from above" 
and transitions "from below" (Dahl 1971; Linz and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1991)15.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 "None of the countries we are studying have the conditions that the literature tells us are requisite for 
democracy", Philippe Schmitter once said, "and if we accept the odds established by all previous attempts at 
democratization in Latin America since 1900, two out of every three of our potential transitions are soon 
doomed to fail" (Karl 2005). 
14 However, structural variables can take on renewed importance if one accepts the premise that they are 
facilitating the creation of favorable conditions for strategic variables, and thus can indirectly influence the 
transition outcome. 
15 Authors have tended to use these labels rather indiscriminately and so far there have been few, if any, 
attempts to clearly devise measuring criteria for either one type of transition. By consequent, "from above" 
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 1.1.2.  Transitions "From Above" - Elite-Driven Democratization 
 
 Most scholars refer to the privileged role of state actors and their strategies when 
talking about transitions "from above". Here, traditional rulers "remain in control, even 
when pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force 
– or some mix of the two – to retain at least part of their power" (Karl 1990, 9). Those 
conceptions of transitions are elite-centered and mostly internalist (Fishman 1990) in that 
the origins of these transitions can be found in problems that arise ex natura from within 
the authoritarian regime itself. Collective actors, mass mobilization and protest are largely 
exogenous to the model, and the emphasis is instead placed on pacting and controlled 
liberalization by incumbents.  
 
 The concept of transitions "from above" has been defined for the first time in 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s seminal work Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, the fourth volume of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for 
Democracy in 1986. Since then, the "transitology theory" has risen to the ranks of a quasi-
hegemonic paradigm in the academic debate on regime change (Collier 1999, Bunce 2000; 
Przeworski at al. 2000). Building on the work of Rustow (1970)16 who stressed the 
importance of actor-based explanations of transitions, this theory argues that transitions to 
democracy are essentially top-down processes initiated, controlled and directed by 
(reformist) elites of the incumbent regime (Bermeo 1997; Geddes 1999b).   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and "from below" have been used to refer to either the distinctive dynamic of the transitions (“modes of 
transition”) or the leading actors of the democratization process (elites or mass actors), or a combination of 
both.  
16 Rustow, in his seminal article Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, emphasizes the 
crucial role of agency in transitions. According to him, every transition is initiated by a conflict between the 
authoritarian regime and opposition forces. While the nature of these forces may vary, it most commonly 
involves a power struggle between old ruling elites of the authoritarian regime and new elites. This conflict 
results in democracy only if the struggling factions manage to agree on a certain number of rules and 
procedures that allow them to resolve their differences and to negotiate a compromise. Even though Rustow 
was the first to propose an explanation of the conditions leading to the emergence of democracy, his theory 
has remained rather marginal due to two major caveats: Firstly, his findings are corroborated by only two 
case studies (Sweden and Turkey), both of which have completed their transition prior to the beginning of the 
Third Wave; and secondly, his working definition of democracy is very vague and does not correspond to the 
procedural minimal criteria outlined by Schumpeter (1942) 
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According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, at the roots of every transition is a conflict 
within the ruling block itself between conservative/hardliner and reformist/softliner forces 
whose unity had previously assured the survival of the regime. Aside from cases in which 
the authoritarian regime is said to suffer an internal collapse or breakdown, incumbents 
generally divide into factions over questions of how to achieve legitimacy and the problem 
of how to consolidate or institutionalize the regime. According to Collier (1999), 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19 – 20) recognize that in some cases this "initial" split 
among rulers may be a reaction to opposition protest. Yet they treat this opposition as prior 
to the sequence of the events they define as initiating the transition (a transition begins 
when incumbents announce their intention to liberalize and are believed, therefore altering 
opposition strategies), and hence as exogenous to their model and excluded from their 
analysis. 
 
When the reformist faction among the authoritarian regime gains the upper hand, 
the regime crisis may lead to a liberalization process initiated by incumbents. Reformists 
(softliners) believe that the only solution to the legitimacy-consolidation problem can be 
found in easing repression and opening up the regime to greater popular participation. 
Liberalization, even though not an actual project for democracy, puts the regime on a 
slippery slope by starting a process that opens up some space for opposition and for a 
dynamic that may push change further than what had originally been intended. 
Liberalization also presents opportunities for what O’Donnell and Schmitter call "the 
resurrection of civil society": a fairly brief phase, in which mass actors such as students 
and the working class may engage in protest. This phase of mobilization is generally 
considered insofar as it affects the strategies and negotiation dynamics of individual 
leaders during the bargaining over the basics of a new political regime. Scholarly opinion 
on the usefulness of popular protest is divided. On one hand, demonstrations may 
strengthen opposition moderates by signaling to rulers that the costs of repression and 
retreating from a reform trajectory have become substantial. Alternatively, they may 
weaken the bargaining position of potential regime moderates and give hardliners a reason 
to subvert the process. 
 
In fact, O’Donnell and Schmitter warn that a regime crisis and subsequent 
liberalization only leads to the instauration of a democratic regime if the warring factions 
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(a majority of regime softliners together with a united front of moderate opposition 
leaders) manage to negotiate a compromise – often in form of a pact - that is acceptable for 
the regime hardliners. The negotiation of such pacts is difficult, as they imply concessions 
that are often hard to swallow for opposition forces. Many pacted transitions in South 
America, for example, contained clauses that provided the former military rulers with a 
general amnesty. Therefore, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, the probability of 
obtaining a successful agreement depends in a large part on the ability of opposition 
moderates to sideline radicals and Jacobins and to keep popular contestation low. 
Mobilized masses "spoil the party" (McFaul 2002), as mass movements are prone to 
escalation and radicalization that can scare potential softliners within the authoritarian 
regime and drive them closer to the hardliner faction. Increased activity is particularly 
dangerous if "widespread violence recurs" or if it threatens "the vertical command 
structure of the armed forces, the territorial integrity of the nation-state, the country’s 
position in international alliances, [or]… the property rights underlying the capitalist 
economy" (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 27). In those cases, "even bland regime actors 
will conclude that the costs of toleration are greater than those of repression" and the 
movement for democracy will fail (Bermeo in Anderson 1999)17. 
 
By consequent, proponents of transitions "from above" view the participation of 
popular forces in the making of democracy with great suspicion, considering that such 
participation generally diminishes the chances of producing a successful transition 
outcome. In their opinion, transitions "from above" are more likely to lead to democracy 
than transitions "from below" (Baloyra 1987; Huntington 1984; Morlino 1987; Schmitter 
and Karl 1991; Share 1987; Stepan 1986; Edvardsen 1997). Karl (1990), for example, 
claims that in Latin America no stable democracy has emerged in which mass actors have 
gained, even momentarily, control over traditional ruling classes. Weiner (1987, 26) argues 
that pressure from left-wing parties is often least effective for democratization because 
they frequently provoke "only (…) increased authoritarianism". Ironically, Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens (1992, 271/223) who claim that democracy is the outcome of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Ironically, more than twenty years after the inception of the transitology theory, the founding fathers seem 
to have at least partially revisited their position as to the usefulness of popular protests. On one hand, 
Schmitter still argues that civil society can only push the moderate elements in the opposition forces and the 
authoritarian regime to the negotiation table but is incapable of influencing the outcome any further 
(Schmitter 2010, 24). On the other hand, O’Donnell contends that civil society plays a crucial role in pushing 
political reforms beyond mere liberalization (O’Donnell 2010, 30). 
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working-class mobilization pursue a similar point when asserting that radical mass parties 
are more likely to "evoke strong defensive, anti-democratic reactions" when compared to 
moderate clientelistic parties. Levine (1988, 392) also asserts that the "obvious" lesson 
from experience is that "conservative transitions are more durable". Finally, Huntington, 
judges that "democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass 
popular action" (1984, 212).  
 
Since its inception in 1986, many specialists have adopted O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s theory on transitions. Przeworski (1991) for example, one of its most ardent 
defenders, argues that the transitology paradigm does not only explain the transitions in 
Latin America and Southern Europe but can also be applied to later transitions, particularly 
those in Eastern Europe 18 . Dean McSweeny and Clive Tempest, two experts on 
Communist countries, confirm such a view. They claim that in Poland, democracy 
emerged out of a compromise between PUWP reformers and Solidarity moderates, with 
regime members Jaruzelski, Rakowski and Interior Minister Kiszczak playing a crucial 
role in pushing their own hardliners to the negotiating table (McSweeney and Tempest 
1993). Lucas Way (2011) goes even further and claims that the failed Arab Spring protests 
can also be explained by O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory, since leaders "who can keep 
the support of crucial elites [notably the security forces] are likely to survive even severe 
crises (...) The readiness of elites to back the regime in a crisis is generally more decisive 
to authoritarian survival than the number of protesters in the streets" (Way 2011, 15).  
 
Despite the popularity of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory among transitologists, 
the empirical reality of most of the 13 case studies used in Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule does not confirm the theory. Firstly, many of the authors involved in the "Transitions" 
project differ in their interpretation of the cases from the conclusions reached by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  In asking why Communism collapsed in those countries he underlines endogenous causes, most 
importantly tensions within the Communist leadership and its supporters that made the system disintegrate 
from within. In his point of view, regime softliners realized that the ideology on which the Soviet Union was 
built had lost its appeal among her subjects and that change was necessary in order to retain at least part of 
their power. As Przeworski puts it, Party bureaucrats "calculated how many thousands of people they could 
beat up if they persevered, how many Ministerial posts they would have to yield if they compromised, [and] 
how many jobs they could retain if they surrendered" (1991, 23). Their position was further compromised by 
the Army’s decision to side with regime opponents and refused to "come to the rescue [of the Communist 
leadership]. In Poland, the Armed Forces led the reforms; in all other countries, including Romania, they 
refused to repress".  Therefore, the internal forces that had held the system together slowly collapsed and 
gave way to negotiated transition projects. 
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O’Donnell and Schmitter (Lowenthal 1986). Secondly, most case studies treat transitions 
that had either failed or had barely begun by the time the book was published. A priori, 
only three case studies seem to confirm the theory: the chapter on Portugal (Maxwell 
1986), on Brazil (Martins 1986) and on Venezuela (Karl 1986). But interpretations of at 
least two of the latter (on Portugal and on Brazil) have been contested by authors that 
claim that popular protest movements have been at the origin of these transitions (Bermeo 
1997; Garreton 1989). In the words of Diamond (1999, 233 – 237), it became evident that 
most intra-regime divisions were in fact the outcomes of dynamic popular struggles against 
nondemocratic systems, and not the other way around.  
 
1.1.3.  Transitions "From Below" - Mass-Mobilizing for Democracy 
 
Although scholars of top-down approaches to democratization acknowledge that 
contentious collective action can help push autocracies toward regime change, their idea of 
the nature and impact of this "resurrection of civil society" suggests that they view protest 
movements more as a symptom than a cause of democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986, 54–6). After the end of the Cold War, however, many former Communist countries 
and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa successfully set out on the road to democratization. 
Scholars studying these transitions (Bunce 2003; McFaul 2002; Ekiert and Kubik 1999; 
Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) quickly recognized that protest movements played a much 
bigger role in determining the outcome of these instances of regime change than originally 
assumed by the transitology project. In fact, they found that mass mobilization had not 
only a substantial impact on the transition process, but that it was even sometimes the 
catalyst that set a transition in motion. Theories on transitions "from below" were thus 
developed largely as an answer to a state-centric conception of transitions that failed to 
recognize that elites are not socially disembodied, but represent and draw upon collective 
groups when entering negotiations (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Anderson 1999).  
 
For most part, theories on transitions "from below" ignore intra-regime dynamics 
and either omit or outright deny that ruling members split into pro- and anti-reform forces. 
In contrast to transitions "from above", collective actors are the dominant force behind 
successful transitions "from below", as their mobilization and demonstration of strength is 
crucial to signalling the regime that reforms are not an option but a necessity. Analyzing 
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African transitions in Democratic Experiments in Africa - Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, 179) were among the first to 
issue a call for "bringing the people back in" the framework of analysis. In contrast to 
Latin American transitions, they argue, democratization in Africa commonly occurred 
from below when a mobilized civil society pushed reluctant rulers into political reforms 
(1997, 198). These rulers, so they claim, did not split into hardliner and softliner factions, 
because the neopatrimonial nature of African regimes effectively precludes the apparition 
of such schisms19. Therefore, interactions between incumbents and challengers tended to 
play out in the streets instead of a traditional negotiation table, and were mostly determined 
by the strength of opposition forces. In fact, incumbents only decided to cede ground to 
some liberalization demands once popular numbers had become too big to be ignored. 
Most African transitions, so Bratton and Van de Walle argue, have culminated in "National 
Dialogues", public round-tables between the old regime and challengers. However, these 
were only the end of a long informal circular dynamic of protest and reaction (Tarrow 
1994) where the display of opposition strength (as evidenced, for example, by mass rallies) 
provoked either repression or concessions, or a mix of both, from the authoritarian regime. 
 
Bunce (2000, 709 - 710) and Bermeo (1997, 314) identify a similar pattern in a 
number of Eastern European transitions. Although Bunce does not outright refuse the 
possibility that those transitions could have been initiated or accompanied by a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime, she does not elaborate on it. Instead, she argues that elites do have a 
role to play in expanding the political sphere, but that such expansion often responds to 
political demands emerging from massive political protest. In fact, she claims that most 
Eastern European transitions have not only been initiated "from below" by the mobilization 
of grass-root forces, but were also largely determined by the strength and perseverance of 
these mobilized mass-actors20. Bermeo, on the other hand, challenges O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s argument that popular mobilization can undercut the democratization process 
by provoking a backlash among frightened elites. Instead, she argues that "in many cases, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19!Bratton and Van de Walle explain that in Africa, the access to and control of patronage resources and the 
lack of political institutionalization of the regime favors struggles between regime "insiders" and regime 
"outsiders" rather than divisions within the ruling clique itself. 
20Interestingly enough, McFaul’s work on hybrid regimes (2002, 212 – 244) seems to confirm Bunce’s 
argument. He claims that power-sharing agreements among elite actors in fact favour the development of 
hybrid regimes rather than democracies, and that in many post-Communist transitions, democracy was only 
brought about where pro-democratic groups could force democratization on reluctant authoritarian elites. 
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democratization seems to have proceeded alongside weighty and even bloody popular 
challenges."21  
 
A significant body of research ensued which identified contentious collective action 
as an important element of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. 
Nonetheless, we find the core argument of transitions "from below" debatable. Not only 
did Bratton and Van de Walle omit to empirically test their theory, their main body of 
work centers on democratic transitions that have in great part failed, since a large majority 
of them have culminated in a simple liberalisation of the authoritarian regime or in the 
instauration of a hybrid regime. Instead of wondering whether authoritarian regime 
dynamics might be somehow related to these transition failures, they state clearly that in 
Africa, authoritarian regimes do not split into hardliners and softliners. While Bunce is not 
quite as categorical in her analysis of the Eastern European transitions, she also neglects 
the elite dimension of transitions in her analysis and only mentions in passing that protest 
movements could have been initiated or accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian 
regime. In general, we find that approaches that center on mass mobilization cannot 
explain plausibly why most transitions "from below" have failed whereas a selected few 
succeeded. In our point of view, scholars rightfully contend that it is highly unlikely that a 
regime that is still in full possession of its coercive capability agrees to relinquish power 
solely because of popular protest (Hyug-Baeg, Im. 1997). Recent scholarship on the 
involvement of the military in democratic transitions tends to confirm this point of view, 
demonstrating that many transitions "from below" feature an important split within the 
authoritarian regime between the ruling clique and its coercive apparatus (McGowan 2003, 
339; Morency-Laflamme, forthcoming). 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) extend the argument, saying that it is precisely because the regime often 
employs a disproportionate amount of violence against the protesters that these challenges are so effective in 
provoking democratisation. Violence against peaceful protesters, they say, is likely to backfire, stimulating 
wider anti-regime mobilisation, precipitating international sanctions and support for the opposition, and 
causing defections in the security forces which will be reluctant to fire on unarmed fellow citizens.   
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1.1.4.  Hybrid Approaches to Regime Change 
 
As we have seen, both theories of transitions "from above" and transitions "from 
below" have flaws that make them look either unconvincing or out of sync with empirical 
reality. For this reason, scholars increasingly argue for the need to revise and integrate both 
approaches, especially since there are more and more studies that show that most 
transitions feature elements of both theories. This emerging body of literature can loosely 
be divided in two categories: studies that treat democratization from a quantitative angle, 
and those that favor single case studies or very small samples of cases.  
 
On the quantitative end of the spectrum, Geddes’s (1999a) large-N study on 
authoritarian breakdown rises some interesting points that closely relate to our own 
proposition in this thesis. She argues that different types of authoritarian government break 
down in characteristically different ways: whereas military regimes tend to split when 
challenged, personalist regimes and Single Party regimes most often try to cling to power 
as long as they can and must be forced out of office by popular uprising, revolution, 
invasion or assassination. According to her, military regimes are more likely to negotiate 
their own withdrawal and democratize, whereas the other two forms of authoritarian 
regimes are more likely to end in violence and upheaval and to be followed by other types 
of authoritarian regimes. Her statistical analysis of a new data set comprising information 
on all regime changes since 1946 tends to confirm these findings.  
 
Geddes’ argument is interesting because it provides support for O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s (1986) idea that a schism within the ruling section, or close supporters to the 
ruling section (like the military) is essential for a successful transition. It also grants an 
important place to popular protest movements by linking authoritarian regime type and 
forms of contestation that are likely to shape the transition. Her reasoning is based on a 
game-theoretical model stressing the different effects various types of authoritarian 
regimes have on the incentives confronting regime supporters when faced with challenges. 
Whereas military regimes are concerned with the integrity of the military as institution and 
are therefore more likely to split into factions when their corporate identity is threatened, 
personalist dictatorships (such as in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa) and Single 
Party regimes tend to circle the wagon and to co-opt their challengers by using their 
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extensive patronage resources. She does therefore implicitly accept the argument of 
Bratton et al. (1997) that such regimes do not necessarily experience divisions from within 
that lead to their breakdown. Her methodology, however, does not verify whether such an 
interpretation is actually true, since her game-theoretical model is based on assumptions of 
strategic behavior that are fixed prior to the analysis itself and there is no in-depth analysis 
of cases that could confirm such a point of view. Moreover, her study is regime-centric and 
even though popular protest movement is considered essential to end certain types of 
authoritarian regimes, its contribution is largely instrumental and exogenous to the model. 
In summum, her argument tends to support O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory in certain 
cases, and Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce’s argument in other cases, but does not 
attempt to link both theories.     
 
Collier (1999), analyzing 27 cases of transitions spanning multiple "waves", 
concentrates more specifically on the labor movement and its contribution to 
democratization. She claims that the contribution of labor to the transition process varies 
according to the timing of movement activity and the stance of the authoritarian regime 
vis-à-vis the prospect of reform. To illustrate this proposal she constructs a typology of 
transitions into which she categorizes her case studies: "Destabilization/Extrication", 
"Transition game" and "Parallel tracks". According to her, the transitions of Spain, Peru 
and Argentina all followed a pattern of "destabilization/extrication" where collective 
protest (notably of labor) delegitimizes authoritarian incumbents and forces their retreat. 
On the other hand, Uruguay and Brazil followed a pattern she calls "transition game". In 
this pattern incumbents prepared for limited liberalization but labor protest reshaped the 
project and forced the regime to move forward with reforms. Finally, Chile followed the 
"parallel track". In this pattern, authoritarian incumbents had an explicit transition project 
and a timetable for retreat, and labor organizations took an early lead in the transition by 
coordinating the democratic opposition. Collier even speculates about a possible 
contribution of labor in triggering the elite project of handing over power. Therefore, so 
she argues, working class mobilization can exert an important influence on elite choice in 
transitions both in impelling and in shaping the transition dynamics. Similar to a 
"watchdog", popular mobilization can push transitions forward and contribute to creating 
more inclusive outcomes. In Spain, one of the canonical initial cases of transitions, labor 
strikes and continuous protest precipitated the transition by undermining the strategy of 
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limited liberalization pursued by then Prime Minister Arias Navarro. As labor mobilization 
grew stronger, the fear of a vacuum of authority and a possible sudden transfer of power to 
an opposition that was quite radical at the time prompted the authoritarian regime to take 
measures for the introduction of democracy in order to avert chaos.  
 
Collier’s causal mechanisms detailing labor influence on democratization show 
important parallels to our propositions in this thesis. However, Collier’s study shows some 
important methodological flaws. Firstly, she concentrates solely on the labor movement 
and neglects other forms of opposition to the authoritarian regime. Therefore she classifies 
transitions that did not involve a strong labor component (for example Greece) as being 
"elite dominated", even though such a definition includes groups as diverse as white collar 
workers, professionals, and bourgeois sectors that have been seen as crucial elements 
"from below" in many sub-Saharan transitions (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). 
Secondly, since her analysis encompasses transitions from several different waves, the 
definition of democracy employed in the study is necessarily too vague for present-day 
standards. Acknowledging that even universal suffrage would exclude many cases from 
her sample, Collier settles for universal male suffrage as a measure, and allows for 
undemocratic institutions such as unelected senators. For example, Weimar Germany is 
included as a case of successful democratization, even though it lasted only a few years 
and most analysts would agree that the Weimar regime was extremely flawed. The same 
problem is found in several of her contemporary cases of democratization, none of which 
ended in the establishment of a lasting electoral democracy.  
 
In other editions of the argument, among others the papers written in collaboration 
with James Mahoney (1999), there are some changes to the number of cases analyzed and 
the definition of democracy employed. Nevertheless, two problems with Colliers’ study 
remain constant: Firstly, while two of her modes of transition (Transition game and 
Parallel Tracks) are in fact initiated by the authoritarian regime, she does not elaborate on 
how this decision to liberalize comes about. She therefore ignores the main element of 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory, the crisis of the authoritarian regime. On the other 
hand, she does not confirm Van de Walle’s theory either, since she does not explicitly deny 
the possibility of such a crisis. Secondly, she equals civil society with labor movement, 
thereby ignoring other important forms of popular participation such as opposition parties 
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and student movements. Her thesis is ultimately that labor plays a role in the transition 
process, but she does not demonstrate that its participation is either sufficient or necessary. 
Therefore, her conclusion is not novel, as O’Donnell and Schmitter’s elite model does not 
negate the possibility of civil society participating to some degree in shaping the outcome 
of transitions. By contrast, this thesis argues that mass mobilizations (including but not 
limited to labor) and a crisis of the authoritarian regime are necessary conditions for a 
successful transition to democracy. 
 
On the qualitative end, there are also a number of recent attempts to bridge the 
divide between top-down and bottom-up approaches to regime change. Wood (2000, 866), 
for example, claims that nearly all transitions from authoritarian rule combine elements 
"from above" with elements "from below", and that mobilization by subordinate social 
actors in some circumstances may be crucial to the success of democratic transitions. Her 
analysis of El Salvador and South Africa found that mobilization by the economically and 
socially marginalized impelled the transition to democracy by transforming key interests of 
economic elites. This led to pressure on the state to compromise with the opposition, 
thereby strengthening regime moderates over hardliners and forcing the initial 
liberalization of the regime. However, she confounds transitions from civil war with 
peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule, and by including armed guerrilla insurrection 
in her definition of transitions "from below" she falls into the trap of conceptual 
overstretching (Sartori 1991). Not only are the structural conditions for transitions 
radically different in the context of an enduring civil conflict, but the transition dynamics 
are centered on negotiating peace rather than establishing a democratic system as such. 
Therefore, they differ considerably from the Third Wave transitions democratization 
theories actually aim to explain. Finally, Wood’s claim that armed guerrilla insurrection 
helped pave the way for democracy in El Salvador and South Africa is debatable, given 
that only South Africa is classified as electoral democracy by Freedom House. 
 
Threlfall (2008) revisits the Spanish case, which has often been stereotyped as a 
typical example for an elite-dominated transition, and finds strong arguments to reassess 
the importance of civil society. She argues that the Spanish transition was the result of a 
difficult "co-construction process" between regime and opposition, where civil society 
played a crucial role both by engaging itself in mass actions through politicized or non-
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politicized civil organizations, and in negotiations with regime actors through the 
representation of the newly created parties. In contrast to the "elitist" account of the 
transition, she offers evidence to show, among other things, that (a) the widespread actions 
of civil society organizations were the real cause of the failure of Navarro’s government 
and of his forced resignation, and (b) that the new Constitution adopted after the 1977 
elections largely reflected the ideals and demands civil society political actors made on 
elites during the transition. Threlfall's position is rather consistent with the more known 
interpretation of the process given by Maravall (1986), which states that the Spanish 
transition was the complex and delicate result of a sum of components which can be 
resumed in: firstly, the reformist politics "from above"; secondly, the pressures and 
demands "from below", and thirdly, the political context of the country as a whole. As a 
single case study, however, Threlfall’s work cannot be used to generalize to other 
transition cases.   
 
Finally, there are also excellent examples of hybrid studies examining transitions in 
the Eastern hemisphere. Doh Chull Shin (2008), for example, analyzes a variety of 
countries in South-East Asia that democratized towards the end of the Third Wave. 
Questioning whether there is a uniquely "Asian way" of democratization, he finds that 
almost all cases of transition have featured both civil society and elite interaction, albeit to 
various degrees. According to his typology, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand have all known a mode of transition known as "transplacement", i.e. a mode 
of transition where elites play the leading role, whereas the transition in the Philippines 
was largely determined by civil society and therefore followed a mode of transition called 
"replacement". Based on those results, he concludes that "of the people involved in the 
democratization process, political elites are known to be the most powerful causers" (2008, 
94). This view, however, is not universally shared: Denny's (2006) study of Indonesia 
shows that from 1997 to 1998, the economic crisis in combination with large protest events 
by non-elite forces have not only initiated the transition, but also contributed significantly 
to creating divisions between Suharto-Loyalists and Suharto-Traitors. They also played a 
large part in the subsequent adoption of a democratic agenda. However, in his analysis, 
mass pressure also led to ethnic conflict and religious enmity.  
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Looking at the Communist transitions, White et al. (1990) point out that popular 
protest initiated the transitions in cases where ruling groups were reluctant to reform. 
Instead of a simple resurrection of civil society as described by O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
these protests were an independent force for change that didn’t need divisions within the 
leadership to prompt it into existence. The authors also confirm that it was indeed the 
protests that broke the unity of the ruling block, citing the example of Czechoslovakia: 
"The division [of the authoritarian elite into softliners and hardliners] was not perceptible 
until after the demonstrations had begun" (White et al. 1990, 285) 
 
In sum, this brief literature review attempted to show that during the last four 
decades, democratization scholars essentially focused their efforts on endogenous 
democratic transitions that took place after 1973. The two main theories elaborated to that 
end agree on two points: (1) Transitions are initiated by a conflict between national actors, 
and (2) they only lead to minimal democracy if the warring factions manage to 
compromise on the adoption of rules and procedures characterizing the new regime. There 
are also two main points of contention between the two theories. The first concerns the 
nature of the conflict at the roots of democratic transitions: specialists disagree whether it 
is a conflict between the elites of the ruling block itself (transitions "from above") or a 
conflict between opposition forces and incumbents (transitions "from below"). In other 
words, is the transition initiated by an endogenous crisis of the authoritarian regime, or can 
popular mobilization initiate transitions? The second point of disagreement concerns the 
importance of mass mobilization for the outcome of transitions: whereas for scholars 
advocating a "top-down" approach mass mobilizations need to remain low and transitions 
involving mass actors are unlikely to lead to democracy, scholars of a "bottom-up" 
perspective argue that mass mobilizations are decisive contributors to democracy and must 
be present throughout the transition process.  
 
At the same time, the number of scholars adopting hybrid approaches to transitions 
is steadily growing. Yet, they almost always explicitly or implicitly subscribe to one 
approach – top-down or bottom-up – with the other playing only a very marginal role in 
the explanatory framework. It is rare to see studies that grant equal importance to both 
variables, and if they do, they rarely connect the presence or absence of these variables to 
the transition outcome as a necessary or sufficient condition. They therefore fail to 
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conclusively demonstrate not only the complementarity of both approaches, but also their 
indispensability for a successful transition outcome.  
 
By consequence, there are also few attempts at formulating generalizations. 
Although there are many single case studies that eloquently demonstrate the importance of 
both authoritarian regime crisis and popular protest for bringing a transition successfully to 
fruition, they cannot make any sort of general statement about whether this relationship is 
anything more than a spurious coincidence – they simply have too few cases to know. On 
the quantitative end, by contrast, the problem is rather that scholars either focus on one 
variable to the detriment of the other (as in Collier and Mahoney’s analysis on the 
contribution of labor movements to democratization), or that their research question is not 
primarily geared towards demonstrating a link between the two approaches (as in Geddes 
analysis which aims at showing that different kinds of authoritarian institutional 
frameworks are vulnerable to different types of transition dynamics). In this case, both top-
down and bottom-up approaches remain separated, and the correctness of such a typology 
is not questioned.  
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1.2.  Research Problem, Hypotheses and Research Objectives 
  
 The shortcomings pointed out in our literature review serve as anchor point for our 
own research question. Is a democratic regime a result of a victory from below, in which 
subordinate or excluded groups wrest power from a reluctant elite, or a conquest from 
above, in which those in power or rising economic groups not holding power pursue their 
own political agendas and seek to strengthen their positions (Collier 1999)? Confronted 
with seemingly irreconcilable positions, our research aims at integrating both approaches 
into a more general framework and to prove that propositions derived from that framework 
possess greater universal validity than either approach taken on its own. We therefore seek 
to answer the following research question: 
 
 Have the successful post-1973 democratic transitions been determined "from 
below", as posited by the paradigm of Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce; "from above", 
as claim O’Donnell and Schmitter; or by the combination of these two scenarios, as 
evidenced by certain case studies? 
 
 As we have noted earlier, existing theories of transitions have privileged either a 
top-down approach or a bottom-up approach to democratization, but the categories 
transitions "from above" and transitions "from below" have not always been clearly 
defined and delimitated in the literature. This has led to a number of competing 
explanations for certain Third Wave transitions. Our analysis attempts to circumvent this 
problem by identifying specific elements that we consider "defining features" of each 
mode of transition; these are our explanatory conditions. We believe that such an approach 
is more fruitful in producing statements that are valid over a large number of cases, one of 
the key goals of the scientific approach.   
 
Following O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), we consider transitions "from above" 
as distinguished, above all, by a schism within the ruling elite, or the ruling elite and close 
supporters. Our first condition is therefore the crisis of the authoritarian regime22. By !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Although O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) make it very clear that a successful transition requires not only 
a crisis between the authoritarian regime members, but also a successful bargaining process between regime 
softliners and opposition leaders, we consider transitions "from above" to be principally defined by the crisis 
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contrast, transitions “from below” feature an important degree of mass mobilization and 
collective action by various spheres of the population before, during and after the initial 
liberalization of the regime. Thus, our second condition is mass mobilization against the 
regime and/or its policies. 
 
In an attempt to answer our research question, we aim at testing three hypotheses:  
 
(1) Transition to democracy initiated by a crisis within the authoritarian regime and 
controlled by the incumbents (Theory of O’Donnell and Schmitter) 
 
 In Scenario (1) regime reformists institute a certain number of democratic reforms. 
Meanwhile, there is no meaningful contestation of the authoritarian regime by opposition 
forces. Moderate (non-radical) opposition forces then react positively to these reforms and 
enter a dialogue with regime reformists. This dialogue culminates in a democratic 
compromise. Our first hypothesis therefore postulates that democracy results from a crisis 
of the authoritarian regime without large-scale mass movements.  
 
(2) Transition to democracy initiated and controlled by popular protest movement 
(Theory of Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce). 
 
 In Scenario (2), moderate and/or radical opposition forces orchestrate protest 
movements that mobilize a large fraction of the population in the capital city and/or the 
main cities of the country. These uprisings appear before the authoritarian regime shows 
any hint of willingness to undertake democratic reforms. After several days/weeks/months 
of protest, the regime proceeds with democratic reforms either unilaterally or after having 
negotiated the latter with opposition forces. Our second hypothesis postulates that 
democracy results from popular mobilization without a crisis of the authoritarian regime. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of the authoritarian regime. We think such a choice is justified given that negotiations between regime and 
opposition are not exclusive elements to theories from above. Most theories "from below" also provide for 
the possibility that democratic transitions can be negotiated, and in fact, many successful transitions in Sub-
Saharan Africa that featured "Roundtables" include an important negotiation element. We do, however, 
recognize the importance of that variable and therefore included "successful compromise" as base element in 
each of our hypotheses. 
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 Combining those theoretical positions we elaborate a third pattern that departs from 
the standard accounts of democratization but seems to be supported empirically by several 
case studies. In fact, our review on the existing literature on democratic transitions and the 
taking into account of research on failed transitions (notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
former Soviet Union) gives us reason to believe that successful transitions from the post-
1973 period have indeed all been determined – in various chronological order - by both a 
conflict within the authoritarian regime between Moderates and Conservatives, and large 
popular protest movements pushing for democracy23. Building on the typology developed 
by Collier (1999) and Collier and Mahoney (1999), this pattern constitutes a synthesis of 
approaches: 
 
(3) Transition to democracy initiated and jointly negotiated either by 
 a. large popular uprisings that provoke a crisis of the authoritarian regime  
 b. a crisis of the authoritarian regime and simultaneous protest movements  
     that feed the crisis and drive the reform process forward 
 
 In Scenario (3a), popular mobilization precedes any sign of an internal crisis of the 
authoritarian regime. Such mobilization then initiates a transition by fulfilling a signalling 
role, telling rulers that reform is inevitable and eventually breaking up the internal unity of 
the ruling block.   
 
 In Scenario (3b), a reformist majority within the authoritarian regime initiates the 
transition by proposing a limited reform project, which is meant to be at the same time a 
concession to potential regime opponents, and a tentative to remain in control of the 
political apparatus. Almost simultaneously, mass protests orchestrated by opposition 
leaders arise and fuel the crisis by demanding full democracy and by rejecting the regime’s 
proposal for limited reform. These movements transform the original reform plan into a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 It is important to specify that the mass mobilizations in our scenarios are different from a simple 
"resurrection of civil society" as proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter. In their view, resurrection of civil 
society refers to relatively brief episodes of mainly moderate protest that is firmly controlled by opposition 
elites. These leaders undertake great efforts to keep "radicals" and "extremists" sidelined so as not to 
compromise the democratization process, which is almost exclusively a product of elite negotiations. By 
contrast, in our conception of scenario (3), mass mobilizations are long, protracted periods of struggle that 
can comprise several cycles of mobilization, demobilization and re-mobilization (Tarrow 1994) if the reform 
process threatens to stall or reverse. 
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veritable project for democracy and push the transition forward by fulfilling a watchdog 
function throughout the bargaining process.    
 
 In all cases the transition leads to democracy if regime reformists and opposition 
forces manage to strike a compromise on the new democratic rules and procedures. Our 
third hypothesis therefore postulates that democracy results from a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime in combination with high levels of mass mobilization in various 
chronological order. 
 
With a view to the existing literature, our research should primarily fulfil three 
objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on 
democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below 
are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the 
scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute 
to the overarching goal of generalization. In other words, we aim at testing the validity of 
the theories on transitions to democracy while at the same time attempting to surpass the 
sterile academic debate between transitions "from below" and "from above" and to 
reconcile two seemingly incompatible positions.  
 
1.3.  Justification of Research and Originality of Contribution 
 
 To our knowledge, there is currently no answer to our research question in the 
literature. This might seem surprising at first, given that the study of democratic transitions 
as a separate subfield in Comparative Politics has existed since the 1970s. A closer look, 
however, reveals that democratization studies have been highly empirically driven, and 
new subjects of interest often replaced older questions even before they were satisfyingly 
answered. The problem of what causes transitions to succeed and the importance of masses 
versus regime actors is one of those questions that had taken a backseat prior to the arrival 
of the Arab Spring rebellions in 2011. But when Tunisian dictator Ben Ali and Egypt’s 
Mubarak both were driven from power by mass protests, scholarly interest was sparked 
again and a host of new studies on the importance of mass movements for democratization 
saw the day (Mansfield and Snyder 2012; Snow and Moss 2014; Shehata 2014; Salvatore 
2013; Paczynska 2013). Generally, intra-regime dynamics did not figure in this new 
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literature; a fact that is particularly important considering the outcome of most of the Arab 
Spring rebellions: so far, only Tunisia has completed the transition to democracy and all 
the other countries have either fallen into civil war or returned to authoritarianism. When 
analyzing the causes for this failure, scholars rediscovered the crucial role of authoritarian 
regime actors (Bellin 2012; Morency-Laflamme and Brunner 2015). Hence, we believe it 
more important than ever to have another look at transition dynamics and revive old 
questions: Are successful transitions really the product of one class of actors alone? Can 
mass movements force an authoritarian regime to democratize, or isn’t it more likely that 
democracies are the product of the combined effects of elite and mass action, "from above" 
and "from below"?      
 
 Although the questions we ask are hardly new, our thesis is novel in several 
respects. Firstly, as previously stated, there is a growing consensus in the scholarly 
literature that the strict separation of transitions into narrowly defined categories such as 
transitions "from above" and "from below" isn’t capturing reality and that there is a need to 
revise and integrate theoretical frameworks. In fact, many transitions to democracy can’t 
easily be classified in one or the other category, as authors often do not use the same 
coding criteria, are inattentive to chronological detail, and do not necessarily agree on what 
exactly constitutes a transition "from above" or "from below". By consequent, there are 
many competing explanations for Third Wave transitions, such as the case of Portugal 
(Maxwell 1986 vs Bermeo 1997); Chile (Huntington 1991 vs Garreton 1989); and Eastern 
Europe (Przeworski 1990 vs Bunce 2003). Our thesis, on the other hand, uses coding 
criteria that are carefully defined and grounded in theory and also includes many contested 
cases in the analysis. This could help eliminate confusion and provide more fertile ground 
for further research on the subject.    
 
 Secondly, while most democratization scholars have rallied behind one or the other 
of the competing theories on transitions, the origins of the transition process and the 
dynamics contributing to its success or failure have never been systematically investigated 
over a large number of cases. In fact, there is an important prejudice amongst many 
scholars of democratization against a quantitative approach to studying regime change, 
primarily due to the complexity of the concepts and the difficulty of representing them in 
standard statistical frameworks. By consequent, studies contesting either O’Donnell and 
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Schmitter’s or Bunce / Bratton and Van de Walle’s theory are for the most part area-bound 
or single case studies. They do not attempt to form a coherent theoretical framework, nor 
do they incorporate their findings into the existing framework of either one particular 
theory. The purpose of our thesis, by contrast, is to integrate existing theoretical positions 
in order to arrive at a circumscribed set of generalizable propositions. To this end we 
combine a quantitative methodological framework (QCA) with qualitative case studies in a 
medium-N setting, something that to our knowledge has not been attempted before in the 
study of democratic transitions. Such an approach offers a number of advantages: On one 
hand, the comparatively high number of cases provides security that our findings are not 
just spurious correlations, and are indeed likely to be repeated in cases outside of our 
sample. The cross-regional focus of our thesis additionally increases that likelihood, and 
provides greater credibility to our claims than an analysis that is carried out through a 
regional lense alone. On the other hand, the "qualitative anchoring" of our concepts 
protects them from becoming overly simplified in a quantitative analysis.  
 
 Thirdly, the proliferation of hybrid regimes and of "democracy with adjectives" 
(Collier and Levitsky 1997) has led to a growing disillusionment in the scholarly 
community with existing explanations of transition dynamics. Whereas elite-led transitions 
"from above" had once been considered the magic formula for democratization, many 
studies that take a closer look at the origins of certain transitions show that popular 
participation has a much bigger part in the success of these processes than previously 
assumed (Porras 2007). As Nancy Bermeo (1997) aptly synthesized, the literature on 
democratization generally accords much less attention to popular organizations than to 
political elites. Thus, the role of popular organizations in the making of democracy remains 
a subject of confusion. Many of the major theoretical works on democratization suggest 
that popular mobilization is important for regime change, but even this very simple 
proposition is not universally shared. Linz and Stepan (1996, 88), for example, 
acknowledge that Spanish political reform occurred in "a context of heightened societal 
pressure for, and expectations of, change" and that "popular pressure kept the transition 
going forward". Yet they fall short of situating the role of collective actors on an equal 
level to elite negotiations and rather choose to classify Spain as "regime initiated transition 
(…) under the pressure of society". By contrast, R.Y. Ortega Ortiz (2000, 69) qualifies the 
predominant explanation of the Spanish transition as "myth" and claims that high levels of 
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contestation-mobilization by diverse societal actors (workers, students and political 
parties) before and throughout the transition process were essential to the downfall of the 
authoritarian regime. Similarly, Maravall’s (1978, 103 – 117) analysis of the Spanish 
student movement makes clear that student mobilizations were key elements for the 
formation of the opposition political programme and for the development of a national 
consciousness about the necessity for a radical transformation of the regime. In short, it is 
still unclear just how important mass movements are in the processes of regime change, 
whether they are ever the primary actors, and whether there are regional distinctions in the 
relative balance between elite and masses. Our thesis could be very helpful in this respect, 
as our method of analysis allows identifying exactly which transitions have been impelled 
by popular protest movements, and hence contributes to better estimating the relative 
importance of mass action in transition dynamics. 
 
 Lastly, as Karl (2005) recently stated, a central finding of 40 years of "transitology" 
is that democratization is the result of a combination of causes, and no single factor has yet 
been identified as being either necessary or sufficient across a range of cases. It is here that 
our thesis offers the potentially greatest plus-value: Focusing on two of the most frequently 
named causes of democratization, the nature and extent of divisions within the 
authoritarian regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski 
and Toka 1999) and the strength of social movements (Tarrow 1994; Collier 1999; Bratton 
and Van de Walle 1997), our research methodology is specifically designed to test whether 
either of these conditions alone, or in combination, is necessary for a successful transition 
to democracy. Such knowledge could prove crucial particularly for the improvement of 
potential democracy promotion programs, which have traditionally focused more on civil 
society actors than on intra-regime dynamics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 38!
 This chapter summarized the principal theoretical debates about democratization 
processes and introduced our own argument. It explained that early research focusing on 
structural theories was found inadequate to explain processes of change that feature 
dynamic interplays between calculating societal actors. As scholars turned to voluntarist 
approaches to democratization, two principal competing theories emerged: firstly, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transitology theory, and secondly, the theory of Bratton and 
Van de Walle, and Bunce. Whereas O’Donnell and Schmitter offer an elitist approach 
("from above") that views transitions as regime-initiated and –dominated exercise in 
negotiation between a small circle of regime and opposition elites, Bratton and Van de 
Walle and Bunce postulate that transitions are primarily determined by the mobilization of 
mass actors ("from below") with the capacity to force a reluctant authoritarian regime out 
of power. Although both theories have been used by a number of scholars to explain Third 
Wave transitions, they offer an incomplete view of reality. Therefore, scholars are slowly 
turning to "hybrid" approaches to democratization that incorporate elements "from above" 
and "from below" in an attempt to obtain a more realistic model of how transitions to 
democracy come about, and what makes them succeed. In this chapter we presented 
examples from quantitative and qualitative scholarship, and showed that our own research 
problem derives from a critique of these existing approaches to transitions. After having 
outlined our research question and our hypotheses, the chapter finally ended with a 
justification of our research project and a delineation of how our thesis adds value to the 
current scholarly pool of knowledge. The purpose of the following chapter is to introduce 
our research methodology and our case sample. 
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2  
Explaining Regime Change:  
Moving Beyond the Theoretical and Methodological Divide 
 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological basis 
our thesis is built on. In the first part we present the methodological framework within 
which the comparative method is situated, before turning to configurational methods and 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the method used in this thesis.  After a general 
overview of the principles and practice of QCA, we discuss the strengths and limits of the 
approach, its appropriateness for our research project and the type of QCA used in this 
study. The second part is dedicated to establishing the conceptual framework of this thesis. 
After defining our outcome condition, "minimal democracy", and our explanatory 
conditions, "crisis of the authoritarian regime" and "mass mobilization", we turn to the 
operationalization and the measurement of these concepts. Lastly, we present our case 
sample and explain the principles behind our case selection. 
  
2.1.  Methodological Framework 
 
 According to Sartori (1991), comparing is at the heart of every scientific endeavor. 
Only by contrasting competing hypotheses it is possible to evaluate theories and, 
ultimately, discard explanations of reality that are found to be incorrect. In most, if not all 
studies on democratization, this comes down to choosing between the statistical versus the 
comparative method. 
 
 2.1.1.  The Statistical Versus the Comparative Method 
 
According to Lijphart (1971), three types of  methods together form the 
fundamental strategies of scientific research: the experimental method, the statistical 
method, and the comparative method. Even though the experimental method is considered 
"the gold standard", its specifics (working with control groups, the ceteris paribus clause, 
etc) make it often unfit for use  in the social sciences (Lijphart 1971, 683).  Alternatively, 
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researchers approximate experimental design by choosing between the statistical method 
and the comparative method. While the statistical method proceeds on the basis of a large 
number of cases, drawn at random if possible, and a relatively small number of variables, 
the comparative method offers a number of techniques that are often case-based, 
specifically in the case of small- and medium N-research design (Ragin 1987). Both 
methods have their respective strengths and weaknesses (for discussion see Brady and 
Collier 2004; King, Keohane and Verba 1994).  However, the nature of statements that can 
be generated by variable-oriented research is fundamentally different from the ones that 
can be generated by case-oriented methods. Whereas variable-oriented methods try to 
predict the (average) influence of a given variable on the dependent variable irrespective of 
case context, case-oriented methods aim at finding commonalities and differences between 
groups of cases (Landman 2000, 27 – 32). This leads to more complex causal explanations 
in which context plays a decisive role (Ragin 1987, 34 – 82).  
 
This thesis tries to find a "via media" between "qualitative" (case-oriented) and 
"quantitative" (variable-oriented) techniques. To this end, we employ QCA, a set-theoretic 
method which forms part of what Cronqvist (2007) calls "configurational-comparative 
methods". Configurational-comparative methods are presented as a "synthetic strategy" to 
"integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the 
variable-oriented approach" (Ragin 1987, 84). On one hand, configurational-comparative 
methods postulate that correlations between social facts can only be discovered by treating 
cases as "wholes" and taking into account contextual specificities. On the other hand, they 
also require that prior to formal analysis, possible variables be identified which could later 
serve as potential conditions for the phenomenon to be examined. The values of these 
variables taken together form the configuration of  a case, and these configurations later 
become the units of the configurational-comparative analysis. By doing so, researchers try 
to find explanations that are as broad-based as possible while still remaining sensitive to 
the fact that causality is often more complex.  
 
Set theory is one variant of the configurational-comparative approach, and has been 
defined by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 6) as follows: "Set-theoretic methods are 
approaches to analyzing social reality in which (a) the data consists of set membership 
scores; (b) relations between social phenomena are modeled in terms of set relations; and 
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(c) the results point to sufficient and necessary conditions and emphasize causal 
complexity in terms of INUS and SUIN causes24." The use of set theory in the social 
sciences is not as new as it might seem. Indeed, a closer look reveals that they provides the 
underlying logic for many, mostly qualitative approaches in the social sciences that aim at 
giving a causal interpretation to patterns found in data. In their origin, set-theoretic 
methods follow Mill’s (1858) methods of agreement and difference. The method of 
agreement is based on the idea that a phenomenon of interest observed across a number of 
cases can be explained by one or several independent variables that do not vary in value. 
For example, if we assume that autocracy is correlated to strong militaries and extensive 
natural resources, we expect to find the presence of both conditions in all cases of 
autocratic regimes under study. By contrast, the method of difference aims at examining 
whether variance in the independent variable results in different values for the 
phenomenon of interest in otherwise identical cases. In the social sciences, this usually 
happens in two steps: first, if a variable X is suspected to cause a certain effect, the 
researcher examines whether this variable is present in all cases featuring the phenomenon 
of interest Y. In a second step, he then investigates whether X is also present in cases that 
do not feature Y. If this is not the case, he can deduce that phenomenon Y is contingent 
upon cause X (Berg-Schlosser 2003, 110 – 113).   
 
Mill’s canons imply rather rigid assumptions about relationships of cause and 
effect, which are difficult to establish even in the "hard" sciences (Berg-Schlosser et al. 
2009). However, although they may not "prove" any causal relationship, they constitute a 
valuable step toward Popper’s (1959) principle of falsification: the elimination of 
irrelevant factors and the approximation of "conditions of occurrence" of a phenomenon, to 
a point where we can say that one hypothesis is preferable to its rivals (Cohen and Nagel 
1934, 267). In fact, the various techniques of QCA are designed precisely to identify and 
narrow down such conditions of occurrence. 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 INUS and SUIN refer to "Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but 
Sufficient" for their effects (Mackie 1965), and respectively, "Sufficient but Unnecessary part of a 
configuration that is Insufficient but Necessary" for the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 79).  
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 2.1.2.  QCA: a Research Approach and a Technique  
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is arguably the most formalized 
technique among all set-theoretic methods (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). However, it 
is also a research approach which has made its way into a number of social science 
disciplines, including political science and international relations (e.g. Thiem 2011), 
economics (e.g. Evans and Aligica 2008), management (e.g. Greckhamer 2011), legal 
studies and criminology (e.g. Arvind and Stirton 2010), education (e.g. Glaesser and 
Cooper 2011), and health policy research (e.g. Harkreader and Imershein 1999). Following 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 3-4), qualitative methods are based on the intensive 
examination of selected cases in order to develop a deep understanding of the researcher’s 
phenomenon of interest. Quantitative methods, by contrast, are defined by their use of 
numerical measures of specific phenomena in order to achieve general statements and 
theories. In this sense, QCA must be understood as a quantitative method that uses 
qualitatively coded data (Cronqvist 2007). QCA is based on Boolean algebra, where a case 
is either in or out of a set, and in its most simple form uses binary-coded data, with 1 
indicating a condition to be true (or present), and 0 indicating the condition to be false (or 
absent). The typical Boolean-based comparative analysis thus addresses the presence, or 
absence of conditions under which a certain outcome is obtained. The data is then 
represented in a truth table in order to identify prime implicants and formulate conditions 
of necessity and sufficiency (for extensive explanation of the technical aspects of QCA see 
Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).  
 
It is crucial to bear in mind that QCA does not take onboard some basic 
assumptions that underlie most statistical techniques. Berg-Schlosser (Berg-Schlosser et al. 
2009, 9) succintly summarizes: "First, 'additivity' is no longer assumed: This means that 
the idea that each single cause has its own separate, independent impact on the outcome is 
abandoned and replaced by the assumption that 'conjunctural causation' is at work, 
meaning that several causes can be simultaneously present (or be combined, somehow), 
constituting a 'causal combination', for the outcome to occur. Second, a given causal 
combination may not be the only route to a specific result; other combinations also may be 
able to produce it. Third, the uniformity of causal effects is not assumed; on the contrary, a 
given condition may, combined with different others, sometimes act in favor of the 
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outcome, and sometimes, differently combined, act against it. Fourth, causality is not 
assumed to be symmetrical— rather, causal asymmetry is assumed, meaning that the 
presence and the absence of the outcome, respectively, may require different 
explanations." Lastly, and in line with Mill’s earlier works, since causality is considered to 
be context and conjuncture specific, QCA rejects any form of permanent causality.  
 
 2.1.3.  Strength and Limits of QCA 
 
Since the beginning of the “Ragin Revolution” (Vaisey 2009) in 1987, there has 
been a number of debates on the virtues and limits of QCA. We shall focus only what we 
consider the most “salient” traits; for a more extensive discussion, see for instance Ragin 
(2000) and Berg-Schlosser (2003). Firstly, in our opinion, one of the main strengths of 
QCA is the fact that it combines aspects of both the qualitative and the quantitative 
research tradition. As such, it allows researchers to develop both an analytical strategy 
(defining variables) and to keep in touch with the holistic perspective of the cases 
examined (grouping the variables into configurations, which are then compared as units). 
When looking at the field of comparative politics, and particularly democratization, the 
utility of such an approach becomes very clear. Prior quantitative studies in 
democratization have in large part focused on a small set of structural factors assumed to 
be operating analogously across cases (see, for example, research related to modernization 
theory; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). In order to assess the conditions conducive to the 
emergence and the stability of democracy, most scholars have employed sophisticated 
statistical models that were able to test the correlations between basic socioeconomic 
factors such as the level of economic development or the level of literacy and 
industrialization (Lipset 1959) and democratic stability. However, the model of 
democratization employed in the present study is based on strategic interaction between 
different actors of the old regime and the opposition. Authors usually contend that 
statistical models are not well suited for this type of analysis, because the conditions 
required for the successful use of regression-based modes of explanation do not apply. Hall 
(2006, 26), for example, claims that "the task of producing quantifiable measures of the 
relevant variables requires such oversimplification that the resulting proxies distort reality 
beyond reasonable limits". In contrast to the statistical approach, the empirical 
observations in QCA do not enter the analysis in their raw form, but are interpreted in 
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relation to a theoretical construct, which is why Ragin calls them "qualitative data" (Ragin 
2000, 9). The use of such data is advantageous because it enables researchers to code 
theoretical constructs that cannot be observed directly (for example democracy, or degree 
of corporatism) qualitatively instead of using (potentially erroneous) dummy variables 
(Cronqvist 2007). On the flipside, qualitative coding depends in large part on the 
conception a researcher has of the underlying theoretical construct and therefore cannot be 
entirely objective. 
 
Secondly, QCA is a method which is particularly well suited for small and 
medium-N research. Even though it suffers from the same shortcomings as other small-N 
research methods (for extensive discussion see King, Keohane and Verba 1994), it is still 
better placed than statistical approaches for circumventing the problem of "many variables, 
small number of cases" which is so common in comparative politics (Berg-Schlosser 2003, 
105 - 106; Landmann 2000)25.  As Ragin (1987) criticized, oftentimes researchers of the 
mainstream quantitative traditions recommend simply to increase the number of 
observations, which potentially leads to conceptual overstretching (Sartori 1971, 1034 – 
1035) and a dilution of the comparability of the cases.  On the other hand, many qualitative 
methods are also ill equipped to deal with research designs that feature more than a handful 
of cases, because they have no formal way of describing conjunctional and multiple 
causality (Cronqvist 2007).  QCA, on the other hand, offers procedures to uncover 
complex causality in both case ranges, with calculations that follow clearly defined rules. 
In fact, another advantage of QCA techniques is their transparency. QCA offers tools that 
are both formalized and replicable- two aspects that many scholars would consider 
indispensable for good scientific research (see, for example, King, Keohane and Verba 
1994). The rules of Boolean algebra are relatively straightforward even for novices, and 
thinking in dichotomic terms often feels "natural" when looking at social facts. However, 
dichotomization in QCA also can be a problem, especially when we have variables which, 
for empirical or theoretical reasons, can take on more than two values. To accommodate 
for this possibility, new variants of QCA such as fuzzy QCA and multi-value QCA have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Statistical approaches are ill suited for most small-N comparative research designs, because often the 
addition or subtraction of a single case is sufficient to significantly alter the result of a regression analysis. 
Additionally, the proper application of many premises of statistical approaches (normal distribution; random 
sampling etc) cannot be guaranteed.   
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been developed, but the integration of variables pertaining to one framework into another 
still remains complicated (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).  
 
Lastly, QCA as a method can contribute to producing "modest generalizations" 
(Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009).  As we have said before, the search for "explicit connections" 
(Rihoux 2008) is an important part of any scientific endeavor. In fact, only generalization 
makes it possible to achieve explanations that are not "individualized", and therefore 
nothing more than an accumulation of descriptions. Yet, generalizations achieved using 
QCA techniques need to be treated with caution. Since QCA in principle is based on Mill’s 
methods, they are subject to the same restrictions Cohen and Nagel already identified in 
1934 (see Berg-Schlosser 2003, 113): Although Mill’s methods can be used to falsify 
hypotheses, they cannot be used to actually validate theories. Additionally, QCA does not 
have rules like the 5 percent significance level to confirm results (Cronqvist 2007), and 
efforts to generalize need to remain inside the initial "homogeneity space" within which 
the empirical data set is contained (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). By consequence, the 
results obtained by QCA are per se not generalizable. However, one of QCA’s key 
strengths is singling out "conditions of occurrence" of phenomena; therefore, the approach 
is well placed to develop and test hypotheses on "middle-range theories" (Merton 1968). In 
that sense, while the external validity of QCA results may be low, internal validity will be 
significantly higher in small-and medium sized research settings.  
 
 2.1.4.  Appropriateness of Method  
 
 As Hall (2003) has said, researchers looking to choose a method should aim to 
achieve a good fit beween ontology and methodology. In the framework of this thesis, we 
believe QCA to be a good fit partly because of theoretical expectations about the 
underlying causal processes at hand, and partly because of technical considerations. 
Firstly, we are interested in set-relations, as opposed to simple correlations. By extension, 
we believe that our research project is bext explained in terms of necessary and sufficient 
causes: we aim to show primarily that either one of our conditions (crisis of the 
authoritarian regime; mass mobilizations) taken alone is necessary, but insufficient to 
produce the outcome "minimal democracy". In our opinion, standard statistical techniques 
are not well suited for such a research goal, because the correlations obtained with a 
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regression analysis do not tell us anything about the nature and direction of the causality 
involved. Identifying INUS and SUIN conditions, on the other hand, is one of the key 
strengths of QCA. 
 
 Secondly, we have strong reason to believe that the outcome we are interested in 
(minimal democracy) is the result of a specific kind of causal complexity (combination of 
two conditions: crisis of the authoritarian regime, and mass mobilisations). The two are 
mutually reinforcing: While mass mobilization can contribute significantly to the creation 
of a disruption in the continuity of the authoritarian regime (Martins 1986), a crisis within 
the ruling clique in turn encourages what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call 
"resurrection of civil society". Therefore both conditions are related and would result in 
multicollinearity in a standard statistical analysis. In QCA, however, this does not 
constitute an obstacle to the analysis, since we are not looking to find the isolated effect of 
one variable, or finding the most powerful predictor for explaining variance in our 
outcome. 
 
 On a more technical note, QCA is a good fit for our thesis both in terms of the size 
of the dataset- 25 cases would be considered a classic medium-N research project – and in 
terms of the nature of our data, which is mostly of a qualitative nature. With reference to 
the first point, sample size, using QCA is very advantageous since correlations derived 
from standard regression in a sample as small as ours might be deemed spurious (Mahoney 
2003, 363). With reference to the latter point, data quality, QCA does not require primary 
data to be quantitative. In fact, it is perfectly possible to work with "subjective", or 
qualitative data, as long as it is possible to transform these data into categories or numbers. 
Additionally, a set-theoretic perspective is useful for this kind of data, since it helps 
maintaining a strong link between the meaning of a concept and its operationalization, and 
therefore avoids that measures become oversimplified.  
 
 Last but not least, we are interested in producing knowledge that can potentially be 
generalized to cases other than the ones examined in our sample. As we have elaborated 
before, generalizations derived from QCA work best for middle-range theories, which  are 
limited in conceptual (and often regional) range, and do not try to determine the 
overarching independent variable that would operate in all social processes. The theories 
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on democratization which are the focus of this thesis are classic middle-range theories, and 
therefore lend themselves well to verification using Boolean techniques. Furthermore, we 
believe that by identifying the key conditions leading to the occurrence of our outcome of 
interest (democratization) in a selection of cases as diverse as the one used in our sample, 
we have grounds to assume with a reasonable degree of certainty that our results would be 
replicated at least in cases that share commonalities with the ones examined by us (i.e 
other Third Wave transitions). Such modest generalization is maybe less impressive than 
the creation of grand theories, but also more substantial (Merton 1968).  
 
 2.1.5.  Choice of QCA Type  
 
 As Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend, the choice of a QCA subtype 
should be made in function of the nature of the variables at hand. If all conditions are 
dichotomous by nature of the concepts, crisp set QCA (csQCA) should be used. If on the 
other hand, there are conditions that do not easily lend themselves to dichotomization 
without losing important information, fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) or multi-value QCA 
(mvQCA) should be the preferred approach. While fsQCA was designed as an alternative 
approach to csQCA in cases where conditions need fine-grained scaling of membership 
scores, mvQCA is considered an extension of csQCA and still retains the main principles 
of crisp analysis. However, it also allows limited use of multi-value variables and therefore 
researchers can avoid a forced dichotomization of conditions.  
 
 Due to ist novelty, mvQCA as a set-theoretic technique received a lot of criticism 
since its inception in 2004 (for the methodological debate, see Schneider and Wagemann 
2012; Vink and van Vliet 2009; Thiem and Dusa 2013; Thiem 2013). Nonetheless, we 
chose to work with mvQCA as opposed to fsQCA for two reasons. Firstly, since only one 
of our explanatory conditions, "mass mobilization", is a variable where differences in the 
level of mobilitzation are important for the analysis all the while our other conditions 
remain dichotomous, our analysis is best suited for a crisp-set approach. Naturally, the 
transformation of ordinary type of data (such as the CTMMI26 index for our mass 
mobilization variable) into categories, as is necessary for the use of mvQCA, involves a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The CTMMI refers to the Comparative Transitional Mass Mobilization Index, as explained further in this 
chapter. 
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certain loss of data that could be avoided by using fuzzy scales. In our opinion, however, 
the information loss is not substantial enough to impact the results of our analysis. In fact, 
as Hermann and Cronqvist (2006, 2) show, mvQCA constitutes the most suitable method 
for analyzing case sets which necessitate the conservation of some, but not all raw-data 
information. This is precisely the case for our thesis: While we still need the conservation 
of enough raw data information to enable us to decide whether to classify a case into "high 
levels of mass mobilization", "low levels of mass mobilization" or "no mass mobilization", 
we do not need to know the relative position of countries within these categories to assess 
their contribution to the democratization process (for the theoretical debate see O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986 vs Bunce 2000 and Bermeo 1997). For example, it is irrelevant to our 
analysis to know whether Mali had higher or lower levels of mobilization than Benin if we 
know that both form part of the set "countries with low levels of mass mobilization". 
Secondly, we prefer working with mvQCA as opposed to fsQCA due to the nature of our 
outcome variable, which is dichotomous. In such a setting, using fsQCA is problematic, 
because fuzzy-set analysis is designed to use degrees of variation on the causal 
configuration to explain degrees of variation on the outcome. If the outcome (such as 
democratization) is not, or cannot be operationalized in a way other than in dichotomous 
terms, there is no real rationale for the use of fuzzy analysis (Vink and van Vliet 2009).  
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2.2.  Conceptual Framework 
 
 The following section is dedicated to establishing our conceptual framework. The 
purpose is to define and calibrate our conditions. In set-theoretic language, calibration 
refers to the process of assigning set membership scores to cases. In essence, this process 
requires firstly the operationalization of the concepts at the basis of our conditions, and 
secondly, a decision on how these concepts are measured. 
 
2.2.1.  Definition and Calibration of "Minimal Democracy" (Outcome) 
 
In Boolean language, the outcome condition refers to the phenomenon to be 
explained. As we have stated in the previous chapter, our research focus are transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy. A transition first and foremost designates "the 
interval between one political regime and another" (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6). 
Hence, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are "intermediate phases" between 
the dissolution of an old, autocratic regime and the establishment of a new, democratic one 
(Cortona 1991, 316). A transition begins with the introduction of some democratic 
measure into the system, and comes to an end when new rules of governance have been 
established – in the case of a successful democratic transition, typically by the holding of a 
founding election (Lindberg, 2006, pp.140-141). We consider it therefore a composite 
variable, comprising two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes: political 
liberalization and democratization (Przeworski 1986; Welsh 1994)27.  
 
A priori, the starting point of a transition can either be full-blown authoritarianism, 
or a hybrid regime. Authoritarianism in this thesis is defined as a form of government 
where the opposition has no viable means to achieve power (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). 
Following Haggard and Kaufman (1995), "the key difference between authoritarian 
regimes and their democratic successors is that the rules of the latter guarantee opposition 
groups the right to challenge incumbent rulers and policies, and to replace those rulers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 This distinction is important in order to differentiate transitions to democracy from a simple change in the 
nature and/or composition of the authoritarian regime. Political liberalization generally refers to a relaxation 
of previous government restrictions, usually in the realm of civil and political freedoms (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986), whereas democratization refers to the introduction of some institutional measure of 
democracy (Polity IV User Manual).  
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through competitive elections". Such a definition therefore allows for a wide range of 
autocracies to be included, for example monarchies, sultanistic regimes, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism and single party regimes. All these regimes are characterized by the fact 
that democratic institutions do not even exist. By contrast, a regime in which democratic 
institutions exist but are deeply flawed is a hybrid regime (Levitsky and Way 2010). For 
the purpose of our analysis, however, we treat "autocracies" as a residual category, 
encompassing both regimes that do not meet any of the criteria for a democracy, or only 
partly meet those criteria. We believe that such an approach is justified because our 
analysis is centered on events that occur after the breakdown of the old regime. Therefore, 
assuming structural factors do not influence transition dynamics, any prior institutional 
arrangements are irrelevant for our thesis.  
 
The end point, or "outcome", of a successful transition is democracy. Democracy, 
as pointed out by philosopher G.W. Gallie, is perhaps "the appraisive political concept par 
excellence" (Gallie 1956, 184), and there is hardly any other concept that has engendered 
as much disagreement about its meaning. J. Peter Euben (1993, 478) captured the crux of 
the dispute as taking place between the "contemporary consensus view" that "democracy is 
largely a matter of choosing among elites in periodic elections" and "what is literally 
meant: the kratia (power, rule, mastery) by the demos". By consequence, scholars have 
witnessed throughout the years a veritable proliferation of "democracy with adjectives": 
guided democracy, tutelary democracy, popular democracy, people’s democracy, unitary 
democracy, consensual democracy - "thinly-disguised attempts to justify something that 
was not at all or only remotely democratic" (Schmitter 1991, 20).  While the general 
understanding of what constitutes a democratic regime has evolved during time, 
Huntington (1991, 7) confirms that by the 1970s a consensus had formed among scholars 
around the procedural definition of democracy provided first by Schumpeter (1942) and 
later refined by Dahl (1971):  
 
"Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, [we define] a twentieth-century 
political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective 
decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population 
is eligible to vote. So defined, democracy involves the two dimensions – 
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contestation and participation – that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic 
democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the existence of those civil and political 
freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political 
debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns."  
 
While certainly restrictive, such a definition presents several advantages. Firstly, it 
allows an easy classification of regimes into democratic and non-democratic while still 
preserving the idea of the existence of certain civil rights and freedoms pertaining to the 
political realm. Secondly, whereas there is vast disagreement among scholars which 
elements should be added to a more liberal conception of democracy, most scholars today 
would agree that Dahl’s categories of competition and participation are the basic criteria 
without which no regime could be called democratic (O’Donnell 1996, 35; Merkel 2004, 
42). Finally, such a definition works well with the main database on regime change we 
work with (Freedom House), as they use fairly similar coding criteria. Freedom House’s 
list of electoral democracies, a largely under-utilized database that qualitatively assesses 
regimes on an annual basis, assigns the designation "electoral democracy" to countries that 
exhibit (a) a competitive, multiparty political system; (b) universal adult suffrage for all 
citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as 
sanctions for criminal offenses); (c) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions 
of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and 
that yield results that are representative of the public will; and (d) significant public access 
of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open 
political campaigning. Although Freedom House’s rating process also includes questions 
related to extended civil liberties, such as the rule of Law and personal autonomy and 
individual rights, these subcategories are not taken into account when deciding whether or 
not to classify a country as an electoral democracy, and therefore we consider that the 
differences between their coding criteria and ours are negligible.   
 
 "Democracy" in our thesis is a dichotomous variable, in that a transition either ends 
in minimal democracy (value: 1) or not (value: 0). In order to distinguish between regimes 
that are minimal democracies and those that aren’t, we employ the Freedom House list of 
electoral democracies, a relatively under-utilized database. Even though the Freedom 
House list provides explicit information on minimal democracies only from 1989 onwards, 
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we were able to fill potential empty cells through a manual verification of Freedom House 
"Freedom in the World reports" compiled by Brownlee (2009). We believe this method to 
be appropriate, given that Freedom House’s definition of democracy is a direct derivative 
of Huntington and Dahl’s concepts and therefore most closely related to the definition 
employed in this thesis. 
 
The choice of this database may seem arbitrary at first, given that there are a variety 
of sources – quantitative and qualitative - on political regimes based on reasonably similar 
definitions of democracy available. On the qualitative end, the most extensive source is the 
compilation of Third Wave transitions elaborated by Huntington (1991). On the 
quantitative end, there are two other databases on regime change relevant for our topic of 
study: On one hand, a new dataset developed by Geddes et al. (2012) provides transition 
information for 280 autocratic regimes in 110 countries (with more than a million 
population) from 1946 to 2010, identifying the nature of their government, the duration of 
their rule, how regimes exit power, how much violence occurs during transitions and 
whether or not the succeeding regimes are democratic. On the other hand, there is the 
Polity IV database that monitors the degree of institutionalized democracy and autocracy 
of all states in the world in a time-series format spanning from 1800 to 2010. The "Polity 
score" captures the regime authority spectrum of any given country in a specific recording 
year on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) and 
also provides information on dates and magnitude of Polity changes (i.e. transitions to new 
forms of government) (Polity IV Codebook).  
 
When taking a closer look at these sources, however, it becomes clear that they are 
inappropriate for our thesis. The dataset of Huntington, for example, is incomplete and 
does not provide sufficient information on what criteria were used to distinguish between 
democratic and semi-democratic regimes, and whether semi-democratic regimes were 
actually classified as minimal democracies. On the quantitative end, the Geddes (2012) 
dataset employs a definition of democracy that is too large. Geddes et al. (2012, 6) define a 
democratic political system as "a regime in which the executive achieved power through 
(a) a direct competitive election in which at least 10% of the total population (equivalent of 
40% of the adult male population) were eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to 
compete and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or (b) indirect 
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election by a body at least 60% of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair competitive 
elections; or (c) constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive." Her 
definition therefore is also based on Dahl’s two criteria, but her minimum requirement for 
suffrage (10% of the total population) differs from Huntington’s idea that "virtually all of 
the adult population" should be eligible to vote. Since we believe that the opportunity to 
express one’s political preference by ballot is one of the core elements of modern-day 
democracy, we cannot use the Geddes database for the purpose of differentiating between 
democratic and autocratic regimes. 
 
The Polity project, on the other hand, is among the most widely used indices of 
democracy and is often given credit in terms of the reliability of the index: the coding rules 
are clearly specified in the users’ manual, the component variables are presented in 
disaggregate form and several coders are used in the coding process28. However, it relies 
on an institutionalist definition of democracy (excluding civil rights and liberties, a crucial 
element of many liberalization processes) and does not offer a theoretical justification for 
the way the component variables are aggregated to a single regime index. Most 
importantly, since Polity does not provide a cut-off point above which countries are 
classified as democratic, it is less useful for deciding whether or not a given transition 
ended in minimal democracy29. 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See Hadenius and Teorell (2005), Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Chapter 5 in Rydland et al. (2008) for 
a detailed discussion of the comparability and quality of democracy indices in general.  
29 On one hand, a positive POLITY score of a given regime generally indicates that the regime’s institutional 
structure is more democratic than autocratic. However, it is difficult to determine a threshold; when is a 
POLITY score high enough to confirm that the regime has reached the status of a minimal democracy? The 
Polity codebook remains silent on this question. Even though it is possible, by looking at the combined 
values of EXREC (the executive recruitment concept) and POLCOMP (the competitiveness of participation 
concept) to identify several scenarios that would allow for the possibility of having a minimal democracy (or 
higher), such a classification implies a great deal of arbitrariness on the part of the researcher. For instance, 
POLCOMP values of 6 could potentially be associated with electoral democracy, but the Polity codebook 
does not provide indications for which country cases such an assumption is true. Instead, the authors only 
state that such a possibility is "less likely, although not inconceivable" (Polity IV User Manual, 78). 
Therefore, we would need to manually verify each country case to which such a score is attributed, provided 
that EXREC scores also allow for the possibility of the country to be democratic.  
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 2.2.2.  Definition and Calibration of “Crisis of the Authoritarian Regime”  
  (Condition I) 
 
 In the framework of this analysis, the most elusive concept is without doubt the 
crisis of the authoritarian regime, as developed first by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). 
Ironically enough, the authors never actually attempt to define this variable clearly and 
unambiguously. According to them, a crisis is synonymous to a split of the ruling elite in 
reformist ("softliner") and conservative ("hardliner") factions, generally over questions of 
how to achieve legitimacy and the problem of how to consolidate or institutionalize the 
regime. However, they do not elaborate further, and only specify one proxy indicator by 
which such a crisis could be identified – the presence, or absence, of serious and 
committed reform propositions. Therefore, defining and clearly delimitating this variable 
in order to make it operable will be one of the main contributions of our thesis.  
 
First and foremost, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is a disintegration of the 
ruling block’s internal cohesion. A member of the ruling block (the authoritarian elite) is 
any individual who has some form of privileged position within an authoritarian regime, 
either from the bureaucracy, governing officials, officers within the security sectors 
(particularly the Armed Forces), heads of strategic economic corporations or any other 
organizations which is of intrinsic value to the survival of the authoritarian regime. These 
individuals have a high degree of privilege in terms of tenure in offices and access to state 
resources compared to the rest of the population (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, pp.86). 
In times of regime crisis, the authoritarian elite can become divided in two groups: pro-
reformists and anti-reformists. Pro-reformists are individuals who want to open the 
regime’s base of support through reforms and potentially electoral means. This does not 
make them fully opposed to a violent crackdown of opposition forces, but this option is not 
their favourite in the face of growing popular discontent (Crescenzi, 1999, pp. 194). Anti-
reformists are members of the authoritarian elite who want to preserve the status quo and 
are therefore more comfortable with the use of coercive means in the face of growing 
pressure against their regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 14-15). 
 
It is very important to distinguish such a crisis of the authoritarian regime from 
simple tensions between different factions of the ruling clique. Authors studying different 
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types of authoritarianisms have long contended that authoritarian regimes are not 
homogenous and that there are almost always tensions between different members that 
compete for influence within the regime. Such tensions may not be visible to the public 
eye and may persist for a very long time without necessarily threatening the cohesion of 
the regime as a whole, which explains why so many authoritarian regimes can survive 
external threats to their rule fairly well. A crisis, on the other hand, implies that the power 
balance between reformist and conservative forces is shifted in such a way as to allow 
reformist forces to take the reins and to impose their agenda onto reluctant regime 
hardliners. Such a shift can be caused by a number of factors, the investigation of which is 
beyond the scope of our thesis. We do, however, believe that large popular mobilizations 
are one prime factor in changing the stance of certain key regime actors and deciding the 
struggle for control between regime factions in favor of softliners. In the spirit of 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory, therefore, our first explanatory condition, "crisis of the 
authoritarian regime", designates a rupture in the unity of the ruling block, following 
which softliners succeed in taking over control from the hardliner regime factions.  
 
Just like our outcome, our explanatory condition "Crisis of the authoritarian 
regime" is dichotomous, meaning that we witness either the presence of a crisis (value: 1) 
or its absence (value: 0). However, here we face a practical dilemma. As Martins (1986, 
75) has noted, "the main difficulty of an investigation into the genesis and development of 
a crisis under an authoritarian regime comes from the lack of visible or reliable indicators. 
(…) As a consequence, the evaluation of critical situations must rely heavily upon the 
analyst’s intuitive perceptions and procedures, which substantially increases the margin of 
error in the analysis of a transition process." It is virtually impossible to know what exactly 
causes softliners to emerge and how their cost-benefit calculations evolve during a given 
situation, as strategic factors are extremely difficult to measure. Huntington (1991, 593) 
claims that decisions may be based on a number of factors. On one hand, the costs of 
staying in power may be considered too important, particularly for military governments. 
On the other hand, the fear of holding onto power and losing it to a strengthened 
opposition may prompt regime actors to think that losing office is better than losing life. 
Softliners may also believe that they would be elected if they ran in fair elections; they 
may opt for democracy out of opportunism and a desire to reap certain benefits (such as 
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IMF loans and US support), or simply out of a genuine conviction that democracy is the 
"right" form of government.  
 
Scholars have tried in different ways to avoid this problem and many attempts have 
been made to identify "objective signals" (Przeworski 1986, 55) that allow approximating 
whether a given regime is going through an internal crisis. Przeworski, for example, 
stresses the strategic postures of different regime actors and classifies them by their risk 
aversion. According to him, scholars trying to establish that a regime crisis is present 
should ask whether or not changes in circumstances may have increased risks for certain 
key factions and led them to change their preferences. When investigating such change in 
circumstances, one may distinguish between "internal crises", i.e. change that originates 
from problems related to the "internal economy" (Martins 1986) of the regime, and 
"external crises", i.e. crises related to society-level changes that have an impact on the 
strategic calculations of regime actors. As Martins notes, authoritarian regimes form some 
sort of inner world with specific interests, tensions and rules of equilibrium. The regime’s 
operational capability depends on how these elements interact, and they do not necessarily 
correspond to the existing social interests, tensions and rules of equilibrium prevailing in 
society. Changes related to the internal economy of authoritarian regimes could therefore 
concern the regime’s decision-making structure, its ideological coherence, rules of 
succession, etc.  
 
Przeworski (1986, 55) claims that objective signals for a crisis of the regime’s 
internal economy are, for example, the imminent death of the founding and not yet 
succeeded leader of a regime; and the impending collapse of the authoritarian institutions, 
whatever the cause. Stepan (1986, 76) particularly stresses the corporate interests of 
military governments, claiming that the perception of an intense threat to the integrity of 
the military-as-institution (f.ex. through disastrous public policies carried out by the 
authoritarian regime) can lead certain factions of the military to move towards 
liberalization in an attempt to transcend the crisis and reequilibrate the situation, as was the 
case for example in Greece and Peru. Cardoso (1986) analyzes the Brazilian transition and 
notes that circumstances were favorable to liberalization, as the authoritarian regime was in 
a critical stage in the battle for presidential succession and Geisel was faced with 
opposition from within the Armed Forces (as evidenced by the fact that the opposition 
! 57!
party was running a political campaign with a General as presidential candidate). Garreton 
(1986) adds ideological shifts to the objective signals for an authoritarian regime crisis. In 
his analysis of the Chilean transition, he notes that the regime’s fragmentation was 
evidenced by the progressive disappearance of the economic team that had formed the 
dominant current after 1975. 
 
External crises originate from changes on the society-level and affect the strategic 
calculations of the ruling clique. Martins (1986) identifies six types of such changes. 
Firstly, the growth and/or diversification of societal demands can lead to social unrest, the 
appearance of new collective actors, and a new capacity of groups and classes to express 
themselves politically. Such developments that evidence a manifest loss of legitimacy can 
undermine the apparent unity of the dominant bloc and provoke changes in the stance of 
key actors. Garreton (1986), for example, stresses the importance of the emergence of 
independent actors from the capitalist class and from sectors of the middle classes that 
broadened the debate about democratization after 1980 in Chile. Middlebrook (1986) 
claims that the political opening in Mexico in 1977 was the result (among other factors) of 
the emergence of several new opposition political parties outside the officially recognized 
party system. Secondly, the diversification of strategic group’s interests or by new 
coalitions among them can erode the regime’s support and lead key actors to believe that a 
new policy orientation is necessary in order to hold onto power. Whitehead (1986), for 
example, claims that the rupture of the military-peasant pact was an essential ingredient to 
the disintegration of the Bolivian military regime in 1978. Thirdly, incongruence between 
societal requirements and the ideological stand or the operational performance of the 
authoritarian regime (obsolescence of values, inefficiency or corruption of the 
bureaucracy, etc.) can also lead to divisions within the authoritarian regime. This element 
is particularly important if alternative political projects emerge at the same time, and if 
these projects can mobilize the support needed for a redefinition of political coalitions.  
Forthly, the emergence of an economic crisis could affect the regime’s ability to control 
the economy and/or allocate financial rewards to its supporters. Kaufman (1986), for 
example, claims that economic crises are triggers for regime change, as they erode middle 
sector and capitalist support for the regime. Cardoso’s analysis of the Brazilian transition 
shows that the evolution of the international economic crisis and the worsening foreign 
debt lessened the authoritarian regime’s room for manoeuvre considerably and led to 
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criticism and disobedience of leading industrialists who used their support for economic 
liberalism as vector for the expression of demands for political freedoms (1986, 144). 
According to Cardoso, this unsettled the linchpins of the systems of alliances that sustained 
the authoritarian military regime. Finally, Przeworski (1986) claims that foreign pressure 
to reform or even outright intervention can also contribute to creating a crisis within the 
authoritarian regime.  
 
However, most of the indicators identified by the literature refer to probabilities, 
i.e. to conditions under which a crisis of the regime is most likely, and cannot be used to 
determine without doubt that, indeed, a split within the authoritarian regime has taken 
place. Analysts can be certain about the presence of softliners only if and when they 
publicly reveal themselves. Following this logic, our proxy measures of a regime crisis are 
designed to identify softliners on the basis of their public actions. In order to do justice to 
our definition of "crisis", we first need to distinguish between indicators that show the 
presence of softliners within the regime, and indicators that unequivocally demonstrate 
their superiority in the power struggle with regime hardliners. Both are necessary for us to 
label a situation as "crisis of the authoritarian regime". 
 
Firstly, (1) softliners are present when some members of the ruling block publicly 
denounce the regime and/or its policies. This includes the appeal to outside support in 
favor of the overthrow of the regime (Przeworski 1986). This indicator seems like a 
relatively strong proof of disunity within the authoritarian regime. In any organization, 
individuals that remain loyal to the organization itself and its goals will refrain from 
publicly criticizing either the leadership or its policies in order to avoid destabilization. On 
the other hand, if dissatisfaction is becoming too great for certain individuals, they may 
choose to carry their grief out into the open where the conflict is no longer confined to the 
"interior economy" of the ruling clique. 
 
Secondly, (2) we can confirm the presence of sofliners in situations in which 
government officials charged with a certain portfolio quietly change government policies 
within their area of responsibility to introduce new ideas or steer the authoritarian regime 
into a direction of greater openness (Hawkins 1998). For instance, Bahrain’s crown prince 
Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa, the principal softliner of the Bahraini regime, gained 
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influence largely as part of a broad reform project called the "Economic Vision 2030" 
which established a series of reform-minded institutions and was considered by many 
observers a direct challenge to the way the hardliner Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin 
Salman had been handling the economy since Bahrain’s independence from Britain 
(Hammond 2012).  
 
Thirdly, (3) the defection of key regime supporters, such as the Armed Forces, and 
the refusal to obey orders by certain government branches, is also strongly susceptible to 
indicate softliners, and potentially a regime crisis. As Oberschall (1996, 100) explains, in a 
crisis, when the regime weakens and the opposition might emerge the winner, agents of the 
state lose fear of their superiors and […] build some credit with the opposition. For 
instance, Krenz (1990, 134 – 136) points out that Communist party chief Honnecker in 
East Germany ordered repression to stop the Monday night marches in Leipzig, but his 
plans were thwarted when police and Army refused to execute his orders.  
 
In order to determine whether those softliners are predominant within the regime, 
and whether a true crisis situation as defined in this thesis is present, we look at two other 
indicators:  
 
Fourthly, (4) a regime crisis is present when members of the authoritarian regime 
propose, and carry through, credible, serious and committed reform plans (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986). This is the proxy indicator identified deductively by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter themselves. According to their logic, there is no liberalization without a prior 
regime crisis, or a struggle between softliners and hardliners. Therefore, if we are able to 
identify reforms, we can necessarily conclude not only that such a crisis has been present, 
but also that the balance of power between hardliners and softliners was such that 
softliners managed to impose their agenda onto the hardliner faction. This line of argument 
is problematic for two reasons. First, it is based upon almost axiomatic reasoning, given 
that the indicator only holds if the basic assumption is accepted to be true: an authoritarian 
regime only carries out reforms if it has previously lost its unity and softliners have 
emerged as the driving force. Secondly, we have shown in the literature review that this is 
exactly the point of contention between the two main theories. Whereas O’Donnell and 
Schmitter claim that there is no transition without crisis, Bratton and Van de Walle and 
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Bunce argue that an authoritarian regime may adopt reforms because they are forced upon 
its leadership, which remains relatively united throughout the transition process. Therefore, 
the problem remains: how to differentiate reform propositions originating from a crisis 
between hardliners and softliners from reforms forced onto a reluctant regime that keeps its 
internal unity? In other words, how can we really be sure that reforms were the 
consequence of a crisis? This problem is mitigated by the methodology of our study: By 
first identifying softliners within the regime via our indicators 1 – 3 we know that a power 
struggle within the ruling clique has actually taken place. Therefore, reforms stemming 
from this power struggle credibly suggest that they were the direct consequence of this 
struggle, and necessarily, of softliner predominance.   
 
Finally, (5) by implication, continued repression and the use of excessive force on 
reform-minded elements can be considered an indicator for the absence or the weakness of 
softliners and the predominance of hardliner factions, and therefore the absence of a 
regime crisis as defined in this study. The bloody repression of the Tiananmen square 
protests in China in 1989, for example, clearly demonstrated that the authoritarian 
government was united enough to act as one in order to defend the integrity of the regime 
under threat.  
 
Unfortunately there is no readily-available database for our variable "crisis of the 
authoritarian regime". We therefore needed to create our own database by means of 
systematic qualitative analysis of our case sample30. To this end we relied both on primary 
and secondary literature, as well as a variety of quantitative databases. In order to identify 
our indicator "reform propositions", we used databases that register democratic progress on 
an annual basis in target countries such as the Polity dataset, the Freedom House annual 
reports and the Inter-Legions Unit Reports of the Economist. Furthermore we had access to 
sources such as the Europa Yearbook, CIA Facts and Files and primary literature such as 
journals, political commentaries and newspaper articles reporting on legislative change in 
target countries. The data we were interested in was primarily related to changes in 
political and civil liberties, i.e. legislative changes carried out by the authoritarian regime 
with a view of allowing greater contestation and participation to take place. For instance, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The database is available in its entirety in the annex of this thesis. 
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the extension of the right to vote to formerly disenfranchised groups of the population, or 
the removal of bans on opposition parties were both considered key reforms potentially 
indicating a regime crisis. For our indicators "defections", "repression", as well as our 
indicators "public discourse of members of the authoritarian regime" and "policy change in 
government portfolios", we used mainly primary sources such as journal articles and 
archives, but also secondary literature such as doctoral theses and scholarly articles where 
appropriate. A resume of our findings can be found in Table I. 
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Table I 
[Presence/Absence of Authoritarian Regime Crisis] 
 
Transition Attempt Result AR Crisis 
Tr
an
si
tio
ns
 in
 L
A/
SE
 
1982 – 1983 Argentina Success Yes 
1976 – 1979 Spain Success Yes 
1974 – 1976 Portugal Success Yes 
1979 – 1990 Chile Success Yes 
1973 – 1974 Greece Success Yes 
1988 – 1993 Paraguay Success Yes 
1980 – 1984 Uruguay Success Yes 
1978 – 1980 Bolivia Failure No 
 
Tr
an
si
tio
ns
 in
 A
fr
ic
a 
 
1988 – 1992 Algeria Failure No 
1992 - 1994 Tanzania Failure Yes 
1990 – 1991 Zambia Success Yes 
1991 – 1992 Mali Success Yes 
1993 – 1994 Malawi Success Yes 
1990 – 1991 Benin Success Yes 
1987 – 1993 Nigeria (1) Failure No 
1998 – 1999 Nigeria (2) Success Yes 
1990 – 1992 Kenya Failure No 
1991 – 1993 Togo Failure No 
1990 – 1992 Cameroon Failure No 
   
EE
 
1990 – 1991 Mongolia Success Yes 
1988 – 1991 Poland Success Yes 
1990 – 1992 Romania Success Yes 
 
SE
A 
1978 – 1979 South Korea Failure No 
1983 – 1986 Philippines Success Yes 
1998 - 1999 Indonesia Success Yes 
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! 2.2.3.  Definition and Calibration of "Mass Mobilization" (Condition II) 
 
 Societal forces opposed to the authoritarian regime carry through mass 
mobilization. In our thesis, those forces are defined as "any group that has the necessary 
resources to organise and mobilise in order to push for a regime change" and that possesses 
some bargaining power vis-à-vis the regime (Crescenski 1999, 194). Such bargaining 
power generally stems from sheer numbers; organized protest in the framework of a 
democratic transition generally involves significant numbers of people. In the Philippines, 
for instance, the popular uprising dubbed "People Power Revolution" that forced President 
Marcos into exile involved as many as 500.000 ordinary Filipinos, as well as a number of 
religious, political and military leaders (Shin 2008, 100).  
 
 Protest events, on the other hand, are "basic units of an organized, sustained, self-
conscious challenge to existing authorities or other political actors" (Kriesi 1997, 53). For 
the purpose of this thesis, three aspects of protest become particularly significant: (1) 
Origin/Timing of mobilization; (2) scope of mobilization; and (3) strategies of 
mobilization.  
 ! (1) Origin/Timing of mobilization 
 
 Earlier research on collective action argued that social movements were 
spontaneous, unorganized and irrational phenomena that occurred in highly charged 
contexts characterized by mass enthusiasm, social contagion and mass hysteria (Morris 
1999, 531). Aristide R. Zolberg (1972) qualifies them as "moments of madness", and 
"times of extreme outrage and collective hopes, not of particular interest and personal 
calculation" (Thompson 2000, 9). By contrast, more recent approaches formulated, among 
others, by Tarrow (1994), Tilly (1978), McCarthy and Zald (1977), Gamson (1975) and 
McAdam (1982) stress agency, strategizing, reasoning, analyses and rationality in the 
causation and the direction of movements. In fact, many of these scholars insist on the 
concept of political opportunity structure to account for movement origins. Political 
opportunity structure refers to the "consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent 
dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure" (Tarrow 1994, 85). 
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According to Tarrow, particular emphasis needs to be placed on the mobilization of 
resources external to the group, since potential challengers are unlikely to generate and 
sustain movements because of their weak social position. Movements are likely to emerge 
only when favorable changes occur in the external political system, the likelihood of which 
significantly increases when divisions develop among political elites. However, such a 
model underestimates challenging groups’ capacity to generate and sustain collective 
action and is therefore only partly useful to describe transitions to democracy. Its main 
limitation stems from the assumption that external political opportunities must first become 
available before challenging groups can generate collective action, even though empirical 
examples (e.g., Kurzman 1996; Rasler 1996) suggest that enormous collective action can 
burst forth precisely when the political authorities close ranks and when heavy repression 
is unleashed. As Morris (2000, 447) remarks, "in some instances collective action can 
generate political opportunities where none existed previously; in other instances political 
opportunities can clear the way for collective action. The temporal sequence is to be 
determined on empirical grounds rather than on a priori theorizing". Our hypothesis is 
based on a similar assumption: protest movements may pre-exist divisions within the 
authoritarian regime, and even provoke and amplify such divisions. This, in turn, generates 
favorable opportunities for other challengers and creates circumstances in which political 
openings are more likely to take place. Therefore, the origins of mass mobilizations as 
relevant for our thesis may be situated either before concrete liberalization efforts are 
undertaken by the authoritarian regime or during the transition process itself. 
 
(2) Scope of mobilization 
 ! As Stepan (1986) has noted, protest movements can be diffuse or coordinated and 
can be organized by various sectors of society31. Although they do not always involve the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Whitehead (1986, 55) for example points to a series of conflicts and protest movements that preceded the 
announcement of an electoral timetable by the Bolivian Banzer regime in 1987; these protest campaigns 
rallied students, workers and peasants around a coalition that ranged from progressive Churchmen to 
Communist Trade Unions. Garreton (1986, 113) on the other hand describes a series of "national protests" in 
his account of the Chilean transition in which activists from many different spheres of society were 
implicated: opposition parties, Church representatives, left-wing political organizations, students and labor 
unions. 
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same protagonists, they generally mobilize a wide array of actors. These groups are united 
in that they are excluded from the polity and have no political access and share the 
common goal of obtaining it. They also share some common identity based upon their 
understanding of their shared interests and by their imagining solidarity with others (Bayat 
2005). Oberschall (2000, 43) for example explains that the lack of a credible Communist 
ideology in the last years of the Soviet Union enabled the rapid formation of a collective 
identity among thousands of ordinary hitherto apolitical citizens, symbolized by the 
emergence of a common consciousness of “We the people” against “them, the 
Communists”. 
 
 While it does happen that a large turnout of collective actors does not translate into 
political gain (see Hornsey et al. 2006), empirical evidence shows that successful 
transitions (such as, for example, the 1989 transitions in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia) often involve numbers that range from several hundred thousand 
participants to millions (Bunce 2003). Anthony Oberschall (2000, 30 – 31) explains this as 
follows: In an authoritarian regime, rulers need only the conformity of the ruled, not their 
votes. Challengers to the rule therefore need to create a negative inducement (a cost) in 
order for their demands to be heard. This cost is usually created by protest, disorder or 
trouble- visible denials of the regime’s claim to legitimacy both on the domestic and the 
international level. On one hand, the challenger offers to stop disorder if the regime yields 
on substantive demands and/or is willing to negotiate. On the other hand, the regime can 
choose to either concede all or at least part of the demands, or to exercise repression. 
However, a big factor influencing the regime’s decision-making during contention is the 
challenger’s capacity to mobilize supporters in the face of regime threats. Bermeo (1997) 
argues that the significance of popular protest is found precisely in elite calculations 
regarding the strength of the protesters. By consequence, a wider participation of civil 
society in mass protests ensures that the cost of repressing dissent outweighs the cost of 
liberalizing, therefore making a transition to democracy more likely. In South Korea, for 
instance, street demonstrations referred to as the "June Popular Uprising" forced the Chun 
government into deciding whether to quell demonstrations bloodily just a few months 
before the scheduled Summer Olympics and risk international condemnation, or to accept 
the demands of antigovernment forces for the direct election of the president by the people. 
In the end the government ceded to the protesters’ demands for reforms (Shin 2008, 100). 
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 In order to avoid weighting issues, we differentiate in this thesis between low and 
high levels of mass mobilization solely on the basis of the number of mobilizations taking 
place, without taking into account how protest movements are actually composed. 
    
 (3) Strategies of mobilization 
 
 When analyzing strategies of confrontation, it is important to distinguish peaceful 
demonstrations of civil society organizations (as evidenced, for example, in many sub-
Saharan transitions; see Bratton et al. 1997) from insurrections, armed rebellions or violent 
revolutions (see, for example, Wood 2000; Stepan 1986). In many of these cases, 
democracy may only be an unintended by-product: as Waterbury (1999, 200) suggests, 
many struggles that are followed by institutional change towards greater participation can 
probably be better understood as violent episodes of state construction. Our thesis is not 
concerned with any of these phenomena, as the dynamics of a transition from civil war 
differ considerably from peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule. Examples of 
acceptable nonconventional collective action are "marches, demonstrations, petitions, 
strikes, riots, boycotts [and] symbolic protest" (Oberschall 2000, 27 – 28).  Most often 
mass protest takes on the form of strikes and lockouts, such as the General Strike of July 
17, 1977 in Peru; student demonstrations (such as in Greece) or general delegitimizing 
campaigns. Ortega Ortiz (2000) for example writes that the Mexican regime between 1935 
and 1940 faced an average of 478 strikes per year involving around 61.000 strikers. 
Maravall (1978) analyzes the Spanish student movement and finds that they frequently 
joined hands with the Spanish worker unions in General Strikes and boycotts in order to 
bring their political demands across. Middlebrook (1986) also notes that the presence of 
national debates is a form of mass protest against the authoritarian regime. 
 
 Protest strategies included in this thesis are "any kind of public action of a 
demonstrative, confrontational, or violent form, which is reported in the [sources] we 
analyzed" (Kriesi 1997; 53). More specifically, this refers to strikes/lockouts, anti-
government demonstrations and riots, an operationalization that is consistent with 
constructs of political protest used, among others, in Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 
Taylor and Jodice (1983), Banks (1971) and Zimmerman (1980).  
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 A fourth variable, the goals pursued by the protesters, has been excluded from our 
analysis on methodological grounds. Qualitative studies have long recognized the 
importance of a "pro-democratic agenda" among opposition groups as a requirement for 
successful democratization. This does not mean that protests should center solely on 
democratic change – in fact, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, ethnic 
identities and discrimination all provide important ground for grievances (Sambanis 2002; 
Fearon and Laitin 2001). However, if the opposition focuses solely on the removal from 
power of the current authoritarian leader without genuinely desiring political change 
towards greater accountability of powerholders and popular participation in the political 
arena, democratization is generally considered unlikely. The nature of the database we 
work with, however, does not allow us to take this fourth variable into account. The Cross-
National Time Series dataset (CNTS) compiles protest events on an annual basis and only 
provides information about the general nature of the protest (strikes, anti-government 
demonstrations or riots). It does not inform us about either scope of individual protests, the 
composition of the protest movement or its demands. Weighting in such information would 
force a manual recoding of every single protest-event taking place within our 
predetermined temporal framework in every country under study – a task that is impossible 
to accomplish with the resources at hand. We therefore deem it justified excluding the 
variable "goals of the protest movement" from the analysis, even though we recognize its 
theoretical importance.  
 
In order to measure "mass mobilization" we take into account the three 
characteristics we identified above as being relevant to protest movements in this study: (1) 
Timing of mobilization; (2) Scope of mobilization; and (3) Strategies of mobilization. For 
the purpose of testing our hypotheses on the relationship between mass mobilization and 
democratization we first need to know whether or not mass mobilization took place at all, 
that is, the actual level of mass mobilization. In order to decide whether mobilization can 
be part of our set "high level of mass mobilization", we further need to know the 
comparative level of mass mobilization, in order to categorize mobilization as either "low" 
or "high". Finally, our model will need to be adapted for the possibility that protest taking 
place outside of the formal temporal framework of a transition (defined as the moment in 
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which the first reforms are introduced into the system) still decisively contributes to the 
transition outcome by creating a crisis within the authoritarian regime.  
 
We measure the actual level of mass mobilization using a modified version of the 
"Transitional Mass Mobilization Index" (TMMI) developed by Htun Htun Soe (2009)32. In 
line with our observation on protest strategies, this index is created from the number of 
General Strikes, anti-government demonstrations and riots reported annually in the Cross-
National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset. The CNTS dataset considers General Strikes as 
"any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one 
employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority." Its CNTS 
variable name is S17F2 General Strikes. Riots are defined as "any violent demonstration or 
clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force" and its CNTS variable 
name is S17F6 Riots. Finally, anti-government demonstrations are defined as "any 
peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or 
voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a 
distinctly anti-foreign nature." Its CNTS variable name is S18F1 Anti-Government 
Demonstrations.  
 
Event count data of mass mobilization in the CNTS dataset is compiled from the 
daily files of the New York Times and is a widely used instrument in measuring mass 
mobilization33. The database contains information on all countries in the world and reaches 
as far back as the mid-20th century or even earlier for certain cases. Whereas there might be 
a danger of reporting bias due to the narrowness of its source, the consistency of the CNTS 
database is probably one of its greatest advantages. In fact, although mass mobilization is 
relatively easy to measure, the challenge of finding reliable datasets to work with is 
considerable. Nancy Bermeo once lamented: "Cross‐national time series data for a 
phenomenon as varied as “popular mobilization” are [simply] not available…" (1990, p. 
311). Bermeo was consequently obliged to use the number of strikes and lockouts 
compiled by the International Labor Organization as a proxy indicator of mass 
mobilization. Although certainly valid in the context of her study, we find her indicator too 
restrictive, as there are many forms of protest movements that do not all involve organized !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Soe developed this and another index of mass mobilization in order to test the relationship between mode 
of transition and resultant quality of democracy.  
33 See, for example, Przeworski et al. 1996; Ulfelder 2005; and Richards and Gelleny 2006. 
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labor. We therefore consider the trade-off between source variety and consistency in the 
CNTS dataset to be worthwhile.  
 
It is also important to note that the CNTS database reports only event count data 
without taking into account the protest magnitude (as defined by size, duration and space; 
Soe 2009, 95). At first glance this might seem disadvantageous; however, it makes sense 
for the purpose of our thesis, since the taking into account of such variables would force 
excessive weighting of our index34. Furthermore, "the size and claim thresholds in the 
Banks definitions (…) probably enhance the comparability of the data across cases with 
varying degrees of press freedom and international interest" (Ulfelder 2005, 321). 
Therefore, rather than take into account the scope of individual protest events it is 
preferable to estimate the magnitude of mass mobilization over the course of a transition 
(by classifying mobilization as "high" or "low").   
 
Our "Transitional Mass Mobilisation Index" (TMMI) is calculated according to the 
following formula:  
 ln 1+!"#$! !"#$%&!!"!!"#"$%&!!"#$%&'!×43 + ! !"#$%&!!"!!"#$%!×102 + ! !"#$%&!!"!!"#$ − !"#$%&'$&(! "#$%&'()'*$%&!×200 !÷ 4 35  
 
TMMI is equal to the natural log value of one plus the mean value of the weighted 
mass mobilization indicators. The weighting follows the one proposed by the Weighted 
Conflict Index of the CNTS database, according to which anti-government demonstrations 
are weighted approximately four times more than strikes and two times more than riots. 
Such treatment of the indicators is consistent with the spirit of this analysis, since we 
consider that in a transition context the former is more of a direct challenge to the non-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 For a more detailed explanation of the weighting issue, see Soe, Htun Htun (2009), pp. 95 - 96 
35 Our Mass Mobilization Index follows the way the Weighted Conflict Index is calculated in the CNTS 
dataset. In the CNTS Data Archive, the Weighted Conflict Index is computed from the event counts as 
follows:  
 
{(Assassinations * 24) + (General Strikes * 43) + (Guerrilla Warfare * 46) + (Government Crises * 48) + 
(Purges * 86) + (Riots * 102) + (Revolutions * 148) + (Anti‐Government Demonstrations * 200)} / 9 
 
The sum of the 8 weighted values of each event are then divided by 9, the number of component variables 
plus one. Our TMMI has been created according to the same logic.  
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democratic incumbents than the latter two. One is added in order to bring the smallest 
value of the TMMI to zero, since the natural log of one is zero (Mertler and Vannatta 2002, 
32). Contrary to Soe (2009) who originally developed this index, our mean value is the 
average value of the weighted three mass mobilization indicators in (maximal) three non-
democratic years preceding the transition plus the years of the actual transition process (i.e. 
the year in which the first reforms are introduced, the interval in-between and potentially 
either the year of the founding election or the year in which the transition process was 
aborted).  
 
Why should this be an appropriate measure? Firstly, including actual non-
democratic years before the start of a transition attempt takes into account our premise that 
mass mobilizations can initiate transitions by pushing the authoritarian regime into 
committing to reform plans. We arbitrarily set this number to three (or less, in case that no 
mass mobilization took place), as we believe that the contribution to reform efforts of the 
authoritarian regime by protest that is too far apart in time is likely very small. Secondly, 
our research is not only interested in mobilization that takes place before an actual 
transition attempt is started, but also in protest that takes place simultaneously with the 
transition process. Mass protest as relevant for our hypotheses covers potentially the 
entirety of a transition, and must therefore include activity both before and after first 
reforms. In order to decide whether or not to include mass mobilization taking place during 
the final year of a transition attempt we follow Soe’s lead and use Polity IV data on the end 
of the ancient regime.36 In fact, Soe (2009, 99) pinpoints the crux of the problem: "If mass 
mobilization in the [end year of a transition] is not taken into account, the democratic 
transition could have [ended] sometime in the mid-year and mass mobilization could have 
occurred in the earlier months of the year [and therefore an important contribution to the 
transition ending would be missed]. On the other hand, if the mass mobilization in the [end 
year of transition] is taken into account in all transition cases, the given mass mobilization 
could be a result of [the new regime] rather than a cause (…)." In this study, we include 
mass mobilization during the final year of a transition only in cases where Polity records 
the ending of the old regime later than June. This solution is relatively simple and to a 
certain degree arbitrary, but we justify this arbitrariness on the grounds of practicality.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Since the data in the CNTS dataset is compiled on a per annum basis, it is impossible to know in which 
month mass mobilization occurs.  
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TMMI is a non-negative index, the minimum index value "zero" (0) indicating no 
mass mobilization and index value "one" (1) indicating the lower bound if some mass 
mobilization did take place (Soe 2009, 51). There is no upper bound to the index, as there 
is no limit to the number of strikes, riots and anti-government demonstrations that can take 
place. Whereas the TMMI is enough to measure the absolute level of mass mobilization, it 
does not measure the relative, or comparative level of mass mobilization, and therefore 
does not provide information on the scope of mobilization (low or high). In order to get an 
idea of the magnitude of mass mobilization compared to regional and non-regional 
counterparts, we use a second index, Soe’s Comparative Transitional Mobilization Index 
(CTMMI). This index is created "from multiplying TMMI with its ratio to the regional 
mean and with its ratio to the global mean before finding its cube root if TMMI of a given 
case is smaller than the global median [or] multiplying TMMI with its ratio to the regional 
mean and with its ratio to the global mean before finding its cube root and multiplying it 
with 1.25 if TMMI is larger or equal to the global median" (Soe 2009, 104)37.  
 
If TMMI of a transition case is smaller than the global median, !"##$ = ! !""#!"#$%&'(! "#$ × !"#$%"! "#$!  
  
If TMMI of a transition case is larger than or equal to the global median, !"##$ = ! !""#!"#$%&'(! "#$ × !"#$%"! "#$! !×(1.25) 
 
While both our outcome condition "minimal democracy" and our first explanatory 
condition "crisis of the authoritarian regime" are dichotomous, we feel that "mass 
mobilization", by nature of the concept, does not lend itself well to such treatment. To the 
contrary, forced dichotomization would lead to a loss of information on differences in 
mobilization scope, as cases without mobilization (such as, for example, Tanzania) would 
be classified in the same category as cases with low mobilization (for example Zambia), 
because they both do not fit into the set "high levels of mobilization". This, in turn, could 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 For a more detailed explanation of the model and its rationale see Soe 2009, 95 – 105. 
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have repercussions on the findings we obtain from our QCA analysis and lead to wrong 
interpretations. Therefore, we decided to give our condition "mass mobilization" values on 
a 3-point scale, ranging between 0 (no mass mobilization), 1 (low levels of mass 
mobilization) and 2 (high levels of mass mobilization). To do so required a transformation 
of CTMMI values in order to classify our cases38. We decided to use the mean value of 
CTMMI to define the threshold between low and high levels of mass mobilization39. If the 
CTMMI value of a transition case was zero, it had no mass mobilization whatsoever and 
the set value was set to 0. If the CTMMI value was smaller than its mean but greater than 
zero, we categorized it as "low levels of mass mobilization" and set the value to 1. By 
contrast, if the CTMMI value was greater than its mean we set the value to 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 In our dataset, the CTMMI takes on values between 0 and 2,68. Potentially, however, higher values are 
possible with a different case sample, if such a sample contained cases with higher levels of mass 
mobilization than those found here.  
39 Despite the fact that Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 33) explicitely caution against using information 
internal to the data at hand, such as the median or the mean, to indicate thresholds, we would like to defend 
our choice of using the CTMMI mean to find the point of indifference.  Schneider and Wagemann warn that 
parameters such as the mean are inappropriate for calibration purposes since they imply that the classification 
of a case depends not only on this case’s own absolute value but also on its relative value with regards to 
other cases. However, in our research, this is precisely the case. It would be useless to know that Kenya has 
an absolute level of mobilization of 6 if we do not know what this value means in relation to other African 
countries that also experienced protests, or to countries in other world regions. Therefore, we believe that 
using the CTMMI mean as a cut-off point between low and high levels of mobilization is justified, since the 
CTMMI is a combined indicator comprising information on both absolute and relative levels of mobilization.  
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Table II 
[TMMI/CTMMI Index] 
 
Transition Attempt TMMItot TMMIbef %TMMIbef CTMMI* 
Tr
an
si
tio
ns
 in
 L
A/
SE
 
1982 – 1983 Argentina 4,94 4,36 88 % 2,17 
1976 – 1979 Spain 6,07 5,60 92 % 2,66 
1974 – 1976 Portugal 5,21 2,87 55 % 2,29 
1979 – 1990 Chile 5,40 2,25 42 % 2,37 
1973 – 1974 Greece 4,36 3,54 81 % 1,53 
1988 – 1993 Paraguay 3,69 4,21 114 % 1,29 
1980 – 1984 Uruguay 4,13 0,00 0 % 1,45 
1978 – 1980 Bolivia 4,37 4,32 99 % 1,92 
   
Tr
an
si
tio
ns
 in
 A
fr
ic
a 
 
1988 – 1992 Algeria 4,29 0,00 0 % 1,76 
1992 - 1994 Tanzania 0,00 0,00 0 % 0,00 
1990 – 1991 Zambia 2,78 0,00 0 % 1,14 
1991 – 1992 Mali 2,62 0,00 0 % 1,08 
1993 – 1994 Malawi 3,26 3,76 115 % 1,34 
1990 – 1991 Benin 3,27 3,55 109 % 1,35 
1987 – 1993 Nigeria (1) 4,00 3,28 82 % 1,65 
1998 – 1999 Nigeria (2) 4,40 3,94 90 % 2,26 
1990 – 1992 Kenya 4,39 2,25 51 % 2,26 
1991 – 1993 Togo 4,53 3,64 80 % 2,33 
1990 – 1992 Cameroon 3,55 0,00 0 % 1,46 
     
EE
 
1990 – 1991 Mongolia 3,93 0,00 0 % 1,45 
1988 – 1991 Poland 4,96 4,21 85 % 2,29 
1990 – 1992 Romania 5,12 3,94 77 % 2,36 
   
SE
A 
1978 – 1979 South Korea 5,23 4,77 91 % 2,24 
1983 – 1986 Philippines 5,98 5,34 89 % 2,56 
1998 - 1999 Indonesia 6,25 5,23 84 % 2,68 
*Mean value: 1,84 
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A final word maybe needs to be said on the concrete use of our TMMI index. A 
priori, only the CTMMI is relevant for the verification of our hypotheses, since only the 
transformed values of this index enter the data matrix of the QCA truth table. In that sense, 
TMMI needs to be calculated in order to obtain CTMMI, but has no further bearing on the 
analysis. TMMI is useful, however, since it enables us to at least somewhat assess the 
timing component of mass mobilization in transitions. By calculating TMMI first for the 
entire duration of the transition process (hereafter referred to as TMMItot) and then 
calculating it again for the 3-year period leading up to the first reform introductions only 
(hereafter referred to as TMMIbef) and then comparing the two values we get an idea of the 
role mass mobilization could have played in a given transition attempt: in other words, it 
allows us to distinguish transitions where mass mobilization conceivably initiated the 
process (i.e. contributed decisively to provoking a crisis of the authoritarian regime) from 
transitions where the contribution of mass mobilization was situated more in the 
bargaining period between the introduction of reforms and the holding of elections. 
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2.3.  Case Selection: Principles and Practice 
 
 After having delimitated our conditions, we now turn to selecting our case sample. 
In a first step, it is important to note that our thesis exclusively focuses on transitions 
belonging to the Third Wave and excludes the most recent attempts at democratization in 
the context of the Arab Spring. It is generally accepted that the Third Wave started with 
Portugal in 1973. As to the end, there is no consensus in the literature: while some authors 
associate the Third Wave to transitions that took place between 1973 and 1995, others 
include even very late transitions such as the one of Indonesia in 200440. We err on the side 
of caution, and therefore set our observational reference frame between January 1, 1973 
and December 31, 2005. We also need to keep in mind to select only cases where a 
transition process has in fact been initiated, and to exclude what Bratton and Van de Walle 
call "precluded transitions"- transitions where one of our independent variables is present, 
but no transition has taken place, as happened, for example, in China in 1989. Disregarding 
this condition would run counter to the aim of our thesis: determining the conditions that 
lead to a successful conclusion of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  
 
 In a second step, it is important to select a suitable database from which our cases 
can be drawn. Even though a variety of data sources for case sampling exist, the two most 
complete and widely used databases (and also the ones used in this study) remain Polity IV 
and the Freedom House "Freedom in the World" database41 . The Freedom House 
"Freedom in the World" surveys provide the most suitable way to identify transition 
attempts in the framework of our thesis. Even though Polity also provides a number of 
mechanisms (DEMOC, AUTOC and POLITY score42) for measuring modifications in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 It is important to note that the later years of the third wave have been marked by a return to 
authoritarianism, or to semi-authoritarian regimes in a number of countries; for this reason, some authors 
hesitate to extend the duration of the Third Wave to transitions that took place between 1995 and 2004.  
41 There is another recent database developed by Geddes et al. (2012) which lists all authoritarian regimes 
that have ended between 1945 and 2010, excluding micro-states, non-independent territories and territories 
that are occupied by foreign forces. This database is useful above all for a first pre-selection of cases because 
it enables us to eliminate exogenous transitions (i.e. transitions that have been imposed by former colonial 
powers and foreign occupation forces). For the actual choice of cases, the Geddes database is not so 
appropriate because it does not provide information on the "degree of democraticness/autocraticnes" of a 
given country, and is therefore unable to monitor gradual changes that might indicate transition attempts. 
42 Institutionalized Democracy Score, which is referred as "DEMOC score" in this paper, is "an additive 
eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive." The AUTOC score is "an eleven‐point Autocracy scale (0‐10)" and the 
"operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, 
! 76!
institutional structure of target countries, it ignores changes in civil and political liberties, 
which are most often precursors to institutional change. By relying solely on Polity we run 
the risk of committing Type I error, failing to identify a transition, or identifying a 
transition much later than it actually occurs (for example Peru (1975) where Polity 
identifies institutional change only in 1978). Freedom House, by contrast, focuses not only 
on institutional change but also on civil rights and liberties; a crucial component in 
liberalization processes. Most, if not all, transitions begin with liberalization and a 
relaxation of the civil and political restrictions imposed on the citizenry. Only Freedom 
House is able to measure those changes through their index "civil rights"; more profound, 
institutional changes are usually measured through the index "political rights". There are 
several ways to use the Freedom House database to identify transition attempts, but not all 
of them are suitable for our research design. 
 
  The first (1) possibility is to use changes in Freedom House’s classification of 
countries (Non-Free, Partly-Free and Free) to identify regime change. However, not all 
transitions feature a change from one category to the other; for example, sometimes 
countries will maintain a "Partly Free" status all along even though within this category 
certain institutional changes take place. These kinds of transition attempts would therefore 
remain hidden from the researcher’s eye. On the other hand, some transitions directly jump 
from the "Non-Free" category to the "Free" category, but Freedom House registers the 
change only when the transition was already a long time underway (for example in 
Portugal). Either way, our research design would be vulnerable to Type I error, failing to 
identify transition cases even though they occur, or identifying a transition case much later 
than it actually occurs.   
 
 The second (2) possibility is to look at changes in both the Civil Rights (CR) and 
Political Rights (PR) categories. Similarly to how the Polity codebook identifies general 
"regime change"43, an X-point change in either one or both of these categories would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on 
the chief executive." Finally, the "combined POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score 
from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to ‐ 10 
(strongly autocratic)." (Polity IV User Manual) 
43 Polity IV defines "regime transition" as a 3-point change in the POLITY variable, "with each continuous, 
sequential change (in the same general direction) in a complex transition occurring within three years or less 
of the previous change" (Polity IV User Manual, 30). A "democratic transition" is said to occur if there is at 
least a 3-point POLITY value change in three years or less from autocracy (i.e. a negative or zero Polity 
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indicate a modification in the general authoritarian structure of the regime, granting either 
greater freedoms and civil liberties or providing greater opportunities for political 
participation. This method is advantageous because it allows identifying transitions even in 
very early stages. However, like Polity’s "3-point"-rule, we need to introduce a threshold 
below which modifications are too insignificant to be taken into account. This is necessary 
in order to distinguish simple modifications of an authoritarian regime from genuine 
transition attempts44. After comparing the Polity and Freedom-House scales of democracy 
(Polity uses a 10-point scale and Freedom House a 7 point scale), we decided that there 
should be at least a 2-point change in either the Civil Rights or Political Rights categories 
or in a combination of both, for us to classify a country as "transitional". Transposed to 
Polity’s coding system, this number corresponds exactly to Polity’s 3-point rule, and can 
therefore be considered reasonable. By adopting this threshold we avoid potential Type II 
errors (identifying a transition even though one could legitimately argue that none occurs) 
and, more importantly, diminish the risk of Type I error since, by looking at the isolated 
indices, we register even small modifications in authoritarian regimes.   
 
 In light of these considerations we choose our cases based on sampling technique 
(2) and use the Polity DEMOC score45 as additional tool to control our selection46. As we 
have explained in our section on concepts, a transition to democracy is defined to take 
place when some democratic measures are introduced into a formerly undemocratic 
system. These democratic measures could include, for example, holding elections – 
especially in the transitions from military regimes; legalization of other political parties – 
especially in the transitions from one- party-dominant regimes; and introduction of 
institutional constraints on the chief executive- especially in the transitions from 
personalistic regimes (Polity IV).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
score) to a partial democracy (POLITY values +1 to +6) or full democracy (POLITY values +7 to +10; 
Polity IV User Manual, 35).   
44 This distinction is of greater importance than one could potentially think. The works of Carothers (2002) 
and other scholars confirm that especially in the first half of the 1990s, when political change accelerated in 
many regions, numerous policy makers and aid practitioners reflexively labeled any formerly authoritarian 
country that was attempting some political liberalization as a "transitional country", only to realize a decade 
later that those countries were in no way on the road to democratization. 
45 DEMOC scores start at 0 for countries whose institutional structure is purely autocratic. As soon as some 
democratic measure (in institutional terms) is introduced in the system, DEMOC score becomes positive. 
46 In our selection, DEMOC scores usually became positive only a few years after the first democratic 
progress in FH’s CR and PR indices had been registered. This can be explained, again, by the fact that 
institutional progress usually takes place only after some liberalization of rights and freedoms has occurred.  
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Hence, in operational terms a transition attempt is said to occur  
 
a) in the year a positive change in either Civil Rights (CR) or Political Right (PR) 
score is assigned to a polity that has been classified by Freedom House as "Non 
Free" or "Partly Free" (but not an electoral democracy!) in the preceding year  
 
b) IF this change is accompanied by an instance of regime change as defined by a 2-
point change (or higher) in the PR, the CR, or both variables.  !! For instance, Brazil’s PC and CR scores changed from 5/5 in 1973 to 4/4 in 1974. 
Since this is a two-point change in a positive direction (following the Freedom House 
coding criteria) we can therefore confirm that Brazil in 1974 started a transition to 
democracy.   
 
 Some might argue with that definition, contending that the starting point of a 
transition should be defined as the year in which the first popular protests are registered, 
since typically transitions "from below" feature a significant amount of mass mobilization 
before the actual reaction of the authoritarian rulers occurs. In our opinion, however, a 
transition, can only take place with a change in the rules of the game by the incumbent 
regime; therefore, the starting year of the transition will be the year in which such a change 
takes place, and not the year in which the first protests were registered47.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 We did, however, add an additional time component to our mass mobilization index in order to account for 
the possibility of transitions being initiated by protest movements.  
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 Having thus delimitated the beginning of a transition attempt, we consider that a 
transition to democracy has ended if either event occurs: 
 
a) Founding elections are held and the polity obtains the designation "minimal 
democracy" by Freedom House;  
 
b) Founding elections are held but the polity does not obtain the label "minimal 
democracy" by Freedom House; 
 
c) No founding elections are held and the authoritarian regime continues in power; 
 
d) Free and fair elections are being held in a polity where elections were already 
common, but which usually were restricted, fraudulent or extremely unfair. The 
polity obtains the designation "minimal democracy" by Freedom House.   
 
 Information on the holding of founding elections is obtained by combining 
information on the end of the ancien regime found in quantitative databases (Geddes 2012; 
Freedom House) with qualitative literature on transitions. The information on whether a 
regime obtained the status of minimal democracy is gathered from Freedom House’s list of 
electoral democracies, as explained prior in our section on the calibration of the outcome 
condition. The resulting universe of cases is potentially fairly big. Due to theoretical 
constraints, however, we have to narrow the population down purposefully, with the aim of 
achieving the most significant results possible. As Retherford and Choe note (1993, 9), 
cases can be selected at random, by purposeful selection, or by some combination of the 
two such as stratified random sampling or systematic sampling.  
 
In a first step, we exclude independent polities whose current population (2015) is 
inferior to one million, such as Cap Verde, Djibouti, Suriname, Samoa, Grenada and Sao 
Tome and Principe. This exclusion is consistent with the methodology employed by 
similar quantitative studies carried out among others by Geddes (2012) and Soe (2009) and 
serves the purpose of increasing the representativity of our case sample.  
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Secondly, we exclude cases of (attempted) democratization after civil war, such as 
El Salvador (1979 - 1992), Angola (1975 – 2002), Cambodia (1993), Liberia (1989 – 
2003), Mozambique (1994), Nepal (after 1996) and Zimbabwe (1979). We justify this 
exclusion by pointing out that there is considerable agreement in the literature that the 
dynamics of transitions in a post-conflict setting differ markedly from "regular" transitions 
from authoritarianism; too much, in our opinion, to warrant inclusion in our case sample. 
As Joshi (2010) argues, the anarchy of armed conflict not only creates conditions hostile to 
the emergence of democracy in the target country (such as the destruction of the economic 
infrastructure, the disintegration of the social fabric and a political climate marked by 
increased hostility and mistrust (Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Licklider 
1995; Kumar 1998) but also creates different priorities for any future leadership to address. 
In fact, most scholars agree that states in the immediate aftermath of conflict have to 
resolve issues of peace, political stability and the establishment of an effective 
administration over the territory. Compared to an autocratic state that has not witnessed a 
civil war, the dynamic of a transition therefore follows very different patterns.  
 
Finally, cases are excluded if foreign troops occupied and governed the country, 
and if democratization resulted from such occupation, as happened in Panama (Geddes 
2012). We justify this exclusion by the fact that decision-makers in such countries are not 
independent, and therefore studying the interaction between the country’s leadership would 
yield biased results.  
 
 According to these selection criteria, we identified 71 transition attempts between 
1973 and 2005. This number represents our total population. Of these transition attempts, 
51 are considered successful transitions (ending at least in minimal democracy) and 20 are 
considered failed transitions (not ending in minimal democracy). The ratio of failed to 
successful transitions is roughly !! or 0.4, meaning that successful transitions constitute 
approximately 60% of total transition attempts.  
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Table III  
[Total Number of Transitions] 
 
Successful transitions 
1982 – 1983 Argentina  1990 – 1993 Niger 
1981 – 1982 Bolivia  1999 – 1999 Niger 
1974 – 1985 Brazil  1977 – 1979 Nigeria 
1979 – 1990 Chile  1998 – 1999 Nigeria 
1976 – 1979 Ecuador  1990 – 1991 Zambia 
1977 – 1978 Dom. Republic  1991 – 1992 Mali 
1986 – 1990 Haiti  1999 – 2000 Mexico 
1974 – 1976 Portugal  1992 – 1993 Czech Republic 
1985 – 1991 Bangladesh  1990 – 1994 South Africa 
1998 - 1999 Indonesia  1993 - 1994 Slovakia 
1990 – 1991 Mongolia  2001 – 2002 Senegal 
1990 – 1991 Nepal   
1984 – 1988 Pakistan  Failed transitions 
1983 – 1986 Philippines  1978 – 1980 Bolivia 
1984 – 1987 South Korea  1976 – 1979 Bangladesh 
1986 - 1996 Taiwan  1979 – 1980 Nepal 
1973 – 1975 Thailand  1978 – 1979 South Korea 
1978 – 1988 Thailand  1988 – 1992 Algeria 
1991 – 1992 Albania  1988 – 1990 Tunisia 
1990 – 1991 Bulgaria  1988 – 1992 Burkina Faso 
1988 – 1990 Hungary  1990 - 1992 Cameroon 
1988 – 1991 Poland  1991 - 1992 Chad 
1990 – 1992 Romania  1975 – 1978 Senegal 
1990 – 1991 Benin  1989 - 1990 Ivory Coast 
1977 – 1978 Burkina Faso  1990 - 1991 Gabon 
1991 – 1993 CER  1990 - 1991 Guinea 
1991 – 1992 Congo Brazzaville  1990 - 1992 Kenya 
1977 – 1980 Ghana  1991 – 1993 Jordan 
1988 - 1996 Ghana  1987 – 1993 Nigeria 
1991 – 1994 Guinea-Bissau  1992 - 1994 Tanzania 
2002 - 2003 Kenya  1991 – 1993 Togo 
1991 – 1993 Lesotho  1980 – 1981 Uganda 
1990 – 1993 Madagascar  1990 - 1991 Mauritania 
1993 – 1994 Malawi    
Source: Freedom House, Polity IV 
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 From this universe of cases we selected twenty-five (25) cases using a combination 
of random and purposeful assignment. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 94) have 
argued, random selection and assignment are beneficial to the scholarly task of drawing 
causal inferences because they automatically ensure that the research design doesn’t suffer 
from either endogeneity, selection bias, or omitted variable bias. However, our random 
selection had to fulfill two conditions. Firstly, in order to obtain an appropriate balance 
between our positive and our negative cases, we separated transitions into "successful" and 
"failed" and set the number of cases randomly drawn from each category to be 
proportionate to their ratio to the total number of transition cases. By consequent, 
successful transition attempts accounted for 60% of the total number of transitions 
analyzed, whereas failed transitions only accounted for 40%. We did this with a view to 
increasing the validity of our findings, as our case sample is still small even for Boolean 
techniques. Secondly, our selection had to be geographically representative, since the main 
purpose of our thesis is the testing, in a cross-regional setting, of hypotheses developed in a 
regional context. Latin America and Southern Europe (grouped together for the purpose of 
simplification, as the timing of those transitions is relatively similar) account for 
approximately one third of the total number of transitions and are therefore represented by 
8 cases in our sample. Africa (including the MENA region) accounts for a bit less than half 
of the total number of transitions and obtains 11 cases in our sample. South-East Asia and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States both obtain 3 cases in our sample. In order to 
ensure that the random cases drawn from each category fulfill our requirement of having 
each region represented (irrespective of transition outcome), we subdivided the categories 
"successful" and "failed" transitions geographically and made sure that the distribution of 
cases corresponded reasonably closely to the geographical weighting.  
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In operational terms, we allocated a number to each of our transition attempts both 
for the category "successful" and "failed" transition. We then selected our cases according 
to the numbers obtained, using a random number generator and taking into account the two 
restrictions explained above48. Our final case selection comprises 25 transition attempts 
between 1973 and 2005, 17 of which are successful transitions to democracy and 8 of 
which are failed transitions.  
 
Table IV 
[Selected Transitions] 
 
Successful transitions  Failed transitions 
1982 – 1983 Argentina  1990 - 1992 Cameroon 
1998 - 1999 Indonesia  1991 – 1993 Togo 
1988 – 1991 Poland  1992 - 1994 Tanzania 
1983 – 1986 Philippines  1988 – 1992 Algeria 
1974 – 1976 Portugal  1987 – 1993 Nigeria 
1998 – 1999 Nigeria  1978 – 1979 South Korea 
1979 – 1990 Chile  1978 – 1980 Bolivia 
1990 – 1991 Benin  1990 - 1992 Kenya 
1993 – 1994 Malawi    
1991 – 1992 Mali    
1990 – 1992 Romania    
1976 – 1979 Spain    
1973 – 1974 Greece    
1990 – 1991 Zambia    
1988 – 1993 Paraguay    
1980 – 1984 Uruguay    
1990 – 1991 Mongolia    
Source: Freedom House, Polity IV; random selection using a number generator 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Although we did our best to keep the sampling process as unbiased as possible, we did have to discard the 
results of the number generator twice, in cases when lengthy research on the respective transitions showed 
that there simply was not enough information on the authoritarian regime available to conduct a conclusive 
case study. The two discarded cases were Burkina Faso (1977 – 1978) and Nigeria (1977 – 1979), which we 
manually replaced with Kenya (1990 – 1992) and Nigeria (1998 – 1999). We are also aware that most 
transitions of our sample are rather short in duration, with Chile being the only transition of "longue durée" in 
our selection. This, however, is purely due to sampling hazard, and given that there are only three other long-
lasting transition processes in our total universe of cases (Taiwan 1986 – 1996, Thailand 1978 – 1988, and 
Brazil 1974 - 1985), we do not think that our results will be unduly influenced by this. 
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This chapter presented and defined the methodological and conceptual framework 
our analysis is based on. It outlined the ontological and methodological principles our 
research is grounded in, and explained the method (QCA) we decided to adopt to test our 
hypotheses. In a second step, it introduced the conditions that form the core theoretical 
framework of our thesis ("minimal democracy", "crisis of the authoritarian regime" and 
"mass mobilization"), and presented ways for assessing and measuring them. Finally the 
chapter offered an overview of our case sample as well as an explanation of how this 
sample was obtained. In the following chapter we will conduct our QCA analysis and 
interprete the results with a view to assessing the truthfulness of our hypotheses.  
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3  
Testing Transition Theories:  
Assessing Their Explanatory Power 
 
 
In this chapter we conduct the QCA analysis to test the three causal hypotheses 
derived from the various competing theories on transitions to democracy: the theory "from 
above" by O’Donnell and Schmitter; the theory "from below" by Bratton and Van de 
Walle and Bunce; and a hybrid theory that combines key elements of both theories. 
 
To recapitulate, the three hypotheses are: 
 
a) Democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime without high levels of 
mass mobilization (theory "from above") 
 
b) Democracy results from high levels of mass mobilization without a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime (theory "from below") 
 
c) Democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime and high levels of mass 
mobilization (hybrid theory "from above" and "from below")  
 
Translated into Boolean language, these hypotheses read as: 
 
a) ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(0,1) !  MINDEMO 
 
b) ARCRISIS(0)*MASSMOB(2) !  MINDEMO 
 
c) ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(2) !  MINDEMO 
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Formulated in INUS terms49, for hypothesis (a) we expect to find a positive 
transition outcome only in cases where transitional countries experienced a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime (1) but where mass mobilization was either completely absent (0) or 
remained very limited (1). Accordingly, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is considered a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for the instauration of a democracy. 
 
For hypothesis (b) we expect a positive transition outcome if transitional countries 
experienced high levels of mass mobilization against the regime (2) but where such 
mobilization did not result in the disintegration of the unity of the ruling bloc (0). In such a 
conception of transitions mass mobilization alone is necessary and sufficient for a 
democratic outcome.   
 
For hypothesis (c) we expect a positive transition outcome to be the consequence of 
both a crisis of the authoritarian regime (1) and significant levels of mass protest (2). 
Hence, our analysis is guided by the general expectation that transitions end in democracy 
if there is both significant disunity among regime actors and a high degree of popular 
contestation of the political status quo. In our opinion, these two elements are necessary 
conditions for the instauration of a (minimally) democratic regime, and neither one taken 
alone is sufficient. A priori, our expectation is to find only hypothesis (c) confirmed; both 
(a) and (b) should lead to a negative outcome. 
 
In the next section we review the conditions derived from the literature and the data 
we used. After that, we first present the process of searching for necessary and sufficient 
conditions and then show the causal model obtained after minimization. In the final section 
we discuss these results and weigh the implications of our results for further studies.  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 INUS stands for "Insufficient but Nonredundant part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition" (Mackie 
1965). Mahoney describes INUS conditions thusly: "INUS conditions are parts of larger combinations of 
factors that are jointly sufficient for outcomes. Thus, while an INUS condition is itself neither necessary nor 
sufficient for an outcome, it is part of a larger combination of factors that is sufficient for an outcome" 
(Mahoney 2010, 131). 
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3.1.  Conditions and Data 
 
The outcome is minimal democracy, defined as a political system in which citizens 
freely participate in the political process, in which the most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections, and in which those civil 
and political freedoms exist to speak, publish, assemble, and organize. We assign 
membership or non-membership in the set "minimal democracies" to our transitional cases 
based on the Freedom House dataset on electoral democracies. 
 
Table V 
[Outcome] 
 
Caseid Transition attempt Minimal Democracy 
 
ARG 1982 – 1983 Argentina 1 
IND 1998 - 1999 Indonesia 1 
POL 1988 – 1991 Poland 1 
PHI 1983 – 1986 Philippines 1 
POR 1974 – 1976 Portugal 1 
NIG(2) 1998 – 1999 Nigeria(2) 1 
CHI 1979 – 1990 Chile 1 
BEN 1990 – 1991 Benin 1 
MAW 1993 – 1994 Malawi 1 
MAL 1991 – 1992 Mali 1 
ROM 1990 – 1992 Romania 1 
SPA 1976 – 1979 Spain 1 
GRE 1973 – 1974 Greece 1 
ZAM 1990 – 1991 Zambia 1 
PAR 1988 – 1993 Paraguay 1 
URU 1980 – 1984 Uruguay 1 
MON 1990 – 1991 Mongolia 1 
CAM 1990 - 1992 Cameroon 0 
TOG 1991 – 1993 Togo 0 
TAN 1992 - 1994 Tanzania 0 
ALG 1988 – 1992 Algeria 0 
NIG(1) 1987 – 1993 Nigeria(1) 0 
SOK 1978 – 1979 South Korea 0 
BOL 1978 – 1980 Bolivia 0 
KEN 1990 - 1992 Kenya 0 
  
 As Table V shows, there are 17 cases that are members of the set "minimal 
democracies"50. There are also 8 non-members, for example Cameroon or Bolivia. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Members of this set vary a lot in the degree of their "democraticness": On one hand, these are countries 
like Paraguay and Nigeria which only exhibit the basic criteria for being classified as an electoral democracy. 
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Going from the outcome to the conditions, the following factors are used in the 
analysis: the crisis of the authoritarian regime (ARCRISIS(0,1)), and mass mobilization 
(MASSMOB(0,1,2)). Whereas ARCRISIS is coded dichotomously, MASSMOB has 
multiple values, which made the application of mvQCA necessary. As we explained 
previously, we used existing data like the CNTS database for measuring popular protest, 
but for ARCRISIS we had to collect our own data, mostly from primary and secondary 
literature. This is marked as "qualitative research" in the "Source" column of Tab. VI, and 
is detailed in the appendix of this thesis. 
 
Table VI 
[List of Conditions] 
 
Condition! Values! Indicators and coding 
rules!
Source!
ARCRISIS! 0=no crisis of the 
authoritarian regime 
1= authoritarian regime 
splits in softliners and 
hardliners, and softliners 
gain control of the 
decision-making process!
0 = regime employs heavy 
repression against 
opposition, regime members 
remain united in public, no 
loss of support among the 
security forces, no 
defections 
1 = defections from within 
the ruling clique, loss of 
support particularly among 
the coercive apparatus, 
credible reform plans are 
being proposed and  carried 
out, regime members speak 
publicly against the regime 
or act in a subversive 
manner !
Qualitative research!
MASSMOB! 0 = no mass mobilization 
1 = low levels of mass 
mobilization 
2 = high levels of mass 
mobilization!
0: CTMMI = 0 
1: 0 <  CTMMI ≤  1,84 
2: 1,84 <  CTMMI  !
CNTS database, 
recoded into the 
CTMMI according to 
the model of Soe 
(2009)!
!
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
On the other hand, there are also Spain and Portugal which, shortly after ending their transition, transformed 
into liberal democracies. As our thesis is not concerned with issues related to the quality of the resulting 
regimes, those differences are not important for our analysis. 
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3.2.  Truth Table and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
 
In the next step, we construct a truth table from the raw data using the QCA 
software Tosmana created by Cromqvist (2011). 
 
Table VII 
[Truth Table] 
 
V1:  massmob V2: Arcrisis 
O: mindemo id: Caseid 
 
V1 V2 O Id 
2 1 1 SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND 
2 0 0 KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK 
0 1 0 TAN 
1 1 1 GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON 
1 0 0 ALG,NIG(1),CAM 
 
Logical Remainders (R) : 1 
Created with Tosmana V 1.302 
 
The truth table allowed us to synthesize the evidence substantially, by transforming 
our 25 cases into 5 configurations. We found out the following: 
 
(1) there are 2 distinct configurations with a (1) outcome, corresponding respectively 
to (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, NIG(2), POL, ROM, PHI, IND) and (GRE, PAR, URU, 
ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON). In other words, there are two different ways to 
reach a successful transition outcome: transitions that exhibited a combination of 
(ARCRISIS(1)) and (MASSMOB(2)) on one hand, and transitions that exhibited a 
combination of (ARCRISIS(1)) and (MASSMOB(1)) on the other hand. This is in 
line with the concept of equifinality, the idea that there are several paths leading to 
the same outcome. 
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(2) There are (3) configurations leading to a (0) outcome, corresponding to 8 cases: 
(KEN, BOL, TOG, SOK), (TAN), and (ALG, NIG(1), CAM). Expressed 
differently, transitions fail if either there is a combination of (ARCRISIS(0)) and 
(MASSMOB(2)), a combination of (ARCRISIS(1)) and MASSMOB(0)), or a 
combination of (ARCRISIS(0)) and (MASSMOB(1)). 
 (3) Finally, 1 non-observed logical remainder ("R") configuration. Hence, there is 
limited diversity in the data: as the 25 observed cases correspond only to 5 
configurations, the remaining Boolean property space is devoid of empirical 
cases.51!
 
We can now verify whether any of our two conditions (ARCRISIS and 
MASSMOB) is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the outcome (MINDEMO) 
to be present. Since ARCRISIS(1) was present in all cases of MINDEMO(1), we conclude 
that the crisis of the authoritarian regime must be a necessary condition for a transition to 
terminate in minimal democracy. On the other hand, ARCRISIS(1) was also present in the 
case of Tanzania, where the outcome was negative (MINDEMO(0)). Therefore, while a 
split within the ruling elite is necessary for a democratic regime to ensue, it is not a 
sufficient condition, i.e. it does not guarantee a democratic outcome.  
 
On the other hand, MASSMOB was also present in all cases of successful transition 
outcomes, all the while the level, or the intensity of protest, didn’t seem to matter: 
MASSMOB(1) and MASSMOB(2) both are connected to MINDEMO(1). Hence, we 
conclude that MASSMOB(1,2) is also a necessary condition for obtaining a minimal 
democracy. By contrast, it does not seem to be sufficient, since there are configurations in 
which MASSMOB is present but the transition outcome is negative (as for example, in 
Cameroon or Kenya). Therefore, at this point, the analysis of our truth table enables us to 
confirm our idea that neither ARCRISIS nor MASSMOB alone are sufficient conditions 
for obtaining a democratic transition outcome.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 As we have only two conditions, the number of logical remainders is still very small, despite the fact that 
we are working with mvQCA. 
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Using the formulas by Thiem (2015, 663) we calculate a consistency52 of 1,0 for 
ARCRISIS as a necessary condition for the instauration of minimal democracy. The value 
for MASSMOB is also 1,053. We thus obtain perfect consistency for both conditions, a fact 
that strongly suggests that a perfect subset relation between condition and outcome exists. 
  
3.3.  Minimizing the Dataset 
 
Minimizing for outcome = 1 without logical remainders produced the following 
solution formula:  
 
massmob(2) * arcrisis(1) + massmob(1) * arcrisis(1) 
(SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND) 
(GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON) 
 
According to this formula, minimal democracy is achieved either by combining 
high levels of mass mobilization and a crisis of the authoritarian regime, or low levels of 
mass mobilization and a crisis of the authoritarian regime 
 
Minimizing for outcome = 0 without remainders we get the solution formula: 
 
massmob(2) * arcrisis(0) + massmob(0) * arcrisis(1) + massmob(1) * arcrisis(0) 
(KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK) (TAN) (ALG,NIG(1),CAM) 
 
This formula tells us that a failed transition outcome is the result of either (a) high 
levels of mass mobilization without an authoritarian regime crisis; or (b) a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime without mass mobilization; or (c) low levels of mass mobilization 
without an authoritarian regime crisis. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Set-theoretic consistency "assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combination 
of conditions (...) agree in displaying the outcome in question. That is, consistency indicates how closely the 
subset relation is approximated" (Ragin 2006). In general, consistency scores should be as close to 1,0 as 
possible. The reason for this is that scores close to 0.5 indicate that there is some contradiction in the data 
(i.e. some cases that show the same conditions but have a different outcome) which point to either a.) errors 
in measurement for either conditions or outcome; or b.) an important variable is missing in the model.   
53 The value for MASSMOB(1) is 0,47, while the value of MASSMOB(2) is 0,53. Together, the consistency 
for MASSMOB(1,2) is 1,0.  
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Including all the remainders for reduction, we get the parsimonious solution 
formula for outcome = 1:  
 
massmob(1,2) * arcrisis(1) 
(SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND + 
GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON) 
 
The solution formula shows that all cases with outcome = 1 result from the 
combination of an authoritarian regime crisis AND mass mobilization, regardless of 
mobilization levels.  
 
Since the results of the solution with outcome = 1 are not always symmetrical with 
the solution formula with outcome = 0, we then conducted a separate analysis for outcome 
= 0, including logical remainders for reduction. This produced the following solution 
formula: 
 
massmob(0) + arcrisis(0) 
(TAN) (KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK + ALG,NIG(1),CAM) 
 
In essence, this means that a failed transition results from either the absence of 
mass mobilization, or the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis. As expected, this 
mirrored the solution for outcome = 154.  
 
Going back to our solution formula for outcome = 1, we then calculated the 
following coverage scores55 (see Tab. 9): "(a) raw coverage: the proportion of (1) outcome 
cases that are covered by a given term; (b) unique coverage: the proportion of (1) outcome 
cases that are uniquely covered by a given term (no other terms cover those cases) and (c) 
the solution coverage: the proportion of cases that are covered by all the terms" (Rihoux !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 For the solution for outcome = 1, no simplifying assumptions were necessary. For outcome = 0, the figure 
was 1 (massmob(0)arcrisis(0)). There were no contradictory simplifying assumptions. 
55 Set-theoretic coverage assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances 
of an outcome. In other words, coverage assesses the "relevance" of the causal condition, i.e. the degree to 
which instances of the causal condition are paired with instances of the outcome (Ragin 2006). 
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and de Meur 2009, 64). In our case, the solution coverage is 100%, since we have no 
contradicting outcomes and all cases are taken into account by our solution formula.   
 
 
Table VIII 
[Coverage Scores of the Solution for Outcome = 1] 
 
Term Cases covered RC UC 
massmob(1,2) * arcrisis(1) 
 
(SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND + 
GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON) 
100% 100% 
 
 
3.4.  Interpreting the Results 
 
 Our mvQCA analysis has found that transitions from authoritarianism result in 
democracy only if both conditions, ARCRISIS and MASSMOB, occur together. If either 
element is missing, the transition is likely to fail – a finding that is supported by the 
empirical reality of our case sample. How do these results support the postulates of the 
competing theories on democratic transitions? A closer look at the different hypotheses 
will bring clarity.   
 
 H1: The theory "from above" by O’Donnell and Schmitter 
 
 Our findings partly confirm, and partly disconfirm the principal hypothesis of the 
theory "from above". To recapitulate, O’Donnell and Schmitter claimed that authoritarian 
regimes do not initiate reforms unless the unity reigning among the members of the ruling 
bloc is broken first. In other words, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is necessary for a 
transition to terminate in the instauration of a minimal democracy. Mass mobilization can 
help liberalization efforts along if protest remains limited and controlled by moderate 
opposition leaders. On the other hand, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, such 
mobilization is not required for a successful democratic transition outcome; quite to the 
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contrary, mass protest, if carried too far, is dangerous and likely to compromise the 
transition success. The crisis of the authoritarian regime is thus considered to be not only a 
necessary, but also a  sufficient condition for democratization. Our analysis corroborates 
the first part of  O’Donnell and Schmitter’s hypothesis: we found that, indeed, an 
authoritarian regime crisis is a necessary condition for a successful transition outcome. 
Additionally, we can also confirm that low levels of mass mobilization, coupled with a 
split within the ruling apparatus, did lead to minimal democracy in almost half of all 
positive transition cases. However, we found that successful transition outcomes in which 
an authoritarian regime crisis was supplemented by high levels of mass protest were even 
slightly more frequent. Thus, we can disconfirm the claim that higher levels of 
mobilization are dangerous for democratization; if anything, we side with Bermeo (1997) 
who dispelled the "myth of moderation" and claimed that higher mobilization holds better 
chances for democracy. More importantly still is our finding that, contrary to O’Donnell 
and Schmitter’s hypothesis, splits within the ruling elite alone are not sufficient for a 
democratic transition outcome. Although we currently only have one case exhibiting such 
a configuration56, it is not unlikely that other cases could be found if the database on 
ARCRISIS was enlarged to other Third Wave transition attempts.  
 
 H2: the theory "from below" by Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce 
 
 Again, the results of our analysis confirm only part of the theory. According to 
Bratton, Van de Walle and other theorists „from below“, authoritarian regimes do not 
reform unless they are forced to by overwhelming mass mobilization. Consequently, the 
higher protest levels are, the more effective the pressure on the authoritarian regime is, and 
the higher the likelihood that eventually rulers are either forced to relinquish power, or to 
initiate reforms that lead to democratization. These reforms, according to Bratton and Van 
de Walle, are not a consequence of a crisis within the ruling elite- to the contrary, they 
claim that African regimes, by nature of their composition, do not split in pro- and anti-
reform forces. Democratic regimes thus are achieved solely by people power, and depend 
to a crucial degree on the level of people’s involvement in the transition process. In other 
words, high levels of mass mobilization are necessary for the instauration of a democratic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 The case is Tanzania, where an authoritarian regime crisis without mass mobilization did not lead to 
minimal democracy.  
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regime.  We found that mass mobilization is indeed a necessary condition, although the 
level of mobilization is less important than assumed by theories "from below". Low levels 
of mass mobilization may also lead to democracy, although the cases in our sample that 
exhibited the configuration "minimal democracy" and "high levels of mass mobilization" 
were slightly more numerous. On the other hand, both the information obtained during our 
data gathering process and the QCA results disconfirm the claim that successful transitions 
"from below" do not experience authoritarian regime crises. Particularly, all those African 
transitions that succeeded featured important splits between the ruler and its support circle, 
in most cases the coercive apparatus. Conversely, with the exception of Tanzania, all cases 
of failed transitions we examined in our analysis lacked the condition ARCRISIS despite 
often significant levels of mass mobilization. Therefore we conclude that mass 
mobilization alone is not a sufficient condition for democratization. 
 
 H3: "hybrid" theory combining elements of "from above" and "from below" 
 
 We discussed in our literature review that an increasing number of scholars today 
support the idea that nearly all transitions from authoritarian rule combine elements "from 
above" with elements "from below". This tendency is evidenced by the apparition of a host 
of new "hybrid" studies that feature both variables, the split within the authoritarian regime 
and mass mobilization, to explain transition outcomes (see for example Wood 2000, 
Threlfall 2008, Shin 2008). As of yet, however, this new strand of research has not 
attempted to formulate a new and coherent theory of transitions integrating both factors, 
nor has it made any claims regarding necessity and sufficiency relations of either variable 
for a successful democratic transition. Our thesis attempts to fill this gap. Following 
Collier (1999), we elaborated two scenarios to describe how such transition dynamics 
could potentially unfold: (a) a transition project is initiated by large popular protest 
movements that either provoke or reinforce tensions within the authoritarian regime, to the 
point where these tensions transform into a veritable regime crisis that leads to a reform of 
the political system; or (b) a split between pro-and anti-reform factions within the 
authoritarian regime prompts the progressive forces among the ruling elite to initiate a 
more or less limited liberalization project. In this scenario, the ensuing mass mobilization 
acts both as an amplifier to the regime crisis, and as a watchdog over the reform process. In 
both cases, high levels of mass mobilization and authoritarian regime crisis are necessary 
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to successfully terminate the transition, i.e. to obtain a (minimally) democratic political 
regime.  
 
 The results of our QCA analysis generally support such a conception of transition 
dynamics, and even allow us to fine-tune certain ideas we originally had with regards to 
our hypotheses. Firstly, we were able to confirm that both conditions, regime crisis and 
mass mobilization, are necessary for a successful transition outcome. This finding is 
evidenced by our case sample: of the 25 examined cases, 17 cases were classified as 
"minimal democracies" by the end of their transition process (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, 
NIG(2), POL, ROM, PHI, IND,  GRE, PAR, URU, ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON) and 
our conditions ARCRISIS and MASSMOB were found consistently in every positive 
transition case. Additionally, there were no contradictory outcomes, i.e. our case sample 
did not contain any case of failed transition where both conditions were also found. Indeed, 
every transition case that failed, i.e. did not lead to minimal democracy, featured only one 
condition: either ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(0) like in Tanzania, or 
ARCRISIS(0)*MASSMOB(1,2) like for example in Kenya, Cameroon, South Korea or 
Bolivia. Therefore, we conclude that neither condition alone is sufficient for 
democratization. 
 
 These findings become particularly relevant if we compare them to research that 
claims that there is a distinct "regional" component to transitions. Diamond, Lipset and 
Linz (1988), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Geddes (2012) are only a few examples 
of scholars that insist that transition dynamics vary significantly according to world region, 
time period or institutional setting. Military regimes of Latin America, for example, are 
said to democratize primarily by splitting into different regime factions, whereas African 
regimes do not split, even when challenged. Conversely, Eastern European, Asian and 
African transitions are considered primarily driven by mass mobilization, whereas elite 
negotiations without much mass involvement characterize the transitions of Southern 
Europe and Latin America. The results of our cross-regional analysis only partially support 
this point of view. In fact, when looking at the comparative level of mass-mobilization 
across our case sample, we find that Portugal, Spain and Chile form part of the transitions 
with the highest level of protest, whereas many African transitions exhibit comparatively 
! 97!
low levels of mobilization57. As expected from the literature, however, the South-East 
Asian transitions exhibit the highest levels of mobilization, followed in some distance by 
the Eastern European transitions. 
 
Table IX 
[Comparative Level of Mass Mobilization] 
 
 
 
On the other hand, we also confirm that not only the military dictatorships from 
Latin America and Southern Europe experienced an authoritarian regime crisis during their 
transitions but all successful transitions of our case sample, irrespective of regional 
affiliation, period of democratization or type of authoritarian institutions. In our opinion, 
this is a case in point for the idea that democratizing countries are, in fact, comparable 
across world regions, despite obvious differences related to socio-cultural and structural 
background.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 We can confirm though that African transitions seem to be impelled to a disproportionate degree by 
popular protest movements.  
0!0,5!
1!1,5!
2!2,5!
3!
Tanzan
ia! Mali! Zambia
!
Paragu
ay! Malaw
i! Benin! Urugua
y!
Mongo
lia!
Camero
on! Greece
!
Nigeria
(1)! Algeria
!
Bolivia
!
Argent
ina!
South!K
orea! Nigeria
(2)! Kenya! Portug
al! Poland
! Togo! Roman
ia! Chile! Philipp
ines! Spain! Indone
sia!
CTMMI Value 
CTMMI!Value!
! 98!
 Secondly, there are indeed a number of transitions in our case sample that seem to 
have been impelled by mass mobilization. This figure is larger, and more diverse than 
conventionally assumed in the literature: even cases such as Spain, which scholars 
traditionally describe as being elite-dominated, experienced considerable mass 
mobilization in the years before the first reforms were enacted. According to our coding 
criteria58, they can therefore be considered protest-initiated. These transitions are listed in 
Tab. X: 
 
Table X 
[Transition Attempts Initiated by Popular Protest Movements] 
 
 
 
 However, not all of these transition attempts also featured a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime. The cases  of Togo, Nigeria(1), South Korea and Bolivia all exhibited 
initial levels of mass protest beyond 77%, yet none of these mass movements were able to 
transform existing tensions within the ruling elite into a full-blown regime crisis. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 We consider a transition to be initiated by protest movements if the percentage of mobilization prior to the 
beginning of the transition is higher than 75% of the total mobilization that country experienced during its 
transition attempt. In formal terms, a transition is protest-initiated if TMMIbef  >  
!"!"" TMMItot. The beginning 
of a transition is marked by the year in which the first reforms were enacted.  
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finding shows that our scenario (a), although plausible in many instances of our successful 
transition cases, does not apply consistently across all cases with high initial mass 
mobilization. Hence, mass mobilization can be a decisive factor in provoking a split 
between regime forces (as was the case for example in the Philippines, or Spain) but as the 
literature on preconditions to democracy suggests, it is far from being the only factor in 
play. Although we eliminated structural conditions as irrelevant to the actual transition 
dynamics from the analysis, we do contend that they become relevant again when 
questions about the likelihood of obtaining specific configurations are being asked, i.e. 
when one attempts to determine how to increase the chances of, for instance, an 
authoritarian regime crisis to occur. This finding, however, does not directly affect our 
main hypothesis, since we did not attempt to identify the factors that encourage either the 
occurrence of an authoritarian regime crisis or mass mobilization. Instead, we were content 
to show that both conditions need to be present for democracy to result.    
 
 For most of our remaining 10 cases (POR, KEN, MOL, CHI, URU, ALG, TAN, 
ZAM, MAL, CAM) the percentage of mass mobilization that occurred prior to the first 
reforms was negligible; only in three transition attempts (Portugal 55%, Chile 42% and 
Kenya 51%) the amount of mobilization prior to, and during the actual reform process was 
relatively equal. Our scenario (b) could therefore have been a plausible option for many of 
those transition that ended successfully. Again, the failed transitions hinge for most part on 
the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis, which we interprete in the following way: if 
the ruling elite offers limited liberalization but remains sufficiently cohesive to avoid a 
regime crisis, even sustained mass mobilization might not be enough to tip the balance in 
favor of authentic reform. On the other hand, in Tanzania we identified the presence of an 
authoritarian regime crisis, but the absence of mass mobilization led the transition attempt 
to fail. In our view, this underlines the importance of mass pressure as vehicle for change 
when faced with a regime that might be only lukewarm about reform: if the popular desire 
for change is lacking, even progressive members of an authoritarian regime might be 
tempted to keep liberalization at a controllable level.  
 
 A qualifying remark, however, must be made with regards to our condition 
MASSMOB. A priori we went with the opinion of theorists "from below" in assuming that 
high levels of popular protest are more conducive to pressuring an authoritarian regime 
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into opening up than weak mass mobilization. Our analysis, however, provided strong 
evidence against such claims, suggesting that cases with low mass mobilization (GRE, 
PAR, URU, ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON) were almost equally as likely to lead to 
democracy as cases with high mass mobilization (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, NIG(2), POL, 
ROM, PHI, IND). Accordingly, we suggest a modification of our original hypothesis: a 
minimally democratic regime is the result of an authoritarian regime crisis coupled with 
mass mobilization, irrespective of protest intensity.  
 
 How do our findings fit into the general framework of transitology? Above all, we 
think that demonstrating the complementarity of the two main transition theories is the 
central contribution of this thesis. Indeed, the fourty-year old argument about which mode 
of transition has greater explanatory power has proven to be a false debate, as both sides 
are right and wrong at the same time: each theory (from above, AND from below) 
contributes a decisive element to a successful transition story, and no single theory alone 
accounts for all the factors that are necessary for achieving minimal democracy.59 On one 
hand, mass mobilization, particularly at high intensities, has proven to be much more 
important than envisaged by O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory "from above". On the other 
hand, a split within the authoritarian regime in pro- and antireform forces is also a vital 
ingredient, despite its absence in Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce’s theory "from 
below". In short, both theories complete each other and should figure prominently in an 
integrated theory of transitions.   
 
 Despite that fact, we unavoidably ended up being confronted with the issue of 
weighting: are both theories really equally important? If not, which factor should be 
considered prime mover, and what evidence do we have to support such a claim? First of 
all, we believe that gauging the relative importance of one factor over the other is a very 
complex subject, partly due to the nature of the variables themselves (both reinforce each 
other and are therefore not completely independent of one another) and partly due to our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 This statement has to come with a qualifying remark: Our analysis did show that the theory "from above" 
alone was enough to explain transition success in certain cases (specifically those where an authoritarian 
regime crisis was coupled with low intensity mass protest). However, there were more cases where protest 
intensity was high and the transition still led to minimal democracy; a case that O’Donnell and Schmitter did 
not account for. Hence, we deem it justified to say that both theories, "from above" and "from below", share 
the explanatory power, although maybe not in equal parts. We will discuss the latter point in a subsequent 
section.  
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research method, which is not equipped for making such distinctions in a quantitative 
manner.60 One should always keep in mind that no transition is like the other, and 
definitive conclusions can only be drawn after examining each case in detail, ideally using 
some sort of process-tracing. Based on our research results, however, we are able to draw 
certain qualitative inferences about potential general hierarchies among our conditions.  
 
 We found that there were many instances of transitions in which high levels of 
mass mobilization were recorded, but where the absence of a clear intra-regime split with a 
reform-committed majority still led to transition failure. The cases of Kenya, Togo or 
South Korea come to mind, where even significant mass protest did not manage to provoke 
a crisis of the authoritarian regime. By contrast, the opposite was true in only one case: in 
Tanzania, the absence of mass mobilization despite an (albeit weak) authoritarian regime 
crisis also resulted in a non-democratic transition outcome. While there could be many 
reasons for these uneven numbers,61 the fact that there are significantly more cases of 
transition failures in which the non-instauration of minimal democracy seems to hinge 
solely on the absence of an intra-regime crisis indicates to us that this condition occupies 
somewhat of a special place in an integrated theory of transitions62.  
 
 What consequences would we expect this to have, both in terms of applied policy 
making and future scholarly research? For the former, we do believe that a shift in 
emphasis is not only necessary but long overdue. In fact, since the arrival of the first 
African and Eastern European transitions involving organized mass resistance, 
politologists, decision-makers and aid organizations have tended to overemphasize the 
democratizing potential of civil society and mass movements. "The hallmark of successful 
and stable democracies", the secretary general of the United Nations recently said, "is the 
presence of a strong and freely operating civil society" (United Nations 2015). The fallacy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 As we have noted before, QCA, contrary to standard statistical techniques, is not suitable for measuring 
variables against each other, as it does not employ any sort of control factors.  
61 On one hand, they could either be purely coincidental, or related to case selection issues, since we did not 
select our transitions upon the explanatory variables- had we specifically checked whether there were other 
cases with no mass mobilization and purposefully included them in our analysis, we might have a better idea 
of whether Tanzania is particular in its transition dynamics or not. On the other hand, they could also be a 
consequence of the fact that it seems to be rare, even in theoretical terms, to have an authoritarian governent 
initiate a change as fundamental as a transition from authoritarianism without even the slightest meaningful 
popular contestation of the political system in place.  
62 This finding ties in with the most recent trends in democratization research, as scholarly interest has started 
to shift towards intra-regime dynamics to explain the breakdown or stability of authoritarian regimes (see, for 
instance Morency-Laflamme (forthcoming), Bellin (2000), Geddes (2012)). 
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of such a unilateral conception of transitions is particularly evident in the context of the 
2010/11 Arab Spring rebellions, in which mass mobilization was hailed by many as a 
miracle weapon against reform-unwilling dictators. Yet, four years later most of these 
transition attempts have either returned to authoritarianism (Egypt, Bahrain) or descended 
into civil war (Libya, Syria, Yemen). A priori there is only one country, Tunisia, that 
successfully transitioned to democracy, and even there citizens and authorities are 
struggling to keep whatever democratic gains they have made. In our opinion, the fact that 
decision-makers both in opposition movements and in foreign aid organizations 
underestimated the importance of intra-regime splits certainly played a role in the low 
success rate of these transitions.    
 
 By consequence, we think that future research should be oriented towards 
investigating the conditions that foster the likelihood of an authoritarian regime crisis as 
prime mover of transition dynamics. As we have seen, mass mobilization can lead to a 
break in the unity of a ruling bloc, but it is probable that it is but one condition among 
many. In fact, even a hundred-thousand people protesting against the Syrian regime could 
not topple President Assad - and neither could those demonstrating in Tiananmen, China in 
1989, or those in many Sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s. In our opinion, this could be a 
further avenue for comparative studies where QCA could be successfully applied. 
 
 Lastly, we feel that two things should be said about potential limitations to our 
study. The first is related to the number of cases employed in our sample. Although our 
thesis figures among the medium-N research settings, our case sample of 25 is still 
relatively small, with all the methodological difficulties such a setting implies. The prime 
reason for our small case number is the difficulties in measuring our condition 
"ARCRISIS": since there was no pre-existing index of this variable, we had to conduct 
extensive qualitative research in form of in-depth case studies, which was time- and 
resource-intensive. If scholars working on democratization in the future were to extend the 
index by adding other cases, it could be used to verify the reliability of the results of this 
thesis. Without this possibility, the generalizability of our results based solely on the 
number of cases is limited. In our view, however, the fact that our findings were consistent, 
i.e. in 25 cases there was not a single case disconfirming our minimal formula, adds weight 
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to the idea that a democratic transition might indeed require both an authoritarian regime 
crisis and popular protest, even if other cases were chosen for the sample.  
 
 The second limitation is related to our choice of conditions. As we have previously 
stated our research focuses solely on actor-based, or "strategic" factors and excluded 
structural conditions on the grounds that we assume they do not influence transition 
dynamics directly. While we believe this to be justified on theoretical grounds, there might 
very well be certain structural factors that can influence transition dynamics in an indirect 
manner, for example by impacting on one hand the degree to which demands for change 
arise from below, and on the other hand the degree to which incumbents are able to contain 
these demands either by coopting or repressing them. In our literature review we did hint at 
this possibility by naming specific economic factors – oil rents, or foreign aid for example 
– whose presence might enable the ruling elite to coopt potential challengers or pacify 
sceptics in the own ranks, and therefore prevent splits in the regime. Nwajiaku (1994) for 
example, claims that the differing outcomes of the National Conferences in Africa can be 
attributed to the degree to which national leaders found themselves disempowered faced 
with economic crisis and, by extent, a reduced bargaining potential. He points out that the 
extent to which the Armed Forces still benefited from the neopatrimonial system was 
particularly important, as they could ultimately swing the balance of power between 
opposition forces and incumbent leadership. On the other hand, it is very conceivable that 
certain institutional settings – a competitive authoritarian regime that regularly holds 
elections, for example – influences the attitude and behavior of  regime actors when faced 
with political opposition. In other words, it is possible to think that a more moderate 
authoritarian institutional framework also encourages greater openness towards divergent 
political opinions, and therefore fosters a higher number of reform-oriented individuals 
within the ruling circle. This, in turn, would make the occurrence of a regime crisis more 
likely. Structural factors might also influence the attitude of mass actors towards the 
regime. Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 7) for example, argue that all regimes (even 
nondemocratic ones) rest on bargaining between political leaders and key support groups, 
and that the stability of that pact hinges on economic conditions. "Good times generate 
support"- when there is a high level of economic growth, citizens won’t protest and 
authoritarian rulers are likely to stay in power. By contrast, in times of economic crisis 
many people are unhappy with their circumstances, which increases the likelihood of 
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political protest "from below". In light of these considerations it would be interesting to 
run our QCA analysis again after including certain of these structural variables, and paying 
particular attention to the cases of failed transitions. If the presence or absence of certain 
structural conditions was positively and consistently related to the presence of our two 
necessary conditions, an authoritarian regime crisis and mass mobilization, we could gain 
important new insights on the way countries democratize- or, respectively, why certain 
countries seem to be "refractory" to democracy (Elbadawi and Makdisi 2010).  
 
 In this chapter we proceeded to test the validity of the main hypotheses elaborated 
by the various theories on democratic transitions. After reviewing the main theories to test, 
the data at hand and the selected conditions, we conducted our analysis within a multi-
value QCA framework. We found that both a crisis of the authoritarian regime and mass 
mobilization are necessary conditions for the instauration of a minimal democracy. Our 
results thus partly corroborated and partly disproved the theories "from above" and "from 
below", and made a strong point for the conciliation of both theories into a third, "hybrid" 
approach to transitions. The following chapter is intended to reinforce that point: by 
qualitatively analyzing three cases of transitions we aim at deepening the analysis and at 
demonstrating the utility of a combined approach from a case study point of view. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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4  
From Theory to Practice:  
An Empirical Demonstration of Our Argument 
 
 
Quantitative studies of democratization remain simplifications of complex 
processes that sometimes seem detached from the actual cases they try to explain. The 
purpose of this chapter is thus to tie back into the "qualitative material" we used to conduct 
our QCA analysis, and explore our results a little bit more in depth.  To recapitulate, the 
heart of our QCA analysis was a theoretical dispute between two competing transition 
theories that each featured a characteristic element: (a) an authoritarian regime crisis; and 
(b) mass mobilization of varying intensity.  
 
 These two factors form essentially three combinations of conditions: 
 
(1) Transition with authoritarian regime crisis AND mass mobilization (at varying 
intensity levels) 
 
(2) Transition with mass mobilization (at varying intensity levels) WITHOUT 
authoritarian regime crisis 
 
(3) Transition with authoritarian regime crisis WITHOUT mass mobilization 
 
Our analysis showed that only configuration (1) led to the desired outcome – 
democratization – whereas all configurations lacking one factor ended in a failed 
transition. In order to illustrate how the presence, and respectively, absence of conditions 
helped shaping these different paths (democratization versus continued authoritarianism), 
we chose three cases from our sample that each represent one configuration, and compare 
them as qualitative case studies. The cases chosen are Indonesia for (1),  Togo for (2) and 
Tanzania for (3). The purpose of this comparison is twofold: on one hand, it serves to 
illustrate once again the research problem our thesis is concerned with, and on the other 
hand, it exemplifies  the methodology our thesis employs in its search for a solution to the 
puzzle. 
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 We chose these three cases with a view to their potential as "ideal types" 
representing each one of the theories our thesis set out to test: Tanzania as example for 
transitions "from above", Togo as example for transitions "from below" and Indonesia as 
example for our own hypothesis combining both theories "from above" and "from below". 
We do not pretend that these cases are a representative sample of all transitions over the 
period covered; nor do we claim that our results automatically apply to all countries 
undergoing some sort of transition. The idea is not to ask if another case could have been 
selected, but if collectively the three cases provide a sufficient empirical basis to gauge the 
relevance of our statistical results.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows: After giving a brief background overview of 
our transitional cases, we will first compare their levels of mobilization and their impact on 
the specific transition dynamics. In a second step, we will examine whether or not these 
mobilizations were accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Lastly, we will 
compare the respective transition outcomes in light of the presence or absence of these two 
aspects, mass protest and regime crisis.   
 
4.1.  Introduction and Background Information  
 
Our thesis departed from the basic question of what causes democratic transitions 
to succeed, given that less than half of all third wave transitions actually terminated in the 
instauration of a minimal democracy. Our case study selection illustrates this point well: 
between the three of them, only Indonesia has completed its transition to democracy. As 
we will see, it is also the only transition case that experienced both significant mass 
mobilization, and an authoritarian regime crisis. Whereas Togo and Tanzania both form 
part of the "African spring", the time period in the nineties when almost all African 
countries underwent transitions from authoritarianism, Indonesia is often considered to be 
the last third wave country to democratize. A priori, however, the pre-transition situation 
of all three countries had many commonalities, the most acute of which was economic 
hardship. Indonesia, for instance, was caught in the devastating Asian economic crisis with 
fuel and commodity prices skyrocketing and the rupiah declining to one-sixth of its 
original value by January 1998. Unable to stabilize the economy, the Suharto government 
had to seek assistance from the IMF and adopt stringent austerity measures, which further 
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increased unemployment and hardship on the population (IMF 1998). Togo, on the other 
hand, had already implemented a structural adjustment program by the time of its 
transition, yet the Togolese economy continued to spiral downward and traditional 
patronage networks were in the process of disappearing. Finally, Tanzania’s socialist 
economic system experienced a crisis in the 1980s that was so severe that external donors, 
who at that time provided more than 30 percent of the country’s GDP in aid to the country, 
pressured the Tanzanian government into joining a SAP (Planmo 2002). Whereas the 
Tanzanian citizens did not react strongly to the economic woes of their country, the 
Indonesian and Togolese populace responded by mobilizing massively against the regime. 
In fact, both in Indonesia and in Togo more than 77 percent of mass protest action took 
place prior to the first reforms, which strongly indicates to us that mass mobilization 
initiated these transitions.  
 
4.2.  Identification of Mass Mobilization 
 
We would like to remind the reader that our thesis considers mass mobilization to 
be either strikes, riots or anti-government demonstrations. In accordance with this 
definition, our case studies will concentrate only on these three forms of mobilization, 
although there might of course have been other forms of subversive actions (for example 
the distribution of anti-government leaflets by Togolese students), too. 
 
4.2.1.  Indonesia 
 
Since the the worsening of Indonesia’s economic situation at the beginning of the 
1990s, a de facto anti-Suharto coalition combining a new generation of middle-class 
democratic activists with dissident nationalists, traditional Muslims, Marxists, human 
rights workers, labor activists, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, and even East 
Timorese freedom fighters had formed that opposed Suharto’s three-decades long "New 
Order" (Liddle 1996; 2002). However, it was only in the years immediately leading up to 
1998 that various groups of that coalition started to organize in mass action against the 
regime. In July 1996, for example, riots broke out in Jakarta after the government ousted 
Megawati Sukarnoputri as leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (The Independent 
1998). A further wave of protests took place before, during and after the rigged General 
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Elections in May 1997, which the ruling Golkar party won with 70 percent of the votes. On 
one hand, thousands of workers coordinated by the SBSI organized strikes and anti-
government demonstrations in a number of industrial areas in Java, calling for basic 
worker rights, the abolition of the restrictive authoritarian laws and an end to the political 
involvment of the Armed Forces (Simanjuntak 1997). On the other hand, supporters of the 
United Development Party orchestrated massive anti-government demonstrations during 
the days set aside for their election campaign (Lane 1998). In the aftermath of the election, 
another round of militant protest over voting irregularities took place, leading to riots that 
left many police stations and government offices in East Java and Madura destroyed.  
 
By early 1998, however, the most influential voice of criticism came from students 
(Noble 2009). Several months into the devastating Asian economic crisis and just a few 
months away from the General Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly in which 
Suharto was preparing for his fifth consecutive "reelection", students and opposition 
groups (involving, among others, retired members of the military) organized petitions 
calling for "reformasi damai" (peaceful reform) and Suharto’s resignation as president. 
Protest within universities grew to tens of thousands of participants within two months, 
and despite the government’s attempts to open talks with the student protestors, the 
students refused to meet, continuing their protest demonstrations instead (Chicago Tribune 
1998a). However, not only did Suharto ignore their calls for his resignation and and 
instead accepted a fifth mandate on March 10, 1998, he also announced a 70 percent 
increase in fuel prices in early May 1997. Outraged, student protesters took to the street 
where they were joined by swells of other Indonesian citizens.  
 
Observers agree though that the turning point of these demonstrations was the 
twilight of May 12 when security forces shot dead six student protesters at Jakarta’s 
Trisakti University and triggered what Asiaweek magazine called "Ten Days that Shook 
Indonesia" (Bird 1999) Between 500 and 2000 people died and many more were raped in 
the most violent and massive riots that Indonesia had ever seen (Richburg 1998a; Noble 
2009). On the worst day of rage, more than ten thousand Indonesians went on a looting 
spree in central Jakarta, torching shopping malls, movie houses and other businesses 
(Chicago Tribune 1998b). On May 18 and the following days, demonstrations with close to 
one million participants shook Jakarta and other cities (CNN 1998c). Additionally, more 
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than 3000 students staged a sit-in in the Parliament building until they were forcefully 
evicted by the military (Chicago Tribune 1998c). Opposition to the Suharto regime was so 
strong that Suharto decided to appear on television for the first time and announced his 
intention to eventually resign, but without giving a concrete timetable (The Independent 
1998). In response, around 700.000 protesters turned out in cities throughout Indonesia, 
and students overran Parliament, this time unhindered by police or the Armed Forces. It 
was the last major protest event before Suharto conceded defeat and resigned, and also 
coincided with the moment when most of Suharto’s supporters abandoned him. For 
instance, fourteen members of Suharto’s Cabinet resigned and General Wiranto as 
representative of the Armed Forces made it clear that the protesters’ demands were 
legitimate and backed by the military (Los Angeles Times 1998). In our opinion, it is 
therefore plausible to say that mass mobilization contributed significantly to creating the 
rift between Suharto and his power base.  
 
4.2.2.  Togo 
 
In Togo, by contrast, mass mobilization provided the impulse for a National 
Conference, but in the end did not lead to a crisis of the authoritarian regime. This is 
interesting, given that the overall scope of pre-transition mobilization was only slightly 
smaller than in Indonesia63. The Togolese reform movement emerged in 1990 as a reaction 
to economic hardship and the gradual waning of patron-client relationships. It was 
spearheaded by a frustrated intelligentsia and directed against the corporatist government 
of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his Single Party, the "Rassemblement du Peuple 
Togolais" (RPT), who had been ruling Togo since 1967 (Decalo 1987, 172). The prelude 
to the transition began on October 5, 1990 when two University professors were detained 
by the Togolese security services for distributing antigovernment tracts. The arrests 
sparked large public demonstrations and resulted in violent repression by government 
forces, the most infamous of which – the massacre of the Bè Laguna – left several dozen 
people dead (Engueleguele et al., 2013).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 This statement is based upon our analysis of the CTMMI of both countries shown in table 10 in the 
previous chapter.  
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Despite the government crackdown, demonstrations intensified in 1991 under the 
auspices of the "Front d’Action pour le Renouveau" (FAR), an umbrella of opposition 
groups led by Yaovi Agboyibo, and several student organizations64. Student grievances 
were directed primarily against SAP austerity measures (Heilbrunn 1993). After Eyadema 
refused to acknowledge a petition prepared by the coalition of student groups calling for 
both better education and the holding of a National Conference for political reform, the 
students started a strike in March 1991 to lend force to their demands. The strike turned 
into violent rioting when government forces attacked thousands of student protesters with 
live ammunition and tear gas (New York Times 1991a) and finally led to the signing, on 
March 22, 1991, of an agreement between the FAR, the students and President Eyadéma. 
The agreement provided for a general amnesty, a new Charter on political parties and the 
organization of a National Forum on Dialogue tasked with elaborating the conditions for 
Togo’s transition to a more participatory political system (Huband 1991).  
 
Whereas the first two laws entered into force, the National Forum on Dialogue 
never took place, as the FAR decided they would no longer be satisfied with anything 
other than a National Conference (Letogolais.com, 2013). Hence, scattered protest events 
continued throughout April and May 1991 mostly under the auspices of the Democratic 
Opposition Front (FOD), a coalition of 11 newly legalized opposition parties. At one point, 
armed citizens even had taken over parts of Lome and were announcing plans for an armed 
rebellion in the street (Rennebohm 2011). In an attempt to pacify the opposition, Eyadema 
agreed to stand down from the post of Defence Minister which he had held since 1967 
(Minorities at Risk 2010). Yet he offered no further concessions, and therefore the FOD 
called for an indefinite General Strike to begin in June and to last until Eyadema resigned 
or a National Conference was organized. The strike, which also involved a major pro-
democracy rally with as many as 30.000 participants, was supported by most citizens of 
Lome and other cities in Togo and completely paralyzed the entire country for several 
weeks (Rennebohm 2011). Astonished by the severity of popular disaffection with the 
regime, the Eyadéma government ended up giving in to opposition demands for a National 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64  According to a March 1991 BBC report, students were mobilized by four independent student 
organizations: the Mouvement estudiantin de lutte pour la democratie (MELD), the Students’ Front for 
Democratic Struggle (FELD), the Youth Reflection and Action Group for Democracy (GRAD) and the 
University Organization for the Fight for Democracy in Togo (OULDT) (Canada: Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada 1994).  
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Conference. Thus, we can confirm that, like in Indonesia, mass mobilization played a 
significant part in fostering the initial movement towards regime change in Togo.  
 
4.2.3.  Tanzania 
 
In contrast to the Togolese and Indonesian experiences, the Tanzanian experience 
with political liberalization in the 1990s was not propelled, or even accompanied, by 
significant popular protest movements. When the Tanzanian leadership began to move the 
country toward democracy in the early 1990s, neither an organized opposition to the ruling 
party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)65 nor a demand for a multiparty democracy existed 
(Hoffman and Robinson 2009). The absence of contestation is said to have several reasons: 
Firstly, the values of civic peace and social harmony are considered to be very important to 
most Tanzanians, and could explain why there were no riots or strikes prior to the initiation 
of reforms by the government (Hydén 1999). In fact, acts of anti-government 
demonstrations remained small and so limited in size that they were not considered 
significant enough to enter our mass mobilization index.  
 
For instance, at the beginning of 1990s, "disturbances" had been reported on the 
island of Pemba (Daily News 1990d) where "political bandits" were said to have burned 
down a CCM party headquarters building (Yakuti 1990a). In another incident, workers at 
CMC Motors in Dar es Salaam closed down the CCM and Jawata Union office in early 
April (Daily News 1990e), a move that Regional CCM Party Secretary John Nchimbi 
called "illegal and unheard of" in Tanzania (Daily News 1990f). The biggest show of 
opposition to CCM rule happened on September 6, 1992, when the Business Times 
reported that 27 people had been arrested after marching on the Ministry of Home Affairs 
in support of a new political group called “Chama Cha Wananchi”, which was said to be 
led by Civil Rights campaigner James Mapalala (Tanzanian Affairs 1992a).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Apart from some small activist groups in Zanzibar that favored the separation from the mainland, sources 
attest only one minor opposition movement, the “Tanzanian Revolutionary Youth Movement” (Canada: 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). 
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Secondly, surveys of ordinary Tanzanians show that the concept of political 
pluralism was either not well understood66 or not a very high priority67 in the eyes of most 
people. In fact, interview answers seem to support the thesis of a British academic who 
dismissed advocates of pluralism in Tanzania as "middle level Tanzanians and frustrated 
professional and business people who feel they have been politically marginalized" 
(Tanzanian Affairs 1991). In fact, there is considerable evidence to believe that the great 
majority of Tanzanians felt genuinely satisfied with the kind of political regime the CCM 
had been providing (Afrobarometer 2012). A 1992 public opinion survey, for example, 
revealed that 77 percent of respondents preferred Tanzania to remain a one-party state with 
the CCM in control (Amon et al. 2002), a fact that led the 1995 presidential candidate 
Benjamin Mkapa to proudly boast that the party "didn’t need to cheat [in potential 
multiparty elections] because it was quite certain that CCM was going to win" (Agence 
France Press 1995)68.  
 
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the first steps towards political 
change in Tanzania emanated "from the top", initiated by former President "Mwalimu" 
Nyerere. Nyerere, the father of the Tanzanian Socialist "Ujamaa", retired voluntarily from 
the Presidency in 1985 and handed over power to his chosen successor, Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi, who also became chairman of the CCM in 1990. Although once a fierce defender 
of "one-party democracy", it was Nyerere who first drew the attention of the Tanzanian 
leadership to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to the inevitability of 
a similar political transition in Africa (Hydén 1999). On February 21, 1990, in a widely 
publicized interview before the heads of the national mass media, Nyerere dramatically 
opened the national debate over multipartyism, while stressing at the same time the critical 
task of protecting Ujamaa (Sunday News 1990a, 7). Suggesting that Single Party rule !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 An anecdote told by David Martin, journalist of The Independent, on November 3, 1990 evidences this 
point well: Asked about political pluralism, one old Tanzanian answered: "Plurality? Does that mean more 
than one wife?“ When he was explained that it meant two or more political parties, so that voters could have 
a choice, his answer was: "What is the point of that?“ (Tanzanian Affairs 1991) 
67 A street vendor who was interviewed by the Daily News in Dar es Salaam, for example, claimed that "I do 
not care what is happening in CCM as long as I get my bread peacefully and I can sell my shirts and 
sunglasses“ (Tanzanian Affairs 1992b). 
68 The truth of this statement is evidenced by a 2008 Afrobarometer survey in which 56 percent of 
respondents in Tanzania claimed to trust opposition parties either not at all or only a little bit, while 51 
percent claimed to trust the CCM a lot. Along the same lines, of the 81 percent of respondents who said that 
they felt close to a political party, 90 percent responded that the party they felt close to was the CCM. 
Similarly, 79 percent responded that if an election were held tomorrow, they would vote for the CCM. 
(Hoffmann and Robinson 2009) 
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might be a root cause for complacency in senior government officials (Wiseman 1990, 
186), he argued that the Tanzanian system had developed a dangerous tendency towards 
authoritarianism. According to Nyerere, "when a Tanzanian cannot write an article and 
argue the need for more than one party – and by doing so he is committing treason – then 
at that stage we shall have gone too far" (Sunday News 1990b, 4). Referring to events in 
Eastern Europe, he added that "Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a single 
party is God’s wish" (Sunday News 1990a, 7).  
 
Officially, Nyerere recommended adopting a multi-party system in Tanzania 
because (1) the political environment was different from that of the 1960s and therefore the 
timing for introducing multiparty politics was opportune; (2) the CCM was a democratic 
party that wanted to preserve peace, stability and national harmony; (3) democracy was 
considered a precondition to Socialism, hence there was no ideological conflict in 
pluralism; and (4) the party wanted to remain modern and ahead of possible opposition 
movements to ensure its legitimacy and future political survival (Ngasongwa 1992). On the 
other hand, however, one can hypothesize that the introduction of multipartyism was a 
tactical decision in order to recover a socialist agenda threatened by economic hardship 
and donor pressure to open up the political system (Ake 1991, 32 – 44). In fact, Tanzania 
in the 1990s experienced a "perestroika without glasnost" (Zirker 1997): largely as a result 
of pressure by external donors, who provided more than 30 percent of the country’s GDP 
in aid from 1985 to 1993, Tanzania joined a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
leading to a period of privatisation, reduction in salaries and subsidies and rampant 
corruption (Planmo 2002). Hence, by recommending multipartyism, Nyerere might have 
believed he could regarner support for a government immersed in the most traumatic 
policies of a foreign-encouraged economic liberalization program (Zirker 1997).  
 
Following Nyerere’s speech, the CCM party hierarchy complied and scheduled a 
National Conference on the political changes in Eastern Europe and a three-day 
symposium on “Socialist construction in the world” (Anglin, 1990, 435). Furthermore, in 
1991, President Mwinyi appointed the so-called Nyalali-Commission tasked with the 
mandate to enquire whether Tanzanians actually wanted a change of the current political 
system, and what legal and constitutional changes were demanded to reintroduce 
multiparty politics (Planmo 2002). In response, the political opposition forces formed an 
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independent National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) to spearhead 
demands for a Constitutional Conference (Nyirabu 2002). The leader of NCCR, Chief 
Abdallah Fundikira, qualified the Nyalali Commission as "a waste of taxpayers’ money" 
and threatened to call on the president to establish a transitional government in preparation 
for multi-party elections (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). However, the government did not 
cede to these demands, and when the Nyalali Commission presented its initial findings and 
recommended the adoption of multipartism (even though only a minority of Tanzanians 
actually favored such change), the National Executive Committee of CCM complied: on 
condition that national unity be preserved and Tanzanians learn the art of "contestation 
without confrontation" (Martin 1992), the CCM accepted on February 29, 1992 to end its 
monopoly of political activities and its supremacy as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
 
We have seen now that mass mobilization initiated the transitions of Indonesia and 
Togo, but not the transition of Tanzania. In a next step we consider the presence or absence 
of the condition "crisis of the authoritarian regime". We will show that only the regime in 
Tanzania and Indonesia experienced splits where softliners emerged victorious over anti-
reform forces, whereas the Togolese government succeeded in preserving its unity over the 
course of the transition attempt.  
 
4.3.  Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis 
 
To recapitulate, in order to identify a crisis of the authoritarian regime, we first 
consider the presence of softliners and hardliners within the ruling clique. We distinguish 
both groups on the basis of a) their public statements; b) eventual defections; and c) policy 
shifts within their respective government portfolios towards greater liberalization. In order 
to determine whether softliners are majoritarian, however, we look at d) credible reform 
propositions and reform implementation; and e) repression of opposition forces. Although 
not every indicator is present to the same degree in every case study (the indicators 
"defections" and "policy shifts", for example, are amiss entirely in the case of Tanzania), 
combining the individual weights of the indicators we do find is enough for us to decide 
whether or not a crisis of the authoritarian regime has taken place.  
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 4.3.1.  Tanzania 
 
In Tanzania, the presence of real softliners is a point of contention. In fact, some 
might argue that dissensions between former President Nyerere, the main advocator of 
liberalization, and President Mwinyi were merely disagreements on modifications of the 
authoritarian government, and not signs of a real crisis of the authoritarian regime. Holders 
of that opinion might say, for example, that the struggle between regime softliners and 
hardliners was not much of a struggle at all, since hardliners were swayed rather quickly 
into adopting political reforms; a fact that would suggest more dissensions between ruling 
factions than a real regime crisis. Indeed, one might either think that there were no true 
hardliners at all, or that people that could have conceivably been considered hardliners, 
such as President Mwinyi, were not the true wielders of power, and therefore couldn’t act 
independently.  
 
For instance, many journalists have underlined the significant power that elder 
statesman Nyerere kept exercising in Tanzania’s government even after he had stepped 
down from all ruling functions. One of them, Ulli Mwambulukutu, managing editor of the 
government-owned newspaper "Daily Times" remarked in 1985 that there was little doubt 
that Nyerere’s voice was going to be heard in Tanzanian politics, as he was still "chairman 
of the party, and the party is very powerful" (Gargan 1985). Nyerere indeed gave ample 
grounds to the suspicions that he remained "the power behind the throne" (Edlin 1987): he 
intervened at least twice during Mwinyi’s presidency to silence party dissenters, once 
against rebel MPs from the G55 who demanded Tanganyika be separates from Tanzania, 
and once against radical students from Dar es Salaam University who organized a series of 
strikes (Africa Review 2013). Hence one could be tempted to agree with the Economist 
who qualified President Mwinyi as "Mr. Nyerere’s man" (Tanzanian Affairs 1985) - a 
puppet without real decision-making power. 
 
However, looking at Mwinyi’s policy-making, there is no evidence of such 
assumptions. In fact, the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) was launched in 1986 against the 
will of Nyerere who frequently voiced his hostility to the program by lancing thinly-veiled 
attacks on President Mwinyi’s leadership (Africa Review 2013). Nevertheless, Mwinyi 
insisted that his government would continue to adhere to these liberalization policies, even 
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though it meant actually rescinding some of the most fundamental principles the Nyerere 
regime had been built on such as the Arusha Declaration (Zirker 1997). Furthermore, 
Mwinyi’s actions and his remarks in public after Nyerere dramatically called for an 
overhaul of Tanzania’s political system show that he was indeed very much a hardliner. 
After his initial response to the crisis, a half-hearted attempt to clean the ruling party from 
corruption by sacking certain cabinet ministers,69 did not silence his critics, he publicly 
rebutted Nyerere on April 10, 1990, arguing that Tanzania needed economic development 
more than multipartyism (Southall 2006, 272). He also lauded the Single Party for having 
been able to bring national unity and stability to the country after the chaos of 
decolonization70. He was joined by then-Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa who claimed 
that there was already sufficient political pluralism in Tanzania’s Single Party system 
(Daily News 1990c, 1) and Zanzibari President Idris Wakil who judged that "a multi-party 
system will not provide solutions to the economic problems Zanzibar is facing at the 
moment and will, instead, wreck unity, peace and stability in the island" (Yakuti 1990b). 
Therefore, we can definitely confirm the existence of hardliners within the Tanzanian 
ruling elite. 
 
On the other hand, one could argue that Nyerere was not really a softliner at all. In 
fact, up to 1989 he seemed to be a firm believer in one-party rule, and even told a political 
rally in Zanzibar on March 5, 1989 that it was time for the state to use its powers to silence 
activists opposed to the ruling party’s views in order to restore public confidence in the 
party and its founders (Nyirabu 2002). Only when he noticed the emergence of real 
divisions within the ruling party did he advocate liberalization, possibly to rally the elite 
around the flag (Southall 2006, 272).  He also kept to a very restrictive idea about political 
opening. For instance, he demanded that Ujamaa be protected at all costs, and were the 
CCM to allow the formation of other parties, these would have to be national, secular and 
Socialist parties (Mruma 1990, 1). Furthermore, he stated that if the Army were to retreat 
from politics, he would rather keep the current political arrangement and forego 
liberalization altogether (Martin 1992). Once the transition was underway, Nyerere even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Mwinyi did in fact defend the ministers, calling them "nice, decent and clean people [that were sacked] 
because a lot of evils have been going on in their respective ministries. It is a question of accountability and 
nothing else" (Daily News 1990a, 3) 
70 He further opined that "what Africans want is a fair return for their sweat through a new international 
economic order" and not the creation of multiple ethnic-based political parties "which can bring chaos 
instead of progress" (Daily News 1990b, 1) 
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helped to obstruct political succession, influencing the nomination of the CCM presidential 
candidate in 1995 and discrediting the opposition by effectively participating in the 1995 
election campaign on the side of the ruling party (Peter and Koepsieker 2006). 
 
However, as O’Donnell and Schmitter have pointed out themselves, softliners need 
not necessarily be democrats. In fact, most softliners do not want the regime to fall, but 
they fight for a less restrictive form of government as a means of legitimizing the current 
system. This seems to be clearly the case for Nyerere whose efforts seem to have aimed at 
saving Ujamaa from a Single Party state that was moving the system toward economic 
liberalization and Capitalism (Zirker 1997). Although he technically did not defect from 
the government (but instead stepped down voluntarily from all ruling functions), many of 
his public statements, as well as the public statements of other regime members (our 
indicator (a) for the presence of softliners) substantiate this claim.  
 
In fact, after Nyerere toured the country in 1986/87 to "dynamise" the party, he was 
shocked by how far from the people the CCM had gone, and by how complacent the 
leadership had become (Tambila 1995, 475 – 476). Possibly influenced by this experience, 
Nyerere then suggested that CCM could and should welcome the sweeping democratic 
changes across the globe, and to be prepared "to change and oversee that change, rather 
than be made to change" (Daily News 1992). He also suggested that multipartyism could 
be the remedy to the nation’s crippling economic problems and the rampant corruption 
within the CCM (Tanzanian Affairs 1992b). Once adopted, he added, there was going to be 
no alternative to multipartyism, and the democratic experiment had to succeed- otherwise, 
an even harsher form of authoritarianism could be the result. He said, "when you divorce 
your wife and then marry another and you discover that your second wife is a disaster, it is 
difficult to return to your former wife. If we try multi-party democracy and then fail the 
likeliest system to ensue thereafter will be a one-man dictatorship or military rule" 
(Tanzanian Affairs 1990). Additionally, there is no doubt that in the years leading up to 
1990 the authoritarianism of other members of the Tanzanian ruling elite was also 
attenuated, not least because of the economic dysfunction of the system and the apparent 
imminence of an economic liberalization program (Pratt 1976, 263). After Nyerere’s 
February interview, for example, a wide range of prominent CCM members (for example 
Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the Secretary of the CCM National Executive Committee for 
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Ideology, Political Education and Training) warned of the potential dangers of Single Party 
systems (Musendo 1990, 1) and stressed the need to increase the legitimacy of the 
Tanzanian political system (Mshana 1990, 1). 
 
Therefore, if one adopts the position, as we do, that there was indeed a split 
between softliners – even reluctant ones - and hardliners, it remains to be seen whether 
softliners were indeed majoritarian. To this end we look at credible reform propositions 
emanating from the softliner regime faction, as well as their actual implementation in the 
course of the transition process (our indicator d for softliner predominance). On one hand, 
we confirm that there was a significant growth in press freedom and freedom of speech in 
the late 1980s (Diamond 1988, 23). Revealing reports of public corruption, the economy 
and even human rights violations by the police appeared, and even though hardliner 
Ahmed Hassan Diria, then-Minister for Information and Broadcasting, warned the press 
against "Western imperialist style reporting and yellow journalism" (Daily News 1989, 5), 
the debate on multipartyism in the press continued without significant repression by the 
regime. On the other hand, the sacking of a number of Ministers accused of corruption 
might also indicate a shift towards greater accountability of the political system, and 
softliner predominance. In mid-March 1990 President Mwinyi asked for the resignation of 
his entire Cabinet for reason of "lack of accountability", adding that "we now want Party 
and government decisions to be implemented fully" (Daily New 1990a, 3).  
 
The greatest indication, however, is the fact that Tanzanian hardliners complied 
with softliner demands and adopted reforms. For instance, despite his personal opposition 
to multipartyism, Mwinyi followed Nyerere’s wishes and announced to members of his 
ruling party that the time was ripe for Tanzania to have a multiparty system (Christian 
Science Monitor 1992b)71. He also implemented the recommendations for reform proposed 
by the Nyalali Commission in 1991 (Mwesiga 2000), even though some caveat remained: 
several controversial pieces of legislation, including the Preventive Detention Act, were 
left unchanged (Hydén 1999, 144), and new laws on political parties tilted the playing field 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 While some analysts suggest that the reason for such rapid compliance is the fact that Tanzanian politics 
traditionally exhibited a strong culture of avoiding conflict and striving for unity within the government 
(Mueller 2013), we do believe that political culture is no sufficient explanation for institutional suicide. 
Instead, we believe that softliners must have been in a position of significant power to overrule hardliner 
opposition; again, a fact that would corroborate the existence of a true regime crisis.  
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excessively in favor of the ruling CCM party72. Additionally, the government decided to 
postpone the elections for Parliament and the Presidency for another three years (Hydén 
1999, 144). However, we argue that even though reforms were flawed, they were in fact 
implemented, which is another major sign for the power of softliners within the regime. 
For the sake of comparison, in 1983 the ruling party offered proposals to the public for 
debate in order to amend Tanzania’s Constitution, but when the public’s demands turned 
against the Single Party state, the regime quickly refused to introduce political reforms 
(Nyirabu 2002). In short, while we do contend that Tanzania’s political liberalization was 
the result of an authoritarian regime crisis, we admit that the split between reformers and 
conservatives was not as significant as in other Third Wave countries and did not create as 
big a rift between old and new system.73 
 
4.3.2.  Indonesia 
 
In Indonesia’s transition to democracy, things are less ambiguous. Not only can we 
clearly distinguish softliners and hardliners both within Suharto’s party apparatus and his 
coercive apparatus, but we also know that softliners eventually managed to impose their 
course of action onto the reluctant hardliner factions. Whereas in Tanzania the leading 
softliners came from within the ruling party, in Indonesia the Armed Forces played the 
biggest role in reform efforts. Starting during the years leading up to the transition, 
observers witnessed dissensions between Suharto and his power base, mostly in form of 
public statements (our indicator (a) for the presence of softliners). Both members of the 
perennial ruling party Golongan Karya (Golkar), as well as parliamentary representatives 
of the Armed Forces demonstrated their democratic predisposition by periodically issuing 
calls for greater accountability of the President, and by keeping the debate about openness 
alive in Parliament (Lane 1991a). People such as Deputy Speaker Syaiful Sulun, Police 
Colonel Roekmini, and Major General Samsuddin regularly called for a stronger 
Parliament, and were in turn dropped from the list of Golkar candidates to be elected. A !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 For instance, every new party had to submit an application for registration and comply with a number of 
more or less arbitrarily defined requirements, independent candidates were banned from participating in 
elections, and the Registrar office was allowed to cancel the registration of any party that, in the eyes of the 
government, ceased to qualify for registration under the new legislation (Nyirabu 2002). 
73 In fact, the transition to a multiparty system in 1992 was accompanied by only limited institutional change 
and resulted in few substantial alterations in the operative rules of the political game (ARD 2003). In our 
opinion, it is clear that the lack of popular contestation prevented a deeper schism between regime forces, and 
is therefore indirectly responsible for the failure of the transition project.  
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similar fate struck Speaker Kahris Suhud, a softliner who had introduced reforms such as 
direct questions and answer sessions with Ministers.  
 
On the other side, there had been ongoing power struggles between Suharto and his 
long time power base, the Armed Forces (Liddle 1996). Dissatisfaction within the officer 
corps of ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) was linked to a number of issues, including 
“unfair” promotions and transfers, “scapegoating” of the military for human rights 
violations, interference by non-military politicians in purchases of armaments and 
equipment, and most importantly, resentment created by the increasing wealth of the 
Suharto family and their associates (Aspinall 1995). Whereas Suharto had gone to great 
lengths to periodically purge the officer corps from soldiers considered disloyal, military 
elites also worked to undermine Suharto on numerous occasions. Examples include the 
"Petition of 50" episode of the early 1980s (Lane 1991b); the warning by ABRI 
commander Benny Murdani over the Suharto family’s business dealings in 1988; the 
imposition of Tri Sutrisno as Vice President in 1993; and the help to Sukarno’s daughter 
Megawati in becoming President of the Indonesian Democracy Party in 1933 (Case 2000). 
In general, the younger generation of ABRI officers was more democratically minded and 
wary of Suharto, considering “he’s [held the Presidency] too long and is too powerful” 
(Richburg 1998b).  
 
At the time of transition, ruling members who publicly declared their opposition to 
Suharto evidenced the lack of cohesion within the regime first. On one side, Amien Rais, a 
key member of the government’s top Islamic advisory board ICMI, first severely criticized 
Suharto’s ruling style and even declared his willingness to challenge Suharto for the 
presidency. He later switched sides to join the opposition and became a major supporter of 
student protests. On the other side, managers of state enterprises such as Djiteng Marsudi, 
Director of the National Electricity Utility, as well as technocrats and former Cabinet 
Ministers Sumitro Djojohadikusomo and Mohammad Sadli declared in the legislature the 
need for a new government (Case 2000). Outside the confines of the legislature, softliners 
were reaching out to the opposition. Adi Sasono, head of an ICMI research institute, 
proposed a national dialogue between government and opposition leaders, and was 
supported in this effort by Syarwan Harrid, head of the Armed Forces delegation in 
Parliament. Most importantly, however, ABRI commander General Wiranto expressed his 
! 121!
support for student demonstrators and what he called "the aspirations of the people", as 
long as their activities remained inside university campuses (Crouch 1999, 61). He even 
went as far as proposing that he and selected Cabinet Ministers hold face-to-face talks with 
student leaders. "As long as their goals are constructive, I think it's good," Wiranto said 
"Like the demand to have a clean Cabinet, that's normal and constructive. But if they 
become destructive, disturb the peace and step on other people's rights, then it's not 
correct" (CNN 1998d). According to him, the Army backed gradual political and economic 
reform as the only way out of the crisis (Chicago Tribune 1998d). He also acknowledged 
that for some time, ABRI had studied other recent cases of transition from military to 
civilian rule, especially with regard to the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, so as to prepare itself for such an eventuality74 (The Straits Times 1996, 14). 
 
As the transition progressed and Suharto’s position became more and more 
precarious, even regime insiders known to be very close to Suharto publicly requested his 
departure. Parliament Speaker Harmoko, third in the ruling hierarchy and a long-time 
friend of Suharto, pressed Suharto to step down and even went as far as to threaten 
impeachment of the President, should he not conform to Parliament’s wishes (CBC News 
1999; Head 1998). After he had issued the call, he and other Assembly leaders, including 
the heads of the dominant military and Golkar party factions, went to see Suharto at his 
residence to reiterate the appeal for Suharto to vacate office (Chicago Tribune 1998e). 
There were also many defections by regime insiders (our indicator (b) for the presence of 
softliners). Within the last days of Suharto’s struggle alone, thirteen cabinet ministers 
resigned (Noble 2009) and of the fourteen economic ministers asked to participate in the 
President’s proposed "reform council", all fourteen refused. In a widely quoted riposte, one 
nominee asked, "Are you crazy? The people will burn down my house" (Vatikiotis and 
Schwarz 1998, 22).  
  
Finally, Suharto’s loss of support among his power base and the predominance of 
softliners are best exemplified by the evolution of military violence during the transition 
(our indicator (e) for softliner predominance). Whereas hardliners such as the commander !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 A senior adviser to President Habibie later confirmed Wiranto's claims, saying that, "the [Indonesian] 
military saw the coming of democracy to Asia and Indonesia, and were preparing for that" (Acharya 1998, 
10). 
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of the Strategic Reserve, General Prabowo Subianto, had taken advantage of the riots after 
May 12, 1998, and even actively instigated violence in order to provide a pretext for 
rolling back the transition (Case 2000), General Wiranto, the Minister of Defense, 
facilitated peaceful protest by refusing to use violence on protestors and thereby effectively 
removing military support from beneath Suharto. For instance, Wiranto ordered that 
students marching on the Parliamentary building be allowed to protest off their campuses, 
and enter the government building without molestation by military forces (Chicago 
Tribune 1998d). Buses escorted by troops ferried the students from the University of 
Indonesia to the downtown parliamentary complex. Along the way, many of the soldiers 
guarding the streets gave the protesters the thumbs up (Chicago Tribune 1998f). In another 
incident, Armed Forces representative Colonel Sriyanto met with 5000 students at his 
palace complex, pledging a symbolic amount of Rp 1,111.111 to support the students’ calls 
for reform (Purdey 2006, 130). Finally, another officer admitted that “soldiers at certain 
barricades in parts of the city had not even loaded their guns with rubber bullets, but rather 
with blanks, so that no harm would come to protesters had they been ordered to shoot” 
(Noble 2009, 6). When Suharto stepped down, the military threw its support behind the 
transition and Habibie, Suharto’s chosen successor (Richburg 1998a), despite the fact that 
there had been much conflict between Habibie and the military High Command in previous 
years (CNN 1998b). At that point it was clear that softliners had won the power struggle 
within the regime, and the transition could move forward. 
 
4.3.3.  Togo 
 
In contrast to Tanzania and Indonesia, the Togolese government did not split during 
the transition attempt, although popular mobilization continued even after the National 
Conference had been called.75 This was principally due to the unwavering loyalty of the 
Armed Forces to President Eyadema. Whereas in Indonesia the Army turned into a key 
player for democratization, in Togo they became the main obstacle to reform and 
effectively prevented a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In fact, there were hardly any 
softliners within the Togolese ruling elite to begin with. We have very little proof of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 In 1992, there were several pro-democracy rallies (February 9, July 30, November 11, November 22) 
gathering more than 200.000 participants and another General Strike that was called by the Collective of 
Democratic Opposition 2 (COD2) on November 16 (Minorities at Risk 2010).  
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significant disunity within the regime, either within party ranks or within the coercive 
apparatus. This is maybe not so surprising, given that many scholars consider the RPT to 
be a simple emanation of the Togolese Army (Toulabor 1999; Lodonou 1988). In reality, 
the Togolese military (Forces Armées Togolaises, FAT) were certainly not that monolithic. 
In fact, even though the Constitution prohibited the military from organizing outside of the 
framework of the RPT, a small minority of soldiers created in 1991 the "Association des 
militaires démocrates" which supported the democratization process (Amnesty 
International 1993). However, there is nothing that leads us to believe that these forces 
were ever strong enough to be a real counterweight to the dominant hardliners within the 
Togolese military, especially since soldiers suspected to be members of the Association 
were regularly persecuted, arrested and executed.   
 
To the contrary, throughout Eyadémas rule in general, and between 1990 and 1993 
in particular, the Togolese Army and President Eyadéma continued to profess their 
unconditional support and loyalty to each other (our indicator (a) for the presence of 
softliners). For instance, Eyadéma publicly declared that the Army “must not be excluded 
from the political life of the nation”, and that it was “infinitely more preferable to implicate 
the military in a permanent way and on all possible levels (decision-making and execution 
of tasks) in the resolution of a country’s problems” (free translation, Amnesty International 
1993). In exchange, senior Army officers repeatedly warned the participants of the 
National Conference that their troops remained loyal to Eyadéma, and that any threat to his 
power risked civil war (Los Angeles Times 1991b). Amela Amelavi, former Minister of 
National Education and port-parole of the government during the 1991 National 
Conference confirms that Togo’s Army had a symbiotic relationship with the Eyadema 
government and would not have been loyal to any ruler it did not choose itself76. The 
Togolese military’s allegiance to the ruler instead of the nation, and particularly to 
Eyadema himself, stands out particularly strikingly if one considers that Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff General Zachari Nandja only recently suspended Togo’s Constitution to 
appoint Faure Gnassingbé, the son of Eyadema, new head of state after his father’s death. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 He said: "Vous savez, le Togo est en paix, essentiellement grâce à l’armée. Et l’armée a fait son choix (…) 
Et la paix ne sera garantie que si l’armée voit ses revendications satisfaites (…) Je vois mal l’armée au garde-
à-vous pour quelqu’un qu’elle n’aura pas choisi" (Djouamon 2005). 
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Faced with such overwhelming hardliner power, it is not surprising that softliners 
never had any significant weight in the decision-making process throughout the transition. 
This fact is evidenced in several ways. Firstly, reform plans (our indicator (d) for softliner 
predominance) did almost never emanate from the government. Instead, they were 
extracted under the sheer pressure of the street, or simply imposed by the opposition-
dominated transitional government. What little liberalization was initiated by the Eyadéma 
regime was timid and for the most part not followed through, as Eyadéma had never made 
a secret out of the fact that he was openly hostile to democratization (Pilon 1993)77. For 
instance, the government put in place a Constitutional Commission in 1990 in order to 
elaborate a new Constitution – a move clearly designed to placate the rising fury of the 
street. However, the referendum to ratify the constitutional amendments set for February 
1991 never took place, under the pretext that the constitutional project first had to undergo 
the scrutiny of experts (Letogolais.com, 2013). Similarly, when opposition groups 
demanded greater political participation and the holding of a sovereign National 
Conference, the Eyadéma government tried to shelter his country from what he viewed as 
"unnecessary political disruption" and instead offered a "National Dialogue Forum" as 
substitute to real democratic change78. Only after mounting pressure did he give in to 
opposition demands, all the while reiterating that such a National Conference amounted to 
a "civilian coup" (Los Angeles Times 1991a). 
 
Secondly, the military repeatedly communicated that it was not prepared to accept 
Eyadémas ouster by the National conference79. After the Conference declared itself 
sovereign, one military leader warned they would not sit and watch, like their counterparts 
in Benin did80. It is quite telling that the military delegation, after walking out in protest, 
never returned to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the High Command of the military 
made it clear they would neither respect nor obey the transitional government. When 
elements of the Army took over the state-controlled radio and television station RTNM !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Prime Minister Koffigoh once put the finger on it when he exasperatedly complained that Eyadema "has 
never wanted democracy, and he doesn't want it [now]." (Christian Science Monitor 1992a) 
78 He said: "Just because my neighbour’s house is on fire, I won’t set my own alight" (Seely 2005, 363). 
79 In order to save the regime, the military went to great lengths. For example, after the conference had 
stripped Eyadema of his powers, troops loyal to Eyadema surrounded the Prime Minister's palace with tanks 
and threatened to reduce this city to cinders if the longtime ruler's powers were not restored (New York 
Times 1991b)!
80 They said: "We saw what happened in Benin. We knew what would happen. We are not sheep" (Seely 
2005, 364). 
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(Radiotélévision de la nouvelle marche) on October 1, 1991, they only accepted to return 
to the barracks after Eyadéma himself had commanded them to do so (Diaspora Togolaise 
pour la Démocratie 1998). In a later incident, when Prime Minister Koffigoh ordered the 
Army to reopen the street separating the Camp of the "Régiments Interarmes Togolais" 
(RIT) from the suburb of Tokoin (a part of the city of Lomé), the military sent a message 
that the Prime Minister should "execute his orders himself" (Letogolais.com 2012). 
 
 Finally, the persistent political violence perpetrated throughout the transition by the 
Togolese Armed Forces (our indicator (e) for softliner predominance) is, in our opinion, 
the clearest proof that hardliners dominated Togo’s authoritarian regime. Police and 
military showed themselves prepared and willing to pass from selective targeting of 
political dissidents to large-scale terrorization of opposition groups and civil society 
(Toulabor 1996). In April 1991, for example, security forces under the command of 
Captain Ernest Gnassingbe, a son of President Eyadema, shot 28 civilians, amongst them a 
pregnant woman and a toddler, and dumped their corpses into the Lagune de Bè in a 
suburb of Lomé (Ameganvi 2011). In 1993, when Eyadéma’s announcement of the end of 
the transition sparked new public demonstrations, security forces fired on demonstrators, 
killing at least 19 people and forcing 300.000 more to flee to neighboring countries (US 
Department of State 2015). 
 
Most importantly, several military operations severely sabotaged the work of the 
transitional government and significantly contributed to Eyadema’s hold onto power. The 
attack on the Primature, on December 3, 1991 (Los Angeles Time 1991c), several botched 
coup attempts (Los Angeles Times 1991d) and the attempted kidnapping of Prime Minister 
Koffigoh (Los Angeles Times 1991e) all exemplify the degree of cohesion within the 
Eyadema regime and its willingness to do away with any progressive force threatening its 
position. For instance, when Koffigoh made a televised address to the nation after the 
attack on the Prime Minister’s palace on December 3, he declared that he decided to give 
himself up in order to avoid "a bloodbath" (Penne 1999, 281; Tété 2012). Asked about his 
red and swollen face, he claimed to have been attacked by bees, but many Togolese 
suspected that security forces had abused him.  
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4.4.  Interpreting Transition Results 
 
After having examined both mass mobilization and regime crisis in our case 
countries, it is interesting to see how the different combinations of conditions actually 
translate into results; i.e. which configuration of conditions led to a successful transition 
outcome. Indeed, only Indonesia managed to reach the status of a minimal democracy. It is 
also the only country where we identified both an authoritarian regime crisis and 
significant mass mobilization. The dynamics were mutually reinforcing: Firstly, mass 
mobilization instigated the transition by provoking a crisis between Suharto and his power 
base, and eventually forcing the ouster of Suharto. In fact, after having lost the support of 
the Army, Suharto resigned and handed his office to his Vice President B.J. Habibie in a 
nationally televised ceremony (Mydans 1998; CNN 1998a). Habibie, a technocrat and 
relatively weak executive figure, subsequently guided the country through the transition 
from the autocratic New Order to the genuinely fair election of Megawati Sukarnoputri in 
October 1999 (Thompson 1999). Whereas the bulk of protest events took place prior to 
Suharto’s ouster, there was still some mobilization centered primarily on student activism 
that helped the transition move along smoothly (The Dispatch 1998, 2; Symonds 1998; 
Chicago Tribune 1998g). Although we haven’t treated this "second phase" mobilization in 
detail in this chapter, we do consider it to be particularly important, since Habibie himself 
admitted, he didn’t "want to say goodbye" to power (Deseret News 1999). Thus, while he 
is certainly to be credited with the introduction of democratic reforms, we opine that civic 
activism fulfilled a non-negligible watchdog function over the process. 
 
By contrast, the transitions in Togo and in Tanzania both failed, since neither 
country was classified as a minimal democracy by the end of the transition. In Togo, the 
decisive factor for failure was clearly the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis. While 
mass mobilization managed to force Eyadema into agreeing to a National Conference, the 
resistance of the Armed Forces prevented any further step towards a political opening. In 
fact, military support81 during the three years following Eyadema’s unilateral ouster by 
leaders of the National Conference helped Eyadema gain the upper hand again in the 
struggle against the new transitional government. When in October 1991 the HCR voted to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 For instance, this period was marked by several unsuccessful coup attempts and persistent political 
violence carried out by Eyadema loyalists.  
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dissolve Eyadéma’s political party and to curtail the power of the military, the Army 
overthrew Koffigoh’s transitional government in what would be known as the "attack on 
the Primature" on December 3, 1991. This coup initiated Eyadéma’s gradual recuperation 
of power (Letogolais.com, 2013). Koffigoh, under pression of the Army, negotiated with 
Eyadéma a "National Unity government" in which the most important ministerial posts 
were assigned to RPT figures (New York Times 1991c). Even though a new democratic 
constitution was adopted on September 27, 1992, a second military coup in October 1992 
effectively put an end to the interim legislature when elements of the Army held the HCR 
hostage for 24 hours. Shortly after the incident, elections that had originally been 
scheduled for December 1992 were postponed and Eyadéma unilaterally declared that the 
transition had ended (Engueleguele et al. 2013). In January 1993 he reappointed Koffigoh 
as Prime Minister whose government, though nominally independent, cooperated closely 
with the President throughout the year and regularly took policy positions consistent with 
Eyadéma’s views (U.S. Department of State 1994). It is interesting to note that even 
though mass mobilization continued - there was, for instance, another General Strike in 
1993 (US Department otf State 2015) - such protest did not lead to any more significant 
liberalization. The most the opposition achieved was the signing of the Ouagadougou 
agreement which set forth conditions for the 1993 presidential and legislative elections. 
But despite the agreement, the election process was so fraudulent that the opposition 
boycotted the elections and Eyadéma won reelection as President with a voter turnout of 
only 36 percent. 
 
In Tanzania, a crisis of the authoritarian regime initiated a controlled liberalization 
process “from above”, but due to the lack of popular input – either before, or during the 
transition – reforms remained superficial and limited to the formal introduction of 
multipartyism. In fact, the lack of popular pressure and demand for reform had two 
consequences: Firstly, it allowed reluctant softliners to set the terms of the transition 
unilaterally. For instance, in May 1992, Parliament endorsed the recommendation to start 
the transition to multiparty politics, amended several articles of the Constitution and 
legalised opposition parties. However, it also imposed two important caveats: Parties could 
not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the 
mainland in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life (Bjerk 2010, 
276). Secondly, it prevented the appearance of deeper fissions in the Tanzanian ruling 
! 128!
elite, and thus constituted a missed opportunity for potentially greater reform. In fact, when 
in 1995 the first multiparty parliamentary elections were held CCM took 80 percent of 
seats and its presidential candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, won the presidential election with 
62.8 percent of votes. Tanzania’s transition therefore ended up with a mere modification of 
its authoritarian regime.  
 
This chapter compared the transition dynamics of three Third Wave transitions: 
Indonesia, Togo and Tanzania. These cases were chosen based upon their quality as 
examples for the three configurations encountered in our QCA analysis: a) a successful 
transition that coupled regime crisis with mass mobilization (Indonesia); b) a failed 
transition that featured mass mobilization without a regime crisis (Togo); and c) a failed 
transition that featured a regime crisis without mass mobilization (Tanzania). Intended as a 
supplement to the QCA analysis of the previous chapter, the analysis aimed at showing 
how the presence, or absence of conditions contributed to creating a particular transition 
outcome. The following conclusion will summarize the results of our thesis and discuss 
their implications within the greater framework of transitology. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 Our thesis presents an attempt to empirically test the validity of the main competing 
theories on transitions from authoritarianism. We hope that it will enable academics and 
policy-makers especially in the international democracy promotion industry to better 
understand the factors necessary to successful democratization, and how they interact in 
order to produce a democratic outcome. Two conditions were identified by the literature as 
being paramount in that undertaking: a split between reformers and conservatives within 
the ruling regime (the so-called "crisis of the authoritarian regime"), and significant levels 
of popular contestation of, and mobilization against the regime. They represent the theories 
of transitions "from above" and respectively, transitions "from below". Variation with 
regard to the presence, or absence, of these conditions is said to be at the origin of the 
differences we observe in the outcome of the Third Wave transitions, with each research 
tradition claiming prime mover status for "their" explanation to the detriment of the other. 
In light of this conflict in the literature, our research wanted to advance three main 
objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on 
democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below 
are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the 
scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute 
to the overarching goal of generalization. Now that we arrived at the end of our study it is 
time to ask whether these research goals were fulfilled.  
 
 First and foremost, our study includes a significantly higher number of cases than 
the vast majority of other existing works. It also uses a method that is transparent, easily 
replicable and increasingly popular in many fields of social science. Therefore, we believe 
that goal (1) was reached and we did conclusively demonstrate that the theories "from 
above" and "from below", instead of two warring enemies on the battlefield of 
transitology, are really two sides of the same coin. Their postulates are not mutually 
exclusive but rather complementary; a point of view that is supported by the fact that 
neither a crisis of the authoritarian regime nor mass mobilization alone - regardless of how 
powerful - was found to be sufficient to produce democratization in all cases under study. 
We do in no way pretend that these findings somehow revolutionize what we already know 
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about transitions; as our literature review has shown, other people recognized this rather 
obvious fact before and a number of good studies exists that are based - explicitely or 
implicitely - on the assumption that both theories on transitions complete each other. The 
merit of our thesis is in confirming these intuitions by virtue of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis.   
 
 Looking at the results of our QCA analysis, we deem it justified to claim that goal 
(2) has also been accomplished. Assuming that no variables other than the strategic factors 
selected significantly influence the outcome of a transition process, we did in fact 
demonstrate that both the authoritarian regime crisis and mass mobilization - at low and 
high levels -  are necessary conditions for successful democratization. This finding is novel 
in the sense that while both theories claim that their explanatory factors were crucial 
ingedients in many transitions, no research before has tried extrapolating from these claims 
to arrive at a more general statement that would be valid for all Third Wave transitions, 
and potentially even beyond. Critics may complain that our case sample, although bigger 
than many others, is still very small to make such an ambitious claim. Yet, the fact that our 
hypothesis was confirmed in all cases under study, that our cases were selected randomly 
(within reason), and that they represent almost 35 percent of the total population speaks in 
favor of our argument. 
 
 Finally, we take a look at our research goal no. (3): contributing to a better 
understanding of how transitions from authoritarianism can become transitions to 
democracy. So, how do our findings tie into what we know about democratization, and 
how do they change what, up to now, we did not know? 
 
 On one hand, past research often stated that democratization follows certain 
patterns that vary distinctively from one world region to the other. O'Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), Karl (1986; 1990), and Burton, Gunther and Highley (1992) for example 
stress that most Latin American and Southern European transitions share the following 
common features: (a) the authoritarian regime initiates the transition itself; (b) it 
subsequently negotiates some sort of pact with a small circle of opposition leaders; and (c) 
the vast majority of the people remains deliberately excluded from the action. Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1997) and other Africanists, on the other side, note that African transitions 
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rather occur through a mobilized civil society forcing a reluctant ruler to either concede 
reforms or step down, often within the framework of an opposition-dominated National 
Conference. Thirdly, scholars examining the former Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe often claim that Communist transitions, and especially the transitions from 
totalitarianism, are so different from all other transition cases that they can't even be 
compared (Meiklejohn Terry 1993).82 Bunce (1995c) points out what she perceives as 
being distinctive about these transitions: (a) pacts between the regime and opposition were 
exceptionally rare, and if they did occur, they lacked durability; (b) the temporal lag 
between mass mobilization and the formation of pacts was very brief; and (c) in most cases 
mass mobilization led directly, i.e. without the intervention of a regime crisis, to the 
termination of authoritarian rule. Finally there are those who claim that democratization is 
less the result of regional dynamics than a product of the distinctive historical context of 
individual countries. Hence, if countries undergo a transition to democracy, they do so 
following specific critical junctures which are not likely to be repeated elsewhere. 
Barrington Moore's (1966) account of the transformation of pre-industrial agrarian social 
relations into "modern" democracies in Western Europe is an example of such an 
interpretation, which renders comparisons of democratization processes virtually 
impossible.  
 
 The findings of our thesis relativize these positions considerably. Methodologically 
speaking, they make clear that processes of regime change need to be investigated under a 
global lense, instead of a regional perspective. More specifically, they show that while 
there might indeed be circumstances common to certain world regions or time periods with 
regards to the onset of a transition - a question that was deliberately excluded from our 
research framework - the process of democratization per se seems to be much less time- 
and context-sensitive than previously thought. Although the temporal order of events may 
vary (for example, African transitions do seem to be impelled to a disproportionate degree 
by popular protest movements), the two central ingredients to a democratic outcome are 
the same in all cases we examined. For one, there needs to be a noticeable demand for 
democracy "from below"; empirics show that without endogenous pressure it is unlikely 
that an autocratic regime magically discovers the virtues of participative decision-making. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 For this debate see, for example, Schmitter and Karl 1994, Bunce (1995a; 1995b) and Karl and Schmitter 
(1995). 
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For two, there needs to be at least a basic willingness on behalf of a majority of the ruling 
elite to allow some sort of liberalization to occur. If all members of the regime remain 
firmly opposed to such an opening and are prepared to use force to prevent it, no amount 
of mass mobilization will bring about democracy. Our analysis provides plenty of evidence 
to support these claims, yet there is also room for improvement. In fact, future research 
might find it interesting to rerun our analysis including either a larger case sample or 
different cases, with a view to increasing the validity of generalizations derived from the 
findings presented here. As we have noted elsewhere, the biggest practical limitation to 
such an undertaking is the availability of information on the presence of a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime in transitional countries. We therefore hope that our attempt to define 
and operationalize this variable inspires other researchers to enlarge and potentially 
improve our index with more qualitative case studies.  
 ! Secondly, scholars generally like to point out that so far no single factor has been 
identified as being either necessary or sufficient to produce democracy. The general 
consensus reflects Karl's (2005, 13) assessment that democratization is the result of a 
combination of causes, not merely one single cause. While certainly true in some respects, 
such a point of view is not conducive to developing parsimonious answers. Hence, we 
found it helpful to distinguish elements that cause transitions to occur from those that 
determine the direction of a transition. The latter is part of the framework of our thesis; the 
former is not. A critical read of the literature, however, shows that in practice scholars 
often treat both types of issues indiscriminately, and consequently fail to distinguish 
between causes that really only affect one type of question. Taking that fact into account, 
we excluded structural variables, such as the level of wealth, education or industrialization 
(Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 2000), the distribution of ethnic groups (Offe 
1998), international pressure (Whitehead 1996) or the location of countries in a pattern of 
international diffusion (O'Loughlin et al. 1998) from our analysis on the grounds that they 
do not directly influence the dynamics of a transition once it is started.83 Structural 
variables, such as the strength and coherence of the authoritarian regime, and the 
mobilizing potential of mass actors are the only elements thought to be of interest in our 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 For explanation on how the onset, and the termination of a transition are determined in this thesis see 
chapter 2. 
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thesis, and whose necessity for the instauration of minimal democracy has been 
empirically demonstrated in the course of our argument.  
 
 Nonetheless, we do not know whether they are the only conditions required to 
obtain such a result. In other words, since we did not include any factors other than 
strategic ones, we cannot say with certainty that, taken together, they are sufficient for 
democratization. It is possible, however unlikely, that some other structural variable 
remained undetected in the course of our analysis, and was co-responsible for the failure, 
or respectively, the success of all the transitions examined. We do not believe this to be the 
case, as our sample is simply too big for such a coincidence. However, we do accept the 
idea that there could well be certain structural factors that influence transition dynamics in 
an indirect manner, for example by impacting on one hand the degree to which demands 
for change arise from below, and on the other hand the degree to which incumbents are 
able to contain these demands either by coopting or repressing them. In our literature 
review we hinted at this possibility by naming specific factors – oil rents, prior experience 
with democratic institutions, or foreign aid for example – whose presence might either 
enable the ruling elite to prevent splits in their own ranks, or the aggrieved population to 
express their demands more effectively. In other words, these elements might make the 
occurrence of our explanatory conditions more or less likely, which could be an important 
point to consider when estimating the chances of a transitional country to become 
democratic. It might therefore make sense to future researchers to rerun our analysis with a 
larger eventail of conditions to test our variables for sufficiency on one hand, and to check 
for potential correlations and mutual reinforcements between structural and strategic 
variables on the other hand.!
 
 On the other hand, our findings also have important implications for the current 
strand of research on regime change. In fact, we believe that they provide a better 
framework than earlier theories for explaining why so many Third Wave transitions either 
led to semi-authoritarian hybrids or new authoritarian regimes. In our point of view, the 
questions of why some countries democratize and why other countries do not really are 
two sides of the same coin, and hinge critically on the relative importance of elite versus 
mass actors. In fact, almost fiften years ago, Thomas Carothers (2002) claimed that the end 
of the "transition paradigm" à la O'Donnell and Schmitter had come. According to him, 
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their theory was no longer able to adequately describe the realities of the late Third Wave 
transitions, because these countries simply did not seem to democratize despite significant 
popular pressure. In light of our results, however, it becomes clear that Carother's critic 
might be symptomatic of a larger trend among democratization specialists towards 
underestimating the importance of O'Donnell and Schmitter's crucial theoretic construct- 
the authoritarian regime crisis.  
 
 Generally speaking, while many questions are being asked about what causes 
transitions to succeed, more often than not the answers exhibit a clear bias towards the 
democratizing potential of civil society and mass mobilization. Virtually all democracy-
promoting programs of all major international players today operate under the premise that 
supporting civil society equals successful democratization. Yet, there is ample evidence to 
show that the exagerated focus on civil society to the detriment of intra-regime dynamics is 
flawed. Looking to the MENA region five years after the onset of the Arab Spring, only 
Tunisia has completed its transition to democracy, while most other countries that 
experienced protests have either descended into civil war or returned to an even harsher 
form of authoritarianism. Thirty years earlier, then-Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad bloodily 
ended an uprising of Sunni Moslems in the city of Hama, leaving between 10.000 and 
25.000 people dead. Around the same time, only a few years later, the student uprising in 
Tiananmen Square in China ended in a deadly crackdown, orchestrated by a regime that 
remained united and determined to squash the popular challenge. Returning to the results 
of our thesis, we found that there were many instances of transitions in which high levels 
of mass mobilization were recorded, but where the absence of a clear intra-regime split 
with a reform-committed majority still led to transition failure. By contrast, the opposite 
was true in only one case: in Tanzania, the absence of mass mobilization despite an (albeit 
weak) authoritarian regime crisis also resulted in a non-democratic transition outcome. In 
short, the fact that there are significantly more cases of transition failures in which the non-
instauration of minimal democracy seems to hinge solely on the absence of an intra-regime 
crisis indicates - at least to us - that elite disunity should occupy a much more important 
place in the democratization literature than it does today.  
 
 Intra-regime splits are important because they can provide crucial insights in the 
three most prominent research subjects of today: (1) the stalling, and eventual authoritarian 
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reversal of transitions; (2) the proliferation of hybrid regimes; and (3) the resilience of 
authoritarian regimes. Firstly, one should note that many, if not most authoritarian regimes 
are not monolithic. Quite to the contrary, tension between different authoritarian factions 
are latent and often persist over many years, and sometimes even decades, before they 
finally break out in the open. Nonetheless, the fact alone that there are members of the 
authoritarian regime who are not completely opposed to modifying the political rules of the 
game does not guarantee that a potential transition will be successful. Softliners also need 
to be majoritarian, and there are many stumbling stones in the negotiation process which 
could make reformers shy away from democracy. An authoritarian reversal of  the 
transition is the likely consequence. Contrary to what is often claimed by the literature, our 
thesis has shown that high levels of mass mobilization are not necessarily a "risk factor" 
for such a reversal; but many qualitative studies (see, for example, Morency-Laflamme, 
forthcoming; Morency-Laflamme and Brunner 2015) seem to indicate that the type of 
demands made by mass actors and opposition leaders most definitely is. Morency-
Laflamme's analysis of the Togolese transition, for example, suggests that the Togolese 
Armed Forces, the principal enemy of reform, might actually have been willing to accept 
greater liberalization if opposition demands had been more moderate. We think there are 
many such cases where a transition reversal can be ascribed to softliners either getting 
"cold feet" during the transition, lacking support among the other regime members more 
generally, or becoming eclipsed by a stronger hardliner faction. Several of the failed 
African transitions in our annex evidence exactly that kind of dynamic; we thus believe it 
highly justified to recommend taking a new look at how intra-regime dynamics shape 
transition destinies. 
 
 Intra-regime splits are also exceptionally relevant for explaining the proliferation of 
authoritarian hybrids. Hybrid regimes have institutionalized some sort of "middle way" 
between full-blown democratization and full-blown autocracy, often as a result of pressure 
from below for more opportunities for participation in decision-making processes. While 
scholars long thought that these regimes were still somehow "on the way" to democracy,  a 
look at the growing number of these hybrids today led most democratization specialists to 
accept that they form a separate category of regimes and must be investigated as such. To 
be sure, noone really claims that hybrid regimes are a new phenomenon (Diamond 2002, 
23), but there is definitely a tendency to think of them as by-products of the Third Wave. 
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Levitsky and Way, for example, find that hybrid regimes "have clearly proliferated in 
recent years" (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 60), so that they now represent "the modal type of 
political regime in the developing world" (Schedler, 2006, 3; see also Brownlee, 2007, 25). 
They claim that these regimes most often emerged either from a transition from 
authoritarianism that failed due to the weakness of opposition movements (for example 
many Sub-Saharan transitions); or from the collapse of an authoritarian regime where 
rulers lacked the capacity to consolidate another fully fledged authoritarian regime (for 
example in Eastern Europe). In our opinion, the explanatory power of both pathways is 
rather superficial, because they conceal the real issues underneath: Why did rulers not 
manage to institute another authoritarian regime? Why did the lack of strength of 
opposition movements actually matter to the outcome of the transition? When looking at 
intra-regime dynamics, all of a sudden these questions make sense. We think there are 
potentially two options for the birth of a hybrid regime (as opposed to a democratic one): 
On one hand, the relative power distribution within the authoritarian regime between 
softliners and hardliners could be such that no party really managed to completely 
marginalize the other. That means, softliners could have succeeded in pushing through a 
certain degree of liberalization, but were stopped by reticent hardliners when reforms 
threatened to go too far. Conversely, hardliners could have wanted to answer demands for 
greater political participation with the repression of opponents, but intra-elite 
fragmentation prevented them from effectively eliminating all areas of contestation. In 
both cases, some sort of "middle way" explicitely or implicitly became institutionalized, 
and a hybrid regime resulted. On the other hand, a hybrid regime could also emerge from a 
lack of softliners. If an authoritarian regime basically consists of opportunistic hardliners, a 
transformation of the regime into something more socially "acceptable" might be accepted, 
provided there are sufficient guarantees the incumbents do not lose power. Certain 
qualitative studies seem to indicate that this scenario is likely when external hegemons try 
and pressure a regime into democratizing, either by using threats such as the witholding of 
aid, or incentives (Menocal et al. 2008). Oftentimes the results are disappointing- as Dahl 
once remarked, "dictators and oligarchs are not easily beguiled by foreign assistance into 
destroying their regimes" (Dahl 1971, 12). In fact, Whitehead (1986, 45) finds that 
authoritarian leaders gradually learned that they could influence external forces and even 
manipulate their division and rivalries analogous to their domestic opponents. According 
to him, "policies aimed at 'promoting democracy' (...) are likely to constitute an open 
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invitation for manipulation by local political actors", including such practices as staged 
elections whose results are predetermined. Kirschke’s analysis of Cameroon, Rwanda and 
Kenya (Kirschke 2000) supports this dim view. She argues that in the early 1990s many 
African transitions were initially forced from the outside and often lacked internal 
developments that could account for a fundamental regime change. As a result, not only 
were regimes more likely to sponsor "informal repression", covert violations by third 
parties, to regain political control, but they were also more likely to degenerate into "new 
democratic hybrids" (Decalo 1992, 8), deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing 
international norms of “presentability” (Joseph 1998, 3-4) while being devoid of any real 
democratic practice. 
 
 Finally, intra-regime splits could also be promising in explaining why some 
countries, or groups of countries, just do not seem to democratize - ever. The Middle East 
has perhaps one of the longest traditions of authoritarian rule, with scholars citing mostly 
structural reasons such as oil rents (Ross 2001), political Islam (Huntington 1984, 208) or 
hegemon pressure to account for this "exceptionalism". However, we find that these 
explanations of authoritarian persistence (and, indeed, resilience) in the region are not fully 
satisfactory; in particular, because many of the variables used to explain the puzzle are not 
unique to the Middle East, and do not seem to have a negating effect on democracy 
elsewhere.84 Instead, we would like to point to process-oriented variables, and particularly 
intra-regime splits, as potentially much more fruitful explanations. In fact, the MENA 
cases provide a particularly good example for countries in which the lack of softliners, or 
their total marginalization within the ruling circle, has successfully precluded 
democratization despite massive popular demand for greater accountability. Morency-
Laflamme and Brunner (2015) demonstrate this using the example of Bahrain, where 
Crown Prince Salman, a reformer, slowly became eclipsed by the hardliner Generals who 
commanded the security apparatus during the 2012 Arab Spring mobilizations.   
 
 Hence, we call for a reorientation of scholarly priorities in favor of an investigation 
into the genesis of authoritarian regime splits. If we discover the workings of the inner 
circle of an authoritarian regime, that is, if we know the elements that can make the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 For example, Norway is one of the biggest oil exporters, yet no scholar would dispute that it is one of the 
most progressive countries in the world.  
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occurrence of splits between conservatives and reform-oriented parties more likely, we 
have a much better chance of assessing a country's potential to move towards genuine 
democracy. We are also better positioned to potentially help a stalled transition move 
forward; something that is of great practical relevance to any organization involved in 
democracy promotion activities. Attempting to open the "blackbox" of the authoritarian 
circle is a difficult undertaking, as even O'Donnell and Schmitter themselves have 
recognized. Nonetheless, we think this is probably the single most promising research 
avenue indicated by the results of our thesis. 
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Appendix: Gathering Data 
Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis 
 
As explained previously, there is no database for our condition "crisis of the 
authoritarian regime" because the concept is based on strategic factors that have never been 
systematically assessed for most Third Wave transitions. We thus establish our own dataset 
on this variable by conducting twenty-five case studies of transitions1, using the indicators 
identified previously: 
 
(1) Public denunciation of the regime and/or its policies by members of the ruling 
block  
(2) Liberalization of certain policy areas by progressive government officials 
(3) Defection of key regime supporters, such as the Armed Forces, and the refusal to 
obey orders by certain government branches 
(4) Proposal and execution of credible, serious and committed reform plans by the 
authoritarian government 
(5) Continued repression as an indicator for the absence or the weakness of softliners 
and the predominance of hardliner factions 
 
Using the structured and focused method as described by George and Bennett (2004, 
67), our cases are examined with a view to identifying one or several of these indicators in 
order to determine whether or not a crisis of the authoritarian regime occurred during the 
transition process. The cases are grouped according to their respective world regions, 
mixing both successful and failed transitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Since the transitions of Tanzania, Togo and Indonesia are treated more in detail in Chapter 4, we only 
include a short resume here.  
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(1) Spain 
 
Spain’s transition to democracy is usually said to have begun with the death of 
Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. The transition itself unfolded in two steps: 
firstly, a period of "apertura" (1975 – 1976) characterized by a limited liberalisation of the 
rules of the game within the existing legal framework of franquism; and secondly, a period 
of democratization (1976 – 1978) in which the restoration of civil liberties and democratic 
institutions and a gradual integration of opposition parties into the political system took 
place (Ethier 1986). In an immediate prelude, the assassination of Franco’s Prime Minister 
Luis Carrro Blanco in December 1973 laid bare the vulnerability of the unreformed regime 
(Bermeo 1987) and exacerbated the rifts between "Inmovilistas"2, "Rupturistas"3 and 
"Reformistas-Aperturistas"4 that had built up during the years of the economic crisis. After 
Franco’s death, the first government under Arias Navarro reflected these divisions: while 
Arias himself was a Conservative, his cabinet included both more progressive elements 
such as José Maria de Areilza as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Garrigues y Díaz 
Cañabate as Minister of Justice, and Manuel Fraga Iribarne as Interior Minister, and 
hardliners such as General Fernando de Santiago as Vice-Chairman for Defense (Sacchetti 
2009). Arias’ nomination as head of government took place in a context of heightened 
social and political tension: ETA terrorist attacks in the Basque Country worsened, worker 
strikes in industry and public services paralyzed many cities, and street riots coupled with 
police reprisals fueled the popular ire against the regime. Furthermore, the political system 
was strongly polarized: whereas the reformist elements of the political class called for the 
establishment of fundamental rights and political associations as stipulated by the Charter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This category comprises both "Continuistas" and "Ultras", groups that favored the perpetuation of Franco’s 
policies and regime style. The Continuist group featured many of Franco’s former politicians and officials, 
including the organic Assembly (the Cortès) and the higher echelons of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, 
the Ultras, also known as "the Bunker", were individuals active in Francoist institutions such as the National 
Council of the "Movimiento" (the Francoist Single Party), the vertical syndicate and the Falangist 
organizations (Colomer 1995). 
3 On one hand, this category comprises groups as diverse as anarchists, revolutionary Marxists and radical 
nationalists. On the other hand, it also refers to the democratic opposition that from March 1976 on grouped 
together in the Democratic Coordination and later in the Platform of Democratic Organisms. This platform 
was composed basically of Communists, Socialists, Basque/Catalan Nationalists, Liberals and Christian 
Democrats. Rather than a continuation of Franquism, they favored a radical break with the past and a return 
to a Republican ruling style (Colomer 1995).    
4 Openists (such as Carlos Arias and Manuel Fraga who formed the government during the first six months 
after Franco’s death) and Reformists, grouped together around the government of Adolfo Suarez and King 
Juan Carlos, favored a procedural type of continuity, i.e. reform from within the Franquist legal system 
(Perricone 2001).!!
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of the Movimiento, the hardliners pushed for increased repression against the opposition. 
Confronted with those incompatible demands, Arias Navarro adopted an ambivalent 
posture: on one hand, he tightened repression against the most radical elements of the 
opposition (Ethier 1986); on the other hand he proclaimed a formal apertura on February 
12, 1974 (Bermeo 1987). However, after months of delaying reforms and objecting to real 
democratization, King Juan Carlos ordered Arias’ resignation and appointed the technocrat 
Adolfo Suarez to take his place. Indeed, Suarez quickly presented a clear political program 
based on two points: Firstly, the adoption of a "Law for Political Reform" that, once 
approved by the Cortès and the Spanish public in a referendum, dismantled the Francoist 
legal system and replaced it with a new democratic bicameral Parliament; and secondly, 
the organisation of free and universal elections with the participation of all political parties 
in June 1977 in order to elect a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new 
constitution. Despite hostile reactions from the Bunker and the Army, Suarez and his 
reformist cabinet also managed to push through a partial political amnesty in July 1976, the 
dismantling of the Francoist secret police in December 1976, the legalization of trade 
unions in March 1977 and the legalization of the Communist party in August 1977 
(Sacchetti 2009). Authors unanimously agree that the progressive attitude of the King, as 
well as Suarez’ close relations to reformists in the Armed Forces were largely responsible 
for these successes. In Spring 1977, Spain held her first free legislative elections after 
Franco, which were won in large part by the moderate centre parties Union de Centro 
Democratico (UCD) and the PSOE (El Pais 1977). Subsequently, the Constituent Cortes 
began to draft the new Constitution in the summer of 1977, which was ratified on October 
1978 and approved in a popular referendum on December 6 with 87,8% votes in favor 
(UAB 2003). 
 
In Spain, the ruling clique split very early into those who favoured reform, those 
who opposed it and those who, while uncomfortable with too much change, were at least 
inclined to go along with it as long as they were able to retain some privileges from the 
past. However, it was only after the death of Franco that softliners were able to occupy 
decisive positions of influence from where they were able to push democratization 
forward. After the initial debacle of Arias Navarro’s attempt to introduce a "democracia a 
la Espanola" (Share 1987), the reins of control were firmly in the hand of a "trias of 
reformists" formed by King Juan Carlos as Franco’s handpicked successor, Adolfo Suarez 
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in the bureaucracy and General Gutierrez-Mellado in the Armed Forces. Their skilful 
leadership, as well as the fact that they occupied the most sensitive positions within the 
regime explains why hardliners were never majoritarian throughout the transition process. 
 
The engine of transition was Juan Carlos whose support for reform was crucial in 
obtaining the compliance of middle forces (such as the Cortès) and in marginalising the 
hardliner elements of the regime (Bregolat 1999). Mistrusted at first by both the 
democratic opposition and the Falangists and disparaged as "idiot king" (Der Spiegel 
1975), Juan Carlos turned out to be a genuine democrat whose reform-oriented attitude 
combined with his "francoist loyalty" played a crucial role in bridging the old and the new 
order. Portraying himself as the "King of all Spaniards", he admitted to the New York 
Times that already in 1969 he "had no intention of presiding over a dictatorship" (Preston 
2004, 254 - 55) and that he did not want to help with the continuation of the current regime 
(Fernandez-Miranda Lozana 1995, 50). Instead, he chose democracy as a means of gaining 
legitimacy for a constitutional monarchy, and to guarantee its survival (Fawcett 1989; 
Martinez undated)5.  
 
Given the strength of the Bunker movement6, Juan Carlos’ nomination of Arias 
Navarro to lead the first post-Franco government7 should be seen as an attempt to lend the 
reform process an air of continuity - "el mayor cambio posible sin ruptura del sistema 
institucional" (Medina Gonzales 1975). Navarro, a self-proclaimed "servidor de la nacion" 
(El Pais 1976) whose goal was to "deflower Spain without pain or sin, by the help of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 As the king explained to his advisor Fernandez-Miranda, "la monarquia no puede ser azul, falangista, ni 
siquiera puede ser franquista. La Monarquia viene de atrás, de los otros reyes, de la Historia y no se puede 
concretar en las actuales instituciones excesivamente parciales (…) el futuro del país se encuentra en manos 
de muy pocas personas. No será nada parecido a lo que es ahora. La Monarquia tiene que ser democrática. Es 
la única manera de que pueda ser aceptada por Europa y por el mundo y de que pueda subsistir." (Rose 2012) 
6 Convinced that "Spain doesn’t need reforms", these hardliners fought to conserve Franco’s "thousand-year- 
empire" (Der Spiegel 1975) and included, among others, the former Chief of the Guardia Civil, General 
Iniesta Cano, Falangist and President of the War Veterans José Antonio Giron as well as Cortès-Member and 
Fuerza-Nueva leader Blas Pinar. Giron stood out for his frequent public stances against the reforms carried 
out first by the Navarro and Suarez governments. Confirming that he "defended political participation, but 
not from within a political party" (Giron 1974), he threatened that those "who hope for a change of regime 
are gravely mistaken" and warned that a multiparty system would be catastrophical for Spain (Die Welt 
1975). Miguel Primo de Rivera y Urquijo, another hardliner, echoed this line in an article published in the 
journal Arriba when he stated that "nuestro Estado debe ser un Estado autoritario que permita una libertad 
politica ordenada contra el libertinaje que proclama el Estado liberal" (Gaceta Ilustrada undated). 
7 In order to gauge their support for his ideas, Juan Carlos asked several Spanish politicians during Franco’s 
final years to express in writing what they would do if they were appointed prime minister when Franco died. 
Adolfo Suarez stated that through this opportunity he was able to develop his ideas on transitions to 
democracy, a key reason why the king later put him in charge of the government (Bregolat 1999).!
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vaseline" (Der Spiegel 1975) initially seemed to offer some hope for a reformist strategy. 
Like Caetano in Portugal he followed a path of limited liberalization followed by 
retrenchment designed to appease the hardliners (Fawcett 1989). However, in doing so he 
was unable to mobilise support for his policies from both the regime softliners and the 
conservatives and deprived many of his ministers of their once apparently promising 
"reformist" credentials (De Areilza 1977). Moreover, he wasn’t strong willed enough to 
resist the pressure of the Bunker, who forced the dismissal of several ministers considered 
too liberal.8 Most importantly, Arias never accepted the idea of transforming the regime 
into a truly pluralist democracy (Maravall and Santamaria 1986, 81), as he remained 
dedicated to Franco and the idea that any legal and institutional reform would have to be 
carried out "como Franco hubiera deseado" (Ardanaz 2014)9. He managed to guide a new 
law on political associations through the Cortès but the opposition rejected it, as it 
legalized only those associations10 the government did not deem "subversive" (New York 
Times 1976). When Juan Carlos finally realized Arias’ "democracia a la espanola" had 
little in common with his own plans to establish in Spain "una democracia sin adjetivos" 
(Cuadernos para el dialogo 1976) he dismissed Arias, calling him an "unabashed disaster" 
(Newsweek 1976).  
 
The King’s presence and behavior was paramount for Arias’ successor, Suarez, and 
his ability to gain support within the regime, as Juan Carlos embodied the legitimacy of the 
Franquist system (Share 1987). Suarez, at first denounced as "an obscure falangist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 Among the victims of the Bunker were Chief of Staff General Manuel Diaz Alegria Gutierrez (Der Spiegel 
1975), Minister of Information Pio Cabanillas, and Minister of Haciendas Antonio Barrera de Irima who 
resigned in protest at the dismissal of Cabanillas. Minister of Labor M. Licinio de la Fuente also resigned, 
citing his opposition to a new law project that would have enabled employers to dismiss striking workers (Le 
Devoir 1975). In response to the personal changes, the group “Tacito” published in their journal “Ya” a 
disenchanted note saying “Ahora todo tiene a ser mas claro (...) Se tuvo la oportunidad de elegir un camino, 
el que los discursos presidenciales senalaban y nosotros apoyamos. Se ha elegido otro… Cuando el pasado 
predomina, solo los arcaizantes se imponen y con ellos es difícil intentar una nueva andadura…” (Gaceta 
Ilustrada 1974). 9 As Fawcett (2009) states, Arias really saw “aperturismo” as a means of bringing disaffected Franquists 
back into the regime. In a meeting with Fernandez-Miranda on February 11, 1976 he clarified his views by 
confessing: "What I want to do is continue Francoism. And as long as I’m here or still in political life, I’ll 
never be anything other than a strict perpetuator of Francoism in all its aspects and I will fight against the 
enemies of Spain who have begun daring to raise their heads and are just a hidden and clandestine minority 
(Fernandez-Miranda Lozana 1995, 53)". In response, the editorial of the journal “Cuadernos para el Dialogo” 
wryly summarized: “Si al principio deciamos 'Arias y la reforma', al final nuestras propias palabras nos 
conducen a decir 'Arias o la reforma'" (Roca I Junyent 1976). 10 Arias contended that associations were the “mas expedita proyeccion politica del pluralismo de la vida 
social espanola”, but still refused to legalize political parties (Laborda and Fernando undated).    
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functionary" and "pure bunker" (Cambio 1976, 18), unequivocally stated that "popular 
sovereignty resides in the people" and promised to work for “the establishment of a 
democratic political system based on the guarantee of civil rights and freedoms, on equal 
opportunities for democratic groups, and the acceptance of genuine pluralism (Powell 
1996, 114 - 115). Following a strategy laid out by the King’s advisor Fernandez-Miranda, 
“de la ley, a la ley”, his goal was to enact democratic reforms through the existing 
Francoist institutions, with the holding of free universal elections as essence of his task 
(Linz and Stepan 1996).  In doing so, Suarez was able to offer something to both sides: “to 
the conservatives (...) a commitment to legal process and an affirmation of existing 
institutions and powers; to the opposition (...) a commitment to the sort of change it 
favoured” (Graeme 2000, 131 - 132). His cabinet featured reformists such as Martin Villa, 
Landelino Lavilla, Marcelino Oreja, Abril Martorell and Calvo Sotelo, and within a year 
and a half a number of reforms were enacted. The most important of these were the 
passage, through the Cortès, of the Ley para la Reforma Publica and the legalization of the 
Communist party11, which Suarez achieved through a combination of incentives and 
threats. For instance, Suarez promised to the Cortès members representation in the new 
Senate through a modification of the electoral law, stressing that the new democratic 
institutions would have the same number of seats combined as the Francoist Cortès 
(Preston 2004, 373)12. At the same time, he coerced the unwilling into complying, for 
example by threatening the members of the Cortès with the dispossession of their posts in 
state companies, with making public the recordings of telephone taps the government 
secret services had placed in their homes and offices, and with the live transmission, on 
television, of the vote for the Reform bill, so that those who voted “no” would have to face 
a consequent drop in popularity (Colomer 1991).  
 
In dealing with the most hardline members of the military, Suarez stressed that his 
reform process did not stray from Francoist legality, permitted the upholding of national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The decision to legalize the Communist party ended any doubts about the sincerity of Suarez’ personal 
commitment to democracy, as he acted on the grounds that not legalizing the party would affect the 
inclusiveness of contestation. As he stated himself, “not only am I not Communist, but I reject strongly its 
ideology (...) but I am a Democrat (...) and therefore I think that our people are sufficiently mature (...) to 
assimilate their own pluralism” (Linz and Stepan 1996, ii). 
12 Suarez later jokingly commented his strategy to Emilio Attard: “But come now! If I hadn’t been able to 
pull out of the hat some seats in the senate to offer to the hara-kiri procurators, how would I have brought off 
the political reform?” (Colomer 1995) 
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unity, and was the King’s will (Preston 2004, 372)13. He also guaranteed not to legalize the 
Communist party, a promise that he later reneged on14.  He was supported by the 
democratic wing of the military under the leadership of General Gutierrez-Mellado, whose 
insistence that “el ejercito permanecera neutral” (Agencia EFE 1976) was critical in easing 
tensions particularly after the government’s most controversial reforms15.  Acting as “the 
King’s umbrella”, and protecting the regime from all sorts of attacks (El Pais 2002), 
Mellado wanted to avoid another civil war at all costs, and was therefore prepared, 
together with a critical mass of progressive-minded soldiers, to isolate potential 
troublemakers within the Armed Forces. His maxime was that “todo lo que desuna es malo 
para el ejercito” and that “among the causes that may cause disunion between us, the most 
dangerous is the political cause” (Agencia Cifra 1976). The dismissal of the first Vice-
president of the government, Lieutnant-General Fernando de Santiago y Diaz de Mendivil, 
together with the Head of the Civil Guard Carlos Iniesta after their criticism of a 
government bill regarding syndical liberty is but one of several instances in which these 
principles were put into practice (Colomer 1995)16.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The king’s relationship with the Armed Forces was crucial in preventing an authoritarian backlash. As 
Franco’s heir and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, the King constantly reminded the military that 
the most important quality in a soldier and in an Army was discipline, whether or not one agreed with a 
specific decision (Juan Carlos I de Borbon y Borbon 1977). The Armed Forces, on their part, found 
themselves between a rock and a hard place: Whereas the Army’s mission had traditionally been to preserve 
Francoism, Franco had given orders before his death that the military should obey the king with the same 
loyalty (Cercas 2011, 30). This contradiction somewhat removed their capacity to act subversively, 
something that was particularly important after the legalization of the Communist party in 1977 when the 
Army felt that the Suarez government had betrayed their trust. Although the Army High Council sent a 
confidential letter to Juan Carlos warning him that “his standing amongst Army officers had suffered a severe 
blow” (Preston 2004, 385; Powell 1996, 128 - 129), their anger did not translate into violence against the 
monarchy or the regime. 
14 As Paul Preston writes, the clothing of the reform bill in Francoist attire led many of those still loyal to the 
ideals of Franco to believe that in voting for the bill, they were supporting a necessary evolution of the 
Fundamental Laws. For instance, the Minister for the Navy, Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga, remarked: “My 
conscience is clear because the democratic reforms will be carried out through Francoist legality” (Preston 
2004, 373 - 374) and the Captain General de Burgos, Mateo Prada Canillas, even went as far as proclaiming: 
“Presidente, viva la madre que te pario!” (El Pais 2012) 15!For instance, after Suarez presented his reform bill to the High Command of the Armed Forces, Mellado 
sent an intimidating report to all the higher officers demanding their abstention from all political activity or 
ideological statements. He warned them: “Whoever does not feel able to do so and has such imperious ideals 
which are, in his own opinion, higher than what the Army demands of him, must relinquish his duties (...) the 
Army is prepared to expel from its ranks all those who do not maintain its discipline” (Colomer 1995). 
16 Another important example is the reaction of the Armed Forces to the legalization of the Communist party. 
Whereas leaders were fuming at the government’s decision - Manuel Fraga declared that “the legalization of 
the Communist party is a genuine coup d’état”, Alfonso Armado denounced “treason”, and General De 
Santiago even stated that “With me as vice president, this would not have happened (...) I’d have brought out 
the tanks”- they were unable to pose any subversive action due to pressure from Gutierrez-Mellado’s and 
other reform-minded officers. In the end, the High Command of the Armed Forces announced “general 
condemnation by all Army units”, but added a paragraph in which they “admitted the accomplished fact with 
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Resume:  
 
The “reformist trias” kept the reins of the Spanish transition process throughout the 
period 1976 - 1978 without significantly losing ground to opposition from hardliners either 
in the civil or the military wing of the regime. Therefore, it is adequate to confirm the 
presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.  
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(2) Portugal 
 
Portugal in 1974 overthrew the authoritarian “Estada Novo” regime in a coup d’état 
known as the Carnation Revolution (Varol 2012) as the first in a long line of “Third Wave” 
democratizers (Huntington 1991). However, the country’s drive towards multiparty rule 
began much earlier, in 1968, when Antonio de Salazaar, Portugal’s longtime dictator, 
became incapacitated and Marcello Caetano was chosen to succeed him as Prime Minister. 
Formerly a protégé of Salazaar, Caetano initiated a series of “political decompression” 
measures, such as introducing a “liberal wing” into the National Assembly, relaxing press 
censure and allowing the return from exile of Socialist party leader Mario Soares (Freitas 
do Amaral 1999). Yet, a group of powerful regime hardliners known as “the Ultras”17 
thwarted any attempt at meaningful political reform. The first great oil shock of 1973 and 
the continuing economic and human drain caused by Portugal’s colonial wars in Africa 
increased the pressure on Caetano whose idea of “continuity and evolution” increasingly 
lost support in both the hardliner and the liberal ranks of the regime. The decisive 
ingredient in these tensions turned out to be dissensions within the Armed Forces, long a 
bulwark of support for the regime. When General Antonio de Spinola, a high-ranking 
regime figure, published his book Portugal and the Future in which he severely criticized 
the government’s conduct of its Africa wars, it sent ripples throughout the political 
establishment in Lisbon. Caetano answered with destituting Spinola from his functions, a 
move that only served to alienate him further from his power base. In fact, reform-oriented 
regime members increasingly came to realize that the only way to greater political freedom 
was by means of revolution. On April 25, 1974, a group of disaffected younger officers 
belonging to an underground organization, the “Movimento das Forças Armadas” (MFA) 
successfully toppled Caetano in a bloodless coup and Spinola emerged as the titular head 
of the new government. The move set in motion a true “resurrection of civil society” 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Within days, tens of thousands Portuguese citizens 
poured into the street, cheering the coup leaders and demanding further democratic change. 
A tumultuous two-year transition period known as the “Ongoing Revolutionary Process” 
(Processo Revolucionario Em Curso, “PERC”) ensued, during which various political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 This group of ultra Salazaarists included members as illustrious as Admiral Americo Tomas, Portugal’s 
president, some senior military officers and the heads of prominent financial corporations.  
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factions ranging from the far left to the center right of the spectrum competed for power18. 
After six provisional governments, an attempted Marxist-Leninist revolution and a coup by 
reactionary military units in November 1975, Portugal’s political turmoil finally 
culminated in the proclamation of a new Constitution on April 2, 1976 and the end of the 
Proceso Revolucionario (Linz and Stepan 1996).      
 
In Portugal, divisions between softliners and hardliners are well documented and 
appeared as early as 1968, the moment when Marcelo Caetano took the office of Prime 
Minister from Salazaar. Assessments of Caetano, the central figurehead of the regime until 
1974, are difficult to make, mostly because of his mixed record of reform attempts on one 
hand, and repression on the other. At the very least, he could be considered a moderate 
authoritarian who realized the need to reform at least part of the structure the Salazaar 
regime was built on. Having served in Salazaar’s regime for 25 years, Caetano had built 
himself a somewhat liberal reputation19, and indeed, his early actions in office suggested to 
some that reform might be underway.  
 
For instance, his televised appearances “conversa em familia” in which he openly 
exposed the country’s problems became famous among the Portuguese (Bailby 1969). In a 
gesture of openness without precedent, he received the chief editors of Portugal’s most 
important newspapers, discussed with them the status of the press20 and promised a more 
lenient approach to censure, demonstratively replacing Salazaar’s strict chief censor 
Venancio Pauro Rodriguez with less orthodox Cesar Moreira Batista (Der Spiegel 1968)21.  
In choosing his cabinet, Caetano also exhibited a more “modernist approach”. Whereas 
ultra Salazaarists Correia de Oliveira (former Finance Minister) and Franco Nogueira !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Organizations participating in the power struggle included the Socialist Party of Portugal (Partido 
Socialista, “PS”), the radical Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues, “PCP”), the 
moderate People’s Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democratico, “PPD”) and the factionalized and 
partially radicalized MFA itself. 
19 Caetano had once been Salazaar’s proclaimed “heir” to the throne, but broke with the dictator in 1958, 
criticizing Salazaar’s tendency to concentrate all decision making power in the executive hands (Der Spiegel 
1968). Later, he prevented police from abusing a mass of student demonstrators in 1957 and then resigned 
from his position as rector of Lisbon University in protest against police actions on University property in 
1962 (Bermeo 1987). 20 Caetano later announced his desire to amend the 1933 Constitution in order to introduce a new law on 
Press freedom before Parliament. However, he also stated that press freedom would continue to know limits, 
especially when “the public interest” and “the international prestige” of the country was at stake (Bieber 
1970) 21 As a result, the Portuguese daily “Vida Mundial” was allowed to print an article denouncing police 
brutality against student protestors in neighboring Spain (Der Spiegel 1968).  
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(Foreign Affairs) lost their seats in the government (De la Souchère 1970), several sub-
ministries (for example the Ministries of Social and Economic Affairs) went to young 
Christian-progressive technocrats22 with a more favorable outlook on press freedom and 
the creation of political parties. 
 
He also allowed Mario Soares and the bishop of Oporto, two prominent opposition 
figures, to return to Portugal from exile (Bermeo 1987) and made some effort to liberalize 
PIDE, Portugal’s secret police (Fawcett 1989). Most importantly, in the runup to the 
October 26, 1969 legislative elections, he authorized for the first time the creation of 
electoral committees which were allowed to hold supervised meetings. He even granted 
opposition candidates a voice in newspapers23 (De la Souchère 1970). When members of 
the “Portuguese Legion”, a fascist paramilitary group under authority of government 
hardliners, broke into the Lisbon office of one of these committees threatening and abusing 
their candidate Eduardo Souto de Moura, Caetano reacted by personally receiving Moura 
and assuring him of his protection (Jaenecke 1969).  
 
However, powerful hardliner factions made it very clear that they wouldn’t hesitate 
to employ force to stop liberalization if they deemed it was carried to far24. During his 
mandate as Prime Minister and until his forced resignation in 1974, Caetano proved unable 
to turn this power struggle within the regime in his favor. Partly, this can be explained by 
the relative strength of hardliners. For instance, President Admiral Americo Thomaz, a 
devoted Salazaarist and hostile to Caetano’s reform plans25, had just been reelected in 
office for another seven years. Prior to his election, a small group of progressive-minded 
individuals within the regime had tried to get Caetano to run for the office himself. If 
successful, he could have nominated a technocrat for Prime Minister, which might have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22 For instance, he elevated Alfredo Vaz Pinto, director of Portugal’s airlaine TAF, to the rank of a State 
Minister. Only a few months earlier, Pinto had declined Salazaar’s offer for a government post (Der Spiegel 
1968). Another reformer, M. Melo e Castro, was promoted head of the National Union (De la Souchère 
1970)  23 However, radio and television remained reserved for the regime.  24 For instance, “Ultra” General Venâncio Deslandes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, warned Caetano 
not to go too far in his efforts to search a peaceful solution to the ongoing colonial war, stating that [the 
hardliners] “would never accept the abandoning of our overseas-provinces” (Bailby 1969). He was echoed by 
then Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira who stated that Portugal’s traditional foreign policy with regards to 
its African colonies was going to be maintained “at all costs” (Carion 1969) 25 It is no secret that Admiral Americo Thomaz, Portugal’s President, was hostile towards Caetano from the 
start, and spoke “against the solution Caetano” for the office of Prime Minister (Carion 1969). 
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facilitated the carrying through of reforms. However, the plan failed, not least because of 
the support Thomaz enjoyed within the ranks of the Salazaarists (Thomaz 1972). Caetano 
was also enormously unpopular with hardliner elements of the Armed Forces. In December 
1973, for example, a “palace coup” led by General Kaulza de Arriaga26, MM. Adriano 
Moreira and Franco Nogueira27 was carried out with the tacit approval of President 
Thomaz28. The coup failed, and several participants were subsequently placed under house 
arrest (Delemos 1974).  
 
As a result, most of Caetano’s reforms fell short of true openings. The new “Status 
on the Press” in force since June 1, 1972 conformed essentially to the old reglementation, 
with the Information Minister Moreira declaring that “it is perfectly normal to control the 
press in order to avoid any abuse of freedom, which is always regrettable” (De Campos 
1973). Unions were still illegal, striking workers found themselves criminally prosecuted, 
and no political organization outside of the “National Union Party” was allowed to form 
(De la Souchère 1972). In the same spirit, the newly reformed Secret Police (DGS, former 
PIDE) led vast repression campaigns against anticolonial movements, and didn’t hesitate 
to employ torture (De Campos 1974)29. Most importantly, even though Caetano had 
promised open competition for the 1969 Legislative Assembly, the “National Union Party” 
“won” every seat, demasking Caetano’s liberalization efforts as a farce (Bermeo 1987)30. 
Another part of the blame may be placed on Caetano himself, because his lack of will to 
break entirely with Salazaar’s corporatist project alienated him from fellow reformists 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26 A few years earlier, Kaulza de Arriaga in a Spinola-esque fashion had criticized Caetano’s “weak 
leadership style” in his book The Portuguese Answer (Bieber 1974). 27 Kaulza de Arriaga was the former chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique; Moreira and 
Nogueira were both Ministers under Salazaar. Further participants were General Joaquim da Luz Cunha 
(Kaulza de Arriaga’s brother in law), General Henrique Troni (Minister of Defence), General Silvino Silvério 
Marques (Governor-General of Angola) and José Manuel Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese 
Guinea).  28 Their idea was to have Thomaz stay President for a while and dismiss Caetano, and instead appoint a new 
cabinet headed by Moreira. Thomaz who had planned on resigning upon his 80th birthday in November of 
1974 would step aside, with the Council of Ministers and Corporate Chamber nominating Kaulza de Arriaga 
as President (Soares 2009)  29 Directives from the Ministry of the Interior were clear; although police were to act within the law, no 
failure to pursue "subversive elements" was to be tolerated by the regime (De la Souchère 1970).  30 Additionnally, Caetano had decided to prohibit discussion of all three of the opposition’s main campaign 
subjects in the months leading up o the election. Caetano himself claimed that such a step was necessary 
because “he realized that Portugal wouldn’t be able to survive a mass movement similar to that of the May 
Revolution of 1968 in France” (Bieber 1973a). 
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within the regime (Wiarda 1977, 257; Bieber 1970)31. His vision of “transforming many 
things, for the essential to remain unchanged” (De la Souchère 1970) caused great 
disappointment among both members of his own cabinet (Saldanha 2010), as well as the 
newly founded “Liberal Wing” of Parliament (Bieber 1973a) and prompted many 
reformists to defect to the opposition32 (De Campos 1973). 
 
Finally, Caetano’s stance on the colonial question and the frustration of large 
swathes of the Armed Forces would prove decisive in tipping the stalemate between 
regime factions in favor of democracy. Prior to 1974, progressive elements of the military 
had repeatedly voiced their opposition to the ongoing wars in Africa33. Particularly, the 
junior officers34 felt that the army had become “the scapegoat” of a colonial policy that had 
lost all legitimacy in their eyes (Delemos 1974; Binnendijk 1987; Cuzan 1999). As 
Caetano himself reveals in his memoires, he was aware that Portugal’s colonial policy was 
an obstacle to its declared foreign policy goal of cooperating more closely with other 
European countries (Die Zeit 1974) and was ready to grant greater autonomy to some of its 
provinces as early as 1972 (Soares 2009). However, staunch opposition of Ultras thwarted 
any of his attempts to deviate from the regime’s traditional Africa policy35. On top of this, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31!Manuela Soares who wrote Caetano’s biography described him as "um homem autoritário", claiming that 
"a democracia não fazia parte do seu pensamento" (Soares 2009) 
32 In 1972, Joao Salgueiro, Sub-Secretary of Planning, resigned, followed by Rogerio Martins and Xavier 
Pintado, Ministers of Economy and Finances. A year later, in 1973, Liberal Parliament members Francisco 
Sa Carneiro, Miller Guerra, and Francisco Balsamao announced their dropping out of Parliament after their 
proposal on abolishing censure was rejected without discussion (Hermet 1973).  33 General Antonio de Spinola, for example, was one of many vocal critics of Caetano’s Africa Policy. In 
1972 he declared that “this war is not so much being won in Guinea as being lost in Lisbon” (Mauersberger 
1979). In February 1974, he published his book Portugal and the Future in which he claimed that the war in 
Africa could not be won and that the only way to keep the African possessions was to grant some sort of 
autonomy to the provinces. According to him, Portugal was “draining its resources in a war that cannot be 
won (...) In this war we fight for ideals that are neither moral nor useful to the Portuguese people” (Bieber 
1974).  34 Officers like Vasco Goncalves, Otelo Cavalho, Melo Antunes, Vitor Alves, Vasco Lourenco and Rosa 
Coutinho explained their doubts with these words:  “We were leading a war against people that spoke the 
same language. We had little understanding of racial differences... We were badly equipped, malnourished 
and in many respects similar to the Guerrilleros (...) There was little difference between an officer of the 
Frelimo and us” (Huebner 1976) 35 When in 1969 Caetano first formulated the idea of "a federation of nations” as opposed to Salazaar’s ideal 
of an “indivisible Portugal”, the powerful corporate groups Champalimaud and the Overseas National Bank 
headed by the President of the National Union Party, “Ultra” Castro Fernandez, put such pressure on Caetano 
that he abstained from implementing the reforms planned for January 1970 that would have granted greater 
administrative authority to Angola and Mozambique (De la Souchère 1970). Two years later, in 1972, a 
secret pact between Bissau’s revolutionary Amilcar Cabral and Caetano that would have resulted in Bissau’s 
independence failed because details of the negotiations became known to hardliners in Lisbon. In Mid-
January, Caetano, visibly under pressure, declared over television and radio that “negotiations with the 
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Caetano’s reform of the military promotion system created resentment among many 
regular officers, because they felt that the government’s efforts to facilitate the obtention of 
battlefield commissions by new recruits was an unfair discrimination to those who had 
waited years to rise in ranks (Cuzan 1999; Joxe 1974). As a result, between 1970 and 1972 
more than 20 percent of young officers deserted the Armed Forces (Ramos de Almeida 
2002).  
 
Finally, the military’s increasing conviction that the solutions to Portugal’s 
problems “could only be brought by the Army itself” (Carion 1969) culminated in the 
April 1974 coup that deposed Caetano36. In a communiqué issued in the aftermath of the 
“Viragem Historica” (Canto 2007), the military committed itself to the establishment of a 
democratic regime and promised to hold popular elections within twelve months for a 
Constituent Assembly, which would then draft a new democratic Constitution (Varol 
2012). The coup was met with no resistance from either the security agencies or other 
elements of the regime – on one hand, a proof of softliner domination, and on the other 
hand, an accurate reflection of the fact that by that point, very few people considered the 
regime worth fighting for (Kohler 1982, 169).  
 
Resume:  
 
We confirm that the Portuguese democratic transition was accompanied by a crisis 
of the authoritarian regime, which manifested itself in the overthrow of Caetano by a 
disaffected softliner faction of the Armed Forces.  
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(3) Greece 
 
The long course towards Metapolitefsi, the Greek transition to democracy, began in 
June 1973 when the head of the Greek military junta, Georgios Papadopolous, initiated a 
number of educational and economic reforms37 in order to legitimize his government. 
Facing growing unrest within the junta’s own ranks and increasing popular opposition to 
military rule and economic hardship, these reforms attempted to defuse the tension and 
sideline opponents within the junta who had attempted to overthrow Papadopolous in an 
aborted naval coup only a month earlier (US Department of State 1973). Through a 
controversial plebiscite, Papadopolous transformed Greece into a “presidential 
parliamentary republic” (Woodhouse 1985, 117) and announced that the country would 
pass to an interim government charged with organising elections no later than the end of 
1974. At the same time, however, he granted himself vast executive powers that further 
alienated the population and fuelled doubts about his actual willingness to hand over power 
to a civilian government. In November 1973, a series of national strikes and student 
demonstrations increased those tensions. Particularly, the occupation of Athens 
Polytechnic, lasting from November 14 – 17, became the epicentre of opposition to the 
regime and catalyzed popular mobilization in many sectors of Greek society (Kassimeris 
2005). Demanding “bread, education and liberty”, the protests escalated rapidly into a 
general political uprising against the military dictatorship and prompted Papadopolous to 
mobilize the military and quell the unrest by force. The exact number of casualties still 
remains unknown because many people refused to attend hospitals for fear of brutality 
(McDonald 1990, 298 - 99). Whereas the effects of the student uprisings on the further 
course of Greece’s transition are often exaggerated in the literature, there is no doubt that 
the violence used in repressing them critically alienated and divided the ruling military 
junta (Tsiridis 2008). Furthermore, it accelerated the hard line coup led by General 
Ioannidis that overthrew Papadopolous from office on November 25, 1973. After installing 
Phaedon Gizikis as figurehead president of Greece, Ioannidis pursued a double strategy, 
cracking down on opponents internally with the support of “the small junta” (Psyharis 
1975), and forcing an aggressive expansionism externally. Following his proclaimed goal 
of achieving “Enosis”, the unity of Cyprus and Greece, he orchestrated the overthrow of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37 These reforms included a general amnesty to all “political criminals” and the subsequent releasing of 300 
prisoners; the lifting of martial law and the easing of press censorship (Tzortzis 2002). 
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Cyprus’ President Archbishop Makarios III; a move that prompted the Turkish invasion 
and partition of the island and dealt the fatal blow to the internal cohesion of the Greek 
regime. Faced with the threat of a war that Greece was not prepared to fight, Ioannidis was 
forced out of office by his fellow Generals and the decision was made for former Prime 
Minister Karamanlis to return to his position (Arapakis 2000). He was sworn in to office 
on July 24 and immediately moved to reinstate democracy (Veremis 1997, 170).  
 
The Greek transition was characterized by continuous clashes between softliner and 
hardliner factions within the military junta, producing one crisis after another until finally 
softliners prevailed in 1973. Papadopolous’ timid liberalization efforts in the beginning of 
the 1970s were followed by a hardliner backlash in 1973, but in response notably to 
Ioannidis’ disastrous foreign policy, a major part of his support base switched allegiances 
to support regime softliners and democratization. Until that turnaround in 1973, however, 
we can say that softliners were never really in control of the transition process. Instead 
they were walking a fine line between pursuing liberalization efforts and appeasing 
hardliner opposition; an effort that ultimately failed when student revolts plunged the 
country into turmoil.      
 
 Papadopolous himself was somewhat of a contradictory figure in that regard. A 
reluctant softliner at best, he indicated at least the intention of ending military rule once a 
satisfactory level of political stability had been reached (Coerant 2001). To this end he 
often compared Greece to the “patient in a cast”, claiming that he put the patient (Greece) 
in a cast ("ασθενή στον γύψο" literally: patient in gypsum) so that he could fix her skeletal 
(Shugart 1997). According to his “Program for the Development of Democracy”, within a 
timeframe of 15 years the Greek per capita income should rise to 2600$, and potentially 
allow the holding of democratic elections (Der Spiegel 1972a). But when popular unrest 
started to spread in 1972, he was amongst the first to recognize the writing on the wall and 
urged his followers to speed up the process of restoring some form of parliamentary 
democracy, saying the military “must definitely leave office this year and surrender power 
to civilians” (Tzortzis 2002, 4). 
 
On the other hand, however, Papadopolous did not make a secret out of his 
authoritarian tendencies, describing the real nature of his regime’s brand of democracy by 
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contending that “even the shadow of martial law is more effective than the normal process 
of law” (Green 1971, 192). During his time as Prime Minister he flaunted the principle of 
separation of powers by amassing a key number of ministerial portfolios, including 
Defense and Foreign Affairs (Danopoulos 1983).  Later on he added the post of regent to 
the list by replacing General George Zoitakis after the latter opposed his plans to replace 
Cyprus’ President Makarios with a more pliable figure (Der Spiegel 1972b)38. Eventually 
Papadopolous abolished the monarchy in a controversial referendum in which he was the 
only candidate, and which was heavily influenced by coercion39. Proclaimed “elected 
president in a July 1973 contest”, he dismissed the remaining members of the junta that 
brought him to power (Der Spiegel 1973a) and postponed the implementation of all articles 
and provisions of the new Constitution regarding elections, political parties and freedom of 
speech and other civil liberties (Papadopoulos 1986 – 1972, 3: 84).   
 
By exhibiting such an ambivalent posture towards democratic processes 
Papadopolous estranged himself from other softliners within the regime, notably the 
Crown, the civil servants and parts of the military (Diamandouros 1986, 146 - 47)40. But 
whereas Papadopolous’ efforts at reform failed partly because of his own distrust towards 
democratic principles, they were also thwarted by hardliner opposition41. In fact, as early 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Zoitakis had been criticizing Papadopolous’ ruling style since the late 1960s when he pleaded for an 
amnesty of Papadopolous-assailant Panagoulis. Furthermore, he repeatedly declined to sign Papadopolous’ 
decrees (Der Spiegel 1972b) 
39 For instance, in the run-up to the referendum on the new Constitution, Interior Minister Stylianos Pattakos 
made clear that those who would not participate would have “to explain their reason for abstention to the 
police in writing” (Grigoriadis 1975, 212 - 14).  40  Papadopolous’ regime traditionally sought to subordinate the bureaucracy and regularly dismissed 
thousands of civil servants considered politically unreliable (Keefe 1977, 157). In reaction, the administration 
deprived the regime of technological and communication skills, withholding information from their superiors 
whenever considered safe (Danopoulos 1988), and undermining the regime’s policy directives. A former 
Minister once sarcastically joked that even after five years in power, Papadopolous and his junta members 
hadn’t found as many collaborators as the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War (Der Spiegel 1972a). 
The Navy mutiny of May 22 – 23, 1973, is another example of the falling out Papadopolous had with part of 
his power base. In an anti-junta protest, the HNS Velos under the command of Nikolaos Pappas took his 
vessel out of NATO manoeuvres, declared himself and his crew against the regime and sailed for Italy after it 
had become public that a number of fellow Naval officers had been arrested in Greece for planning to act 
against the junta (Bangor Daily News 1973). The incident sparked a wave of arrests in the Navy and also 
spilled over into the Air Force and parts of the regular Army.  41 The junta’s position towards free elections is but one of many examples of such resistance. In an interview 
with the German magazine “Der Spiegel” in 1969, Interior Minister Pattakos dismissed all talk about 
elections, saying that people should not expect “miracles like Christ did in three days”. In 1971, Minister of 
Social Affairs Ladas commented on the same subject: “We are not stupid. We know we wouldn’t stand a 
chance in free elections. Therefore we have to educate the people until they are ready for elections, even if 
that takes 20 or 30 years”. Finally, Constantine Papadopolous, a brother of the Premier Papadopolous, 
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as 1986 he attempted to initiate reforms. His point of view was that if the junta remained in 
power longer than a certain time it would consolidate into a regime, something that was 
never intended. However, stiff resistance from hardliners, among others Ioannidis, 
frustrated any attempt at liberalization, and after two years of struggle, Papadopolous 
considered resigning (Tzortzis 2002)42. Instead, in summer 1973 he appointed Spyros 
Markezinis, leader of the tiny Progressive Party and a committed softliner, as Prime 
Minister, with the mandate to hold popular elections some months later (Danopoulos 
1983).  
 
Although the dominant argument concerning the “Markezinis experiment” has been 
that it was a mere trick on behalf of Papadopolous to find a way to secure his position in a 
pseudo-democracy (Tzortzis 2002), there is no doubt that Markezinis genuinely tried to 
advance the democratic project (Theodoracopoulos 1976, 235). Since 1969 he advocated 
for a compromise between the military and old guard politicians in order to return to 
constitutional rule (Der Spiegel 1973b), and when made Premier, he did not hesitate to 
trumpet his intention to full and inclusive democracy43. In interviews with the foreign 
press he claimed that “in the new Parliament he would seek a radical amendment of the 
Constitution so that the powers of the President be reduced” (Grigoriadis 1975, 36) and if 
he did not agree with the President [Papadopolous], he would resign. However, his plans 
quickly went beyond the limits of toleration of even the moderate factions in the Army 
(Bonanos 1986, 128), and rumors of an imminent coup had been circulating openly in the 
Defence Ministry before they were overtaken by the events at the Polytechnic (little 
Tzortzis 2002). As the situation got out of control for Papadopolous and Markezinis, the 
final word was in the hardliner forces that controlled the Army; a fact that facilitated the 
subsequent coup by General Ioannidis, described by Markezinis as the “Greek Qaddafi” 
(Meletopoulos 1996, 34).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
shrugged: “What do you want, we have a democracy except we don’t have elections. Is that really so 
important?” (Der Spiegel 1972a)    42 Complaining that he lacked support from other leading figures in the junta, he claimed that he was “being 
subverted by my fellow Evelpides cadets” (Tzortzis 2002, 4) and only stayed in office after faction leaders 
renewed their trust to him.  
43 Markezinis is reported to have said: “I did not and do not have any illusions: in the elections I will get 
15%. I hoped, however, that finally the old parties would participate and we could come to terms on forming 
a government” (Konofagos 1982, 113; Markezinis 1979, 411).  
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Ioannidis, a powerful hardliner and commander of the Greek military police ESA, 
had never been secretive about the fact that he would try removing Papadopolous from 
power if the latter betrayed the principles of the 1967 revolution. In his eyes, almost 
everything that the Markezinis government did from the day it took office brought that 
moment nearer (Martin 2010). Moreover, he had been capitalizing on the growing 
discontent among large swathes of the lower and middle rank officers, who believed that 
Papadopolous with his accumulation of offices and titles "was harming the seriousness of 
the regime and giving it an unacceptable image" (Bonanos 1986, 110 – 112; Veremis 1997, 
266 - 67). Dismissed by Papadopolous as “Arsakeiás”44, Ioannidis was portrayed by the 
American ambassador to Greece as an “incompetent” (Borchgrave 1974) who did not 
believe in Western style democracy (American Embassy in Greece 1973). Indeed, after the 
coup Ioannidis warned Pattakos that "[he was] not playing" and that he "shall have a 
dictatorship (…) and stay in power for thirty years" (Tzortzis 2002, 10)45. To this end he 
reinstituted repressive measures such as censorship46, expulsions, arbitrary detentions and 
torture.  
 
Instead of consolidating the regime, however, Ioannidis‘ hardline policies 
exacerbated the existing tensions between different regime factions. As Kissinger explains, 
by the end of 1973 the Greek military regime was split in three groups: firstly, a small, 
hardline nucleus of around 20 to 30 junior to middle grade officers loyal to Ioannidis; 
secondly, a group of tough nationalists called the Qaddafites who reportedly favored a 
neutralist position of Greece towards NATO; and finally, a moderate majority in the 
Armed Forces centered on senior officers from the Navy and the Air Force who worried 
about the implications of continuous Army involvment in the government. According to 
Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece, these officers believed that "the close 
identification oft he Greek Army with the present regime is not only seriously discrediting 
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44 In Greek, this refers to a quiet, shy girl (Kathimerini 2008) 45 Similar statements from Ioannidis had been issued already prior to the coup: In 1969, the German 
magazine “Der Spiegel” obtained access to a secret letter from Ioannidis to Papadopolous, in which the 
former issued an ultimatum in 11 points. According to Ioannidis, these were issues that the Armed Forces 
“were displeased about and that were to be changed”- among others, he demanded that Papadopolous 
publicly declare that Greece was not to return to parliamentarism (Der Spiegel 1973c)  46 To publishers, Ioannidis made it clear that any talk about elections was not welcome under his rule, and 
whoever was not happy with the regime’s policies was free to close down his publishing house and leave the 
country. He also warned the general populace that they would have to prepare themselves for a long rule by 
decree, and that any and all opposition would be “swept away” (Der Spiegel 1973d). 
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the Greek military in the public mind but is also dividing the Army into factions and 
undermining its military capabilities" (Library of Congress Manuscript Division 1974). 
The Greek involvement in the Cyprus debacle finally was the spark that lit the fire and 
allowed softliners to take back the reins of power. In fact, when Turkey decided to invade 
Cyprus, Ioannidis‘ decision to order a general mobilization left the small group of ultras 
completely isolated (Tsiridis 2008): not only did large parts of the Reservist Army openly 
defy their officers, laying bare the lack of military preparedness for a war, but also the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to abandon Ioannidis and to seek "a political solution" to the 
crisis (Diamandouros 1984)47. Former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was tasked 
with setting up a civilian government and oversee a peaceful transition to democracy 
(Xydis 1974). 
 
Resume:  
 
We confirm that the removal from power of Greek military ruler Ioannidis was the 
product of a crisis of the authoritarian regime that occurred after a series of controversial 
policy decisions helped softliners in the Army gain the decisive edge.  
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(4) Argentina 
 
In the late 1970s, Argentina’s ruling military junta decided that the “National 
Reorganization Process” launched after the overthrow of Peron in 1976 had been 
successful, and that there was a need to develop new projects for institutionalizing the 
future political order (Bombal 1991). In 1979, this vision slowly crystallized around a 
“political dialogue” intended to create a new regime in which the military was to occupy a 
legitimate and permanent tutelary role. At the same time, organized labor, supported by 
business leaders and civic groups such as the Mothers of the Disappeared, slowly began 
reasserting its voice and called for a return to democracy. Serious economic problems, 
mounting charges of corruption and a growing external debt increased the sociopolitical 
tensions, and in 1981, just as the Videla administration was leaving office, Argentina 
plunged into a deep recession (Schumacher 1984). The new government led by Lieutenant 
General Roberto Viola and Lorenzo Sigaut adopted a number of limited political 
liberalization measures, but was hesitant in addressing the economic situation, which 
increased the crisis of confidence in the regime and heightened inner-military tensions. In a 
palace coup General Leopoldo Galtieri replaced Viola after only eight months in office 
(Acuna and Smulovitz 2007). Galtieri’s strict economic recovery program temporary 
succeeded in bringing the economic unraveling under control, but he could not quell the 
spreading of strikes and protests by an increasingly militant civil society.  Against this 
background, several political parties grouped together and formed the “Multipartidaria”, a 
coalition that demanded respect for human rights, an end to the “Dirty War”, a lifting of 
the state of emergency, and an immediate return to constitutional democratic rule (Hang 
2013). At the same time divisions within the junta deepened as more and more Generals 
became disillusioned with the military’s capability to redress the inner-political situation 
and favored a return to the barracks. In a desperate attempt to rally the population around 
the flag and to turn attention away from the junta’s internal problems, Galtieri embarked 
on a military conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, or “Malvinas” 
(Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1992, 94 - 168). However, the country’s defeat in 1982 
irreparably discredited the Argentine government in the eyes of the public and escalated 
the conflict within the junta. Popular unrest exploded and led to a wave of violent street 
demonstrations directed against the government and the Armed Forces. On June 18, 1982, 
Galtieri was forced to resign from his post, and retired General Reynaldo Bignone was 
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named President (Malloy and Seligson 1987, 29). Bignone lifted the ban on political 
parties, gradually restored basic political liberties and announced free elections to be held 
in early 1984. In the face of prolonged popular protest and strikes, this timetable was 
moved up to autumn 1983, and on October 30 Argentinians elected Raul Alfonsin of the 
Union Civica Radical as their new civilian President.  
 
In the Argentine transition we identify conflicts within the ruling junta on several 
different levels which increased in intensity as the political situation unfolded. On one 
hand, a power struggle took place between hardliners and softliners about the future 
institutionalization of the regime and the question of how to deal with Argentina’s growing 
socioeconomic problems. Whereas softliners favored an eventual return of the military to 
the barracks and greater liberalization, hardliners wished to secure a permanent role for the 
military in politics. On the other hand, a conflict about power distribution within the ruling 
junta pitted the three Army branches (Army corps, Navy and Air Force) against each other, 
and exacerbated the softliner-hardliner rift. The intensification of the divisions took place 
in three different phases and led to a crisis of the authoritarian regime in 1982.  
 
The first divisions within the Argentine junta reared their heads already in the late 
1970s, when the Chief Commander of the Army General Jorge Rafael Videla seemed 
intent on pursuing a reconciliation strategy with union leaders in order to arrive at a 
consensus that would allow him to perpetuate military rule48. He was opposed by the Chief 
of the Navy, Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier Orlando Agosti, Commander of the 
Air Force, who both favored political reform through a pact with the traditional political 
parties (Sanabria 1977; Agencias 1978a). The conflict became public for the first time in 
1977 when Massera, in an interview with the daily journal “El Nacional” declared he was 
“un democrata convencido” who desired the liberation of all political prisoners in the 
country. Asked by the journalist about the possible evolution of Argentina’s government 
towards a pro-democratic formula similar to Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador, Massera responded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48 Videla was perhaps the most notorious hardliner in the Argentine junta. In 1975 he declared that “in 
Argentina, in order to ensure the security of the country, as many persons as necessary should die” (Morin 
2014), and he was ruthless in his approach towards the “war against terrorism”. He also insisted that “no se 
modificara el actual esquema del poder” even in the case of a possible return to some sort of tutelary 
democracy tentatively set for 1991 (El Pais 1977b). In an interview in 1978 he confirmed that he would not 
hand over power to “whomever was democratically elected, because the Argentine people was not 
sufficiently mature” for self-government (Fuensalida, José Román 1978) 
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that such an evolution was logical, since the military “didn’t know how to govern” (El Pais 
1977b). The divisions deepened in 1978 when it became known that Massera was opposed 
to Videla remaining President yet another term (Agencias 1978b). Instead, he favored a 
democratization of the military regime, with himself occupying the central role of “el 
hombre de la transicion” (De la Calle, Angel Luis 1978a)49. However, when Videla retired 
from his post in 1981, he was succeeded not by Massera (who retired in September of the 
same year) but by Army commander General Viola (Skaar 1994). Viola’s reputation was 
clearly less authoritarian than that of his predecessor (Ceberio 1980) – in fact, he entered 
office with the promise to renew the dialogue between the government and opposition 
parties. Therefore, this change of leadership suggested that whereas softliners succeeded to 
impose a certain direction on the political course of the Argentine junta, the control of any 
such process was to be assumed by the Army, and not any of the other service branches 
(De la Calle, Angel Luis 1978c). 
 
During Viola’s presidency, the internal divisions of the military junta worsened 
(Snow and Manzetti 1993, 35). Viola, feared by hardliners for his ideas “of a freer society” 
(The Economist 2003), announced that his objective was to establish a stable democracy, 
and that during his presidency, the necessary laws for the reestablishment of political 
parties, “responsible” freedom of speech and civil liberties would be passed (Ceberio 
1981)50. Most significantly, he attempted to strike a pact with the Multipartidaria in 1981, 
but the civilian leadership refused to enter into negotiations with the military junta (Skaar 
1994).  On the other hand, hardliners in the Armed Forces who opposed party activity and 
elections left Viola hardly any manoeuvring space (AFP 1981a). The Navy, for example, 
still recalling the humiliation suffered by Massera, opposed Viola’s reform attempts and its 
Commander in Chief, Vice Admiral Jorge Issac Anaya, declared in 1981 that he favored 
the establishment of an even stricter authoritarian state. He said he felt that Viola’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!49 According to Massera, “el poder corrompe, y el poder ejercido absolutamente corrompe absolutamente” 
(Candau, Julian García 1978). Affirming that the military junta had failed to achieve success in two of its 
main areas of interest – the economy, and education- he insisted that the time was ripe for a change. Later it 
became known that Massera had secretly sent a group of representatives to Washington in order to present 
his ideas about democratization and to seek North-American support for this goal. During the trip, he 
supposedly portrayed himself as the only person “capable of bringing such an undertaking to fruition” (De la 
Calle, Angel Luis 1978b). However, it is debatable how much Massera’s ambitions to become Argentine’s 
democratic strongman was fueled by resentment over the unfavorable internal power distribution between the 
Navy and the regular Army corps (El Pais 1977c)   50 Among other liberalization measures, he facilitated the obtaining of information about the “desaparecidos” 
in the Dirty War, alluding to them for the first time as “ausentes para siempre” (AFP 1979; EFE 1979). 
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political line contributed to diminishing the role of the Armed Forces, and especially that 
of the Navy (AFP 1981b). The revolt by the Third Army corps commander Luciano 
Menendez against Viola over the liberation of the former editor of the newspaper La 
Opinion, Jacobo Timerman, in 1979 (Canelo, 2004, 286) is another typical example of 
Viola’s standing among many junta members who considered him excessively “blando” 
(El Pais 1980; Agencias 1979). Finally, the 1981 coup of hardliner Army commander 
Galtieri ended the short interlude of political liberalization (The Telegraph 1981)51, 
bringing hardliners back to the forefront of action52.  
 
Galtieri, a fervent devotee of military control and partisan of a “strict and rigorous” 
policy towards dissenters (AFP 1981c)53, entered office endowed with much larger powers 
than his predecessor, something that irritated and eventually alienated other junta 
members54. He strongly supported the military crack-down on political opposition (The 
Telegraph 2003), and the ruthlessness with which several protest marches in 1982 were 
repressed left no doubt that liberalization was over (El Pais 1982)55. However, similar to 
the scenario in Greece, Galtieri’s hard-line policies also served to exacerbate divisions 
between the hardliners and softliners within the Armed Forces. Firstly, the nationalistic 
sectors of the officer corps were unhappy with Roberto Aleman, Galtieri’s ultraorthodox 
Minister of the Economy, who initiated an extensive privatization program that threatened 
the military’s corporate interests (Snow and Manzetti 1993). On the other side, softliners 
that considered their mission to defeat terrorism completed were increasingly eager to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 According to former military president Juan Carlos Ongania, rumors about an impending coup had been 
around for some time in 1981, but General Viola had never said a word and instead spent most of his days 
smoking cigarettes and drinking whisky with fellow officers. According to him, such behavior was 
symptomatic for the prevailing opinion among the junta members that “the Process (...) was exhausted and 
the Military Junta is trying to elude responsibility of all of Argentina’s disasters” (Mercopress 2011) 52  Together with Viola, liberal Cabinet Ministers Oscar Camilion (Foreign Affairs) and Gen. Diego 
Urricariet (Public Works) were forced out. Galtieri therefore succeeded in forcefully eliminating the biggest 
proponents of “apertura”, after he had reportedly tried for eight months to convince Viola to step down 
peacefully. Viola, on the other hand, had refused and told Galtieri he would only resign “for political 
reasons” (Rush 1981).  53 In an interview with Bernardo Neustadt, Galtieri made no secret of his aversion towards democratization. 
Asked whether “las urnas estan muertas”, he answered that “seria funesto acelerar un transito a las urnas”, 
and that “antes de sacar las urnas debemos fijar las pautas, a partir de las cuales se implementara el nuevo 
sistema para evitar (...) caer en el abismo” (Neustadt 1980). 54 Air Force Chief Brigadier Lami Dozo, for example, resigned from the military junta when he found out 
about the enhanced powers of Galtieri, angrily shouting: “On these conditions I am not taking the job” 
(Mercopress 2011).   55 For instance, the protest march of labor unions to demand “paz, pan y trabajo” in April 1982 ended with 
more than 1000 arrests and left hundreds of people wounded in Buenos Aires and other cities (Fermosel 
1982).  
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return to the barracks while the Armed Forces were still in a somewhat favorable position 
to negotiate an exit (Skaar 1994). However, the turning point of the crisis came with 
Argentina’s defeat in the Falkland war.  
 
Military sources reveal that already before entering the war Galtieri did not enjoy 
the support of all branches of the Armed Forces (Irigaray 2009). However, the humiliating 
defeat and Galtieri’s insistence on continuing a confrontation that could have led Argentina 
to the edge of the abyss56 eroded his power base among the remaining junta members and 
tipped the balance in favor of the softliners (Lakeland Ledger 1982). Galtieri himself 
claimed he “voluntarily retired” because the Army “did not give him the political support 
to continue as commander and President of the nation” (Meislin 1982), and affirmed he’d 
rather step down "than call on loyal troops to defend him" (Burns 1983). However, rumor 
has it that Galtieri was awakened from a nap and, clad only in his underwear, was told that 
he was no longer President (The Economist 2003). This version of events is corroborated 
by a number of defections of high-ranking Cabinet Ministers right after Argentina’s 
surrender (El Pais 1982b), and by the fact that swathes of security personnel ordered to 
break up a protest vigil outside the Argentine Defense Ministry decided to join the 
protesters instead (Oakley 2011). Against the background of a deeply divided officer corps 
– the Air Force and the Navy had withdrawn from the junta and left all political 
responsibility to the Army (Gadsden Times 1982) – retired General Reynaldo Bignone, a 
convinced softliner, was elected President. In an unprecedented meeting with Argentina’s 
civilian political leaders, he promised to lift the ban on political activity and to hold 
elections (Ocala Star Banner 1982), a promise the junta followed through in 1983. In our 
opinion, this demonstrates that softliners had reached a critical mass over the remaining 
hardliners57.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 Journalists claim that when it became clear that the Falkland war was lost, a reunion of 14 Army Generals 
was held, in which 12 Generals were in favor of a complete stop of hostilities and a diplomatic solution, 
whereas Galtieri was one of two Generals that objected (Yuste 1982) 57 Interior Minister, Gen Llamil Reston, for example, supported Bignone and assured that the Army would 
honor its commitment to democracy. Another General, Alejandro Agustin Lanusse, recognized that the 
Army’s reputation had been badly tarnished, and that “never again” should the military rule Argentina 
(Goodsell 1982).  Finally, even Galtieri’s successor, General Nicolaides, regarded as a direct, no-nonsense 
hardliner (New York Times 1982), publicly assured that “the argentine military will never again overturn a 
constitutionally elected government” (Prieto 1983) and promised “full support” to the transition project 
(Schumacher 1982).  
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Resume:  
 
Disastrous and divisive policies by Argentine dictator Galtieri, along with a gradual 
strengthening of reformist military factions, resulted in the crumbling of Galtieri’s support 
base and democratic elections. Thus, we confirm the presence of a crisis of the 
authoritarian regime.  
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(5) Chile 
 
The quest for multiparty politics in Chile began in 1983 during a deep economic 
crisis when protests against Augusto Pinochet’s longtime military rule broke out. On one 
hand, popular discontent was directed at the regime’s vision of a totally unrestricted 
market economy, elaborated by a set of technocrats known as the “Chicago Boys” 
(Boeninger 1985/1986). On the other hand, it defied Pinochet’s longterm project of a 
“protected democracy”, which had been enshrined in a new Constitution just a few years 
earlier via a controversial plebiscite that also guaranteed Pinochet continuation in office 
until at least 1989 (New York Times 1988). The protests were first peaceful, but quickly 
degenerated into violent clashes with the Army and State Security notably due to the 
violence of two extremist demonstration groups, the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez, 
and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Bernath-Plaistad and Rennebohm!
2008/2011). At the same time, the regime attempted to foster limited liberalization by 
slightly increasing press freedom, allowing political exiles to return to the country, and 
holding meetings with opposition groups (The Washington Post 2000). In March 1985, the 
political murder of three well-known Communist leaders by a special unit of the 
Carabineros, Chile’s police force, galvanized the opposition and the independent Right into 
signing the National Accord that called for a transition to full democracy. The Accord, 
backed by the Catholic Church and signed by all political parties except the radical Left 
and the sectors allied to the government, had an enormous impact on public opinion and a 
considerable effect on the Armed Forces (Boeninger 1985/1986), but Pinochet rejected all 
calls for talk. Instead, demonstrations and strikes, along with attacks on civilians continued  
through 1987 when Pope John Paul II visited Chile and condemned Pinochet’s government 
as constraining the ideals of democracy (Bernath-Plaistad and Rennebohm!2008/2011). In 
order to quell unrest following the visit, Pinochet announced that a national plebiscite 
would be held to either approve or reject his continuation as president. Dismissing requests 
by the Catholic Church for appointment of a “consensus candidate”, he still allowed the 
“No”-camp to campaign in a relatively free atmosphere, because he believed that his 
economic success story would earn him the gratitude of the Chilean populace and another 
mandate (AP News Archive 1988). However, on October 5, 1988, Chileans voted with a 
55% majority against Pinochet. With the Armed Forces supporting the outcome of the 
referendum and refusing to intervene in favor of Pinochet, the President found himself 
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forced to hand over power to a transitional government, and on December 14, 1989, 
Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin became Chile’s first democratically elected president 
in nearly 20 years (Dow 1998, 62).  
 
In Chile we find clear evidence of a split within the authoritarian power base, 
particularly between hardliner General Pinochet and pro-reform members of his military 
junta. These tensions transformed into a true crisis of the authoritarian regime when 
Pinochet's attempt at an auto-golpe to perpetuate his hold on power was foiled by 
opposition from his own ranks. Prior to 1987, the cornerstone of Pinochet’s power was the 
loyalty of the Armed Forces, which stemmed from a tradition of vertical command, 
professionalism and legalism (Constable and Valenzuela 1989/1990)58. This is not to 
imply that Pinochet’s policies went entirely unchallenged. As civilian opposition to the 
regime mounted, softliners within the regime spoke out against Pinochet as early as 1975, 
when a group of Generals sent Pinochet a letter criticizing the latter’s economic “shock” 
policies and the role of the secret police, DINA (Remmer 1989). Three years later, a call 
for a return to democracy issued by the Commander of the Chilean Air Force led to the 
forced retirement of General Gustavo Leigh and eight other senior Air Force members, 
whose permanence had theoretically been guaranteed by the Statute of the government 
junta (Délano 1986). Generally speaking, the 1980s witnessed a gradual weakening of the 
Armed Forces’ attachment to authoritarianism (Library of Congress 2001), a tendency that 
was amplified by the 1985 verdict of Judge Jose Canovas who openly challenged the 
Pinochet regime in his investigation of a triple political involving members of the police 
force murder (Los Angeles Times 1992). 
 
Two of the most important softliners in this respect were, without doubt, Air Force 
Commander General Fernando Matthei and Head of the Naval Forces, Admiral José 
Toribio Merino. Speculations about a fallout between Matthei and Pinochet had been 
circulating already in 1984 when Matthei openly pleaded in favor of greater openness of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 The professionalism of the Chilean military was unrivalled in Latin America, and was upheld by a strict 
separation of the military as institution and government. Officers were forbidden to maintain military ties if 
assigned government posts, or even to discuss politics; a rule that was strictly enforced by Pinochet who 
retired several Generals that were too outspoken (Constable and Valenzuela 1986). For example, in August 
1985, General Cesar Mendoza, the head of the Carabineros, was dismissed, and Pinochet also threatened his 
Air Force Commander General Matthei, raising the specter of General Leigh’s dismissal in 1978 (Remmer 
1989, 159).   
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the regime towards the opposition (Reuters/EFE 1984). In 1987, after the papal visit, these 
impressions took on a concrete form when Mattei confirmed his belief that it was time for 
the Army to return to the barracks and for civilians to take over the government in a 
process of genuine democratization59. A similar tune came from Merino who, despite 
declarations from the official government speaker Francisco Javier Cuadra that the regime 
would not alter its policies, confirmed that there could be dialogue with the opposition as 
long as the various parties had a doctrine and a program (Délano 1987). During the 
preparations for the 1988 referendum, the split between Pinochet and his Army base 
became even clearer. In fact, part of Pinochet's junta (particularly the Ground troops) 
supported his candidacy60, but Matthei, Merino and later also the head of the Police force, 
Rodolfo Stange, expressed their preference for a civilian candidate, possibly from the 
centre-right61. Additionally, Matthei stressed that the Armed Forces “no deben estar 
involucradas en el proceso electoral, no deben ser juez y parte; quien sea candidate debe 
presentarse como civil y las fuerzas armadas son garantes del proceso y no parte del 
proceso” (Agencias 1987). He was thus indirectly discouraging Pinochet from 
campaigning, who, at that time, retained both titles of President and Head of the Armed 
Forces62.  
 
When Pinochet later that year prepared to turn the referendum on an extension of 
his presidency into a fear campaign, painting the spectre of chaos if the opposition’s “No”-
vote was to be victorious, Matthei publicly contradicted Pinochet and affirmed that “Chile 
was sufficiently mature to confront the “Si” and the “No” in the same way. More 
importantly, he added that the Armed Forces would ensure that the outcome of the 
plebiscite was respected, no matter the result” (Délano 1988a); that there was to be a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 According to Matthei, “el momento es ideal para que militares y civiles estrechemos la mano (…)” since 
the military “están dispuestos a vivir en paz y construir una verdadera democracia” (Délano 1987) 60 For example, the Defense Minister Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal declared that Pinochet was “the ideal 
candidate”. In an article of the journal “El Mercurio” he claimed that “en los nueve años que he servido en el 
Gabinete ministerial he podido apreciaímuy de cerca la labor que, con misticismo y vocación de estadista, ha 
realizado Su Excelencia para el bien de Chile, y creo que es legítimo expresar mi anhelo de que pueda, 
constitucionalmente, prolongar su mandato” (Comas 1987) 61 Interestingly enough, Matthei later admitted in his Memoires that he actually voted for Pinochet in the 
referendum out of loyalty, but that in doing so he betrayed his personal convictions that Chile was ready for 
democracy. He claimed that he hoped the No-Side would win, and when his hopes were confirmed, he 
hurried to be the first to announce the victory to the Chilean public (El Mostrador 2013) 62 It is noteworthy that at the same time government hardliners started a smear campaign against Matthei in 
order to marginalise him on the political front. For instance, the journal El Mercurio published an article 
claiming that Matthei was born out of wedlock; a claim that, if proven true, could have cost him his position 
in the military junta (Comas 1987).  
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competitive election of President and Parliament, should the “No”-side win; and that they 
were free to modify the Constitution as long as it took place within the existing legal 
framework (Délano 1988b). Rodolfo Stange, for his part, confirmed that there would be no 
state of emergency during the referendum, a fear voiced by many opponents of Pinochet 
(Délano 1988a).  
 
The decisive moment for the Pinochet regime, however, was the night after the 
referendum when results showed the victory of the “No”-campaign. In his memoirs, 
Matthei writes that Pinochet was convinced of winning the plebiscite, but that as a 
precaution, he had ordered the Intelligence services to prepare an alternative plan in case 
the opposition was victorious (Mercopress 2003)63. “I am not leaving, no matter what”, he 
told advisors, and planned “to do whatever was necessary to stay in power” (BBC 2013)64. 
Newly declassified CIA papers described Pinochet as “nearly apoplectic about the results” 
as he summoned members of his military junta to his palace to try and have the results 
overturned (USA Today 2013). Matthei, in an interview with the journal “La Nacion”, 
confirmed that Pinochet was prepared to send the Army to the streets to seize the capital. 
He also said Pinochet pressed the other junta members to sign a decree that would have 
given him powers far-reaching enough to even marginalise the junta itself (EFE 2000). 
However, General Matthei, General Merino and Rodolfo Stange, together with the 
members of the Junta that acted at the time as a legislative body, firmly opposed Pinochet's 
intentions and refused to sign the decree65. By consequence, Pinochet found himself forced 
to accept defeat. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!63 According to testimonies, the plan involved creating the impression of post-referendum violence in order 
to justify military intervention and the imposition of martial law. While the vote count was still going on, a 
series of explosions shook the capital and Pinochet was heard commenting about groups of hooded gunmen 
on the street. “If anyone moves, we will hit them with everything”, he said (De Lama 1988) 64 US security cables reveal that members of Pinochet’s military junta as well as opposition leaders 
suspected in advance that Pinochet wasn’t going to recognize the referendum results.  General Matthei, for 
example, explained that Pinochet tried to rally support for a defiance of the vote by persuading the Armed 
Forces that they “could never turn over the country to civilians because [they] would end up accused [ for 
Human Rights abuses committed by the Pinochet regime] (Spooner 2011, 20 – 21). Suspicious of the delay 
in the release of the referendum results, Matthei therefore took the lead and admitted them to the press before 
even meeting with Pinochet (Christian 1988). “It seems to me, really, that the “No”-side won”, he said, as he 
went to the Presidential palace for a meeting with the President shortly after midnight. The government 
refused to comment on the results.   65 Instead, Matthei applauded the responsibility shown by the political parties that participated in the 
referendum, saying that the popular will was to be respected: “El pueblo dijo no por una amplia mayoria del 
12%. Y esto es tan claro como echarle agua  (…) Ahora es otra generación la que debe pensar. Son civiles los 
que deben llevar la bandera" (Délano 1988c). 
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Resume:  
 
Pinochet’s removal from power was in large part a consequence of an internal 
conflict pinning progressive Air Force and Navy commanders against hardliners from the 
regular Armed Forces. Thus, we confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.  
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(6) Paraguay 
 
Paraguay’s quest for democracy began in the late 1970s/early 1980s when 
economic troubles brought the patronage network of Paraguay’s longtime ruler Stroessner 
to a halt (Powers 1992).  Realizing that Stroessner’s backward, bureaucratized government 
prevented a much needed liberalization of the economy, regime critics in the opposition 
parties, labor organizations, business groups, student organizations and the Catholic 
Church, backed by international support notably from the United States, began mobilizing 
against the regime (Carter 1990, Codas 1981, 1,2,6; LARR 1985). The first direct political 
expression of such opposition found its expression in 1986 with the signing of the Acuerdo 
National between four political parties, of which only one, the Febrerista Party, was 
officially recognized by the regime. Their demands included the restoration of democracy 
in Paraguay, the lifting of the state of siege, the release of political prisoners, a new 
electoral system, and the independence of the judiciary (Bareiro-Saguier 1979).  Despite 
constant harassment by the government, the Acuerdo National managed to organise rallies 
in Asuncion (1985) and Caraguatay (1986), which attracted several thousand people before 
being dispersed and repressed by police (Nickson 1988). In a subsequent step, the 
Acuerdo, backed by the Catholic Church, launched a major initiative to start a National 
Dialogue between the government, private business and opposition parties in order to 
promote democracy in Paraguay (Nickson 1988). However, the initiative failed, because 
the regime refused to participate on the grounds that the Acuerdo included political parties 
that were not officially recognized. Ultimately, however, scholars agree that it was a 
succession crisis and a subsequent fracture within the ruling Colorado party and the 
military which brought down the Stroessner regime. As it became clear that the “lider 
eterno” (Nickson 1989) was seriously ailing, divisions appeared in the once-monolithic 
ruling bloc between “tradicionalistas” and “militantes”. The traditionalists favored a more 
open approach to politics and argued for a non-personalist transition that would still 
include a role for the Colorados in future Paraguayan politics. On the other hand, the 
militants remained fanatically devoted to Stroessner and pursued a succession plan that 
would transfer power to Gustavo Stroessner, the dictator’s son (Lezcano 1990, 26). In 
1987, the militants finally succeeded in gaining control of the National Party Convention 
and initiated a purge of traditionalists within the party (Rodriguez Alcala 1988; Sondrol 
1992). They also cracked down hard on dissent within the populace. For example, they 
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brutally repressed a Silent March organized by the Church in Asuncion on December 10th 
to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Nickson 1989); they broke up opposition meetings (Long 1988); and they closed 
down media stations and newspapers (Orlando Sentinel 1987). However, when the new 
militant leadership attempted to bring the Armed Forces under control by retiring their 
leadership (which was generally known of harboring sympathies for the traditionalist 
faction of the Colorado party), a faction of the Army led by Gen. Andres Rodriguez 
decided to stage a coup on February 2, 1989 (Abente 1989). Rodriguez assumed the 
presidency promising democratic reforms and initiated substantial political liberalization. 
Only two months later, in May 1989, free presidential and congressional elections were 
held which were won by Rodriguez and the Colorado party, marking the end of the 
“stronato” (Miranda, 1990, 144). 
 
 Paraguay demonstrates impressively how divisions within one pillar of the ruling 
group can lead to democratization by spilling over into other institutional areas of the 
regime, finally leading to its downfall. As we have pointed out before, three key 
developments helped bringing about the overthrow of Stroessner: the split within the ruling 
party into traditionalist/militant factions; the growing radicalization of the dominant 
militant faction and its exacerbating effect on existing institutional tensions; and finally, 
the attempt by the militants and Stroessner to purge the Armed Forces.  
 
Although the traditionalists were hardly convinced softliners – in fact, their role in 
destituting Stroessner was very timid - they have generally been identified as less 
aggressive and violent than the militants, and as favoring at least some type of limited 
reform66. However, they were also very fragmented, with factions coalescing around a 
specific charismatic leader 67 . In contrast, the militants were clearly hardliners and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66 The “tradicionalistas” wanted to go back to the original content of Colorado ideology, and hoped to move 
away from hard-line authoritarianism (Abente 2009). They believed Paraguay was moving towards a more 
open system, and further emphasized democracy and social justice. Most of their leaders came from families 
that had played a major role in the party already since the 1940s (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).   67 The traditionalist group closest to the regime was led by Juan Ramon Chaves, the president of the party 
and the senate. Although in favor of limited reform, this group was not prepared to oppose Stroessner. In 
contrast, the “eticos”, a faction that developed around National Committee member Carlos Romero Arza, 
urged a return to the traditional values that inspired previous Colorado governments, and openly called for a 
dialogue between the party and the opposition (Pereira 1987, 509). Two additional groups formed in 1987: 
firstly, the Movimiento de Integracion Colorado (MIC) composed of retired Colorados that had fallen out 
with Stroessner and led by former Interior Minister Edgar Ynsfr’an. This faction advocated the reassertion of 
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constantly called for even greater repression of the opposition (Abente 1989). They felt 
generally more loyal to Stroessner than to the Colorado Party, referring to themselves as 
“militantes combatientes stronistas” and affirming that there was no “coloradismo sin 
Stroessner” (Salgueiro 2008)68.  
 
 Even though open confrontation between the two groups did not occur until 1987 
(LAWR 1989, 2), the first signs of discord surfaced already in 1980/1981 when, for the 
first time, more than one list competed in “seccionales” elections. In prior elections, “a 
single united slate of candidates for the junta [had been] proclaimed and unanimously 
approved” (Abente 1995, 309), and therefore, the possibility of incorporating open 
competition into the party greatly disturbed the inner circles of the party leadership 
(Abente 1995, 310). The emerging divisions broke into public prominence for the first time 
in 1984 following elections for members of the National Committee. At that time, party 
leaders who once refused to even hint at discord in the party publicly acknowledged that a 
power struggle was under way, and that Stroessner himself was at least a behind-the-
scenes instigator (The Telegraph 1985). In what was considered by many a fight for 
democratization of the party, militants attempted to have Mario Abdo Benitez, Stroessner’s 
private secretary, elected first vice president, but the traditionalists rejected the bid. The 
struggle subsequently spread to the local committee level with conflicts becoming public 
in some towns and rival Colorado groups appealing for support from different members in 
the National Committee69 (Hanratty and Meditz 1988). 
 
The factionalism deepened in September 1985 following an intervention of Carlos 
Romero Pereira, a junta member who publicly denounced the lack of political ethics and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
authority of the National Committee, greater independence by the Junta de gobierno, a restructuring of the 
party to confront the opposition in a more open system, and a civilian presidential candidate (Nickson 1988; 
1989). Secondly, the Movimiento Nacional y Popular (MNP) led by Colorado intellectual Leandro Prieto 
Yegros worked for a reunification of the party and proposed to serve as bridge between traditionalists and 
militants (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).  68 There was factionalism among militants, too, but the dividing line did not run along ideological issues. 
Rather, the orthodox (“ortodoxo”) and institutionalists (“institucionalistas”) disagreed upon the succession 
issue: whereas the orthodox favored Stroessner’s son, Gustavo, succeeding Stroessner after his death, the 
institutionalists adopted a more pragmatic stance. For instance, the Minister of Public Health and Social 
Welfare Adan Godoy Jimenez proposed that Stroessner stay in power until he died or resigned, after which 
either a civilian or a military figure with the same general orientation would assume power (Hanratty and 
Meditz 1988). 69 The party infighting weakened its support base and dealt a severe blow to its legitimacy; a fact 
demonstrated by a letter published in the weekly newspaper “El Pueblo” from a Colorado seeking to resign 
from the party- a virtually unheard of event in Paraguay (The Telegraph 1985). 
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the corruption in the Colorado party and referred to the militants as culprits (Nickson 
1989)70. The conflict took a dramatic turn in early 1986 when the ethicals, and later also 
the MIC, publicly opposed Stroessner's bid for yet another term of office and openly called 
for a civilian Colorado Party candidate in the 1988 elections (Long 1988). It was the first 
time since 1959 that an organised group within the party had opposed Stroessner, who 
reacted in April 1986 by castigating the ethicals and the MIC as “deserters” and forced 
Romero Arza to resign from the Council of State (Nickson 1988). Subsequently, in May 
1987, the militantes announced a hardline-slate for the presidency and the three vice 
presidencies of the National Committee. The “golden foursome” was headed by Interior 
Minister Sabino Augusto Montanaro, and also included Benitez, Justice and Labor 
Minister Jose Eugenio Jacquet and Minister of Health and Social Welfare Ad’an Godoy 
Jimenez. The group demonstrated its strong links to the repressive apparatus when police 
barred the entry of the party convention to tradicionalistas (Long 1988), which resulted in 
the militants capturing all four leadership posts and all other seats on the National 
Committee.  This victory was repeated in November when all 874 militant delegates 
unanimously chose Stroessner to be the Colorado presidential candidate for the elections 
scheduled for February 1988. They also drew up a slate of congressional candidates that 
excluded any traditionalists (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).   
 
However, the traditionalists remained an active dissident group and launched a 
political offensive in 1988 in order to discredit the militant Junta (Arditi 1990). For 
instance, a string of statements by high-ranking Colorado dissidents designed to “erode the 
legitimacy of the militante-controlled group” (Abente 1995, 311) was published in 
newspapers in December 1988 and January 1989 (Abente 1989). One of the authors, 
Humberto Dominguez Dibbs, Stroessner’s former son-in-law and once a loyal supporter, 
even called the militants “political eunuchs” (Long 1988), and former Supreme Court 
President Luis Maria Argaña organized meetings in militant strongholds during which he 
would strongly attack the party leadership (Abente 1989).      
 
The divide between militants and traditionalists ultimately undermined Stroessner's 
support among the military, which turned into a decisive pro-democracy force (Bethell !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 The intervention followed the uncovering of a major financial scandal involving the “militante” president 
of the Central Bank (Abente 1989). 
! 223!
1991; Fregosi 1997, 259). In fact, even those in the Armed Forces who did not join the 
coup such as Maj. Gen. Gustavo Prieto Busto, expressed publicly that they had been 
increasingly disconcerted and demoralized by events since 1987 (El Diario de Noticias 
1989b, 10). There were several contentious issues. Firstly, soon after their taking over of 
the National Convention, the militant leadership demanded that the Armed Forces renew 
their partisan loyalties to the new party line (Salgueiro 2008). The military, itself divided 
into “stronistas” and “institucionalistas”, felt torn: whereas the stronistas conformed to the 
order established by Stroessner, the institutionalists felt a strong antipathy towards the way 
the military as institution had become under Stroessner, whom they considered “too 
dictatorial”71 (Naville 2008; The Globe and Mail 1989a, A6). The fact that the new 
Colorado leadership now attempted to establish a correlation between loyalty to Stroessner 
and the rank and file officers were able to attain in the Army laid the groundwork for the 
scissions that would later provoke the coup of 1989 (Riquelme 2003, 198 - 201). 
Furthermore, large sections of the Army identified much more strongly with the 
traditionalist faction of the Colorado party and personalities such as Luis Maria Argena, 
the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (The Inquirer 1989) than the militant 
leadership, most of whom were regarded as "upstarts" (Orlando Sentinel 1987). Most 
importantly, they resented that the militant leadership treated the Armed Forces as an 
extension of the police. This fact that had become clear when in November 1988 the Army 
had been ordered to cordon off the town of Concepcion to stop a protest march in support 
of the local bishop who had been publicly insulted by a militante leader (Nickson 1989). 
 
The widespread dissatisfaction of young officers whose promotions were being 
indefinitely postponed (Bouvier 1988, 33), along with the rise of Gustavo Stroessner who 
threatened to retire a number of more senior Generals, created additional pressure (Abente 
1989). Vara describes the succession problem as one of “internal distributive illegitimacy” 
(Vara 1989, 9), as the professional soldiers complained that salaries were too low and the 
military hierarchy was disrupted. For instance, the higher officers received the lion’s share 
of the spoils of corruption and Gustavo Stroessner himself was an undistinguished officer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!71 Further, rumor had it that the marriage between Stroessner’s son and coup-leader General Rodriguez’ 
daughter had gone awry, therefore weakening an important link between the military and the government 
(Roett 1989) 
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of the Air Force, a minor branch (Sondrol 1992)72. Tensions were exacerbated by rumors 
that the militant leadership, in what was considered an illegitimate power grab by the 
Colorado party, was planning to forcefully retire hundreds of high-ranking colonels. 
Within this context many felt the need for a preemptive coup, as the leadership of the 
military was not willing to suffer the fate of the traditionalists at the 1987 party convention 
(Abente 1989)73 . General Rodriguez himself was reportedly ordered to give up his 
command and retire, or accept the ceremonial post of Defence Minister – an order he 
refused (Deseret News 1989) With the strength of the first Army corps behind him (Smith 
1989a), and Infantry and Air Force divisions joining in (Heath 1989), he ousted Stroessner 
on February 3, 1989 and announced a political opening intended to bring “democratisation, 
human rights and the full and total unification of the Colorado Party” to Paraguay (Comas 
1989; Smith 1989b)74. 
 
 Resume:  
 
 Paraguay’s dictator Stroessner was ousted following a conflict between party 
factions that ultimately spilled over into the Armed Forces and provoked a rift within his 
military support base. We confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!72 Moreover, Gustavo Stroessner ordered Generals around as though they were his subordinates (Abente 
1989), which provoked coup-leader Rodriguez, who had long been Stroessner’s handpicked successor 
himself (Powers 1992). Indeed, a Brazilian official later commented that ”Rodriguez decided not to wait until 
the old man’s death (...) He had to act now or see himself removed from the succession race” (Riding 1989).  73 According to civilian leader Edgar Ynsfran, the military decision to strike had been made in December 
1988, but the coup was delayed for a week because Stroessner discovered it and traveled to Germany, taking 
with him Col Lino Oviedo, the officer who later held the gun to Stroessner’s head (El Diario de Noticias 
1989a, 9; Mendelson Forman 2013). Military sources, however, claim that the coup had been planned already 
in August 1987 when the militants displaced the traditionalist faction in the party convention. According to 
General Eumelio Bernal, Commander of the First Division of Infantry, Rodriguez expressed his 
preoccupation and said: “Bernal, tenemos que buscar la forma de arreglar esto”. General Oviedo confirmed 
these claims, explaining that there were various plans to remove Stroessner from office. A decisive moment 
is said to have been a visit in 1988 from General Frederick Woerner, Chief of the Comando Sur of the United 
States, which told Rodriguez in a private meeting that the White House would look favorably on “any 
military action that brough a democratic opening to Paraguay” (Ultimahora.com 2014) 74 Although Rodriguez had never publicly spoken against Stroessner (Los Angeles Times 1989), opposition 
leaders were confident that they “saw several signs that the new government was genuinely committed to 
moving toward democracy”. Indeed, Chaves, a traditionalist who was named a Minister without portfolio in 
the Rodriguez cabinet said in an interview that the changes would be profound, and that all parties would be 
permitted to organize and take part in the elections – a promise Rodriguez kept for the most part (Smith 
1989c).   
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(7) Uruguay 
 
Uruguay’s first steps towards democracy started in 1976, when President Juan 
Maria Bordaberry was forced to abdicate after submitting a proposal to the military calling 
for the elimination of all political parties and the creation of a permanent dictatorship 
headed by Bordaberry himself. He was succeeded by General Aparicio Mendez who in 
1977 revealed the military’s political plans for the future: After purging Uruguay’s 
National Party and the Colorado Party, a new Constitution would be elaborated and 
submitted to a plebiscite in 1980. Subsequently, national elections would be held with a 
single candidate agreed on by both parties, while the military would retain tutelage over 
the future executive (Hudson and Meditz 1990). Despite all attempts to silence opposition, 
however, the Uruguayan populace rejected the project to found “a new Republic” with 
57% of votes (Rilla 1997), a decision that spiralled the ruling military government into a 
four-year period of open confusion and bitter inner-political struggle (Sanguinetti 1991). 
After breaking ranks and exposing a corruption scandal within the military, retired General 
Gregorio Alvarez Armelino became the next President and slowly adopted measures to 
restore political dialogue in the country. A new “cronograma” providing for a three-year 
democratic transition and a new Law on Political Parties was adopted in order to regulate 
the election of political leaders, the functioning of political conventions, and the 
preparation of political platforms (Romero 2009). This new political plan was to allow the 
traditional Colorado and Blanco parties to choose new leaders by means of primary 
elections in 1982, who would then meet with representatives of the Armed Forces and, via 
negotiations, rewrite the Constitution. The text would be submitted to another plebiscite 
concurrently with a General Election in November 1984 (Gillespie 1985). The 1982 
primaries resulted in an even greater popular rejection of the regime, as sectors opposing 
the dictatorship won overwhelmingly in both traditional parties. The so-called “Dialogo” 
between politicians and the military advanced only slowly and was increasingly marked by 
civil resistance and radicalization, as Uruguay went through her worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression. Confrontation came to a head in August 1983 when both 
traditional parties pulled out of negotiations, and the government temporarily suspended all 
public political activity (Pion-Berlin 2011). This spurred mass protests and labor strikes 
and eventually prompted the more moderate Generals of the junta to rehabilitate most of 
Uruguay’s politicians, including part of the Left (Gillespie 1985). A second round of talks 
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in 1984 between the military and civilian politicians culminated in the Naval Club Pact. 
Signed by the Armed Forces and representatives from the Colorado Party, the UC and the 
Broad Front, the pact called for national elections to be held in November of that same 
year. It also settled the question of a military tutelage over a future civilian government, 
with the military giving up its long-sought goal of “cosena”, a virtual veto power over all 
civilian government decisions. Instead, they settled for an advisory board that would be 
controlled by the President and the cabinet (Hudson and Meditz 1990). On the other hand, 
it was agreed that the military would not be prosecuted for Human Rights violations, and 
that the radical leader of the Blanco Party, Wilson Ferreira, would be barred from running 
for President – a concern that had been particularly prominent for the ruling junta (Pion-
Berlin 2011). Competitive elections were held in November 1984, with the Colorado Party 
winning most of the votes, and Julio Maria Sanguinetti being sworn in as President on 
March 1, 1985.   
 
In Uruguay, we identify a crisis of the authoritarian regime that evolved through 
various phases. Tensions between different power centers within the military first surfaced 
clearly in 1976 when the Uruguayan Armed Forces broke ranks with President Bordaberry. 
When the latter suggested the permanent abolition of political parties and the construction 
of a corporatist dictatorship under his own command, the majority of the Generals of the 
Junta de Oficiales Generales balked at the idea, since they didn’t believe that corporate 
authoritarianism would either be successful or legitimate in Uruguay (Gillespie 1985)75. 
On the other hand, they also strongly opposed Bordaberry’s suggestion that the military 
abandon public administration and return to the barracks. With the military divided into a 
hardline Army, softline Navy and a middle-of-the-road Air Force (Gillespie 1986, 176), 
the conflict resulted in the ouster of Bordaberry and a victory for the proponents of the so-
called “cronograma”, a leisurely timetable for the reinstitutionalization of the regime76. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!75 The Armed Forces maintained that it was necessary to maintain the two main traditional parties, the 
Colorado Party and the Blanco party, as they considered them to be the only way to return, at some 
undetermined point in the future, to a representative democracy (EFE 1976b). General Eduardo Zubia, one of 
the leaders in Bordaberry’s ouster, explained the situation with these words: “El presidente quiere un barco 
nuevo y nosotros sólo queremos calafatear el barco viejo y seguir adelante” (Maragall 1978) 76 In our opinion, it would be erroneous though to equate the ouster of Bordaberry with a victory of regime 
softliners over hardliners, as the resulting cronograma did not constitute a true attempt at democratization of 
the regime. Although hardliner Generals such as Esteban Cristi who were thought to oppose any type of 
electoral legitimation lost power (Gillespie 1986), the constitutional project that followed Bordaberry’s 
ouster reflected the fact that the dominant current in the military remained at least moderately authoritarian.  
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This project, however, was not aimed at democratization but rather constituted a controlled 
liberalization of the regime. The real decision-making power remained with the National 
Security Council, which was dominated by senior Generals and the Commanders of the 
Armed Services. The nomination of Aparicio Mendez, a moderate authoritarian with little 
to no personal power as President, and the subsequent policy changes that curtailed 
political rights of traditional Uruguay parties reinforce this point (New York Times 1988). 
Whereas Mendez recognized that the military government in its current form “could not 
last forever”, he also spoke out against too much democracy, claiming it would invite 
“terrorism and communism” (Der Spiegel 1979). In his opinion, the political reins of the 
country should be handed back to the traditional parties “dentro de un termino razonable”, 
but only after they had been “depurados, regulados y reorganizados” (Beck 2013a; EFE 
1976a). The constitutional project proposed by the military reflected these beliefs: a 
permanent executive role for the National Security Council, a Political Control 
Commission with powers to dismiss any civilian official, and a prohibition on all leftist 
parties were only a few of the antidemocratic features that voters eventually rejected in the 
1980 plebiscite (Pion-Berlin 2011).  
 
The failure of the project to found a democradura spiralled tensions within the 
military into an open crisis of the authoritarian regime (Gillespie 1987). From that moment 
on, according to Gillespie, “a power struggle broke out between those officers that wanted 
to continue redemocratization with 'valid interlocutors' of the traditional parties, and those 
that wanted democracy to remain outside of the cronograma” (Gillespie 1995, 88)77. Out of 
this bitter conflict, General Gregorio Alvarez finally emerged as the regime’s next 
President after exposing a corruption scandal within the military junta78, even though the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!77 Prior to the plebiscite, there was a general consensus among the military that their proposal was going to 
be accepted by a margin of at least 6% (Radiopasillo 2013), a belief that was later confirmed by a number of 
high-ranking officials. After the clear “No”-victory, divisions in the military ran deep. On one hand, Generals 
like Vice Admiral Hugo Marquez publicly admitted defeat and declared that “como demócrata, acataba la 
decisión de la mayoría y la hacía suya” (Ceberio 1980). Moreover, when asked in private, they opined that 
the refusal, by the Uruguay voters, to accept the new Constitution allowed for an honorable exit to the 
military. On the other hand, hardliners like General Rapela, head of the Political Affairs Commission, kept 
referring to the “No”-voters as puppets of the terrorist “tupamaro”-network, and refused to cede power. 
When El Pais journalist Batlle told Interior Minister General Manuel Nunez, for example, that the only 
possibility to salvage the situation in Uruguay was to include the traditional parties into negotiations about a 
new democratic constitution and the return of the military to the barracks, he was jailed for several days (El 
Pais 1980).  78 Although it would be tempting to interpret Alvarez’ betrayal of esprit de corps as an indicator of his 
democratic disposition, we believe that it was rather a tactical decision to outmanoeuvre potential enemies 
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Navy vigorously opposed his candidacy (Sebastian 1978). Although Alvarez ascended to 
the Presidency when a new “aperturista” wind blew through the Uruguayan Armed Forces, 
his personal commitment towards democracy was doubtful (El Pais 1981). Not only had he 
been one of the most active leaders in the golpe of 1913 that destroyed Uruguay’s 
democratic institutions, but his attitude towards political parties had always been one of 
deep disdain (Rodriguez Larreta 1981). Indeed, Alvarez’ ambitions remained ambiguous 
throughout the transition process, and often stood in the way of confidence-building 
(Gillespie 1986). For instance, prior to the plebiscite he encouraged his comrades in arms 
not to pact with the political parties, as they "provocaron la pérdida de fe en las 
instituciones y comprometieron el destino del país" (Ceberio 1981).  
 
However, after the victory of the No-vote, he changed course, publishing a calendar 
with the following political goals: the approbation of a law on political parties in 1982; 
constitutional reform in 1983; and general elections in the first trimester of 1984. He 
continued oscillating between liberalization in certain areas, while maintaining repression 
in others79; therefore we believe he was a reluctant softliner at best, and a moderate 
authoritarian at worst. Indeed, during 1983 and 1984 there was increasing divergence 
between the more committed softliners in the military and Alvarez, who pursued a harder 
course and was even suspected to want to perpetrate himself in office (EFE 1985). As 
events unfolded, however, it became clear that regime softliners were in the majority, 
which explains why the commitment of the Armed Forces to holding elections in 1984 
remained strong despite the ambivalent attitude of the President towards the process80. For 
instance, in 1983 Alvarez, together with Coronels Bolentini and Carrera Hughes, proposed 
twice to create a “political party of progress”, which was to consist of dissident figures 
from the traditional parties and which would promote Alvarez’ candidacy for the 1984 
elections. However, he did not receive the necessary support from within the Armed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
within the junta de oficiales generales. However, it is undisputable that Alvarez’ actions directly contributed 
to the dismissal, and therefore sidelining, of important hardliner figures, such as the Interior Minister Manuel 
Nunez (Ceberio 1981). 
79 For instance, one month after Alvarez’ inauguration in September 1981 it was announced that a new 
machinery for primary elections was to be set up, so that the traditional parties could choose new leaders who 
would negotiate a new constitutional framework with the military. Paradoxically, the same month the 
newspaper “La Democracia” was temporarily shut down for publishing a letter from a banned Christian 
Democrat (Gillespie 1986).  
80 In March 1984, for example, the Colorado party accused the Blanco party of having conducted secret talks 
with Alvarez, in which the idea of indirect presidential elections with Alvarez as candidate was discussed. 
This scandal was not only damaging to the Blanco party, but it also showed further evidence of the increasing 
isolation of Alvarez within a military in which the dominant current was reformist (Gillespie 1986).!!
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Forces (Romero 2009; Beck 2013b). Furthermore, whereas Alvarez remained adamant to 
not reopen negotiations with the traditional parties after the breakdown of the first 
“Dialogo” in August 1983, many of his fellow officers defied him and sometimes publicly, 
sometimes privately, sought the contact with the civilian politicians to end the crisis (EFE 
1983). For instance, Interior Minister General Hugo Linares Brum reassured Uruguayans 
that "la finalidad permanente del proceso de reconstrucción nacional es instaurar un 
régimen verdaderamente democrático" (Agencias 1983). Only a few months later, the 
Navy and the Air Force commanders hinted at being willing to achieve an agreement with 
the two traditional parties to hand over power in elections even without a new 
constitutional framework; something that had always been a condition sine qua non for 
Alvarez and more conservative elements in the Armed Forces (Prieto 1983).  
 
Finally, the ascension of General Hugo Medina to the key post of Army 
Commander in Chief in 1984 seemed to indicate that regime softliners had definitely 
gained the upper hand. A reformist himself, in his inaugural speech he committed the 
Army to an honorable exit (EFE 1984a) and affirmed that a newly elected civilian 
government would be accepted and respected by the military. Furthermore, he gave 
assurances that those who had acted “sin honestidad” during the military regime would be 
trialed (El Pais 1984). Events leading up to the November 1984 elections supported the 
truthfulness of his words: not only did the military and civilian politicians sign a 
“Normalization Act” that annulled many of the repressive legislation media and traditional 
parties had been subjected to under military rule (EFE 1984b), but when the opposition and 
the labor movements organized strikes, the regime either did not react at all, or showed 
restraint (Becker 2010)81. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 It was rumored that Alvarez was planning to retaliate against the strikers by ordering mass arrest of 
politicians, but the military commanders refused to comply with the orders (Becker 2010) 
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Resume:  
 
The predominance of softliner military figures after the failed plebiscite of 1980 
steered Uruguay towards the democratic elections of 1984, despite resistance from 
hardliners and ambivalent General Alvarez. We therefore confirm the presence of an 
authoritarian regime crisis.  
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(8) Bolivia 
 
Bolivia’s failed attempt at democracy began in 1977 when General Banzer, under 
the general pressure of the Army and civil society, decided to relax most of his 
authoritarian decrees and promised presidential elections in 1980. Although he accepted to 
not stand as a candidate himself, he refused to grant a total amnesty to all syndical and 
political leaders still in exile, possibly hoping to indirectly maintain himself in office 
through another military candidate. Faced with massive strikes and labor agitations, 
however, Banzer was forced to concede the amnesty!(Sanchez!1978a)!and!to!call!early!elections! in! 1978! (Sanchez! 1978b). He announced General Pereda Asburn as his 
preferred successor, and promised that the new regime would establish democracy if 
Pereda was elected. To the shock of the military, however, a large amount of voters, and 
particularly peasants, supported the UDP, a newly formed grouping of left and center 
parties. This rupture of the traditional military-peasant pact was such a harsh blow to the 
regime that Pereda, backed by the hardliner faction of the Armed Forces, decided to stage a 
coup. But his government lasted only a few months, before a new junta under General 
David Padilla removed Pereda. Padilla, a softliner who belonged to the moderate 
Institutionalist faction of the military, openly favored a return of the military to the 
barracks. Not only did he promise free elections in early 1979, but he also declared that the 
government would not present a formal candidate of its own, or even support any of the 
civilian contenders (Klein 2003).  Although the election proved to be one of the fairest in 
Bolivian history, none of the main candidates was able to gain a majority. It was only 
when the military showed signs of acute impatience that Walter Guevara Arze, a 
compromise candidate with no backing amongst any of the major parties, was appointed 
interim President and mandated with organizing new elections in 1980. Additionally to 
having no own power base and unable to take independent action to alleviate the country’s 
economic problems, Guevara also faced the hard task of overseeing the trial of former 
President Banzer; a project that the newly elected Parliament decided to undertake against 
the will of the military and which outraged even the more moderate faction under General 
Padilla (Dunkerley 1982). By consequence, in a disastrous blow to the constitutionalist 
experiment, the first civilian regime since 1964 was overthrown in November by Colonel 
Alberto Natusch Busch, a hardline military commander, following a rebellion by the 11th 
garrison of Trinidad against Guevara's “weak government”. Natusch, who had connections 
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to Banzer, sought to establish a form of bonapartist regime in which both Congress and 
Trade Unions participated in an administration directed by, and “under the discipline of the 
Armed Forces” (Aqui 1979). When Natusch stepped down after only two weeks because 
of intense civilian opposition and only limited backing amongst the military, another 
compromise candidate, Lidia Gueiler Tejada, was appointed interim president. In 1980, she 
presided over elections in which the parties of the Left under Siles Zuazo gained a clear 
majority of the vote. Before Zuazo could take office, however, the process was disrupted 
by a military coup led by hardliner General Luis Garcia Meza who seized the government 
and, returning to an early Banzer-style authoritarian military regime, closed the chapter of 
the democratic experiment for the following two years (Rex and Hanratty 1989). 
 
 According to our coding criteria, Bolivia’s 1978 – 1980 transition attempt did not 
feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Although the Bolivian Armed Forces were split 
in a conservative core and more progressive elements (the so-called “institutionalists”), the 
latter’s reformist project was short lived and didn’t have enough support to withstand the 
opposition of defenders of the status quo.  
 
From its inception, Bolivia’s transition attempt stood on shaky feet. Although 
General Hugo Banzer announced a liberalization program in 1977, he did so out of a sense 
of vulnerability and a desire to relegitimize an already dwindling grip on power, rather 
than a deep-seated democratic conviction (Whitehead 1986). In fact, in 1977, the Banzer 
regime was badly riven by corruption and internal dissent, to a point where regime officials 
spoke of a true “desgaste politico” of the Armed Forces (Sanchez 1977a). Large foreign 
loans weighed heavily on a struggling economy, Banzer’s self-declared foreign goal to 
recuperate access to the coast had not brought fruit, and an increasingly vocal civil society 
demanded the return to constitutional rule. Moreover, a growing sector of the Armed 
Forces sought a revision of the terms of the “banzerato”, “with the prime objective of 
diminishing its unpopularity and vulnerability to internal division, as well as reversing the 
extended hegemony of Banzer’s personal following within the institution” (Dunkerley 
1982). Notwithstanding, for the longest time Banzer refused to publicly name a concrete 
date for the convocation of elections (De la Calle 1977), and only relented after the loss of 
support from his own ranks culminated in an announcement made by six Generals who had 
once helped bringing Banzer to power. They declared that the government no longer 
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represented the spirit of the majority within the Armed Forces, and that it was time to stop 
assuming the role of a political party (Sanchez 1978a). Only a few months earlier, the High 
Council of the Armed Forces had forced Banzer, along with 50 other Generals and 
Coronels, to retire to the Reserve Forces (Sanchez 1977a). 
 
 However, even after embarking on the electoral transition train, Banzer’s attitude 
towards handing over power remained highly ambiguous, and he likely had no sense of 
being defeated (Whitehead 1986).  In an interview with El Pais, for example, he admitted 
that “cuando los militares llegamos al poder, es muy dificil hacernos abandonarlo” and 
even hinted at a possible interruption of the transition process, should certain “criterios 
individuales opuestos a la constitucionalizacion” come to pass (De la Calle 1978a). Doubts 
about Banzer’s sincerity intensified when the news about a failed coup against the regime 
spread. According to the Interior Ministry, the coup protagonists were “reactionary 
elements” of the military that planned to interrupt Banzer’s liberalization process (El Pais 
1977). However, only four days later General Villalpando, head of the “Ejercito”, 
denounced the accusations as false, claiming that two of the five officers involved were 
openly known for their progressive opinions. Therefore, many feared that the incident was 
orchestrated to show that Bolivia still lacked the preconditions for holding elections and 
therefore could serve as a pretext for postponing the transition timetable (Sanchez 1977b).  
 
When the election date drew closer, it turned out that Banzer’s preferred candidate, 
his ex-Minister of the Interior, Airforce General Juan Pereda, was likely not going to win 
the vote and therefore Banzer’s efforts to assure a placid “continuismo” were not going to 
bear fruit. To avoid losing power Banzer then organized - or at least acquiesced in - a 
massive and open fraud in the poll, which plunged the Bolivian regime into a deep crisis. 
The reaction of the populace forced Banzer to publicly declare that he would devolve 
power to the Armed Forces by the end of his mandate on August 6, 1978, given the 
absence of a clear electoral mandate (Dunkerley 1982; Whitehead 1986).  The election 
fiasco, coupled with the ADN’s positive attitude towards the Natusch and Mesa coups 
demonstrate that Banzer always preferred some sort of “guided rule” with the Armed 
Forces still exerting a considerable amount of tutelary control over the process.  We 
believe it therefore adequate to qualify Banzer a moderate hardliner who never intended 
true democratization in the first place.  
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During the short interregnum of his successor, General Pereda, the democratic 
project in Bolivia remained stagnant principally because of Pereda’s own lack of 
democratic ambitions. On one hand, he assured the Bolivian public early on that he had the 
intention of “contribuir decididamente a la instauracion de un regimen democratic 
autentico” (EFE 1978a), announced the opening of a political dialogue with the various 
political forces in the country (EFE 1978b) and even abolished some of the most draconian 
of Banzer’s legislations such as the Ley de Seguridad de Estado (EFE 1978c). On the other 
hand, however, all the key positions in his government were kept in the hands of the 
military, and soon detentions and acts of repressions became so common that the Catholic 
Church deemed it necessary to initiate a petition demanding the respect of Human Rights 
(El Pais 1978a). Most importantly, however, Pereda did not call for elections despite his 
promise to do so (De la Calle 1978b; Rex and Hanratty 1989). He ended up being 
overthrown by General David Padilla Arancibia, a member of the younger institutionalist 
faction of the military, in a bloodless coup in November 1978.  
 
 Padilla, along with the military faction supporting him, considered that the main 
role of the Armed Forces was to be defenders of the country rather than political 
intervention (Rex and Hanratty 1989). In this point, Padilla was categorical: His 
administration sought only to maintain public order and oversee the preparations for, and 
the holding of another poll in 1979 (Padilla Arancibia 1980). He also refused to name an 
official government candidate, promising that on August 6, 1979 the Armed Forces would 
hand over power to whoever was democratically elected (De la Calle 1978b). A genuine 
softliner, he allowed the political spectrum to develop into a much fuller array of political 
forces than had been the case under the Banzerato, which made him the candidate of 
choice for any “salida democratizante” to opposition forces (Dunkerley 1982). Siles Zuazo, 
moral victor of the fraudulous 1978 elections, even qualified Padilla’s coup as “patriotic” 
(El Pais 1978b) and both Walter Guevara Arce and Lidia Gueiler, civilian presidents 
between 1979 and 1980, confirmed that they believed Padilla was serious and honest in his 
claim that the Armed Forces would be returning to the barracks (Santa Cruz 1979a; El Pais 
1979a).  
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However, multiple efforts by regime hardliners to destabilize the Padilla regime 
and its subsequent civilian administrations show that the institutionalist faction, or 
“Karachipampas”, did not have much support within the military as a whole, and that the 
civilian representatives of the government were weak and powerless (Dunkerley 1982). 
Firstly, both Walter Guevara Arce and Lidia Gueiler were compromise figures born from 
an electoral deadlock and the impending threat of another golpe82. As such, they had no 
significant power base of their own and were constantly subject to harassment and pressure 
from regime conservatives. More importantly, however, the policies they tried to 
implement were highly controversial and divisive particularly among the military, 
especially between those loyal to former President Banzer and those who favored a quick 
and thorough “desbanzerisacion” of the Armed Forces. The first civilian President, 
Guevara Arce, alienated a big part of the military by suggesting that he would not 
incorporate any military members into his government (Santa Cruz 1979b), and by 
initiating a public trial against Banzer for corruption and Human Rights violations83 that 
was viewed negatively even by the most moderate parts of the Armed Forces84.  
 
As a result, Arce was removed from power through a coup by hardliner Coronel 
Alberto Natusch, a first clear sign that the balance of power had started to shift decisively 
towards the anti-democratic faction of the military (El Pais 1979b). Accusing Congress to 
act “en forma ajena a las verdaderas angustias nacionales” (Agencias 1979a), Natusch 
justified the coup as “necessary to save Bolivia from the shipwreck of a dysfunctional 
parliamentarism”  (Santa Cruz 1979c). Despite the backing of a number of Army garrisons 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!82 Banzer first voiced the possibility of another military takeover in a reunion with Siles Zuazo and Victor 
Paz Estenssoro after both refused to give up their claim to the Presidency (El Pais 1979c). Padilla later 
reiterated that option (Agencias 1979c) and insisted that “el país no puede estar sujeto a los vaivenes de un 
peligroso juego de intereses de partido... Ser político no significa impunidad para sembrar desconfianza y 
crear divisiones» (Santa Cruz 1979f) 83 It was alleged, among other things, that after the 1979 elections the military led by Banzer had presented a 
16-point set of demands to the civilian candidate, including involvement of the High Command in all Cabinet 
discussions and decisions, preservation of the purchasing power of all military salaries, with pay rises for the 
officer corps, and a guarantee of adequate resources for COFADENA, the military institution that operated 
various strategic public enterprises (Whitehead 1986).  84 Padilla, for example, publicly declared that the officer corps was afraid the process was going to transform 
into a general indictment of the Armed Forces, and warned that the military would not tolerate “insultos ni 
calumnias” against Banzer, or accept that the prestige of the Armed Forces as institution was jeopardized (De 
la Calle 1979). A year later, General Meza used the Banzer trial as a pretext for his own coup, declaring that 
“es un proceso que va más contra la institución castrense que contra el ex mandatario" and because of that, 
the Armed Forces “responderán con las leyes militares a los congresistas a cuya iniciativa se debe el juicio” 
(El Pais 1980c).  
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and part of the Army High Command85, civilian and military opposition to Natusch’s coup 
was so strong that Natusch was eventually forced to surrender power (Santa Cruz 
1979d). 86  However, he had succeeded in neutralizing an important part of the 
institutionalist wing of the Armed Forces87, therefore unknowingly paving the way for 
General Meza’s authoritarian regime only half a year later.    
  
The subsequent appointment of Lidia Gueiler, another compromise candidate, 
revealed the extent of divisions within the Armed Forces, and the degree to which the 
hardliners had an advantage over the institutionalists. For one, the “golpistas” were placed 
under the authority of a President who left them largely undisturbed (Dunkerley 1982). For 
two, only within a week the leading patron of deposed Colonel Natusch, General Luis 
Garcia Meza, staged a passive coup in La Paz’ Miraflores barracks in a refusal to accept 
Gueiler's new military appointments which largely favored the institutionalist camp88 
(Agencias 1979b; Santa Cruz 1979e). Over the coming months the hardliners increased 
their hold over a lackluster Gueiler regime. They committed acts of terrorism against left-
wing political figures, including an attempt on the life of the President herself (AFP 1980), 
and pursued a “strategy of tension” that culminated with Meza’s forced appointment to the 
rank of Army commander (IPS 1980). In June 1980 the Army High Command issued a 
communiqué signed by all three Army branches (Earth, Air and Navy) that demanded the 
postponement of the upcoming poll by at least a year. They warned that the elected !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!85 Among the high-ranking officers, Padilla’s immediate successor, General Victor Castillo, as well as Hugo 
Banzer himself were the most important supporters of the coup (El Pais 1979d). 86 We believe that this was due principally to two factors: Firstly, Natusch’s coup came at a time when 
softliners within the Bolivian military still had a certain degree of support. Secondly, Natusch himself had 
only a limited followership within the Armed Forces, which centered mainly on a group of comrades in arms 
that, like Natusch himself, had not managed to ascend to the rank of “General” within the military. This lack 
of support on part of the Armed Forces became most evident when more than 200 Army officials headed by 
Coronel Rolando Saravia and Coronel Jorge Escobar signed a manifesto that called upon their camarades to 
“oponerse a un Gobierno que está conduciendo al país al borde de la guerra civil” (Santa Cruz 1979g), 
following which the National Police stopped carrying out orders to suppress protestors demonstrating against 
Natusch in La Paz (Santa Cruz 1979h).   87 After Natusch’s coup, General Padilla and several other high-ranking institutionalist officers publicly 
denounced the takeover declaring that “El 95% de los militares estamos cansados de convulsiones políticas 
fruto de ambiciones personales” and expressed their allegiance to civil President Guevara Arce (Santa Cruz 
1979i). However, they were arrested and put on trial, which left the democratic faction of the military 
marginalized and deprived of their key members (Santa Cruz 1979j; EFE 1979).  88 Gueiler attempted to change the High Command that had survived the fall of Natusch after she had 
received a petition from a group of institutionalist officers that accused them of “delitos de 'lesa patria' and 
'lesa institución'" (Santa Cruz 1979k). Meza himself was to be substituted with General Rene Villaroel, but 
pressured Gueiler into appointing General Rubén Rocha Patiño, a fellow hardliner (Santa Cruz 1979l). Meza 
saw his “linea dura” reinforced when the commanders of the operative garrisons issued a communiqué 
unanimously declaring their support for the current High Command (Santa Cruz 1979m).  
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government “no tendrá la capacidad suficiente para gobernar" (Agencias 1980a), and that 
the Armed Forces would not recognize whichever candidate emerged victorious (De la 
Calle 1980a). However, Congress rejected their ultimatum, and the left-wing UDP under 
Siles Zuazo won a decisive majority (De la Calle 1980b). As a result, the bloody uprising 
of the Trinidad garrison early on July 17 under the leadership of General Meza and the 
unanimous support of the principal Army branches (El Pais 1980a) violently ended “las 
aventuras electorales” (El Pais 1980b)89 and returned Bolivia to an authoritarian regime 
similar to the early Banzerato for the next two years. 
 
Resume:  
 
Despite attempts of softliner military factions to install a democratic regime, 
Bolivian hardliners remained dominant and ended liberalization attempts with a bloody 
coup. Therefore we confirm that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime.  
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(9) Algeria 
 
Algeria’s bid for democratization began in the early 1980s when Chadli Bendjedid, 
President of Algeria from 1979 to 1991, introduced a series of economic reforms to 
stabilize the country after the devastating oil shock of the 1970s (Evans 1992, 5). However, 
the reforms backfired and led to increased government corruption, a growing foreign debt 
and worsening living conditions for ordinary Algerians. In autumn 1988, food shortage, 
growing frustration with the inefficiency of the ruling “National Liberation Front” (FLN), 
and a corruption scandal involving one of the President’s sons (Belkaid 2011) set off work 
strikes and food riots that spread chaos in many Algerian cities. Martial law was installed 
and the military violently repressed the protests, killing between 150 and 400 people. At 
the same time the President embarked on a series of political reforms aimed at restoring 
government legitimacy, starting with the release of all prisoners taken during the October 
riots, a general amnesty, and the loosening of press censorship (Volpi 2003, 83). In 
February 1989, the Constitution was modified to allow for multipartism (Lahouari 1996), 
and President Bendjedid promised free General Elections for 1991. As a result of these 
liberalization efforts, more than sixty new political parties emerged, among which the 
fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) quickly became one of the most influential 
contenders for power (Lahouari 1997). In fact, the FIS swept the first local elections under 
the new electoral system in June 1990. Encouraged by their victory, members of the FIS 
majlis ash-shura cautioned that the decision to participate in the political process might 
pose significant risk to the ruling party (Cook 2004). Boasting slogans such as “Pas de 
démocratie”90 , and “l’État islamique par l’urne ou le fusil” (Bi Essandouk aou bi 
elbendoukia) (Nezzar 2000), Ali Belhadj, one of the party leaders, declared that the FIS 
"has committed itself to the immediate implementation of Islamic law and trying former 
Algerian officials if it wins the general elections scheduled for 27 June" (FBIS-NES-91-
092, 1991). Although this message surely was not warmly received with the government, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!90 FIS party leaders actually made it clear that the party would not hesitate to use democracy to gain power, 
but that it would subsequently tolerate pluralism only if it did not compromise Islamic values and principles. 
Party leader Ali Benhadj, for example, declared in the journal “l’Horizondaté” of February 1989 that he 
would “end pluralism if it allows political parties to spread ideas and opinions that are in contradiction to the 
beliefs of Islam”. Party cofounder Abbassi Madani, for his part, confirmed to the journal “Algérie Actualités” 
of December 24, 1989 that “if democracy is a framework of dialogue and respect for opinions, we agree with 
the concept. However, we do not accept that an elected official be in contradiction with Islam, the Sharia and 
its values” (MAOL 2011). 
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the election process went ahead and the first round of the legislative race was held in 
December 199191. When the FIS registered another stunning victory and obtained more 
than two thirds of available seats, Bendjedid prepared negotiations with the party leaders 
and even invoked the possibility of cohabitation (Rocherieux 2001; Kaush and Youngs 
2008). The Army responded by canceling the second ballot and forcing Bendjedid to 
resign on January 11, 1992 (Algeria-Watch 2012). A “High Council” formed by military 
officers took over the reins of power, thus putting an end to the fledgling democratization 
process (WDR 2012). More than 150.000 Algerians are believed to have lost their lives in 
the ensuing civil war (Lymo 2005).  
 
In Algeria we do identify a split within the ruling elite into hardliners and softliners.  
But whereas a crisis as defined in this study requires softliners to be in the majority, in 
Algeria they ended up being eclipsed by regime hardliners. This fact was evidenced not 
only by sheer numbers, but also by the way the democratization process unfolded: Slowly, 
pro-reform forces were sidelined, and finally the hardliner forces of the military shut down 
the transition process. Between 1989 and 1992 President Chadli Bendjedid and his Prime 
Minister Mouloud Hamrouche were the two main softliners of the Algerian regime. 
Hamrouche, a former Colonel, introduced a number of reforms aimed at liberalizing the 
economy and eradicating corruption92. For instance, he tried to suppress the "intermediary 
chain of command" within the party hierarchy in a bid to increase transparency of 
information (MAOL 2011). He also separated the portfolio of the Defense Ministry from 
the Presidency to create a more balanced power structure93. Furthermore, Hamrouche was 
credited with having ended 30 years of state monopoly on print and audio media, loosening 
censure and allowing the creation of 169 journals (for example “Le Quotidien d’Algerie”, 
“El Watan”, or “Le Soir d’Algérie”) (Rocherieux 2001). “Reforms without liberty are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!91 A member of the “Mouvement Algerien des Officiers libres” who held the post of chief of research and 
analysis (SRA) during the Bendjedid era claims that the 1991 elections were Algeria’s first and only truly 
free elections. According to him, General Mohamed Betchine had given direct orders that vote-rigging was 
out of the question, and certain officers even prevented actions of ballot-stuffing in certain election offices 
(MAOL 2011). 92 These reforms included the negotiation of a medium-term agreement with the IMF to stabilize the 
country’s financial situation (MAOL 2011) 93  Hamrouche’s efforts earned him the ire of the Defense Minister, hardliner General Nezzar, who 
complained in an interview with the journalist Sid Ahmed Semiane that it was “a perturbation” to be 
subordinated to someone of lesser rank (Semiane 1988). 
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doomed to fail”, he once declared, (El Watan 2011) “we must go towards a veritable 
transition” (El Watan 2007). 
 
On the other hand, most of Hamrouche’s reforms wouldn’t have taken shape 
without the support of President Chadli Bendjedid (Le Quotidien d’Algérie 2012). 
Insisting that “les reformes, c’est moi” (LeMatin.dz 2012), Bendjedid is often viewed as 
the “father of Algerian democracy” (Daou 2012), even though some claim he never 
intended a political opening, only greater freedom within the FLN (MAOL 2011)94. But 
insiders to the regime, such as former Minister of Interior Larbi Belkheir, opine that 
Bendjedid “really was in favor of democratization” (Slate Afrique 2012). According to 
Belkheir, Bendjedid “wanted to create great things, dreaming that Algeria was the most 
beautiful country in the world and wanted prosperity for everyone (...) He maybe didn’t 
envision a total and brutal political opening, but he wished to open the door within the 
party to other political currents, which, later, would have led to political pluralism” 
(Semiane 1998, 111 - 126). Nonetheless, many of Bendjedid’s reform projects remained 
flawed, possibly because of hardliner resistence. For instance, the 1989 Constitution 
retained a variety of authoritarian structures such as the state security courts and the 
powerful presidency95, and it did nothing to curtail the political power of the Army.96 
Laws regulating the creation of new political parties were also demonstratively restrictive 
(Cook 2004).  
 
When in 1992 the military cancelled the 2nd round of elections, Bendjedid 
reaffirmed his support for democratization. “We cannot pretend to be a state with a rule of 
law if we do not respect the verdict of the polls, no matter what the result may be97”, he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!94 Critics cite Bendjedid’s pre-1988 discours in which he said that "those who are not satisfied with our way 
of ruling the country are free to leave Algeria" (L’Expression 2007). 95 Rachid Tlemçani, a political scientist at the University of Algiers once joked that the Algerian President is 
“empowered with all the attributes of an enlightened sheikh” (Tlemçani 1990, 14).  96 In fact, the military itself indicated after the adoption of the Constitution that it would remain engaged in 
politics (Cook 2004) 97 In an interview with the journal “Sophia Asian Studies”, Bendjedid confirms that the government should 
have respected the will of the people (“La démocratie a donné au people algérien le choix des islamistes en 
toute liberté, exactement comme cela s’est passé en Palestine quand le peuple palestinien a voté pour 
Hamas”, Koudil 2010) 
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declared, echoing the words of Hamrouche98 a year earlier. (LeMatin.dz 2012). Even 
before the balloting took place, he indicated that although “he preferred an Islamist defeat, 
he was ready to come to terms [with the FIS] should the occasion arise” (Charef 1994, 
236). Bendjedid’s position within the Algerian regime gradually weakened in the course of 
the transition in favor of the ascension of hardliners. The “coalition of military officers” 
formed by figures such as Defense Minister Khaled Nezzar, Interior Minister Larbi 
Belkheir and Ground Forces commander Mohamed Lamari were said to be the “de facto 
rulers of Algeria”99 (Volpi 2003), and they didn’t keep their aversion to Bendjedid100 or 
the democratization process a secret101. Belkheir, for instance, gave the Minister of Justice 
an ultimatum to put an end to the electoral process102 and met the President personally to 
let him know he would not tolerate cohabitation with a party that doesn’t subscribe to 
constitutional principles (Semiane 1998, 111 - 126). !
 
Their power was evidenced by their capacity to sabotage the reforms passed under 
the Hamrouche government103, and to marginalise reform-minded factions within the 
ruling circle. For instance, in 1987, General Belloucif and his associates, the Minister of 
Military Justice and Social Action, were forced from office and in 1989, the Chief of the 
National Gendarmerie force, Hachichi Zine El Abidine, was dismissed (MAOL 2011). In 
1991, Mouloud Hamrouche would share their fate after a long campaign of 
destabilization104. After a short episode of martial law following a FIS-organized general 
strike, General Nezzar and General Belkheir forced Bendjedid’s hand in dismissing 
Hamrouche, telling him “a political decision was in order” (Nezzar 2000). In 1992, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!98 In 1991 after the sweeping victory of the FIS in the 1st round of legislative elections, Hamrouche 
graciously accepted the results, declaring that “our defeat attests even more to our desire for a democratic 
opening than would a victory in which one would have been suspected of irregularity” (Wynn 1994, 36) 99 According to Lahouari (1996), these officers considered it "as normal as breathing that the military 
hierarchy should have the final say in forming the government". 100 In his Memoires, Nezzar claims that Bendjedid "n’était pas fait pour être président de la République" 
(Nezzar 2000), et "quand il disait quelque chose d’intelligent, on devinait qu’il venait de recevoir Mouloud 
Hamrouche" (LeMatin.dz 2012).  101 Nezzar denounced the political opening, arguing ”qu’elle nous menait droit vers tous les dangers”, and 
that the government position towards the FIS “ne tenait pas la route” (Nezzar 2000).  102 According to Nezzar, Belkheir screamed “Si vous ne le faites pas, j’ordonnerai dès demain aux walis 
d’arrêter le processus" (Nezzar 2000). 
103 The Interior Ministry, in violation of the new laws on the creation of Unions and political associations, 
continued to refuse registration to a number of new Unions and political associations outside the ruling circle 
(El Watan 2011).  
104 Hamrouche and his ministers of the Interior and the Economy suffered from delegitimizing attacks by the 
hardliner-controlled press and security services who regularly insulted them publicly and even fed them false 
information to discredit them in the eyes of the President (Moussa 2012; MAOL 2011). 
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Bendjedid's actions indirectly confirmed the military council’s immense influence. In fact, 
he made sure to dissolve Parliament prior to resigning himself, in order to avoid that the 
President’s constitutional successor, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, took over the Presidency, 
because he knew that Belkhadem didn’t enjoy the approval of the military (AF 2012; 
Charef 2012).  
Finally, the cancellation of the 2nd round of the 1992 polls and the dismissal of 
President Bendjedid show most clearly that Algeria’s authoritarian regime did not 
experience a crisis. Until today, accounts on the true facts “behind the scenes” of 
Bendjedid’s resignation diverge. When the President announced his decision to leave 
office on 11 February, Algerian officials and press confirmed that his demission resulted 
from an ultimatum by the Army’s top command which opposed Bendjedid's power-sharing 
plans with the FIS (Kaush and Youngs 2008)105. Major-General Nezzar himself reports in 
his memoires that within days of the first round of voting in 1991 the military resolved not 
to allow the FIS to attain a majority in the National Assembly (Nezzar 2000, 236) and that 
the second round of voting would not take place (Algeria-Watch 2012). He even gives 
precise indications about the day when Bendjedid supposedly “lost the support of the 
Army”, but denies that Bendjedid’s resignation was a coup d’Etat106 (Nezzar 2000, 237). 
Bendjedid later confirmed this thesis in his memoires, claiming he resigned deliberately in 
order to “limit the bloodshed of Algerians” (AF 2012). It remains that the Generals 
prevailed, and they didn’t hesitate to declare that “they are willing to exterminate three 
million Algerians to re-establish order” (MAOL 2011). 
Resume:  
When Algerian president Bendjedid offered the possibility of reform and open 
elections in 1992, the Algerian military formed a united front against their President and 
forced him to cancel the election. We therefore confirm that there was no crisis of the 
authoritarian regime. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Hichem Aboud, for example, tells the story of General Lamari pinning Bendjedid with his collar to the 
wall in his office with the words: “Here is your resignation letter, and you will read it now in front of the 
cameras, or you’ll know the same fate as Ceausescu” (Aboud 2002, 147)  
106 To prove his claims, he cites the fact that Bendjedid did not experience any reduction in his prerogatives 
or liberties either before or after his resignation. He does, however, admit that “practical, political and 
military measures have been considered”, but that Bendjedid’s resignation took away the need to resort to 
such extremes (Nezzar 2000, 236). 
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(10) Tanzania107 
 
Contrary to most other African transitions, the Tanzanian experience with political 
liberalization in the 1990s was not propelled, or even accompanied, by significant popular 
protest movements. When the Tanzanian leadership began to move the country toward 
democracy in the early 1990s, neither an organized opposition to the ruling party Chama 
cha Mapinduzi (CCM) nor a demand for a multiparty democracy existed (Hoffman and 
Robinson 2009). In fact, a 1992 public opinion survey revealed that 77 percent of 
respondents preferred Tanzania to remain a one-party state with the CCM in control 
(Amon et al. 2002); a fact that led the 1995 presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa to 
proudly boast that the party “didn’t need to cheat [in potential multiparty elections] 
because it was quite certain that CCM was going to win” (Agence France Press 1995). The 
political transition was therefore initiated “from the top”, and was largely influenced by 
former President Mwalimu Nyerere. Nyerere, the father of the Tanzanian socialist 
“Ujamaa”, retired voluntarily from the Presidency in 1985 and handed over power to his 
chosen successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who also became chairman of the CCM in 1990. 
Although once a fierce defender of “one-party democracy”, it was Nyerere who first drew 
the attention of the Tanzanian leadership to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, and to the inevitability of a similar political transition in Africa (Hydén 1999). On 
February 21, 1990 in a widely publicized interview before the heads of the national mass 
media, Nyerere dramatically opened the national debate over multipartyism, while 
stressing at the same time the critical task of protecting Ujamaa (Sunday News 1990a, 7). 
Suggesting that Single Party rule might be a root cause for complacency in senior 
government officials (Wiseman 1990, 186), he argued that the Tanzanian system had 
developed a dangerous tendency towards authoritarianism. According to Nyerere, “when a 
Tanzanian cannot write an article and argue the need for more than one party – and by 
doing so he is committing treason – then at that stage we shall have gone too far” (Sunday 
News 1990b, 4). Referring to events in Eastern Europe, he added that “Tanzanians should 
not be dogmatic and think that a Single Party is God’s wish” (Sunday News 1990a, 7). 
Officially, Nyerere recommended adopting a multi-party system in Tanzania because (1) 
the political environment was different from that of the 1960s and therefore the timing for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4 
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introducing multiparty politics was opportune; (2) the CCM was a democratic party that 
wanted to preserve peace, stability and national harmony; (3) democracy was considered a 
precondition to Socialism, hence there was no ideological conflict in pluralism; and (4) the 
party wanted to remain modern and ahead of possible opposition movements to ensure its 
legitimacy and future political survival (Ngasongwa 1992). On the other hand, however, 
one can hypothesize that the introduction of multipartyism was a tactical decision in order 
to recover a Socialist agenda threatened by economic hardship and donor pressure to open 
up the political system (Ake 1991, 32 – 44). In fact, Tanzania in the 1990s experienced a 
“perestroika without glasnost” (Zirker 1997): largely as a result of pressure by external 
donors, who provided more than 30 percent of the country’s GDP in aid from 1985 to 
1993, Tanzania joined a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) leading to a period of 
privatisation, reduction in salaries and subsidies and rampant corruption (Planmo 2002). 
Hence, by recommending multipartyism, Nyerere might have believed he could regarner 
support for a government immersed in the most traumatic policies of a foreign-encouraged 
economic liberalization program (Zirker 1997).  
 
Following Nyerere’s speech, the CCM party hierarchy complied and scheduled a 
National Conference on the political changes in Eastern Europe and a three-day 
symposium on “Socialist construction in the world” (Anglin, 1990, 435). Furthermore, in 
1991 President Mwinyi appointed the so-called Nyalali-Commission tasked with the 
mandate to enquire whether Tanzanians actually wanted a change of the current political 
system, and what legal and constitutional changes were demanded to reintroduce 
multiparty politics (Planmo 2002). In response, the political opposition forces formed an 
independent National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) to spearhead 
demands for a Constitutional Conference (Nyirabu 2002). The leader of NCCR, Chief 
Abdallah Fundikira, qualified the Nyalali Commission as “a waste of taxpayers’ money” 
and threatened to call on the President to establish a transitional government in preparation 
for multi-party elections (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). However, the government did not 
cede to these demands, and when the Nyalali Commission presented its initial findings and 
recommended the adoption of multipartism (even though only a minority of Tanzanians 
actually favored such change), the National Executive Committee of CCM complied. On 
condition that national unity be preserved and Tanzanians learn the art of “contestation 
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without confrontation” (Martin 1992), the CCM accepted on 29 February 1992 to end its 
monopoly of political activities and its supremacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.  
 
In May 1992, Parliament endorsed the recommendation to start the transition to 
multiparty politics, amended several articles of the Constitution and legalised opposition 
parties. However, it also imposed two important caveats: Parties could not have an ethnic 
or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, in order 
to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life (Bjerk 2010, 276). When in 1995 
the first multiparty parliamentary elections were held amid widespread reports of 
irregularities, CCM took 80 percent of seats, and its presidential candidate Benjamin 
Mkapa won the presidential election with 62.8 percent compared to 27.8 percent for the 
leading opposition candidate Augustine Mrema.   
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(11) Mali 
 
By the late 1980s, many Malians had become disenchanted with the regime of 
Moussa Traoré who had ruled the country since his ascension to power in 1969. Struggling 
with a stagnating economy and a corrupted leadership, they felt that Traoré’s regime was 
both detrimental to the country’s well-being, and unreformable108. During the year 1990 
opposition to the military dictatorship began forming around three main groups, which 
quickly consolidated into the Comité de Coordination des Associations et Organisations 
Démocratiques (CCAOD): the Comité Nationale d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID), the 
Alliance Démocratique du Mali (ADEMA) and the Association des Élèves et Étudiants du 
Mali (AEEM) (Bertrand 1992; Sidibé and Kester 1994). The CCAOD would later move to 
the forefront of dissent by helping to initiate the mass demands for a multi-party system 
and democracy in Mali. Paradoxically, however, some of the first public demands for 
greater pluralism came from inside the regime itself, when the UNTM, Mali’s government-
sponsored Union, declared her support for the instauration of multipartyism during her 
extraordinary session on May 28/29, 1990. Three months later Mali’s barrister association 
echoed this call in an open letter to the President published in the independent journal Les 
Échos (Lange 1999). In early 1991, CCAOD convened a series of talks on greater political 
openness with the government. The talks, however, failed due to Traoré’s unwillingness to 
discuss the issues put forth by CCAOD, notably an investigation into the death of some 
pro-democracy protestors at the hands of security forces (Passanante and Rennebohm 
2011). Only a month later, on March 17, 1991, CCAOD organized a “National Day of 
Martyrs” demonstration which more than 100.000 people attended. They reiterated their 
demands for a National Congress to establish a multi-party system. Additionally, AEEM 
announced a 48h student strike to begin the next day, and a protest march to take on place 
on March 22. Traoré responded by instating a state of emergency and ordering riot police 
and the military to repress the demonstrations, which resulted in the death of at least 22 
participants. At the same time, he offered concessions to opposition leaders, promising to 
free hundreds of political prisoners and to consider the instauration of a multiparty system. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 The dismissal, in 1987, of Soumana Sacko, a Finance minister hailed for his integrity, was only one of 
many instances that proved to ordinary Malians that reform-minded individuals were not particularly 
welcome in Traoré’s regime (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005, 55). 
! 263!
Yet he refused to resign as President (Reuters 1991). Conversely, the opposition rejected 
any deal that fell short of Traoré leaving power, and on March 25, thousands of workers 
followed a call by the UNTM for a national strike meant to last until Traoré resigned. 
Demonstrations continued in force, but for the first time since the beginning of 
demonstrations the Army did not shoot on protestors (Reuters 1991). One day later, a 
military group led by Lieutnant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré toppled General Traoré 
in a palace coup and promised to turn Mali into a multi-party democracy and to organize 
elections. Indeed, in 1992 Alpha Oumar Konaré of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali 
won Mali's first free and fair legislative and presidential elections. 
 
In Mali’s democratic transition, divisions within the regime were apparent in both 
the civil machinery and the military, even though the latter should prove decisive in tipping 
the balance of power in favor of regime softliners. On the side of the bureaucracy, there 
were people like Bakary Karambé, the UNTM’s General Secretary, who were sympathetic 
to the democratic sentiment among the populace and who pushed within regime 
organisations for greater openness. It is significant that civil members of the regime were 
among the first to raise the call for multipartyism: first during a conference of the Single 
Party in March 1990 (Diarrah Totoh 1996, 34), and then again in May 1990 during an 
extraordinary session of the regime-associated Workers’ Union (Villalon and Von Doepp 
2005)109. 
 
During the course of the transition, several other high ranking figures from Traoré’s 
ruling apparatus publicly denounced Traoré’s stubbornness and his lack of comprehension 
for the gravity of the situation, and declared their willingness to work with opposition 
leaders towards a democratic solution. Reports claim that during the protests of March 22 
and 23, 1991, Mathieu Tiona Koné, Minister of Communication, called Traoré to alert him 
on the deteriorating situation and advised him to announce immediately the instauration of 
multipartyism. Laughingly Traoré replied: “Tu t’affoles pour rien” (JeuneAfrique.com 
2011a). Two days later, when Traoré sent away an opposition delegation demanding his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109  The Union representatives ended their reunion by declaring: “Considérant que le parti unique 
constitutionnel et institutionnel ne répond plus aux aspirations démocratiques du peuple malien (..) le conseil 
central extraordinaire rejette en bloc le dirigisme politique qui entrave le développement de la démocratie au 
Mali (…) et opte pour l’instauration du multipartisme et du pluralisme démocratique" (Cerdes 1995, 33). 
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immediate resignation, the Minister-General of the Presidency, Django Sissoko, is said to 
have run after the delegation members, begging them to come back and negotiate, and 
confirming that softliners within the regime were willing to consent to change: “Revenez, 
ne partez pas! Ne faites pas comme lui (...) Le Mali ne se limite pas à un seul homme!"  
(JeuneAfrique.com 2011b; JeuneAfrique.com 2011a). Finally, the Single Party’s 
administrative secretary M’Bouillé Siby and Traoré’s political secretary Djibril Diallo 
publicly dissociated themselves from Traoré by calling for the establishment of a multi-
party system (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005). Diallo also resigned from his post as a show 
of support for the protesters (Wilmington Morning Star 1991), claiming that this was “in 
agreement with [his] conscience as a man, a militant and a citizen” (Faul 1991a)110. 
 
Within the military, support for Traoré essentially centered on a hardliner group of 
senior leaders that cultivated a close friendship to Traoré, notably Air Force commander 
and Minister of Defense General Mamadou Coulibaly, and Interior Minister General 
Sékou Ly. When demonstrations against Traoré started, Ly promptly proceeded to prohibit 
political activities by CNID, ADEMA and AEEM and threatened violence against those 
who would defy his orders (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005). Heeding Traoré’s call to 
“braid [dissenters] crowns of fire” (JeuneAfrique.com 2011b), Ly was at the forefront of 
repression against protestors in March 1991, showing that at least part of the Army was 
still loyal to the President (Faul 1991b). On his orders, soldiers fired into protesting crowds 
with live bullets, killing at least 148 and wounding hundreds, and then blocked hospitals to 
stop the wounded from getting help (New York Times 1991; Reuters 1991). Some 
accounts claim they even burnt down several shops at the market with their customers still 
inside (Morrisson and Azam 1999).  
 
On the other hand, a large number of young soldiers and officers were in favor of a 
return to the barracks and sympathetic to the protestors’ plight (Faul 1991a). By March 26, 
thousands of soldiers put down their arms and joined the pro-democracy movement in the 
streets, refusing to execute Traoré’s orders to shoot on the protestors. The same day, after 
several previous coup attempts had remained unfruitful, a group of young officers led by 
Lieutnant Col. Amadou Toumani Touré overthrew President Traoré with the support of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Diallo had tried to resign already in 1990 after telling the ruling party that “the one-party system has 
reached the threshold of incompetence”, but his request had been denied (Faul 1991a). 
! 265!
Anatole Sangaré, Chief Security Director, Oumar Traoré, Assistant Chief of Staff, and 
Oumar Diallo, Chief of Staff, who promised to support the coup by facilitating access to 
Traoré’s office. Touré, claiming that the Army was forced to act to “put an end to the 
bloodthirsty and corrupt regime of Moussa Traoré” (New York Times 1991), promised a 
return to the barracks for the Army111 and the instauration of "social justice and total 
democracy” (Los Angeles Times 1991b). To this end he solicited the collaboration of the 
Committee of Pro-Democracy Associations (Diop 2011), announced the disbanding of the 
Single Party and the organization of free and fair elections within a year.  
 
Resume:  
 
Touré’s successful coup proves that softliners within the regime had marginalised 
the hardliner group sufficiently to take over the reins of power; we therefore believe it 
correct to confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime in Mali’s democratic 
transition. 
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(12) Zambia 
 
Zambian disaffection with the regime of Kenneth Kaunda increased sharply during 
the 1980s when the socio-economic decline, combined with Kaunda’s first attempt to 
implement an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program, led to a rapid rise in the cost 
of living and to serious legitimacy problems for UNIP, the ruling Single Party (Los 
Angeles Time 1986). In 1986, the so-called IMF riots broke out after the government tried 
to cut the maize subsidies, and forced Kaunda to abandon the IMF policies. Three years 
later, inspired by the changes taking place in the former Communist countries, the Trade 
Union leadership of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) resolved to spearhead 
a campaign for greater governmental accountability and the restoration of multi-party 
politics (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). ZCTU-President Frederick Chiluba, who would 
later become Zambia’s first freely elected President, declared in March 1990 that “the 
ZCTU believes that the one-party system is open to abuse” and called on President Kaunda 
to hold a national referendum on democratic pluralism (Times of Zambia 1990a). Anxious 
to take back the initiative, Kaunda agreed a month later to hold such a referendum, but 
stressed that UNIP would be campaigning for a “no”-vote because multiparty politics 
risked fragmenting Zambian society and returning it to the “Stone Age politics” of ethnic 
violence (Reuters 1990a). But the referendum campaign was overtaken by events: In June 
1990, in an attempt to get the economy back on track and rekindling ties with the IMF, the 
government decided to double the prize of “mealie-meal”, a dietary staple. In response, 
three days of riots and looting occurred in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, with security 
forces killing at least 27 people and arresting near one thousand more. Additionally, in 
what seemed to be an ill-prepared coup attempt by a group of disaffected junior Army 
officers, a rebel Army lieutenant broadcasted from the government radio station on June 30 
that there had been a change of regime, prompting jubilant crowds to surge into the street – 
only to be disappointed hours later when Grey Zulu, UNIP’s General secretary, went on air 
to announce that the putsch had failed (Beatwell 1991). 
 
 In the meantime, a National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy 
spearheaded by figures from civil society (Frederick Chiluba) and former UNIP-members 
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that had defected to the opposition112 formed in July 1990 and pushed for the abandoning 
of the referendum and the immediate organization of multiparty elections (Bratton 1992). 
But Kaunda stalled, and soon peaceful mass protests calling for the President’s resignation 
were held in almost every major city. Pushed into a corner, in September 1990 Kaunda 
acceded to the opposition’s demands, appointed a commission to draft a new Constitution 
and legalized independent political parties. By January 1991, the National Interim 
Committee itself registered as a political party under the name of the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and its chairman Frederick Chiluba won Zambia’s first 
free presidential elections only a few months later. 
 
In Zambia, we find that softliners started showing their colors fairly early in the 
transition, and they were present both in the civilian and the military wing of the regime. 
However, the Zambian transition is peculiar among African transitions in that it did not 
culminate in the forceful removal of the dictator, as happened for example in Mali. In fact, 
if one listened to an interview Kaunda gave to the New York Times ten years after his 
abdication, one might be surprised that the former dictator even stayed in power as long as 
he did, given his vocal support for popular self-determination113. But whereas Kaunda 
might have had a more moderate predisposition towards leaving power than many of his 
African peers, he certainly was not a convinced softliner. In fact, Kaunda openly favored 
the retention of the one-party-system and often warned against the pitfalls of multipartyism 
which “would only bring chaos to the nation”. Instead, he appealed to the opposition to 
“come back to the fold”, arguing that “multiparty politics in the Third World, especially 
developing countries in Africa, brought nothing but hatred, as those in opposition failed to 
look at matters but created conflicts which led to death.” (Times of Zambia 1990b). In fact, 
Kaunda believed that opposition was foreign to African tradition, and believed that it 
would be unfair to expect Africa to follow pure, modern democratic principles if these 
principles took centuries to develop in European countries (Olivier 1981). Therefore, even 
after agreeing to restore Zambia’s multiparty system, Kaunda’s government continued to 
arrest political opponents, ban opposition gatherings, fire critics from within the ruling 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 The two members in question were former Finance Minister Arthur Wina and former Foreign Minister 
Vernon Mwaanga. 
113 “There is no shame in leaving power”, Kaunda affirmed, and went even further: “Why should anyone in 
public life impose himself on the people? (...) The decisions must be made by the people” (Swarns 2002). 
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party and order riot police to suppress protestors (Ham 1991), all the while disparaging 
political foes by labeling them “misfits, malcontents and drug traffickers” (Reuters 1990b). 
 
Why did Kaunda then decide to give in to opposition demands, organized elections 
and willingly stepped aside when it became clear that Chiluba had won? On one hand, 
overconfidence in his own and his party’s popularity might explain part of the paradox114. 
On the other hand, however, we believe that softliner pressure, and particularly the fear of 
an eventual loss of support of the Armed Forces played a major part in Kaunda’s decision 
to accept pluralism. In the civil wing (UNIP) of Kaunda’s regime, dissident voices had 
appeared already in the early 1980s. In Parliament, for instance, where all members 
belonged to UNIP, backbenchers acted as the “unofficial opposition” and displayed a high 
degree of independence in opposing those government policies they felt to be against the 
interests of the majority of Zambians (Gertzel 1984). They rejected, for instance, Kaunda’s 
project to transform the legislative mandate of Parliament into a part-time mandate 
(Merino 2013).  
 
Calls for reform increased in number and strength by the end of the 1980s. 
Kaunda’s abandoning of the IMF-guided economic recovery program in 1989 gave new 
legitimacy to voices like ex-foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga, who called for the 
abolition of state monopolies and free competition in all sectors of the economy, and 
former UNIP General Secretary Humphrey Mulemba, who demanded an end to the state of 
emergency, increased protection for Human Rights, an end to political interference in the 
judiciary and civil service, and the establishment of a Constitutional Commission (Times 
of Zambia 1989). These calls were echoed at UNIP’s Fifth National Congress in March 
1990. Former Finance minister Arthur Wina, for example, demanded a re-examination of 
UNIP’s political dominance. Alexander Chikwanda, another former Finance Minister, 
attacked the one-party state and called for the reform of local government and emergency 
powers, civil rights and elections. (Bartlett 2000). By consequent, delegates to the UNIP 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!114 These miscalculations were nourished partly by incorrect assessments of UNIP’s support base. UNIP 
General Secretary Grey Zulu, for example, argued that UNIP would succeed “even in the multiparty state 
because in the 17 years of one-party participatory democracy a lot of achievements had been made and those 
ought to be credited to UNIP” (Times of Zambia 1990d). Therefore, right after voting, Kaunda declared that 
he “expect[ed] to win the game, and the election” (Los Angeles Times 1991). 
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congress passed resolutions in support of political liberalisation measures (Times of 
Zambia 1990c; Mwaanga 1990, 80), but nevertheless voted to retain the one-party system.  
 
After Kaunda had presented a bill to Parliament that would have strengthened the 
existing executive structures, Parliament, by rejecting the bill, once again demonstrated its 
dissident character towards the regime (Times of Zambia 1990e). Only one month later, in 
April 1990, Kaunda announced his intention to hold a referendum on the reintroduction of 
multi-party elections.  A second incident, however, prompted him to abandon his 
referendum plans in favor of a direct move to elections: in August 1990, the National 
Assembly unanimously approved the Haimbe Report (Government of the Republic of 
Zambia 1990), which recommended far-reaching reforms of the structure of the political 
regime to increase popular participation in political affairs and improve the accountability 
of party and government (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). During the first quarter of 1991, 
calls from inside UNIP for Kaunda’s resignation became more and more frequent, as less 
and less members openly supported UNIP. One UNIP member, Enock Kavindele, even 
offered to challenge Kaunda for the party presidency and the party presidential nomination 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Other leading members of the UNIP central committee, 
such as Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga, and Gray Zulu, declined to stand for 
reappointment (Phiri 2001).  
 
Furthermore, a number of high-level UNIP politicians, including at least 20 former 
or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 former UNIP Cabinet Ministers, had defected from the ruling 
party and joined the MMD camp (Bartlett 2000). At an August MMD rally in Lusaka, MPs 
Bennie Mwiinga, Humphrey Mulemba and Sikota Wina, as well as UNIP Central 
Committee member Ludwig Sondashi publicly resigned from the party, and MP Joshua 
Lumina apologized to the crowd for supporting UNIP (National Mirror 1990a). Most 
importantly, three of the plotters of a 1980 coup attempt to overthrow Kaunda (Brig. 
Godfrey Miyanda, Mbita Kabalika and Valentine Musakanya) were among the MMD’s 
main organizers (Perlez 1991). 
 
The dominant position of softliners within UNIP and the number of defectors 
explain in part why party hardliners were unable to gather sufficient support to derail the 
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transition process115. The other part of the explanation lies within the softliner faction in 
the military, which made it clear that, while unwilling - for the moment - to support a coup, 
they looked favorably upon the claims of the protesters. By the start of 1991, UNIP’s and 
Kaunda’s position looked increasingly shaky, and the loyalty of the Armed Forces was in 
question (IISS 1990). Kaunda seemed to be aware of this fact, since after announcing his 
decision to hold elections, he implored the Defence Forces to remain loyal to the 
“government of the day”, affirming that “as UNIP is in power, your loyalty to the UNIP 
government should remain unquestionable” (Times of Zambia 1990b). His fears were not 
without foundation, as there had been several unsuccessful coup attempts in the past 
decade116, the most recent of which occurred in June 1990117. 
 
Although the coups were foiled by government troops, one of their senior 
commanders, Lt. General Hannania Lungu revealed that it was not so much loyalty to 
Kaunda as to the Constitution that motivated the intervention: “We were ready to bomb the 
Mass Media Complex if it meant to defend the state (...) it does not matter who is in power 
but people should always believe in democracy” (Chifuwe 2003). His words are further 
corroborated if one considers that loyalist forces in the aftermath of the putsch attempt 
hesitated several hours before coming to the President’s rescue (Borger 1990), and 
truckloads of military policemen were seen giving thumbs-up signs as an indication of 
support for the protesters that had come to cheer Kaunda’s fall (Perlez 1990). Therefore, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!115 For instance, at an UNIP party rally in November 1990, the Secretary of State for Defence and Security 
unsuccessfully tried to convince the crowd that they should identify multiparty advocates in their own 
neighborhoods: “We have to demarcate our sections, branches and wards and know how many of the houses 
are not UNIP. Mark the enemies by their language and notify the government, which will find means of 
converting them to UNIP. If that fails, the government will find other means of making it practically 
impossible for them to live in Lusaka” (National Mirror 1990b) Party hardliners also verbally attacked the 
international election observers, accusing them of being “a big imperialist plot” intended to install “a puppet 
MMD government” in Zambia (Bjornlund et al. 1992, 425), but Kaunda moved quickly to restrain these 
voices and he publicly called on Zambians to support the observation mission.  116 Zambia’s first coup attempt in 1980, initiated mostly by businessmen, was preempted days before its 
implementation by the arrest of the coup plotters and their armed supporters on a farm in Chilanga (Times of 
Zambia 1980). In 1988, a second coup attempt led by former Vice President Lt. Gen Christon Tembo and 
fifteen other high-ranking dissidents was also foiled and the plotters imprisoned. They were released in the 
course of the transition (Ham 1990) 117 During this coup, Lt. Mwamba Luchembe, together with a handful of fellow officers, took control of the 
national radio for several hours, claiming that the Army had taken over the government (Legum 1996, 676). 
Speaking about the attempted putsch, Luchembe claimed that he took action because of the government’s 
poor performance and the shortage in basic necessities (Times of Zambia 2013). Although Kaunda was quick 
in dismissing the plotters as “confused persons” (Los Angeles Times 1990), it was clear that the plotters had 
the backing of senior officers such as Army commander Lt-Gen Gary Kalenge, and the Inspector General of 
the Police, Josiah Konayuma, both of which lost their posts after the coup was foiled (Mills 1992). 
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the very real fear of a successful coup attempt sooner or later might have been a key factor 
in Kaunda’s change of position towards democratization. 
 
Resume:  
 
Softliner pressure, together with fear of losing the support of a progressively 
oriented military, led hardliner Kaunda to accept opposition demands and to hold 
democratic elections. We therefore confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian 
regime.  
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(13) Malawi 
 
Malawi’s transition to democracy began in the early 1990s when “lifetime 
president” Hastings Kamuzu Banda encountered increasing domestic and international 
criticism to his rule (CIIR 1993; Mchombo 1998; Newell 1995; Clapham 1996, 202; 
Decalo 1998, 96). In the midst of a deepening economic crisis, domestic opponents led by 
Trade Union leader Chakufwa Chihana and exiled political dissidents were becoming more 
vocal in their denunciation of Banda’s Human Rights abuses, the IMF-imposed structural 
adjustment program and Banda’s authoritarian leadership style (Phiri 2011). The spark 
ignited a fire in March 1992 when Malawi’s Roman Catholic Church issued a pastoral 
letter brandishing the country’s corruption and mismanagement, and calling for political 
reform and the reestablishment of multiparty politics (Kirby 1994). Only days later, 
protests against Banda’s regime broke out in Zomba, Blantyre and other cities and turned 
into nationwide industrial riots in which at least 38 people were killed by police and 
security forces (Somerville 1992, 11). In response to the unrest Banda tightened repression, 
boasting that dissidents would be “meat for crocodiles” (Africa Research Bulletin 1992, 
10509). But as plans to kill the Bishops who issued the letter leaked to the media (Patel 
2006, 16), Western nations suspended their aid to Malawi in order to force the regime to 
comply with international humanitarian law; a move that some cite as having important 
repercussions for the democratisation process in the aid-dependent African nation 
(Ionvbere 1997). The June 1992 legislative elections under the Single Party represented 
another blow for the Banda regime. Not only did these elections record the lowest voter 
turnout in the country’s political history, they also witnessed the defeat of almost half the 
Parliamentarians, including those nominated and endorsed by Banda. In July, the regime’s 
decision to imprison Chihana led to further public demonstrations. Reeling from the unrest, 
in autumn 1992 the regime offered a number of concessions to civil society, including the 
establishment of a “Presidential Committee on Dialogue” and the creation of a Public 
Affairs Committee with the participation of Malawi’s churches and leading opposition 
movements (Ihonvbere 1997). The first meeting between proponents and opponents of 
democracy took place on October 19, and on the eve of this meeting Banda announced his 
plans to hold a referendum to assess the popular desire in the country for constitutional 
reform (Kirby 1994). It was clear from his press statement that the exercise was not 
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intended to be a neutral assessment of voters' preferences, but would provide Malawians 
with an opportunity to show support for “their Kamuzu” (Ng'ong'ola 1996). However, in 
June 1993, 63 percent of the citizenry voted in favor of multi-party democracy, prompting 
Banda to reluctantly accept the results and to announce General Elections to be held within 
a year. Leading up to these elections, continued violence by Banda’s private security 
forces, the “Young Pioneers” (MYP), prompted many to fear a reversal of the transition 
process if Banda should lose. Unexpectedly, however, a rebellion of enlisted personnel and 
junior officers of the regular Malawian Army proved crucial: in a military mission called 
“Operation Bwezani” they forced the disbanding of the MYP and therefore ensured equal 
competition for all political contenders (Phiri 2011). As a result, in May 1994, Banda was 
compelled to relinquish the presidency to Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF).  
 
In Malawi’s democratic transition we can identify regime softliners both within the 
civil and the military wing of the governing circle. However, it was only in December 
1993, when the majority of Banda’s coercive apparatus stopped supporting the regime, that 
a real crisis of the authoritarian regime unfolded. Prior to these events, the hardliner faction 
around Kamuzu Banda remained dominant and successfully stifled internal dissent through 
repression. Banda himself never made his hostility towards opposition a secret (Nsanja 
2006)118. Even dissidents operating outside Malawi were in constant danger of being 
killed, as the deaths of exiled Malawian organizer Attati Mpakati in Zimbabwe (1983) and 
journalist Mkwapatira Mhango in Zambia (1989) show (Posner 1995). When in 1983 Dick 
Matenje, then-Secretary General of the Single Party, introduced a motion in Parliament 
that would have resulted in a modest liberalization of the regime, his bullet-riddled body 
was found together with those of two other Ministers, Aaron Gadama, and Twaibu 
Sangala, in an overturned car near the Mozambique border (Van Donge 1998). Critics say 
the support of those Ministers for multiparty politics angered John Tembo, uncle of 
Banda’s longtime companion Cecilia Kadzamira and head of the feared MYP, who 
planned to succeed the aging Banda but who lacked the support of the civil servants and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Banda himself said: “There is no opposition in heaven. God himself does not want opposition – that is 
why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu have opposition?” (Short 1974, 40). In order to maintain 
his dominance he was willing to go to great lengths: As early as 1966 he announced: “If to maintain political 
stability and efficient administration I have to detain 10.000, 100.000, I will do it (...)” (Phiri and Ross 1998, 
49). “The Malawian system, the Malawian style is that Kamuzu says it’s that and then it’s finished. Whether 
anyone likes it or not, that is how it’s going to be here (...)” (Virmani 1992, 78).  
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the Armed Forces (Robinson 2009). When it became clear that Tembo was quickly 
consolidating his power, many former Banda loyalists broke away from the ruling MCP, 
for example Dr. Bakili Muluzi who formed the UDF.  It was also a wake-up call for many 
inside and outside the regime circle that a change in the political system was becoming an 
imminent necessity (Phiri 2011). 
 
Why then did Banda accept to hold a referendum on his rule and set up elections? 
In fact, we think that even though government hardliners accepted a certain liberalization 
process, they did so begrudgingly and with the idea that, should their electoral appeal 
prove insufficient to keep office, their repressive capacity certainly would (Brown 2004). 
This turned out to be a major miscalculation given the alienation of the Malawi Armed 
Forces, a vital part of Banda’s support base. Anger about Banda’s leadership style had 
been growing within the lower and middle ranks of the military since the 1960s, when 
Banda started to concentrate resources in the hands of a paramilitary security force, the 
Young Pioneers. With acquiescence of the senior military leadership, Banda was diverting 
resources from the regular Armed Forces towards the MYP119 and humiliated them in the 
face of their MYP counterparts by entrusting the task of Presidential Guard to the MYP 
instead of the military (Phiri 2011)120. Furthermore, the rise of John Tembo and his 
involvement in the RENAMO uprising in neighboring Mozambique seriously alienated 
both senior and junior leadership of the Malawi Army (Rupiya 2005). Deployed into 
Mozambique in order to help the government in place fight a guerrilla rebellion, Malawi 
soldiers were furious when they realized that MYP was covertly supporting RENAMO 
rebels, and that they were losing men in a war which was being fuelled by their own 
country (Phiri 2000) 
 
As a consequence, the Armed Forces occupied an unusually reformist role in the 
transition to democracy (Forster 2000). When students protested in March 1992, junior 
Army officers stationed nearby offered them encouragement and protected them from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 The lower and middle rank officers of the Malawian Army knew that the arming of the Young Pioneers 
went through the Army itself; their suspicion was confirmed when they found Cobbe Barracks of the Malawi 
Army at bases of the Young Pioneers during the Bwezani raids (The Monitor 1993b). This discovery 
strengthened the sense of betrayal these officers felt towards the senior military leadership and Banda 
himself.  
120 Another embarrassment to the military was the fact that by 1985, the MYP had a commander that was 
more senior in rank than the commander of the regular Armed Forces.!
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police (Amnesty International 1992, 11). A month later, senior and middle-ranking officers 
met with Banda and made clear that they would not be used for MCP partisan purposes or 
for repressing Malawians calling for multipartyism (Brown 2004). Some even claim that 
the only reason for why Banda accepted the referendum results was because of pressure 
from the Army (Meinhardt and Patel 2003).  
 
Finally, the turning point in the Malawi Army’s relationship to politics came in 
December 1993, when a minor incident between soldiers and MYP members sparked 
“Operation Bwezani”121, the violent disarming of the Young Pioneers. What started out as 
a soldiers’ rebellion (Van Donge 2002) was also a catalyst for the transition to democracy, 
as the elimination of the MYP destroyed Banda’s last meaningful influence on the security 
machinery and made it impossible for the regime to forcefully interrupt the 
democratisation process (Meinhardt and Patel 2003). Whereas Operation Bwezani was 
clearly motivated at least partly by inner-military tensions122, there was also a decidedly 
political aspect about the operation, which was the Army’s general support for the 
democratic transition. For instance, during the operation soldiers took Fred Nseula, the 
head of the Transitional Committee NCC, on a tour to see the weapons they had recovered. 
This gesture signalled that they recognized the alternative civilian leadership to Banda, 
even though the NCC at that time had no executive or legislative power (Chirambo 2004). 
Afterwards, when the Army returned to the barracks, officers made it clear that they did so 
out of respect for the opposition-dominated NCC rather than because they continued to 
recognize the authority of Banda’s Single Party (Posner 1995). By the same token, the 
return to the barracks was interpreted by many as a tacit approval of the process of political 
change, since the Malawi Army could have easily taken over the government (Chirwa 
1994). For an Army that traditionally maintained a “detached loyalty” to the regime, 
Operation Bwezani was a major turning point (Phiri 2000) and one that would decide the 
crisis of the authoritarian regime in favor of softliners.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Bwezani means “give back”, and is a reference to the fact that the Malawi Army was retrieving military 
material that the MYP was not willing to give up (Chirambo 2004). 
122 Operation Bwezani had, in fact, produced a coup within the Army’s own ranks, as lower and middle-rank 
officers demanded the resignation of senior officers perceived to be corrupt and “compromised by politics” 
(The Monitor 1993a).!!
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Resume:  
 
The military’s support for the democratic transition and their refusal to exerce their 
repressive capacity on Banda’s behalf sealed the fate of Malawi’s dictatorship.  We thus 
confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.  
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(14) Benin 
 
Like many other African transitions, Benin’s quest for democracy started with an 
economic downturn in the mid-1980s when President Kerekou’s position became 
increasingly precarious both among supporters of his regime and the opposition (Banégas 
1995a; Gisselquist 2008).123 When state resources dried up further, Benin adopted an IMF-
prescribed structural adjustment program, but the measures were too little too late:  in 
1988, Benin’s three state-owned banks collapsed, and in 1989, the government was unable 
to pay the salaries of its civil servants, including most of its soldiers (Banégas 2003, 77). 
After several months of unpaid salaries, students and public sector workers, together with 
exiled opposition politicians, launched a first wave of strikes that was violently repressed 
by the regime’s security forces124 (Noudjenoume 1999, 126). A few months later, in April 
1989, a second wave of strikes shook the country, and by December 1989, 40.000 
Beninese demonstrated in the streets of Cotonou against Kerekou’s regime (Heilbrunn 
1993, 286). In response to this upheaval, Kerekou announced that steps would be taken to 
“introduce a healthy political climate” in the country (Reuters 1989b) and the PRPB, 
Benin’s Single Party, embarked on a cautious liberalization program. In August 1989, 
several hundred political prisoners were granted amnesty, and in December 1989, Kerekou 
announced the abandonment of Benin’s Marxist-Leninist state doctrine (Aube Nouvelle 
2010). Following the counsel of his advisors, he also announced that a National 
Conference known as the “Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives” would be held in 
which representatives of all sectors of Benin’s society could propose reform plans to the 
government (Morency-Laflamme 2015). All but one political party, the Parti Communiste 
du Dahomey, agreed to take part in the conference (Banégas 2003, 147) which took place 
from February 19 - 28 in Cotonou (ONEPI 1990). However, only a few days after the start 
of negotiations opposition politicians gained the upper hand and voted the conference 
sovereign, an act which de facto destituted President Kerekou. The motion passed with 372 
votes for to 17 against with 32 abstentions; numbers that demonstrate that at least some 
government representatives supported the declaration (Seely 2001). Initially infuriated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!123 As early as 1985, students began launching small-scale strikes against the government’s policies. 
Together with public sector workers they also organized clandestine unions that paralleled state-sponsored 
official unions (Nwajiaku 1994, 435). 124 Kerekou had ordered the Armed Forces to stop the protesters by all means, authorizing the use of force if 
necessary (Reuters 1989a). 
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about this “civilian coup d’État” (Faul 1990)125, Kerekou later accepted the conference’s 
sovereignty and its new transitional government headed by Prime Minister Nicephore 
Soglo. A new Constitution was elaborated and the first multiparty legislative elections 
under the new Constitution were held on February 17, 1991. In the following presidential 
elections former President Kerekou participated, but lost to Soglo with 32.5 per cent to 
67.5 per cent (Gisselquist 2008). 
 
Benin’s democratic transition featured both a split within the Beninese authoritarian 
regime between pro- and antireform forces and a softliner majority, which played an 
important part in Kerekou’s decision not to contest the results of the National Conference. 
We can therefore confirm that Benin underwent a crisis of the authoritarian regime. As 
Seely suggests, the months leading up to Benin’s National Conference were dominated by 
a consensus, even on the part of some members of Kerekou’s regime, that reform was 
necessary (Adamon 1995). Kerekou was head of an effectively bankrupt state, his 
networks of patrimonial base had collapsed, and he was isolated from Benin’s Single 
Party, the PRPB (Seely 2005). Kerekou’s own position remains ambiguous: whereas some 
praise him as the “father of the winds of peace and democracy in Benin and Africa” 
(Dembele 2013), we believe it more accurate to classify him as a moderate whose anxiety 
for his personal survival superseded his desire for the survival of his regime (Allen 1992).  
 
Firstly, while Kerekou was not opposed to a certain degree of reforms, he did not 
go out of his way to enact them. In fact, the Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives was 
already the third forum of this genre organised during Kerekou’s reign, but the decisions 
taken by the two first ones were never applied (Aube Nouvelle 2010). Moreover, when 
Kerekou addressed the conference on its opening day, the reforms he hoped the conference 
would achieve were rather minimal (Eckert 2002). Paradoxically, he recognized that 
“democratic renewal [in Benin was] an inescapable necessity of our time" (PBS 2001), but 
he nonetheless cried when the National Conference delegates told him Benin’s citizens no 
longer wanted him as President (Faul 1991) and refused to resign, repeatedly shouting 
“Don’t tell me to quit (...) Make your programme, write a new Constitution, name a Prime 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!125 According to a transcript of the conference, Kerekou yelled: “You tell us that there is no longer a 
government, that the state no longer exists. But it is intolerable to believe that the current government is 
resigning, or that it will resign at the end of your labors.” (PBS 2001) 
! 286!
Minister, but don’t tell me to resign” (Seely 2005). Later, he threatened to intervene in the 
electoral process if there were irregularities or violence accompanying the polls (Faul 
1991), a fear that was fueled by the theft of ammunition and grenades from an Army base 
where pamphlets signed by an unidentified "death squadron" threatened a coup to unseat 
the interim government (Deseret News 1991). Pascal Gandaho, a conference delegate, 
captured the ambiguous role of Kerekou in the democratization process well, noting that 
“it seemed like [Kerekou] was not at all opposed to the conference but at the same time he 
acted as if the conference delegates were his guests” (PBS 2001). In fact, many 
participants to the conference were convinced Kerekou brought two versions of his closing 
address on 28 February 1990, and chose the one that accepted the conference decisions at 
the last minute (Seely 2005, 364). 
 
We believe that Kerekou felt compelled to accept the democratic transition by the 
might of reformist divisions both in the civilian and the military wing of his regime. The 
first signs of internal splits within the regime bureaucracy became apparent in 1985, when 
the Minister of Education, Michel Alladayé, didn’t overtly condemn the election of the 
independent student union BEN and was subsequently dismissed from his functions 
(Banégas 1995a). At the same time, technocrats within the various government ministries 
promoted economic and political liberalization (Adjaho 1992, 15). For instance, in March 
1989, the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Ali Houdou, used a pseudonym to publish 
an article in the journal “Ehuzu” in which he blamed the state bankruptcy on a system 
which “doesn’t want to see, hear or understand anything” and called for political reforms 
(Banégas 1995b). These developments created an explosive situation, as government 
hardliners, the “Ligueurs”, were still fairly powerful and tried to block any attempt at 
change. At times they even entered in direct conflict with Kerekou himself (Banégas 2003, 
88-89; Banégas 1995b; Morency-Laflamme 2012). These elements were outnumbered in 
1989 when several pro-reform members of the ANR were appointed to government posts. 
Men like Robert Dossou, René Ahouanssou and M. Salifou made it clear that their 
participation in the regime was conditional on Kerekou’s willingness to enact reforms, and 
they later played a pivotal role in the abandon of Benin’s Leninist-Marxist doctrine and the 
organization of the National Conference (Morency-Laflamme 2014; Alidjinou 1992).   
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The division in the Armed Forces, Kerekou’s main power base, would ultimately 
prove decisive. Throughout the 1980s, discontent with government policies steadily grew 
within the officer corps as the gap widened between the well-equipped Presidential Guard 
and the under-funded, proletarized Army corps (Banégas 1995b). As Morency-Laflamme 
explains, during this period more and more officers publicly expressed their desire to 
“return to the barracks” and their openness to some kind of political reform, whereas the 
Presidential Guard remained for the most part loyal to the PRPB government (Morency-
Laflamme 2014). By 1989, the Beninese Army was, according to Levitsky and Way, “the 
least-cohesive Army in Francophone Africa” (2010, 292) and only about 10% of the 
Armed Forces remained loyal to Kérékou (Noudjenoume 1999, 166). Six failed coup 
attempts between March and October 1988 provide ample evidence of this progressive 
erosion of support for Kerekou’s regime (Banégas 1995b). The National Conference 
marked the turning point in the struggle between pro- and anti-reform groups within the 
leadership of the Armed Forces. In fact, hardliners led by Colonel Maurice Kouandaté 
threatened to use force to end the conference if delegates voted to destitute Kerekou, and 
even went as far as positioning tanks around the conference building (Morency-Laflamme 
2011)126. However, this threat remained empty, as the majority of the Army made it clear 
that it was opposed to such intervention. The next morning, Colonel Vincent Guezodje, the 
official representative of the Armed Forces, declared in front of the National Conference 
that the Army supported the reform process and would not interfere with it (ONEPI 1990). 
Thus, Kerekou was left with little option but to accept the results of the conference, and the 
ensuing democratic transition. 
 
Resume:  
 
A reformist majority both in the civilian and the military wing of the regime, and 
thus a crisis of the authoritarian regime, led President Kerekou to accept the results of the 
National Conference and Benin’s democratization.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!126 Allies of Kouandaté supported his move, notably Colonel Martin Azonhiho, Minister of Security, who 
was also vigorously opposed to giving sovereignty to the conference. According to a transcript, he said: “We 
are in Africa, under the “Tree of Talking.” And when you are under that tree, there is a chief. You are invited 
to come and eat. You come in, you are a guest, and you take the pot (...) We had good reason to say no to 
sovereignty” (PBS 2001). 
! 288!
References: 
 
Adamon, Afize. 1995. Le rénouveau démocratique au Benin: La Conférence Nationale des 
 Forces Vives et la période de transition. Paris: l’Harmattan. 
 
Adjaho, Richard. 1992. La faillite du contrôle des finances publiques au Bénin (1960-
 1990).  Cotonou: les éditions du Flamboyant. 
 
Alidjinou, Dansou. 1992. Le discours politique béninois (1972-1990). Doctoral Thesis. 
 Université Montpellier I. 
 
Allen, Chris. 1992. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State : Democratic Renewal in Benin”. 
 Review of African Political Economy 54: 42 – 58. 
 
Aube Nouvelle. 2010. “19 février 1990 - 19 février 2010 : Il y a 20 ans, un nouveau départ 
 au Bénin“. February 19th. Available at: http://beningate.net.over-blog.com/article-
 19-fevrier-1990---19-fevrier-2010-il-y-a-20-ans-un-nouveau-depart-au-benin-
 45297361.html. Accessed March 19th, 2014. 
 
Banégas, Richard. 1995a. "Mobilisation sociale et opposition sous Kérékou". Politique 
 Africaine 59: 25 – 42. 
 
Banégas, Richard. 1995b. "Action collective et transition politique en Afrique. La 
 conférence nationale du Bénin". Cultures & Conflits 17: 2 - 22. 
 
Banégas, Richard. 2003. La démocratie à pas de caméléon : Transition et imaginaries 
 politiques au Bénin. Paris : Karthala. 
 
Dembele, Francoise. 2013. ”Burkina Faso: Acteurs de la conference nationale du Benin - 
 Hommage rendu à un démocrate nommé Mathieu Kérékou". AllAfrica.com, April 
 29th. Available at: http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304300021.html. Accessed 
 March  19th, 2014. 
 
Deseret News. 1991. "Fears of Army Intervention Won’t Delay Benin Elections”. March 
 10th. Available at: http://www.deseretnews.com/article/150863/FEARS-OF-
 ARMY-INTERVENTION-WONT-DELAY-BENIN-ELECTIONS.html. Accessed 
 March 19th, 2014.  
 
Eckert, Amy. 2002. "Book Review: Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Determinants of 
 Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo”. Millenium - 
 Journal of International Studies 31: 433 - 434. 
 
! 289!
Faul, Michelle. 1990. “Demands for Democracy Meet Tear Gas, Tears”. AP News Archive, 
 February 28th. Available at: http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/Demands-for-
 Democracy-Meet-Tear-Gas-Tears/id-e45bee80bb403da918ae02455ad72abd. 
 Accessed March 19th, 2014. 
 
Faul, Michelle. 1991. “Beleaguered President Threatens to Intervene in Elections”. AP 
 News Archive, March 7th. Available at: 
 http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Beleaguered- President-Threatens-to-
 Intervene-in-Elections/id-4ba39de4db0f844c399c88d17015d342. Accessed March 
 19th, 2014. 
 
Gisselquist, Rachel M. 2008. "Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin". 
 Democratization 15(4): 789 - 814. 
 
Heilbrunn, John R. 1993. “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo.” 
 The Journal of Modern African Studies 31(2): 277 - 299. 
 
Levitsky, Steven and Lucas Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes 
 after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2011. L’influence des forces armées sur les processus de 
 démocratisation en Afrique Subsaharienne: Les cas du Bénin et du Togo. 9th 
 Annual Conference of CEPSI : "La sécurité dans tous ces états: Repenser sécurité, 
 conflits et développement dix ans après le 11 septembre". Montréal. 
 
Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2012. Authoritarian Crises and Democratic Transitions in 
 Sub-Saharan Africa. Annual Conference of the Société Québécoise de Science 
 Politique. Ottawa: SQSP. 
 
Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2015. “A Missing Link? Elite Factionalism and 
 Democratization in Africa”, Canadian Journal of African Studies 49(3): 459 - 477. 
 
Noudjenoume, Philippe. 1999. La Démocratie au Bénin, 1988-1993: Bilans et 
 Perspectives. Paris : Editions L'Harmattan. 
 
Nwajiaku, Kathryn. 1994. “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited.” The 
 Journal of Modern African Studies 32(3): 429 - 447. 
 
Office National d’Edition, de Presse, de Publicite´ et d’Imprimerie (ONEPI). 1990. 
 République du Bénin : Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives de la Nation du 19 
 au 28 février. Documents Fondamentaux. Cotonou: ONEPI. 
 
! 290!
PBS. 2001. “Hopes on the Horizon: Africa in the 1990s”. Benin: Transcript, February 
 16th. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/hopes/benin/transcript.html. Accessed 
 March 19th, 2014. 
 
Reuters. 1989a. “Upheaval in the East; Benin, Too, Gives Up Marxism for Reforms”. New 
 York Times, December 9th. Available at: 
 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/09/world/upheaval-in-the-east-benin-too-gives-
 up-marxism-for-reforms.html. Accessed March 19th, 2014. 
 
Reuters. 1989b. “Anti-Government Protesters Confront Benin's Riot Police”. New York 
 Times,  December 14th. Available at: 
 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/14/world/anti-government-protesters-confront-
 benin-s-riot-police.html. Accessed March 19th, 2014. 
 
Seely, Jennifer C. 2001. Transitions to Democracy in Comparative Perspective: The 
 National Conferences in Benin and Togo. Doctoral Thesis. Washington University. 
 
Seely, Jennifer C. 2005. “The legacies of transition governments: post-transition dynamics 
 in Benin and Togo”. Democratization 12(3): 357 - 377. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 291!
(15) Cameroon 
 
The drive toward multiparty rule in Cameroon began in 1989 when Le Messager, 
one of Cameroon’s leading journals, published an article written by Pius Njawe and JB 
Sipa that denounced Paul Biya’s political monolithism. Biya, originally heralded as a 
liberal reformer, had taken over power from his autocratic predecessor Ahidjo in 1982 and 
had since ruled Cameroon without any significant opposition (Courade and Sindjoun 
1996). Only a few months later, prominent attorney Yondo Black created the 
“Coordination nationale pour la démocratie et le multipartisme”, a movement requesting 
greater openness and political participation. In consequence, in February 1990, Black and 
some of his collaborators were arrested and charged with attempted subversion and 
destabilization of the government (Kingue 2012). Despite the government crackdown on 
those requesting multipartism, John Fru Ndi, a librarian from English-speaking North West 
Province, decided to launch his own political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in 
May 1990. But security forces broke up the new party’s first official rally in the town of 
Bamenda and killed six people in what would later be known as the “Bamenda shooting” 
(Gros 1995). After this incident, large-scale demonstrations broke out with people carrying 
banners wishing “long life to his Excellence Paul Biya” and praising his “efforts to install 
multipartism” (Engueleguele 2013). Only at that point President Biya accepted to abandon 
the political monopoly held by his government party, the “Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Movement" (CPDM). By December 1990, a series of laws aimed at legalizing political 
parties and establishing freedom of assembly were enacted (King 2012). Subsequent to 
these small steps towards liberalization, the opposition in Cameroon demanded that the 
government convene a sovereign National Conference, similar to the conferences that had 
been held in other African countries (for example Benin). This National Conference was 
supposed to devise rules and procedures for holding the upcoming local and national 
elections and put Cameroon on the road to genuine democratic governance. However, the 
Biya government refused, arguing that the Constitution “had always provided for 
multipartism” and therefore a National Conference wouldn’t have any judicial basis to 
stand on (Engueleguele 2013). The period that followed was characterized by a wave of 
general strikes dubbed “Opération Villes Mortes” (Operation Ghost towns) designed to 
force the government into organizing a National Conference, and violent repression killing 
at least 300 people. However, the Biya government did not budge and after several months 
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of withstanding the pressure of the Villes Mortes campaign, the opposition came to the 
bargaining table. The trilateral talks, a government-initiated series of meetings between 
representatives of the government, opposition and civil society, were held in March 1992 
to discuss a limited number of issues, such as access to the media for political parties and 
changes to the electoral code (Emmanuel 2012). But even though the talks cumulated in 
the organization of elections, no real progress on concrete politico-constitutional reform 
was achieved (Social Democratic Front 1991). The October 1992 presidential elections 
ended with Paul Biya winning by a small margin (39,9% of voices, compared to 35,9% for 
J. Fru Ndi (SDF)) (King 2012). The National Democratic Institute, an observer institution, 
condemned the poll as fraudulent and noted that “the Cameroonian government (...) took 
unusually extreme and illegitimate actions to ensure the President’s victory” (NDI 1993). 
In response to post-election riots in certain parts of the country, the Biya government 
proclaimed the state of emergency and jailed many opposition leaders (for example his 
closest rival, J. Fru Ndi). Since then, the purported swing to a democratic governance 
structure has only gone as far as “the political ritual of holding elections, all of which have 
been marred by gross irregularities and blatant disregard of the fundamental principles of 
democratic electioneering” (Nyamnjoh 2002).    
 
When taking a closer look at the events in Cameroon between 1990 and 1992, it 
becomes clear that softliners, if existent at all, were never in a dominant position within the 
Biya regime. Therefore, there was never a crisis of the authoritarian regime as defined in 
our thesis. Firstly, the reform plans put forth by the government were neither serious, nor 
committed. Insisting on Cameroon’s special position amongst other (democratizing) 
African nations (“le Cameroun, c’est le Cameroun”, Ebolo 1996) Paul Biya made it clear 
that he considered pluralism an imposition and advocated for what he called “an appeased 
democracy” (“la démocratie apaisée”, Mugabe 2010). In 1990, for example, the 
government claimed to liberalize by enacting new legislation regarding the state of 
emergency, the press, associations and political parties. In reality, however, these new laws 
retained much of their repressive nature. The new press law, for instance, codified for the 
first time the practice of censorship and the new law on associations permitted the 
government to ban any organization deemed threatening to public or state security (Human 
Rights Watch 1992). Since their inception, the Biya administration did not hesitate to make 
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use of these new laws: it banned groups as diverse as Human Rights Watch, Cap Liberté, 
and the National Association of Cameroonian Athletes.  
 
The government’s stance on reform is also exemplified in its refusal to convene a 
National Conference (“I have said it, and I repeat it, the National Conference has no 
purpose for Cameroon”, Bigombe and Enthong 1996; Krieger 1994) and its subsequent 
organisation of the Trilateral talks, a platform that fell far short in scope from similar 
conferences in other countries. Not only did President Biya not participate personally (he 
sent his Prime Minister instead), but he restricted the main agenda to only include the 
elaboration of a new electoral code and constitutional reform. Most importantly, the 1992 
elections went ahead under the still-unchanged electoral laws (Gros 1995). These rules 
created an uneven “level playing field” for the incumbent and his challengers: for example, 
the campaign period was far shorter than what was constitutionally required (Bouopda 
2007), the opposition parties could not organize and many voters were turned away on 
election day because they didn’t have identification papers. 
 
Secondly, there were few signs for discontent inside the regime itself. Only during 
the last phase of the transition, the presidential election, some dissident voices from the 
President’s own ruling party, the CPDM, could be heard. Indeed, some high-profile CPDM 
figures (including a former Secretary General of the party and a former governor of East 
Province) resigned in protest over the conduct of Paul Biya’s election campaign, accusing 
the Minister of Territorial Administration charged with the organization of the elections 
“of pressuring governors to do everything in their power to secure at least 60 percent of the 
vote for President Biya” (Gros 1995, 121).  
 
But whatever the restiveness within party ranks, there is little doubt that the 
coercive apparatus remained unwaveringly behind the government during the period from 
May 1990 to December 1992. In fact, it is particularly striking to compare military support 
for Paul Biya from the 1990 transition period to recent events in which factions of the 
military publicly requested Biya to step down (“À bas la tyrannie de Paul Biya, du RDPC 
et des Généraux des forces armées”, African Independent 2011). In 1990, Paul Biya 
surrounded himself with a group of loyal Generals sharing his ethnic and regional 
background who had protected him from an attempted coup d’Etat six years earlier 
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(Koaci.com 2011). Colonel Etoundi Nsoé Raymond, General Pierre Semengue and others 
not only benefitted from enormous financial advantages (Mbog 2012) but they also were 
fervent opponents of what they called “a civilian coup d’État” – the demand of opposition 
groups for a National Conference. In fact, General Pierre Semengue later admitted that, 
had the National Conference indeed taken place, the military would have stepped in and 
overthrown the government127 . These revelations explain why Cameroon’s military 
continued repression indiscriminately before, during and after Cameroon’s attempted 
democratic transition. In fact, Cameroon's soldiers and policemen showed themselves 
ready, willing, and able to make warrantless arrests, detain prisoners indefinitely, publicly 
flog at least one opposition leader, seize dissident newspapers, intimidate opposition voters 
and kill demonstrators (Berlin 2011; Afrique Contemporaine 1993, 72; Africa Research 
Bulletin 1992, 744).  
 
Resume:  
 
There was never a significant split between Paul Biya and his ruling coalition, 
neither within the ruling party nor between Biya and his coercive apparatus. Therefore, we 
opine that Cameroon’s transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian 
regime. 
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(16) Nigeria 1 
 
Nigeria’s bid for multipartyism began in 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida 
announced a step-by-step political transition program. Initially welcomed as reformer, 
Babangida relaxed many of his predecessor’s restrictions on political life and the media, 
initiated an economic recovery program similar to the IMF’s SAP (Los Angeles Times 
1989) and established the Political Bureau, composed mostly of academics, to advise him 
on the restructuring of the country’s political system (Lewis 1999). At first Babangida 
established October 1, 1986 as the target date when he and the Armed Forces Ruling 
Council (AFRC), the highest decision-making body in Nigeria, would hand over power to 
a civilian government. Over time, however, the regime moved away from its commitment 
to change, pushing back the final handover date to July 1987, then to June 1990, and 
finally to October 1992. At first Babangida justified this stalling by referring to a detailed 
plan which drew upon the Political Bureau report and included several phases, such as the 
drafting of a new constitution, a focused campaign of mass mobilization and political 
sensitization (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1989), conducting a National census (Musa 
1990) and staggered local, state, and federal elections (Kraxberger 2004). Babangida made 
it clear that before handing over power to a civilian government he wanted to address 
controversial issues that, according to him, caused Nigeria’s previous experiences with 
democracy to fail128. To many observers, however, Babangida’s determination to influence 
every crucial stage in the implementation of the transition program suggested rather that 
the President might have a “hidden agenda” of perpetuating himself in office (Olugbenga 
1992, 1916). In 1989, the regime lifted the ban on political parties, but at the same time 
confined the scope of political debate, participation and competition. Refusing to accredit 
an array of independent political associations, the Babangida government instead 
established two officially-mandated parties, the centre-right National Republican 
Convention (NRC) and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) which were to 
provide the framework for competitive elections over the next three and a half years. After 
a foiled coup attempt in 1990 and much electoral wrangling during the presidential 
primaries in August and September 1992, Babangida once more moved the transition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!128 In the words of Babangida himself: “What we need is not a handover programme of the 1979 experience 
but a broadly spaced transition in which democratic government can proceed with political learning, 
institutional adjustment and a re-orientation of political culture, at sequential levels of governance beginning 
with local government and ending at the Federal level” (Nwokedi 1994, 191). 
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goalposts to August 27, 1993 (Lewis 1994). By this time opposition to the regime had 
coalesced into a call for a sovereign National Conference championed by the Campaign for 
Democracy (CD), an umbrella organization of about fourty different civil society groups. 
In January 1993 Babangida addressed these calls by appointing a civilian “Transitional 
Council” to act as a shadow administration until the final handover (Abubakar 1994). On 
June 12, 1993 Nigeria conducted what was widely considered the freest and fairest 
presidential elections in the country’s history, pinning two candidates against each other 
that both claimed personal friendship with Babangida: Moshood Abiola (SDP) and Bashir 
Tofa (NRC) (Adedoyin 1993). But when it became clear that Abiola who was opposed by 
a wide faction of the military was likely to win129, Babangida summarily voided the 
elections, citing legal and administrative problems as the grounds for annulment (Ofoelue 
2012; Vanguard Nigeria 2013). In riots that subsequently erupted in Lagos and other cities, 
security forces killed more than 100 people, and Babangida issued a decree cracking down 
on the independent press130. But faced with a political impasse and a crumbling support 
base in the military, he found himself forced to concede to the transition deadline. 
Reluctantly, Babangida resigned on August 27, 1993, handing over power to an interim 
government headed by Ernest Shonekan (Eyinla 2001). The move was widely regarded as 
a sham given that General Abacha, Babangida’s right hand, was made Minister of 
Defence. Only three months later, those suspicions should prove true: on November 10, 
1993, a High Court judge declared the interim regime illegal, and General Abacha forced 
Shonekan to resign, taking over power himself and ending the transition process. 
In our analysis of Nigeria, we conclude that there was no crisis of the authoritarian 
regime. Firstly, there were few committed softliners that could have pushed through the 
transition project. Even though there were some isolated pockets of officers that desired a 
return to the barracks and a disengagement from politics, by 1993 they were either 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Preliminary results leaked to the press showed a majority of 59% for Abiola who carried not only the 
southwestern Yoruba areas, but also several states in the far North, the middle belt and the minority 
Southeast (Lewis 1999). Following these predictions, the “Association for a Better Nigeria”, a shadowy 
organization of regime supporters who campaigned for the continuation of military rule, obtained an 
injunction from the Abuja High Court against the release of the election results. 
130 Several newspapers, including the Concord (owned by presidential contender Abiola), Punch, and Daily 
Sketch were permanently closed down, and Babandiga imposed a 10 year prison term for anyone convicted 
of spreading “false statements or rumours” after criticism by four editors of the newsmagazine Tell was 
published (Noble 1993).!
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sidelined, coopted or eliminated (Lewis 1994)131. Babangida himself was an enigma of 
sorts: while his public rhetorics were an indefinite discourse on democracy, they were also 
often thinly veiled double-speak132. A cunning political manipulator, he had his very own 
vision of the kind of Nigeria he wanted to create, and whereas some believe that the 
President held sincere designs at least during early phases of the transition, others conclude 
that Babangida never had any real intention of relinquishing power to civilians (Lewis 
1994, 131 – 133)133. An early assessment of Babangida’s regime by Diamond and Galvan 
(1987, 75) perspicaciously captures this paradox: “As Nigeria made democratic progress in 
1986, it also showed signs of deepening authoritarianism”. As the gap between 
Babangida’s formal commitment to the transition project and his actions widened over the 
years, even his close friends came to portray him as “the main obstacle to democracy in 
Nigeria” (Noble 1993).  
Beckett and Young (1997) contend that the concept of “permanent transition” is a 
useful analytical framework in this context. According to them, military rule in Nigeria 
was legitimized by the creation of a sense of progress and transition towards civil 
democratic government, generating the illusion that the military intended to hand over the 
government while concomitantly encouraging participation of the broad section of the 
political class. Indeed, in his first New Year Days speech as military president, Babangida 
declared “that this administration does not intend to stay in power a day longer than is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 For instance, in the wake of the annulment of the 1993 elections, officers such as Colonel Abubakar Umar 
and Major-General Ishola Williams who expressed a strong pro-June 12 view lost their commission (Rotini, 
Alana and Akinwumi 1998, 148)    
132 To cite only one among numerous examples of Babangida’s two-faced rhetoric: As late as mid-May 1993, 
Babangida reiterated the military’s imminent disengagement from formal politics and even warned the ranks-
and-file of the military not to be found “on the other side of the democracy barricade”; rather, they should get 
prepared for “a democratic civilian succession to which they must be subordinate”. Yet during the same 
speech, he reiterated that the boundaries between civil and military society were not clear-cut, and that the 
military could intervene at any moment to rescue the nation’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and 
stability from perceived external and internal threats (Amuwo 1995) 133 Arguments and evidence can be found for both standpoints. On one hand, it is legitimate to ask why the 
Babangida regime would have put Nigeria through a transition process whose official cost is estimated at 
between 25 to 35 billion naira (Nwokedi 1994) if there was never any chance of the transition actually 
coming to fruition. Former Director-General of the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) and creator of 
Babangida’s two-party system, Prof. Omo Omoruyi, supports this thesis. According to him, “the transition 
programme was personal to IBB (...) IBB genuinely wanted to make history (...) IBB’s overriding ambition 
was to be a military officer who voluntarily handed over power to a democratically elected president in 
accordance with a programme of phased democratic transition” (Omoruyi 1993). He also said that Babangida 
wasn’t interested in what Washington called “the West African Model” of democratic transitions, such as in 
Ghana, or Togo (The Nigerian Voice 2011). On the other hand, former Defence Minister General Sani 
Abacha once told confidants that Babangida had been toying with the idea of ruling Nigeria for 30 years 
(Omoigui 1993) and Chief Abiola, Babangida’s friend and presidential contender, portrayed Babangida as “a 
man who after eight years is still as thirsty for power as on the first day” (Ajayi 2006)  
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required to lay the necessary institutional framework to bring about a better and more 
stable Nigeria” (Moody 2001). Yet from the outset, Babangida made it clear that this 
liberalization process was a “top-down” led process, the timing and contents of which only 
the regime could decide (Amuwo, 1990; Agbese and Kieh, 1992; Rotimi and Ihonvbere, 
1994) 134 . By consequence, political and economic reforms were implemented and 
rescinded at whim, serving primarily to “break the grips of former First (...) and Second 
Republic politicians on State institutions and resources”135 (Reno 1993; Amuwo 1995) and 
to consolidate Babangida’s regime in spite of formal lip-service to a transition program136.  
The flawed character of the regime’s reform program is evident in several respects. 
Firstly, following the lifting of the ban on political parties in 1989, conditions for both the 
formation of new political associations and the candidacy to the presidency were set so 
stringent that they could not possibly have been met by any of the contenders for power137. 
Consequently, none of the forty-some organizations that applied for registration obtained 
party-status (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991). Instead, Babangida announced the creation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!134As Luckham succinctly notes, Babangida took personal control of both Army and State from the 
beginning, and knew what he wanted to do in power and with power (Luckham 1994, 43). He was the first 
military ruler to declare himself President; he was also the first to dismiss his deputy, Commander Ebitu 
Ukiwe, even though the latter was well respected in military circles. Finally, he was also the first to dissolve 
and recompose at his whim the military “legislative” council.  135At various points in the transition process Babangida banned “discredited” First and Second Republic 
politicians and military officers from partisan politics (Diamond 1991) in an effort to foster the emergence of 
a “new breed” of Nigerian politicians supposedly imbued with higher ethical and patriotic values. Scholars 
have suggested, however, that Babangida calculated that the New Breed would be too dependent and fragile 
to pose a real threat to his presidency, and fully expected to be asked to continue in office (Amuwo 1995). 
The New Breed would thus constitute the civilian base for a diarchy with Babangida at the center (Omoigui 
1993) 
136 For instance, when Babangida created the Political Bureau in 1986 to organise nation-wide consultations 
on Nigeria’s political future, he promised all but three or four members involvement in the ensuing transition 
politics, thereby making sure they would be loyal to him (Amuwo 1995). Throughout his reign, Babangida 
continued to use material inducements to keep his political allies aligned, and resorted to repression wherever 
cooptation proved unfruitful. The State Security Service, for example, became a power unto itself, 
responsible for a growing array of arbitrary arrests, Human Rights abuses and assassinations (Lewis 1994). 
Two open coup attempts also resulted in dozens of executions (Los Angeles Times 1990). 137 First, political parties were to have offices and a functional secretariat in all the Federal and State 
capitals, loval government headquarters, and wards. They were also required to provide passport 
photographs, names and addresses of all their members. Furthermore, the National Electoral Commission 
was authorized to disqualify candidates to any election irrespective of court orders and without offering 
credible reason for such an action (Momoh 1995). After the annulment of the 1993 elections, additional 
requirements were imposed on future presidential contenders, such as an age limit; a clean criminal record; 
and proof that they believed in the corporate existence of Nigeria and didn’t have personal, corporate or 
business interests that conflicted with Nigerian national interests. Most importantly, they were required to 
have been registered members of either of the two government-created political parties for at least one year 
prior to 1993, which effectively excluded all candidates that had been running in the elections from further 
political contestation (Ajani 2013). 
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two official parties, “a little to the left” (SDP) and “a little to the right” (NRC), and 
proceeded to build offices for these two organizations across the country and to fund their 
activities, including deciding on and publicising their ideological platforms (Ihonvbere 
1996; Dowden 1993). Secondly, the regime adopted a number of strategies138 to delay its 
own transition goalposts, which finally culminated in the annulment of the June 12, 1993 
elections. In this respect, its cooperation with the shadowy “Association for a Better 
Nigeria” that openly campaigned for the continuation of military rule is particularly 
noteworthy139.  
 
As we have shown, there were no true softliners in the Babangida regime. His 
ouster in 1993 should therefore be explained by rivalry between regime hardliners rather 
than a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In the words of Rimmer (1994, 101 – 2), what 
forced Babangida out “was not the transition to democracy but the view taken by another 
faction of the military that his time was up”. This hardliner faction led, among others, by 
Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, Gen. Sani Abacha, and Brigadiers Mark and Akilu, was not willing to 
leave power and is said to have threatened Babangida, forcing him to choose between 
annulling the 1993 presidential elections or leaving office voluntarily, short of which he 
and the potential winner of the elections, Chief Abiola, might be killed (Omoigui 1993)140. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!138  One such strategy was the creation of new states right before the presidential election in 1993 
(Kraxberger 2004) in order to divide the opposition and to focus attention at the local scale (Oyewole and 
Lucas 2000, 79). Another strategy was the lack of preparation for the elections. In fact, no polling booths or 
voter registers were even set up until the director of the U.S. Information Service in Lagos warned that any 
postponement of the election would be “unacceptable” to America (Amuwo 1995). As a result, the CDS 
withdrew accreditation to Americans to monitor the election. 139 As Nwokedi (1994) notes, the total freedom with which the ABN operated, and the financial resources 
which they spent on their cause were out of proportion to what should normally be expected from ordinary 
individuals, and strongly suggest that the ABN was manipulated and funded by the Babangida regime. 
Abimbola Davies, a former ABN member, confirmed this thesis and claimed that at the time of the 1992 
elections, the ABN was paid to create “an organized confusion” to allow Babangida to continue in power 
(The Guardian 1993). 140 Even though the bulk of hardliner officers did not want to give up power for either Abiola or Tofa, they 
were particularly hostile to an Abiola presidency, as there was strong evidence that he would have 
investigated the Babangida administration for crimes (Mahmud 1993). During negotiations for an Interim 
National Government (ING), Babangida was said to have told SDP officials that "some senior military 
officers were prepared to die rather than accept Abiola as president" (Africa Confidential 1993a, 7; 1993b, 
2). Allegedly, Gen. Abacha was particularly opposed to Abiola, and Babangida told his friend Omoruyi: 
“Sani is opposed to a return to civilian rule (...) if he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force 
Chief Abiola on him” (Omoruyi 1999, 165). Babangida himself had actually encouraged Abiola to run, 
financing his campaign with 35bn Naira and promising to make him chairman of the Transitional Council 
(CKN Nigeria 2013). Allegedly, Babangida saw Abiola’s candidacy as a way of resolving the credibility 
crisis he faced after the botched 1992 primaries (The Nigerian Voice 2011), and underrating Abiola’s clout, 
assumed the elections would be inconclusive. According to Babangida himself, he decided “to let the bloody 
thing go on” for fear of being accused again of not wanting to leave office (CKN Nigeria 2013). However, 
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However, pressured by the hostile reaction from the domestic and international front to the 
cancellation of the elections, the hardliners under Dogonyaro and Abacha realized they 
would have to sacrifice Babangida in order to keep office themselves (Welch 1995). 
Consequently, Abacha (who was said to have been scheming to become head of state 
himself several months earlier)141 organised a de facto palace coup, forcing Babangida to 
resign on August 27, 1993142. (New York Times 1993; Ihonvbere 1996). When his 
appointed successor, Ernest Shonekan, took office, most observers agreed he was a mere 
face-saving device for Babangida to take his exit (Nwokedi 1994)143. Indeed, only three 
months later Abacha dissolved the ING to seize power on his own terms. 
 
Resume:  
 
The ouster of President Babandiga should be understood as an intra-regime rivalry 
between hardliners rather than a softliner majority. Hence, there was no crisis of the 
authoritarian regime in Nigeria’s first transition attempt. 
 
References: 
 
Abubakar, Nurudeen. 1994. “The Stalled Transition in Nigeria”. Africa Updates Archives I 
 (4): Nigeria on the Edge? Available at: http://web.ccsu.edu/afstudy/upd1-4.html. 
 Accessed February 2nd, 2014. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
when it became clear that Abiola would win, Babangida found himself confronted with a hostile hardliner 
corps who, according to Babangida’s son Muhammed, threatened him. ''There were other generals, including 
Abacha, who said that if power was ceded to a Southerner like Abiola, the North would have nothing left,'' 
Mr. Babangida Jr. said. ''They put my father in a corner. They threatened him.'' (Cohen 1998). Subsequently, 
the President told Abiola: “They will kill you rather than allow you to become the elected President, 
Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria. They will also kill me, if I allow you to be sworn in as the President." (The 
Nigerian Voice 2011).  
141 Sources tell us that Abacha had been jealous of Babangida’s position ever since the latter took office in 
1985, and many say that there was some sort of “succession pact” between the two. However, allegedly their 
wives did not get along, and Mrs. Babangida did not relish the thought of her husband handing over power to 
General Abacha, which might have played a part in how the dynamics of Babangida’s resignation unfolded 
(Omoigui 1993). 
142 In fact, by July 12, 1993, Babangida was allegedly told at a marathon meeting with Principal Staff 
Officers and Field Commanders that he could no longer "rely on the loyalty of his Armed Forces should he 
stay beyond 27 August" (Africa Confidential 1993c, 1) 143 From his first day in office, Shonekan carried the reputation of being a military puppet with Abacha 
exercising an active direction of the nominally civilian government (Shiner 1993). He was not sworn in as 
“Commander in chief of the Armed Forces”, and he was to stay at the Presidential Guest House instead of the 
main villa. The Governors of Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Ondo States refused, at least in public, to recognise 
Shonekan as the Head of State (Omoigui 1993). 
 
! 303!
 
Adedoyin, R. 1993. “Babangida, Abiola redefine friendship”. The Guardian, July 4th.  
 
Africa Confidential. 1993a. July 30th. Quoted in Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. General 
 Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal 
 Rulership Project. Centre d’études d’Afrique Noire: Institut d’études politiques de 
 Bordeaux. 
 
Africa Confidential. 1993b. November 5th. Quoted in Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. General 
 Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal 
 Rulership Project. Centre d’études d’Afrique Noire: Institut d’études politiques de 
 Bordeaux. 
 
Africa Confidential. 1993c. July 16th. Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. General Babangida, Civil 
 Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project. 
 Centre  d’études d’Afrique Noire: Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux.  
 
Agbese, Pita O. and George O. Kieh. 1992. “Nigeria: Transition to Democracy and the 
 Pathological Elite Thesis". Zeitschrift für Afrikastudien 15/16: 19 - 35. 
 
Ajani, Jide. 2013. “Why we annuled June 12 Presidential election — General Ibrahim 
 Babangida”. Vanguard Nigeria, June 8th. Available at: 
 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/why-we-annuled-june-12-presidential-
 election-general-ibrahim-babangida/. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Ajayi, Femi. 2006. “I Cancelled, not annulled June 12": Should Nigerians trust Ibrahim 
 Badamosi Babangida again?” Nigeriaworld, September 25th. Available at: 
 http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/092506.html. Accessed February 2nd, 
 2014. 
 
Ajayi, Rotimi, Olu Alana and Yemi Akinwumi. 1998. Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives in 
 Nigerian Studies. Nathadex Publishers. 
 
Amuwo, Kunle. 1990. “Soldier - rulers and Military Academic Advisors: Notes on 
 Constitutionalism and Democracy in Nigeria with Specific Reference to the 
 Babangida Administration". In Tyoden, S.G. (ed.), Constitutionalism and National 
 Development.  Ibadan: NPSA, 519 - 532. 
 
Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – 
 Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project. Centre d’études d’Afrique Noire: Institut 
 d’études politiques de Bordeaux. 
 
Beckett, Paul and Crawford Young. 1997. Beyond The Impasse of Permanent Transition in 
 Nigeria. New York: University of Rochester Publishing Company. 
! 304!
 
CKN Nigeria. 2013. “I Wanted To Make MKO Head Of Interim Govt..IBB". September 
 28th. Available at: http://www.cknnigeria.com/2013/09/i-wanted-to-make-mko-
 head-of-interim.html. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Cohen, Roger. 1998. “A Nigerian Revisits His Place in History”. New York Times, July 
 25th. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/25/world/a-nigerian-revisits-
 his-place-in-history.html. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Diamond, Larry and Dennis Galvan. 1987. “Sub-Saharan Africa”. In Wesson, Robert (ed), 
 Democracy: A Worldwide Survey. New York: Praeger. 
 
Diamond, Larry. 1991. “Nigeria's search for a new political order”. Journal of Democracy 
 2(2): 57 - 58. 
 
Dowden, Richard. 1993. “Babangida annuls presidential election: Britain freezes aid as 
 Nigeria military pulls back from democracy”. The Independent, June 24th. 
 Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/babangida-annuls-
 presidential-election-britain-freezes-aid-as-nigeria-military-pulls-back-from-
 democracy-1493454.html. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Eyinla, Bolade M. 2001. "Political transition and the future of democracy in Nigeria". 
 Africa  Quarterly 41(1-2): 61 - 89.  
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1989. Political Education Manual: Towards a Free and 
 Democratic Society. Abuja, Nigeria, Directorate for Social Mobilisation 
 (MAMSER). 
 
Hermet, Guy. 1973. “Une dictature feutrée contrainte à user de la force". Le Monde 
 Diplomatique, December. Available at: http://www.monde-
 diplomatique.fr/1973/12/HERMET/31960. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Ihonvbere, Julius. 1996. “Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of 
 Democratisation in Nigeria”. The Journal of Modern African Studies 24(2): 193 - 
 225. 
 
Kraxberger, Brennan. 2004. “Geo-historical trajectories of democratic transition: The case 
 of Nigeria”. GeoJournal 60: 81 - 92. 
 
Lewis, Peter. 1994. “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition”. 
 African Affairs 93(372): 323 - 340. 
 
! 305!
Lewis, Peter. 1999. “Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?” Journal of Democracy 
 10(1): 141 – 156. 
 
Los Angeles Times. 1989. “Nigerian Leader Vows Tough Economic Line”. June 6th. 
 Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-06/news/mn-1725_1_austerity-
 price-boosts-goods-and-services. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Los Angeles Times. 1990. ”Nigeria: Coup Plot Suspects Hunted; 42 Executed”. July 29th. 
 Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-29/news/mn-1496_1_coup-plot. 
 Accessed February 2nd, 2014.  
 
Luckham, Robin. 1994. "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: a 
 Survey of Literature and Issues". African Studies Review 37(2): 13 - 75. 
 
Mahmud, Sakah. 1993. "The Failed Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Its Implications 
 for Democracy and Human Rights". Africa Today, 4th Quarter: 87 - 88. 
 
Momoh, Abubakar. 1995. "The Political Economy of the Transition to Civil Rule". In 
 Adejumobi, Said and Abubakar Momoh (eds), The Political Economy of Nigeria 
 Under Military Rule: 1984 - 1993. Harare: Sapes Publishing Company, 28 - 30. 
 
Moody, John. 2001. “Nigeria Striking a Delicate Balance”. Time Magazine, June 24th. 
 Available at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,143131,00.html. 
 Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Musa S. A. 1990. An Accountable and acceptable census: A major tool for National 
 Development. National Population Commission, Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 
New York Times. 1993. “Nigeria's Latest Military Ruler Bans Political Activity”. 
 November 19th. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/19/world/nigeria-s-
 latest-military-ruler-bans-political-activity.html?src=pm. Accessed February 2nd, 
 2014. 
 
Noble, Kenneth. 1993. “Nigeria General Makes His 5th Offer to Step Down”. New York 
 Times, August 18th. Available at: 
 http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/18/world/nigeria-general-makes-his-5th-offer-to-
 step-down.html. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Nwokedi, Emeka. 1994. “Nigeria’s democratic transition: Explaining the annulled 1993 
 presidential election”. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
 International Affairs 83(330): 189 - 204. 
 
Ofoelue, Onukwube. 2012. “How Nigeria’s Freest and Fairest Election Was Annulled”. 
 National Mirror, October 28th. Available at: 
! 306!
 http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/how-nigerias-freest-and-fairest-election-was-
 annulled/. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Olugbenga, Ayeni. 1992. “Back on Course?” West Africa, November 9 - 15. Quoted in 
 Lewis, Peter. 1994. “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic 
 Transition”. African Affairs 93(372): 323 - 340. 
 
Omoigui, Nowa. 1993. “Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993”. Available at: 
 http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui21.htm. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
Omoruyi, Omo. 1999. The Tale of June 12: The Betrayal of the Democratic Rights of 
 Nigerians (1993). Lagos and London: Press Alliance Network. 
 
Oyediran, Oyeleye and Adigun Agbaje. 1991. “Two-Partyism and Democratic Transition 
 in Nigeria”. The Journal of Modern African Studies 29(2): 213 – 235. 
 
Oyewole Anthony and John Lucas. 2000. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. Lanham, 
 Maryland: Scarecrow Press. 
 
Reno, William. 1993. "Old Brigades, Money Bags, Newbreeds and the Ironies of Reform 
 in Nigeria". Canadian Journal of African Studies 27(1): 66 - 87. 
 
Rimmer, Douglas. 1994. "Nigeria Changes Course". Africa Insight 24(2): 99 - 109. 
 
Rotimi, Ajayi and Julius Ihonvbere. 1994. “Democratic Impasse: Remilitarisation in 
 Nigeria”. Third World Quarterly 15(4): 669 - 689. 
 
Shiner, Cindy. 1993. “Nigeria's Military Ruler Quits; Appoints Interim Government”. The 
 Washington Post, August 27th. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
 srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/bab0893.htm. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
The Guardian. 1993. July 17th, citing Africa Confidential 34(13), 1993, July 2nd. Quoted 
 in Nwokedi, Emeka. 1994. “Nigeria’s democratic transition: Explaining the 
 annulled 1993 presidential election”. The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
 Journal of International Affairs 83(330): 189 - 204.  
 
The Nigerian Voice. 2011. “The Secret Behind the Anulment of June 12 & What Abiola 
 Died For”. June 13th. Available at: 
 http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/53716/1/the-secret-behind-the-
 annulment-of-june-12-amp-wha.html. Accessed February 2nd, 2014. 
 
U.S. Department of State. 1979a. Reaction to Prisoner Release. Telegrams from US 
 Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. 
! 307!
 July 19th, Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and 
 Information Center, Yale University.!
 
Welch, Claude E. 1995. "Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria: Pains of an Unaccomplished 
 Transition". Armed Forces & Society 21(4): 593 - 614. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 308!
(17) Nigeria 2 
 
Nigeria’s second attempt at democracy in the 1990s began with a highly restrictive 
and controlled political transition program whose predetermined goal was the 
transformation of General Abacha from a military dictator to a civilian Head of State 
(Eyinla 1999). On June 8, 1998, however, just before his inauguration, Abacha died 
suddenly and left the reins of the country in the hands of General Abdusalami Abubakar, 
the Chief of Defence Staff and next in the military hierarchy. A genuine softliner, 
Abubakar quickly moved to dismantle the Abacha transition program: he dissolved all 
existing political parties, ended the term of the National Electoral Commission and 
annulled the fraudulent previous elections (Ojo 2014). Although he rejected the 
opposition’s call for a Sovereign National Conference, he did announce a new agenda that 
pledged the return of the military to the barracks and the transfer of power to elected 
civilians on May 29, 1999. A series of elections and political reforms was to return the 
country to democratic rule, including promises for the release of political prisoners and the 
return of exilees (Ojo and Azeez 2002); the promulgation of a new Constitution; and free 
and open elections supervised by an independent Electoral Commission (Lewis 1999). 
Four elections were scheduled between December 1998 and February 1999: the Local 
Government Council elections (5 December, 1993); State Assembly and Gubernatorial 
elections (9 January 1999); National Assembly elections (20 February 1999); and the 
Presidential election (28 February 1999). In a show of sincerity, Abubakar explicitely 
encouraged the participation of as many political associations as possible in these 
elections; yet only three were eventually registered as officially recognised political 
parties. These were the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) (Ojo 2014). The presidential contest was between retired 
General Olusegun Obasanjo (PDP) and Chief Olu Falae (AD/APP). Obasanjo’s candidacy 
was backed by the military, as he was considered the one person who was able to run a 
“coup-proof government” (Eyinla 1999). He won the election by a wide margin. Parallel to 
these developments, Abubakar inaugurated an independent Committee to coordinate 
debates on the Draft Constitution in November 1998 and signed the new Constitution into 
law on May 6, 1999. The implication of this was that elections had been held before the 
constitutive framework for the electoral process had been laid down, which emphasizes the 
flaws in the conduct of the elections and shows that the transition process had been far 
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from ideal (Ololo 2004). Though the AD/APP alliance initially contested the election 
results in court, Olu Falae eventually conceded in the interest of avoiding another return to 
military rule. Therefore, Obasanjo was sworn in on May 29, 1999 and officially ended the 
Abubakar transition program (Ojo 2004). 
 
Our analysis of Nigeria’s 1998/1999 democratic transition confirms the existence 
of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. After the failed Babangida transition of the early 
1990s, hardliners under General Abacha led the country with an iron grip for several years. 
However, their rule was never uncontested, as pre-existing divisions within the military 
continued to deepen. The main issue revolved around Abacha’s transition program, which 
adopted the same form as that of his immediate predecessor, General Babangida, and was 
meant to institutionalize military rule in civilian guise (Damilola 2011). While there 
certainly were those who supported Abacha in his endeavour144, many officers felt that the 
military had been the biggest losers from their involvement in politics and began to join 
Nigerian civilians in calling for a return to true democracy (New York Times 1998a)145. 
Prominent representatives included Maj. Gen. Ishaiya Bamayi, Chief of staff, Deputy Head 
of State, Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya146 and, surprisingly, Abacha’s presidential 
predecessor, General Babangida (Rupert 1998a; French 1998a). Five years after his ouster, 
Babangida began making statements about the need to bring military rule in Nigeria to an 
end147. During a public lecture in Jos, for example, he dismissed military rule as 
“authoritarian” and declared that Africa’s salvation lay in democracy (Ofuoku 2015). 
Moreover, he reportedly met Abacha shortly before the lecture and advised him against 
self-succession. In our opinion, Babangida’s statements can be considered representative 
of a powerful tide that was moving against Nigerian hardliners even earlier than 1998.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!144 Certain Generals even voiced their support to the instauration of a regime modeled after the Indonesian 
dictatorship of President Suharto (French 1998a) 145 According to a senior Nigerian General, ''there are many of us who have made our lives in the Army 
because we were trained to believe that the military had something vital to offer to the nation. This, however, 
does not include politics, and we have a bunch of officers who come to think of themselves as permanent 
politicians. In behaving this way, they are dragging us all down'' (French 1998c) 146 In 1997, Diya, who was known for his “quiet” opposition to Abacha’s presidential aspirations, was 
allegedly involved in a coup plot to remove Abacha from office. Along with six other accused officers he 
was arrested and later sentenced to death (Africa Confidential 1998, 1-2).  
147 Although we do not know to what extent Babangida’s conversion to a democrat was genuine, he is said to 
have considerably influenced General Abubakar, Abacha’s successor and convinced softliner. He also voiced 
regret about his cancellation of the 1993 elections, calling it “wrong” and claiming that he acted under 
pressure from his fellow Generals (Njoku 2001). 
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However, the turning point for softliners only came with Abacha’s death and the 
instauration of General Abubakar, a democrat, over other leading hardliners148. Abubakar, 
a soft-spoken career soldier with no political ambitions of his own, had been among those 
who were pressing for a rapid end to military rule (Murphy 1998). Claiming that “the 
survival of the country depends on a rapid and peaceful transition to a lasting democracy” 
(Online Nigeria 2015), he assured Nigerians that his administration “had no desire 
whatsoever to succeed itself”, and that he respected the fact that “Nigerians want true 
democracy” (Vick 1998)149. Immediately after taking up office, he moved to push forward 
reforms, while at the same time isolating hardliners within the regime. Firstly, he 
reaffirmed his commitment to the social-political transition program of late General 
Abacha and rebuffed opposition calls to hand over power by Oct. 1 to a civilian 
government of National Unity that would organize elections (Cohen 1998a). This move 
strongly indicated to observers that top officers who wanted the Army to loosen its direct 
political control were gaining power (French 1998a), but that they were also trying to 
outmanoeuvre factions in the military known to oppose any democratic change (French 
1998b). Secondly, he prevented a violent clash between security forces and pro-democracy 
groups that had organized a series of protests linked to the fifth anniversary of the canceled 
1993 elections, and subsequently released a series of prominent political prisoners 
including General Obasanjo, Beko Ransome-Kuti, and the Oil Union chiefs Frank Kokori 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!148 Besides Abubakar, prospective successors had included key Abacha loyalists Maj. Hamza Mustapha, 
Head of Abacha’s special Bodyguard Unit, and Col. Muhammad Marwa, military administrator of Lagos 
state. Although there are those who claim that Abubakar was named President mainly to “keep power in the 
upper echelons” (Rupert 1998b), there are several reasons to believe that his nomination does indicate the 
rising power of softliners within the Nigerian Army. Firstly, according to senior Nigerian officers, Abubakar 
“had no real constituency among the security forces” (French 1998a); for him to be selected he therefore 
must have been able to count on significant support from other, more powerful officers. Secondly, he was not 
the most senior soldier, and even had to be promoted to the rank of full General before taking up the 
Presidency (Online Nigeria 2015). In our opinion, this takes away credibility from the argument that 
Abubakar’s nomination only happened to forestall the possibility of younger officers seizing power. 149 According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, one of the key aspects of softliners being in charge of the 
political direction of a country is that reform plans are believed by the opposition. In the case of Nigeria, both 
opposition and foreign politicians confirmed that they found Abubakar’s pledged sincere. For instance, after 
his release from prison, retired General Obasanjo claimed that he believed “General Abubakar understands 
that an entirely new democratic structure for the nation must be created, and that he cannot wait a day beyond 
Jan. 1, 1999, to hand over power to a civilian President” (Cohen 1998b). On another occasion, the Deputy 
President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, said he believed there was a real willingness on the part of the 
Nigerian government to “keep the door open to democracy” (New York Times 1998c).   
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and Milton Dabibi150. Finally, he replaced a series of hard-line supporters of late General 
Abacha, among others the Chief of Security Maj. Hamza Mustapha (Los Angeles Times 
1998)151.  
 
However, after the sudden death of prominent opposition politician Chief Abiola, 
Abubakar found that continuing with Abacha’s transition program posed too much of a 
problem in terms of credibility, and within two weeks announced a new agenda for a 10-
month transition to democratic rule (Lewis 1999). Although it merely replicated the 
activities of previous transition programs, it still clearly carried the stamp of softliners, 
since the government actually tried as much as possible to detach itself from the transition 
implementation process in order to avoid creating mistrust in the transition exercise 
(Damilola 2011)152.  Admitting that Nigeria’s “most recent attempt at democratisation was 
marred by manoeuvring and manipulations of structures and actions [which] only 
succeeded in creating a defective foundation on which a solid democratic structure can 
neither be constructed nor sustained” (The Guardian 1998, 15), Abubakar then proceeded 
to implement a series of reforms. Firstly, he dissolved the five political parties registered 
by the Abacha regime and cancelled all previous elections conducted under these parties. 
Secondly, in an attempt to march towards genuine and fully-fledged democratic civilian 
rule, many transition implementation agencies established by the Abacha regime were 
dissolved and their decrees repealed. Finally, Abubakar pledged not to interfere with party 
formation.  Consequently, Abacha’s electoral commission, the National Electoral 
Commission (NECON), was dissolved and a new independent electoral body, the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established. This body was 
charged with the responsibility of registering political parties, registration of voters and the 
conduct of elections (Momoh and Thovoethin 2001). Further reforms included greater 
press freedom (Onishi 1998) and the fight against corruption within the military hierarchy. 
In an unprecedented move, the junta voted to publish a list of its members’ individual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!150 Walter Carrington, a former American ambassador to Nigeria, estimated that “the restraint that the Army 
showed and the subsequent release of the prisoners suggest strongly that the new leadership has gained 
control over hardliners in the Army” (French 1998b). 151The gradual replacement of hardliners with more democratic-minded officers was an important part of 
asserting Abubakar’s authority, as reportedly hawks within the regime were already accusing him of “going 
soft” over the release of detainees (Simmons 1998b) 152 One of the early demonstrations of this autonomy was the fact that INEC and political institutions agreed 
on the modalities for the formation and registration of political parties. 
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assets in a bid to prove their interest in accountability (New York Times 1998b). These 
reforms were taken so seriously that even prominent dissidents such as Nobel laureate 
Wole Soyinka returned from exile, feeling confident that the new military government was 
serious about leading the country towards true democracy (Simmons 1998a). When 
General Obasanjo won Nigeria’s first free and fair elections in February 1999, he repeated 
that belief:  ''Today we are taking a decisive step on the path of democracy [...] We will 
leave no stone unturned to insure sustenance of democracy, because it is good for us, it is 
good for Africa, and it is good for the world” (Onishi 1999). A few months later, when 
announcing the imminent release of the new Constitution, Abubakar, too, affirmed that the 
military had learnt its lesson, and would not interfere in politics in the future. “The era of 
coups is dead and buried”, he said (BBC News 1999). 
 
Resume:  
 
After the death of hardliner Abacha, a majority of softliners took over the reins of 
the Nigerian authoritarian regime and pushed through democratic reforms despite 
opposition from the hardliner camp. We therefore confirm the presence of an authoritarian 
regime crisis.  
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(18) Kenya 
 
Kenya’s first attempt at reintroducing democratic governance began in the wake of 
the upheavals in Eastern Europe (Africa Watch 1991, 37). Throughout the late 1980s, 
Kenya’s Single Party system had become a source of growing tension, as resistance to 
President Daniel Arap Moi’s rule became increasingly organized and vocal. In fact, the 
Moi government had since 1986 faced mounting criticism from Kenyan Church groups 
and clandestine opposition organizations, to the extent that in 1989, the Vice President 
ordered a commission to investigate the matter. Whereas he concluded that a majority of 
Kenyans still supported the Single Party system, in 1990 intellectuals, church workers and 
lawyers under the leadership of former Cabinet Ministers Charles Rubia and Kenneth 
Matiba organized a series of demonstrations called “the Saba Saba”, calling for a return to 
democracy (Africa Watch 1991, 61). The rally never took place, as Moi ordered the 
imprisonment of the organizers two days before the event, and kept them in jail without 
charges for more than six months (Hiltzig 1991). The arrests sparked a series of riots 
throughout the country that left more than 20 people dead (Bratton and van de Walle, 
1997, 182) and prompted six opposition leaders to form the Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy (FORD) in May 1991. Among other demands, the group’s program called for a 
repeal of the 1982 constitutional provision making Moi’s party the sole legal political 
party; for a National Convention before any election; and for the boycott of any elections 
held under the one-party system (Hiltzig 1991). Shortly after its formal announcement, 
FORD was declared illegal by the Moi government (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, 77-8), 
which also banned a FORD-organized pro-democracy rally planned for November 16, 
1991. When the event took place despite the prohibition, the government quashed the rally 
with force and wholesale arrests. Among the arrested were also eight opposition leaders 
who Moi accused of violating public order (Human Rights Watch 1992, 56-57). 
International outrage over the harsh repression eventually forced Moi to change course, as 
the major donors of development aid decided to suspend financial assistance over lack of 
reform (New York Times 1991a). Bowing to international pressure, in December 1991 
Moi allowed for the restoration of multiparty government by repealing article 2A of the 
Constitution, which made the Kenya African National Union (KANU) the only authorized 
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political party (FBIS-AFR-91-23811 1991). Both domestic and international observers, 
however, came to realize that Moi had no intention of actually leaving office. Although he 
authorized many political parties to participate in the December 1992 elections (Africa 
Events Feb. 1992), his government kept harassing the opposition, refused access to foreign 
observers (BBC Summary 1992) and used force to break up further pro-democracy 
demonstrations, citing the increase in tribal violence as a justification for such action 
(Christian Science Monitor 9 Mar. 1992).  Therefore, the elections were not deemed fair, 
as it was considered that Moi and his political machine used their incumbent status to 
control the results (KHRC, 1998). Indeed, Moi was elected to a fourth term as president 
with 36.3% of the vote ahead of Kenneth Matiba (26.0%), Mwai Kibaki (19.5%) and 
Oginga Odinga (17.5%). 
 
In the Kenyan case we find that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime, 
although there were, indeed, a few regime members that defected from the ruling party 
during the period of turmoil. For instance, both FORD and the Democratic Party were 
founded by former members of the Moi government 153 . Yet, most of those 
Parliamentarians, Ministers and provincial officials who left KANU to join the opposition 
camp did so only in the late stages of Kenya’s transition attempt (Hiltzig 1992a). In 1992, 
for example, six Ministers – including three of Cabinet rank – resigned within a three-week 
period, and two others, including Peter Oloo Aringo, a Minister for Manpower 
Development and a leading reformist, were dismissed by Moi himself (Hiltzig 1992b). 
Despite their high rank, the numbers of defectors remained relatively low. In addition, it 
was lost on almost no one that most of the leaders deserting KANU were once part of the 
chorus that echoed Moi’s attacks on democratic governance. It is therefore conceivable 
that their joining the opposition camp took place not so much out of a genuine conviction 
that Kenya should become democratic, but in a bid to position themselves to retain their 
old power under a new system (Hiltzig 1992b). By consequence, Kenya’s softliners did not 
manage to seriously threaten President Arap Moi’s power base and hardliners remained in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!153 FORD was founded by Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba, both former Cabinet Ministers in the Moi 
government. Matiba, out of protest, had left the government in 1988 and was later sent to prison where he 
suffered a stroke (Der Spiegel 1992). Together with Charles Rubia he had spearheaded the “Saba Saba” 
protests in 1990 that introduced the demand of multiparty politics in Kenya. The Democratic Party, on the 
other hand, was founded in 1991 by Mwai Kibaki, former Vice President and Minister of Health in the Moi 
cabinet.  
! 318!
control, free to pursue strategic liberalization: while they conceded the return to 
multipartyism, the essential rules of the game remained unchanged.    
 
President Arap Moi himself, in fact, never made much of an effort to hide his 
disdain for democracy154. For the longest time he staunchly resisted pressure to broaden 
the one-party state, maintaining that “the party is supreme” (Rule 1986), and instead 
offering to reform KANU to broaden its base (Perlez 1990a). In 1990, addressing a two-
day convention of the governing party, Moi said Kenya need not copy what was being 
done elsewhere (Perlez 1990b)155. As the country was “at least 200 years behind” the West 
in economic development, it should not expect Western style democracy for another two 
centuries (Perlez 1991b). Whereas the leaders of other African countries like Gabon, 
Cameroon or Congo at least promised some kind of political reform, Moi threatened to 
hunt opponents to his rule down “like rats” (Der Spiegel 1990) who “will all be picked up 
and kept aside to cool down (...) If they want chaos, Moi is not a coward” (New York 
Times 1990).  
 
In this sense, it is clear that President Moi’s abrupt switch in favor of a multiparty 
system was nothing but a strategic move designed to perpetuate Moi’s authoritarian hand 
while at the same time showing sufficient political pluralism to persuade Western donors 
to restore the $360 million in aid that were suspended until Moi conceded reforms (Perlez 
1991c; Noble 1992). Indeed, Moi’s actions after legalizing opposition parties showed that 
he never intended for the electoral process to be genuine, saying the move had been forced 
on Kenya by foreign pressure (Los Angeles Times 1992) and promising that the opposition 
would get “zero mandate from the people” (Perlez 1991d). Reactions from both the KANU 
party and the security forces were almost unanimously supportive. “Aid is being used as a 
weapon”, said Abdul Rahman Bafadhil, the secretary of KANU’s youth branch. “What we 
need is public accountability.” Other delegates complained that Western donors, and 
particularly the US, were “forcing us to a multiparty system” (Perlez 1991d), and even put !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 In 1984, for example, he explained his governing style in the following way: “I would like Ministers, 
Assistant Ministers and others to sing like a parrot after me (...) That is how we can progress” (Perlez 1991a). 
155 Moi was obviously referring to to the multiple National Conferences that were being held in other African 
countries. He maintained that Kenya, with its strong tribal allegiances, was not cohesive enough to afford the 
“luxury” of multiparty politics (Le Monde Diplomatique 1992, 26; Africa Confidential 1990, 2). His Vice 
President, George Saitoti, echoed his words at a rally of ruling party loyalists, claiming that multiparty 
politics was to blame for the violence in countries such as Zaire. “Kenyans are not ready to spill blood”, he 
said. “They are united and have opted for one party, one government” (Perlez 1991e).!
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forward a resolution to make Arap Moi President for life (AFP 1991). Most importantly, 
however, Moi received a renewed pledge of loyalty from senior military officers (Orlando 
Sentinel 1990a), reassuring him that the security forces would continue to execute his 
orders156. This explains why, in the months leading up to the election, the KANU 
government was able to indiscriminately use repression and to manipulate the electoral 
process in a way that guaranteed KANU a continuation in power.   
 
Firstly, Moi regularly denied FORD and other opposition groups the right to hold 
rallys, calling their politicians “subversive and power hungry Libyan-trained thugs” and 
threatened to use force should they ignore his orders (Perlez 1991e). In other cases, police 
physically prevented the opposition party's officials from ceremonially opening provincial 
or district offices. Additionally, supporters of KANU tried to establish de facto “off limit” 
zones in large swathes of the country by attacking opposition leaders157 (Hiltzig 1992c). 
Secondly, not only were opposition leaders granted virtually no access to the state-run 
radio and television system, there was also a renewed crackdown on independent media. In 
1992, Human Rights Watch reported that Gitobu Imanyara, editor of the Nairobi Law 
Monthly, and Njehu Gatabaki, editor of Finance, as well as journalists Paul Amina, 
Macharia Gaitho and Julius Bargorett, were harassed, arrested or beaten for promoting 
multipartyism in their writings (Human Rights Watch 1992, 60-61). Moreover, several 
publications were banned (Hiltzig 1990), including some issues of the magazines 
Newsweek and Der Spiegel and the International Herald Tribune which reported acts of 
police brutality during the demonstration on 16 November 1991 (IRBC 1992). Thirdly, the 
organization of the election day itself also showed that the rules were loaded against 
opposition parties. At first, no date was set for a vote158. When finally December 7 was 
chosen, the date was set in a way that would minimize both international scrutiny and 
opportunities for the opposition to organize and compete. For example, since Moi refused 
to allow for an effective domestic monitoring system, as many as one million voters did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 For example, riot police opened fire on the Saba Saba protestors, killing at least 20 (Perlez 1991f), and 
demolished a Nairobi shantytown whose inhabitants had denounced corruption in the government clique. 
When a senior Cabinet Minister condemned the actions of the police, Moi dismissed him (Perlez 1990c).  
156 On February 19, 1992, for example, a mob ambushed an 11-car convoy of FORD leaders in the town of 
Ngong, where 11 officials were injured (Hiltzig1992c). 
157 On February 19, 1992, for example, a mob ambushed an 11-car convoy of FORD leaders in the town of 
Ngong, where 11 officials were injured (Hiltzig1992c). 
158 In fact, an article in the February 1991 issue of Africa News quoted President Moi as saying, “Nobody 
should go around cheating the people [into thinking] that elections are on.” (Megill 2008, 530) 
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not receive identity cards and could therefore not register to vote (New York Times 1992). 
Furthermore, there were reports that teachers, civil servants, soldiers and police officers 
had been “admonished” to vote for Moi’s KANU party (Perlez 1992a).  
 
Lastly, Moi did not hesitate to instrumentalize political violence to his own ends. 
When in 1992 tribal clashes erupted between members of President Moi’s Kalenjin tribe 
and the Luo tribe to which many opposition members belonged, Moi allowed the violence 
to spread in order to undermine the movement for democracy (Perlez 1992b).  In an effort 
to demonstrate to the public that pluralism in Kenya would inevitably lead to political 
chaos, Moi did not order the police or the military to intervene; to the contrary, it is 
rumored that they even offered logistical help to the Kalenjins (Der Spiegel 1992). Regime 
critics suffered a similar fate: for instance, Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge, an 
outspoken critic of Moi, was murdered after a government official had warned Muge his 
life was in danger (Orlando Sentinel 1990b). Another high profile murder case involved 
former Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott, the closest aide to the President, and former 
Head of Internal Security Hezekiah Oyugi who was accused of killing Robert Ouko, 
former Kenyan Foreign Minister, after the latter threatened to expose corruption in the 
ruling circle (Der Spiegel 1991; Der Spiegel 1990)159. As a result of all this, Kenya’s 
transition attempt did not lead to the instauration of minimal democracy. Instead, the 1992 
election results reaffirmed KANU’s superiority and Moi remained in office until 2002. 
 
Resume:  
 
The Kenyan transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime, as 
both the bulk of the Single Party and security forces remained loyal to hardliner Moi. As a 
result, Moi initiated pseudo-reforms to placate Western governments while the real rules of 
the game remained unchanged and Moi remained in power.  
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(19) Togo160 
 
The Togolese reform movement emerged in 1990 as a reaction to economic 
hardship and the gradual waning of patron-client relationships. It was spearheaded by a 
frustrated intelligentsia and directed against the corporatist government of General 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his Single Party, the “Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais” 
(RPT), who had been ruling Togo since 1967 (Decalo 1987, 172). The transition began on 
October 5, 1990, when two University professors were detained by the Togolese Security 
Services for distributing antigovernment tracts. The arrests sparked large public 
demonstrations and resulted in violent repression by government forces, the most infamous 
of which – the massacre of the Bê Laguna – left several dozen people dead (Engueleguele 
et al., 2013). Despite the government crackdown, demonstrations intensified under the 
auspices of the “Front d’Action pour le Renouveau” (FAR), an umbrella of opposition 
groups, and finally led to the signing of an agreement between the FAR and President 
Eyadéma on March 22, 1991. The agreement provided for a general amnesty, a new 
Charter on political parties and the organization of a National Forum on Dialogue tasked 
with elaborating the conditions for Togo’s transition to a more participatory political 
system.  
 
Whereas the first two laws entered into force, the National Forum on Dialogue 
never took place, as the FAR decided they would no longer be satisfied with anything 
other than a National Conference (Letogolais.com, 2013). Astonished by the severity of 
popular disaffection with the regime, the Eyadéma government eventually gave in to 
opposition demands for a National Conference on the condition that the latter would not 
declare sovereignty. However, as soon as the National Conference opened in July 1991, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4 
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the participating opposition groups immediately broke the agreement, and although 
severely harassed by the government, drafted an interim Constitution calling for a one-year 
transitional regime that would culminate in free elections for a new government. They 
unilaterally selected Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, a prominent Human Rights activist, as their 
new Prime Minister, created a transitional Parliament (the High Council of the Republic, 
HCR) and stripped President Eyadéma of most of his powers (although he was to remain 
chief of state for the duration of the transition).  
 
Outmanoevered by these events, the following three years constituted a test of wills 
between the new transitional government and Eyadéma and his supporters, during which 
Eyadéma gradually gained the upper hand. This period was marked by several 
unsuccessful coup attempts and persistent political violence carried out by military loyal to 
President Eyadéma. When in October 1991 the HCR voted to dissolve Eyadéma’s political 
party and to curtail the power of the military, the Army overthrew Koffigoh’s transitional 
government in what would become known as the “attack on the Primature” on December 
3, 1991. This coup initiated Eyadéma’s gradual recuperation of power (Letogolais.com, 
2013). Koffigoh, under pression of the Army, negotiated with Eyadéma a “national unity 
government” in which the most important ministerial posts were assigned to RPT figures 
(New York Times 1991). Even though a new democratic Constitution was adopted on 
September 27, 1992, a second military coup in October 1992 effectively put an end to the 
interim legislature when elements of the Army held the HCR hostage for 24 hours. Shortly 
after the incident, elections that had originally been scheduled for December 1992 were 
postponed and Eyadéma unilaterally declared that the transition had ended (Engueleguele 
et al. 2013). In January 1993 he reappointed Koffigoh as Prime Minister, whose 
government, though nominally independent, cooperated closely with the President 
throughout the year and regularly took policy positions consistent with Eyadéma’s views 
(U.S. Department of State 1994). On August 25, 1993, Eyadéma won reelection as 
President in a highly fraudulent electoral process marked by the non-participation of all 
major opposition candidates and a voter turnout of only 36 percent.  
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(20) Poland 
 
Poland set off on the road towards democracy at the end of the 1980s after a long 
and steady economic decline. On the surface, authoritarianism remained strong 
(Wesolowski 1990) and few analysts would have predicted an imminent breakdown of the 
Communist system. But attempts at reforming the ailing Polish economy “from above” 
proved unsuccessful, and when in 1988 the government felt compelled to introduce a 40 
percent rise in food prices to counter the worsening economic situation, a wave of strikes 
rippled through the country. In January 1989, there were 49 strikes with an estimated 
15.000 participants; in March of the same year, the number of strikes had quintupled 
(Pakulski and Markowski 2010). By that time the Communist authorities recognized that 
they wouldn’t be able to weather crisis after crisis without building broader public support, 
and that they’d need "national consensus and cooperation" in order to carry out reforms 
(Prohnitchi 2006). Such support, they realized, was only obtainable by including at least 
the symbolic participation of opposition forces in the decision-making processes (Powers 
1988). Therefore, when General Jaruzelski proposed reconciliation talks aimed at defusing 
the mounting social unrest, he gave de facto recognition to the banned Solidarity Union, 
once Poland’s most important opposition organization. On August 31, Interior Minister 
Czeslaw Kiszczak initiated talks with its leader, Lech Walesa, but negotiations eventually 
broke down as it became clear that the Communist nomenklatura was strictly opposed to 
one of the most important opposition demands, the legalizing of Solidarity, and instead 
intended to simply place some opposition figures in its ranks without actually changing the 
political system (Wesolowski 1990). By mid-1989, however, the situation had shifted; 
partly due to social pressure and the opposition’s refusal to accept the co-optation strategy, 
and partly due to the strengthened position of reformists within the Communist leadership. 
Specifically, the Polish Army and the security forces controlled by Jaruzelski and Kiszczak 
had gradually moved from their position as “the faithful arm of the Communist Party” to 
something approximating a “third party” (Pakulski and Markowski 2010), which played a 
major role in opening up the way for the 1989 Roundtable talks. These talks between the 
party-government side, represented by both the ruling party-state apparatus and its military 
arm, and the Solidarity-Opposition side, led by Walesa and a number of smaller opposition 
groups, lasted for two months and ended with an agreement specifying the program for the 
gradual change of the political system and the economic model. Most importantly, partly 
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open parliamentary elections were to be held in April. The results of these elections came 
as a shock to all involved parties: While the Communists and their coalition partners 
received two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House, one third of the Lower House seats 
and almost all Senate seats were claimed by Solidarity candidates. The failure of the 
Communists at the polls produced a political crisis in the party headquarters. Trying to 
save face, First Secretary Mieczyslaw Rakoswki attempted to renege on the Round Table 
agreement by insisting on filling both the President and the Prime Minister positions with 
Communist party members and by claiming the strategic ministries of Defense, Security 
and Foreign Affairs (Skórzyński 2009). When the opposition declined, the National 
Assembly elected General Jaruzelski as President on July 19, which gave the Communists 
at least titular control of Poland. However, two attempts at forming a government failed, 
and when Lech Walesa managed to arrange a coalition uniting Solidarity with the PZPR’s 
former allies, the Peasant and Democratic Parties, Jaruzelski gave in and asked Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual and Solidarity advisor, to head Poland’s first non-
Communist government in over 40 years (Los Angeles Times 1989). The Cabinet was 
reshuffled in July 1990, and in October 1990 the Constitution was amended to curtail the 
term of President Jaruzelski. Direct presidential elections – the first in Poland’s history - 
were scheduled for November 1990 and were won by Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who 
in December 1990 became Poland’s first popularly elected President.      
 
When analyzing primary and secondary sources, it becomes fairly obvious that the 
Polish authoritarian regime did experience a crisis during the country’s transition to 
democracy. We can clearly distinguish hardliners, represented by a big part of the 
Communist party nomenklatura both inside Poland and the Soviet Union ally government, 
and softliners led by General Jaruzelski and aides, as well as the leader of the Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Even though some researchers might argue that the 
“Gorbachev-factor” should be considered an “international factor”, we disagree on 
methodological grounds. Earlier we defined an authoritarian regime as being composed of 
the ruling circle and its supportive system, particularly the coercive apparatus. However, 
throughout the Soviet era, Moscow prevented Eastern European regimes from developing 
truly national Armed Forces, and Polish rulers had to essentially rely on the Soviet Army 
under the Warsaw Pact in order to protect their regime both from internal as well as from 
external enemies (Fields and Jensen 1996). Beyond the military aspect, the Soviet 
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Communist Party exercised control over satellite states’ governments through political, 
economic and cultural mechanisms, forming a unique pattern of relationships in which the 
Soviet Communist Party was the undisputed senior partner (Jones 1985, 2). Therefore, we 
argue that the Polish authoritarian government cannot be viewed separately from its Soviet 
counterpart, and the split between hardliners and softliners only makes sense if one 
includes parallel developments in the Kreml.  
 
During the years leading up to the transition, Polish society witnessed the onset of a 
gradual process of “softening” of Communist power in which softliners advocated for the 
liberalization of civil society (Prohnitchi 2006). On the side of the Polish government, 
several political initiatives were undertaken that reflected the growing conviction of 
Jaruzelski and his aides that “problems in Poland should be dealt with in a political way 
[negotiations with the opposition], and not in an administrative way [the use of force]” 
(Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006, 22). Firstly, when Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko, a 
prominent pro-Solidarity priest, was killed in 1984, Jaruzelski tasked his Interior Minister, 
General Kiszczak, with the investigation that led to four secret policemen. Jaruzelski 
allowed a public trial of the security forces, thereby demonstrating his acceptance of public 
opinion. Simultaneously, General Kiszczak moved to purge the Interior Ministry of many 
hardliners, and some of them were even expelled from senior party posts (Kaufman 1989). 
Following the Popieluszko affair, in 1986 Jaruzelski granted a full amnesty to all those 
arrested as a result of the 1981 imposition of martial law (The Szczerinianin 2013). He also 
drastically relaxed censorship, giving Poland a virtually free press. This is why, in 1988, a 
televised political debate between much vilified Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the 
leader of the pro-regime All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), Alfred Miodowicz, 
could take place (Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006, 22).  
 
In 1989, it was Jaruzelski together with General Kiszczak and another close 
political ally, Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who managed to overcome the 
resistance of the Communist party leadership towards legalizing Solidarity, and they bore 
prime responsibility for the success of the Round Table agreements. In fact, after General 
Jaruzelski agreed to the first government talks with Solidarity leaders in seven years, party 
offices in 38 of the country’s 49 provinces protested to Warsaw, and Jaruzelski was bitterly 
criticized at shop-floor meetings with Communist workers (Tagliabue 1989). Party and 
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industry conservatives feared that any recognition of the opposition organization would 
ultimately threaten their positions and power (Powers 1988). Reluctance to the project of 
legalizing Solidarity was so fierce that regime softliners had to resort to “blackmail” to 
force their way onto the hardliners.  
 
During the 10th Plenary Meeting of the PZPR on December 20-21, 1988, and 
January 16-17, 1989, Jaruzelski “took the floor several times”, and finally even threatened 
his resignation, together with those of Prime Minister Rakowski, Interior Minister 
Kiszczak and Defense Minister Siwicki, should the resolution for lifting the ban not be 
adopted (Tagliabue 1989). In an effort to sway conservatives, Rakowski, who had 
established a reputation as one of the party’s leading Liberals during his 24-year tenure as 
editor of the party’s weekly magazine Polityka, issued a speech claiming that Solidarity, if 
legalized, would have to submit to strict regulations. Yet, even opposition leaders 
understood that “Rakowski’s conditions were empty words intended to sooth the party” 
(Powers 1989). In a symptomatic reaction that reflected the wind of change in the 
Politburo, the Central Committee endorsed Jaruzelski’s plans by a vote of confidence 
(Dudek 2002, 30)  
 
 On the Soviet side, a series of public declarations by Gorbachev echoed that wind. 
In 1986 he proclaimed “unconditional respect” for the right of every country “to choose 
the paths and forms of its development” (Keller 1989), thereby de facto abandoning the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. In 1988 at a UN summit, he reiterated the principle of freedom of 
choice and proclaimed that any interference in internal affairs of sovereign states was 
inadmissible (Renwick 2006). On several occasions Gorbachev also intervened directly in 
favor of the democratization process in Poland, despite harsh criticism of Kreml and 
Warsaw Pact hardliners161. Before Jaruzelski offered round table talks to Solidarity 
Gorbachev visited Poland in the middle of a wave of violent strikes and made it clear to the 
Polish authorities that he would not approve any form of violent suppression of the 
opposition (Pakulski and Markowski 2010). Finally, when negotiations over a possible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 In the Kreml, Radomir G. Bogdanov, a Colonel in the KGB and an official of the Soviet Peace 
Committee, asserted that Solidarity’s refusal to take part in a Communist-led government had the 
significance of a “coup” (Keller 1989). In East Germany, Honecker banned Polish newspapers and started a 
hostile campaign against Polish guest workers, and the Romanian Communist party sent an open letter to 
Polish comrades warning them against “capitulation” (Pakulski and Markowski 2010). 
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new coalition government in Poland after the 1989 Parliament elections stalled, he called 
Prime Minister Rakowski and counseled him about the need for compromise, bluntly 
stating that “time had come to yield power” (Parks 1989).  
 
The most striking proof of the victory of softliners over Polish and Soviet 
hardliners, however, was the fact that neither Jaruzelski nor Gorbachev even considered 
intervening militarily after the instauration of the first non-Communist government in 
Poland. When comparing the situation with 1981, when Jaruzelski cut short a first attempt 
at liberalization by introducing martial law162, one notices two crucial differences. On one 
hand, the attitudinal change in the Soviet Union signalled that change was not only 
tolerated but welcomed (McSweeney and Tempest 1993). When Nicolae Ceausescu, the 
Romanian dictator, called for a military intervention of the Warsaw Pact States in Poland 
(Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006), his motion did not find support from the rest of 
the leaders of the Eastern bloc, including Gorbachev who openly discouraged “a new 
variant of martial law”163. This represented a significant attitudinal shift from earlier years 
when Moscow sent Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia to end the Prague Spring, or 
used Soviet troops to crush anti-Communist uprisings in Hungary and East Germany 
(Parks 1989). On the other hand, with the exception of top-level military and political 
leaders, most Poles were firmly committed nationalists, and by 1989, Polish Generals 
“presided over a schizophrenic Army composed of soldiers who were openly and 
unequivocally hostile to the Soviet Union” (Rakowska-Harmstone et al. 1984, 236). 
Therefore, it is not clear whether Jaruzelski would even have been able to prevent the 
course of events if he had tried to. 
 
Resume:  
 
Polish softliners under Jaruzelski, together with a reformist Army and the support 
of progressive-minded Soviet officials led Poland to its first non-Communist government !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!162 Jaruzelski later justified his actions, stating that he felt compelled to introduce martial law in order to 
prevent an imminent Soviet intervention (Unger!1993). He hoped to employ the minimum of force so that he 
would be able to reach agreements with the more moderate elements in the country, and continue those 
aspects of reform which would not undermine the authority of the government.  163 According to Ash (2009), Mieczysław Rakowski sounded out Gorbachev on the possibility of ‘a new 
variant of martial law’ in August 1989. Gorbachev responded that it was impossible. 
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despite resistance from hardline Communist party officials. We therefore confirm the 
presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. 
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(21) Romania 
 
 Romania embarked on the quest for multiparty politics on December 16, 1989, 
when protests broke out on part of the Hungarian minority in Timisoara in response to a 
government-ordered eviction of Protestant pastor Laszlo Tokes. Earlier that year, Tokes 
had criticized the repressive regime of Nicolae Ceausescu to Hungarian television 
(Brubaker 2006), complaining about the Human Rights situation in his country. He was 
subsequently accused of inciting ethnic hatred and was to be sent to the countryside 
(Ivanes 2001). As Tokes refused to move, the crowds that had amassed in front of his 
house to protect him were attacked by special troops of the Interior Ministry, the 
Securitate, and the Romanian Army. Over the course of three consecutive days the city 
was clouded in a civil-war-like atmosphere, pinning unarmed protestors and heavily armed 
security forces against each other in what seems to have been a direct order from 
Ceausescu himself.164 The clash left at least 400 people dead and hundreds more wounded 
(Siani-Davies 2005, 281), but by December 20, the Armed Forces deployed to crush the 
uprising were either retreating or fraternizing with the protestors. Learning about this turn 
of events, Ceausescu, returning from a state visit in Iran, decided to call a mass rally to 
demonstrate popular support to his regime in Bucharest. This move proved to be an 
enormous miscalculation on his part, as crowds gathered in front of his palace started 
jeering and calling for the downfall of the dictator (Bohlen 1990a). Mass disorders erupted 
in every major Romanian city as the live images of a fear-struck Ceausescu were broadcast 
to millions of Romanians at once (McNeil 1999). In a desperate attempt to appease the 
crowds, Ceausescu offered to raise the salary of every Romanian worker by 100 Leu (7 
Dollar), and when the attempt failed, he ordered security troops to fire (Der Spiegel 2000). 
Despite a bloody night of repression protestors returned in numbers on December 22, but 
this time the Armed Forces refused to quell the unrest. By the late morning, the security 
ring outside the Central Committee building had been breached and protestors had taken 
over the central television station. While fighting in the streets between the Romanian 
Army defectors and Ceausescu loyalists was still ongoing, a group of former Communist 
party officials under the leadership of Ion Iliescu formed the National Salvation Front, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 “Relay my orders to all officers”, Ceausescu told General Coman, the officer responsible for the Army 
units stationed in Timisoara, before the shootings began. “I want that calm should be restored in Timisoara in 
one hour” (Bohlen 1990a). 
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new party and self-proclaimed interim government (Ivanes 2001). Ceausescu and his wife 
Elena fled in a helicopter, but their pilot defected and the Army caught them. They were 
later tried in an extraordinary military tribunal and executed on Christmas Day out of fear 
that loyalists would try and rescue them (New York Times 1990a). Four months later on 
May 20, 1990, Romania held her first free presidential and parliamentary elections which 
Iliescu’s party, the National Salvation Front, won with 66,31% of the votes.  
 
Our analysis finds that there were several types of liberalizers in Romania’s regime. 
On one hand there was a little group of disaffected Communist officials, security agents 
and Army Generals that had been plotting against Ceausescu for a long time and that found 
the popular uprising a convenient opportunity to put their “palace coup” in motion (Chilton 
1994; Haerpfer 2009; Roper 2000; Der Spiegel 2009). On the other hand, there were critics 
of Ceausescu from within his own ranks, which spoke out against him but did not dare 
engaging in regime-overthrowing activities. Finally, a third group of softliners composed 
of spontaneous defectors from government officials and security forces increased in 
number as the popular rebellion advanced. This last group encompassed notably the bulk 
of the Armed Forces, and was crucial in tipping the balance of power in favor of the 
softliners.  
 
The first group, a number of second and third tier nomenklatura members, in 
cooperation with some retired Army Generals and Securitate officers, had secretly been 
conspiring against Ceausescu since the early 1970s (Ratesh 1991). Little is known about 
their true motives, but many historians believe they wanted more power than what 
Ceausescu was willing to concede (Zeit Online 2009). They did not want a transition to 
democracy but were looking to reform the existing regime in order to create a more 
humane form of Socialism (Ivanes 2001). In an interview with the French magazine “Le 
Nouvel Observateur”, former conspirator General Nicolae Militaru, Minister of Defense in 
the post-revolutionary government, admitted that the group165 had been preparing to unseat 
Ceausescu in Spring of 1990, and that they simply joined the uprising in December (Le 
Nouvel Observateur 1990). Silviu Brucan, one of the key actors of the conspiracy, explains !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!165 Members of the group are said to have been Militaru himself, former Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe, 
Defence Minister Ion Ionita, Securitate official Virgil Magureanu, Army General Costyal, Silviu Brucan, 
editor in chief of the Party daily Scanteia, and Ion Iliescu, Ceausescu’s former heir apparent who fell from 
favor for criticizing Ceausescu’s Mao-like personality cult (McNeil 1999; Le Nouvel Observateur 1990) 
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in his book (Brucan 1993, 153) that the first attempt to stage a coup was planned for 1984, 
but that the movement was found out and many of the main instigators were arrested and 
executed.  Nonetheless the plotting continued in secret and by 1989, he claims, sections of 
the Army and Securitate had already been won over. The fact that the Army and large 
swathes of the security services defected on the morning of December 22, 1989 could be 
considered proof of Brucan’s claim. He also reveals that the group had received “support 
for their plans” both in Washington and in London, as well as from Gorbachev (Brucan 
1993, 150).166 
 
The second group of softliners consisted of government and party officials who, 
albeit critical of Ceausescu and his ruling style, did not dare oppose him openly or 
undertake any subversive action against his regime. For instance, after the annual 
convention of the Romanian Communist Party in 1989, a “Committee for National Change 
within the framework of the Romanian Communist Party” came forward with a 44-point 
program demanding the removal from power of the Ceausescu clan and encouraged all 
neighboring socialist countries to cut ties to the Romanian Communist Party (Der Spiegel 
1989a). However, the signatories of the letter remained anonymous; an experience that 
also Mr. Iliescu and Mr. Brucan had to make when looking for allies willing to participate 
in a hypothetical post-Ceausescu government (Bohlen 1990a). Despite good contacts in the 
Politbureau, both men were unable to find anyone in Ceausescu’s close entourage 
courageous enough to make a move, although many hinted that they shared their views. Up 
to November 1989, the most “daring” attempt to speak out against Ceausescu were two 
letters. The first one was written by Brucan in March 1989 and was signed by six high-
level Communist Party officials.167 They demanded an end to Ceausescu’s increasingly 
repressive reign of terror, which they considered “a danger for the biological existence of 
the nation” (Der Spiegel 1989b). The second letter was a report prepared by Dumitru 
Mazilu, a former member of the Romanian State Security Council, which was smuggled 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!166 Similar to events in Poland, the positive attitude of the Soviet leadership provided an important boost to 
Romanian softliners. Not only promised Gorbachev the coup plotters the Soviet Army would not interfere 
(McNeil 1999), he also publicly encouraged the Romanian uprising in their “'breaking off with the 
authoritarian regime and embarking on the road of democratic renewal” (Clines 1989) 167 The signatories of the letter were Romanian diplomat Mircea Raceanu, Party Secretary Gheorghe 
Apostol, former Deputy Prime Minister Alexandru Birladeanu, Party founding member Constantin 
Pirvulescu, former Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu and Grigore Raceanu, Mircea Raceanu’s stepfather 
(Binder 1989c) 
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out of Bucharest and denounced Ceausescu’s Human Rights abuses and the terrible living 
conditions of ordinary Romanians (Lewis 1989) 
 
By the time of the Romanian uprising, however, the third group of softliners proved 
decisive in transforming dissent within the Romanian regime into a true crisis from which 
reformers would emerge victorious. As crowds swelled in front of the Presidential palace, 
defections increased both within the government apparatus and the military wing of the 
regime. On December 17, for instance, Ceausescu threatened to execute two of his top 
Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and the Defense Minister, for their cautious handling 
of the Timisoara demonstrations. He met with a rare objection from his inner circle of 
advisors, notably from Ion Dinca, the former Prime Minister (Bohlen 1990b). A few days 
later, State Security chief Iulian Vlad announced over the radio that he was siding with the 
insurgents, and encouraged the Army and the Securitate to join him (Binder 1989a; Binder 
1989b). Most importantly, however, the death of Defense Minister General Vasie Milea 
proved crucial in turning the Armed Forces against the regime. Since Milea’s actions 
during his final hours are in dispute168, the announcement of his death suggested to many 
that the loyalty of the Army’s High Command was in doubt,169 and that a similar fate 
could await those who stayed with the regime (Hall 2000).   
 
Available evidence suggests that the troops did indeed initially join the shootings at 
Timisoara on December 17 under the direction of Chief of Staff General Stefan Guse, but 
that many of them were either coerced into shooting170 or led to believe they were fighting 
Hungarian insurgents (Bohlen 1990a)171. However, when troops were confronted not with 
foreign ursupators but fellow Romanians who were voicing many of the same concerns 
that they and their families shared, soldiers reportedly refused to carry out their orders and 
some even joined in the demonstrations (Ratesh 1991, 33-34). Army Major Viorel Oancea !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!168 Some claim he committed suicide because he couldn’t bring himself to order troops to fire on innocent 
protestors. Others claim he was executed by Ceausescu for disobeying orders (New York Times 1990b; New 
York Times 1989) 169 Ceausescu seemed to be aware that elements in the Armed Forces were reconsidering their loyalty to 
him. In response to this threat, he retired approximately half of his Generals during the Annual Communist 
Party congress in 1989 (Der Spiegel 1989a). 170 Conscripts who refused were summarily executed, and the wounded were being killed in hospitals 
(McNeil 1999) 171 This tactic proved disastrous for Ceausescu, as the Army High Command felt betrayed and “disgraced in 
front of the people”. As Major Lupoiu put it, “it forced officers to take a clear position, and the one [they] 
chose was against Ceausescu (Bohlen 1990a) 
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was to become the first higher-ranking Army official in Timisoara to publicly declare his 
allegiance to the revolution (Urian 1990, 5/11). The operation commander, General Victor 
Stancalescu, soon joined him. Realizing that the security forces “couldn’t kill everyone in 
Timisoara” (Binder 1989d), he had his leg put into a cast as camouflage and returned to 
Bucharest to support the uprising which most of the regular conscripts had already joined 
(McNeil 1999). His switching sides is generally considered one of the key moments of the 
democratic transition, as he ordered the Army to return to the barracks, oversaw much of 
the transition process as new Defense Minister, and was responsible for the capture and the 
execution of the Ceausescus (Der Spiegel 2009). The gruesome end of the dictator and his 
wife proves just how much the soldiers were disaffected with the regime: whereas only 
five volunteers were asked to execute Ceausescu, eighty soldiers insisted on shooting (Los 
Angeles Times 1990). 
 
Resume:  
 
Facing overwhelming crowds demonstrating for democracy, Romanian dictator 
Ceausescu was ousted after a critical mass of progressive elements in the civilian and the 
military wing of his regime turned against him. Thus it is adequate to speak of a crisis of 
the authoritarian regime. 
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(22) Mongolia 
 
Mongolia began its transition to democracy in the wake of the upheavals that took 
place in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s policy directives of Glasnost and 
Perestroika sent ripple effects through the MPRP, Mongolia’s Communist Party, and 
initiated cautious movement toward reform starting in 1986: “orchloj bajguulat” (renewal), 
and “il tod” (transparency) (Batbayar 2003; Boone 1994). Liberalization took a big step 
forward in 1988, when General Secretary Jambyn Batmunkh at a plenum of the MPRP 
Central Committee publicly criticized former Mongolian leader Tsedenbal and triggered a 
public debate about national culture and the crimes committed during Mongolia’s 
transition to Communism in the 1930s (Fritz 2008). Batmunkh’s statements – virtually 
unheard of in Mongolia – not only contributed significantly to delegitimizing the existing 
regime, but they also encouraged the formation of a pro-democratic opposition. In early 
1989, the first organized opposition groups emerged172 and quickly formed into political 
parties, such as the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU). They demanded a multiparty 
system, free elections with universal suffrage, the replacement of the centrally planned 
economy with a market system, private property, reorganization of the government, and 
protection of Human Rights (Heaton 1991). Whereas Batmunkh initially responded 
positively to these demands and promised a dialogue with the MDU, the ruling party 
appeared divided: Premier Dumaagiyn Sodnom denied any political or economic necessity 
for reform, saying that restructuring could occur gradually over five years, and other 
Politburo members contended that the main purpose of having other parties would be to 
improve the performance of the ruling party (Ulaanbaatar International Service 1990; 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service 1990). However, an upsurge in public political 
activity between December 1989 and March 1990 involving street protests with as many as 
20.000 people led to a crisis of confidence within the MPRP (Sanders 1999, 692).  On 
March 9, Batmunkh announced the resignation of the entire Politburo, signalling a major 
breakthrough, and a new leadership under G. Ochirbat took over the party’s reins. Under 
Ochirbat, Mongolia entered into protracted negotiations with opposition forces to enact 
real democratic reform (Doh Chull Shin 2008). For instance, in May 1990, the constitution 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Examples include a group called “New Generation” led by S. Zorig and E. Bat-Uul, and the “Club of 
Young Economists” led by M. Enkhsaikhan and D. Ganbold. 
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was amended in two ways: first, by deleting any reference to the MPRP’s role as the 
“guiding force in the country”,173 and second, by emphasizing the “establishment of 
democracy” as key element (Soni 2008). Moreover, new parties were legalized; the “State 
Little Hural”, a standing legislative body elected by proportional representation of parties 
was created; and a new electoral law fixing the date of the next General Election to July 
1990 was approved. The first free multiparty elections were held on July 29, and the 
MPRP democratically renewed their rule with 85% of votes cast.    
 
In Mongolia, high Mongolian Communist Party officials (such as G. Ochirbat 
himself) actually confirmed the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Our 
analysis comes to a similar conclusion: Although there was a small number of reticent 
party hardliners, softliners within the MPRP became predominant already very early in the 
transition and remained vastly unchallenged throughout.  Similarly to other transitions in 
the former Soviet bloc, Mongolia’s transition featured two kinds of enabling forces: On 
one hand, Gorbatchev and the Soviet Union’s Armed Forces provided a fertile climate for 
a democratic overhaul and effectively prevented Mongolian hardliners from organising an 
armed crack-down on opposition forces. On the other hand, Mongolian softliners provided 
the “ground work”, marginalising the anti-reform forces within the Party and carrying out 
actual reforms in collaboration with the leading opposition figures.   
 
The ascension to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and the 
domestic and foreign policy reforms he advocated were crucial for liberalization in 
Mongolia (Gail 1987, 1-9). In 1986, shortly after announcing his perestroika and glasnost 
policies, Gorbachev gave a speech in Vladivostok signalling a rapprochement with China, 
and at the same time a plan to reduce, and ultimately completely withdraw Soviet troops 
from Mongolia (Gelman 1988, 48; Heaton 1987, 76). For Mongolia’s ruling party this had 
two important consequences. Firstly, Mongolia’s Army had always been weak, given that 
the Soviet Union had been the main protector of its borders (Doorenspleet and Mudde 
2008). As Murphy pointed out, since Mongolia became independent, Russians had been 
directing all important coercive organs: the Ministry of War had eight military advisors !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 The elimination of the MPRP’s monopoly on power was something that Batmunkh had been suggesting, 
who argued “the party [should] achieve a leading role through its work rather than through a constitutional 
position” (Sanders 1990a, 11).  
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and the head of the Secret Police was Russian, as were all the military training officers 
(Murphy 1966, 97). Therefore, in withdrawing that pillar of support Gorbachev favored 
liberalization in Mongolia by taking away the possibility for regime hardliners of 
organising a violent crack-down on pro-reform forces (Fritz 2008). Secondly, as Mongolia 
lost much of its geo-strategic importance for the Soviet Union, it also lost much of its 
foreign economic aid (Far Eastern Economic Review 1991). By consequent, Mongolia’s 
domestic rulers were forced to look for alternative partners (who were also often more 
favorable to democratization than the Soviet Union had been) to ensure their economic and 
security interests.174 At the same time, Gorbachev’s opposition to violent reactions against 
anti-Communist protests in satellite countries175  conveyed a very important political 
message to the Mongolian Communist party leadership. In fact, the replacement of 
Tsedenbal as Mongolia’s party leader with Jambyn Batmunkh was without doubt 
undertaken with direct approval from Moscow (Ginsburg 1995). In short, the loss of Soviet 
commitment (both military and economic) in Mongolia reinforced the moderate stance of 
Communist elites and reduced the democratisation process to a national occurrence in 
which the Mongolian leadership, freed from the constraints of Soviet authority, could take 
decisions favorable to Mongolia’s national interests (Franquelli 2013).  
 
The first of those leaders was Jambyn Batmunkh, a young and pragmatic politician 
who, although very much a Communist176 , was less entrenched and more open to 
democratic change than his predecessors (Fritz 2008). Inspired by Gorbachev’s lead, he 
initiated Mongolia’s own form of perestroika and glasnost in stages, interpreting it as a 
way of restructuring people’s old habits and thinking in order to initiate processes of 
renewal within the new party leadership (Sanders 1989, 46). In the first stage of reform, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 In 1987, for example, Mongolia established diplomatic relations with the United States (Akiner 1991, 66). 
175 When Gorbachev witnessed the Tiananmen protests in China in 1989, he addressed the media, stating that 
he would support the reform process in Socialist countries and that he would use political methods to resolve 
the situation if prodemocratic movements were to form in Russia (Pravda 1989).!
176 When Batmunkh came to power, he promised to continue strengthening the relationship with the Soviet 
Union, vowing that the political orientation of the Soviet Communist party was, and would remain, the 
principal line of the Mongolia Communist Party and state (Sanders 1985, 124). As Kaplonski argued (2004, 
51), although Batmunkh later severely criticized the Socialist doctrine and initiated a severe reappraisal of 
Mongolia’s approach to Socialism, the very existence of the Communist Party was not in doubt for him. In 
fact, in his book Never Allow the Use of Force in Decision Making he claimed that the reforms he introduced 
were not about abolishing Socialism, but about eliminating mistakes caused by the flaws of Socialism. In 
doing so he hoped to deepen Socialism and to move it in the right direction (Bayantur 2008).  
! 347!
initiated at the December 1988 MPRP plenum, Batmunkh announced that decision-making 
within the MPRP was to be decentralized and multi-candidate elections for all levels were 
to be held. Enterprises were allowed to retain a share of hard currency earnings, and a new 
foreign policy approach featuring greater interaction with Western and Asian economies 
was initiated. Most importantly, he encouraged civil society, non-governmental 
organizations, and their engagement in party and state issues (The Asia Foundation 2000). 
In the next reform stage initiated in 1989, Batmunkh introduced a number of new programs 
on economic productivity. On the political front he set up commissions to revise the MPRP 
program, draft amendments to MPRP rules, and most importantly, revise the MPRP 
Constitution (Sanders 1990b, 61).  
 
It was under Batmunkh’s rule that Mongolia’s transition passed through one of its 
most decisive moments- a point in time that would show the dominance of regime 
softliners and the isolation of conservatives. When in early 1990 the MDU began 
launching a campaign for the regime to step down, the MPRP was seriously divided over 
how to respond (Ginsburg 1995). Hardliners pushed for a furious, Tiananmen-Square-style 
reaction and even sent Security Services to threaten high-ranking accommodationists (Fish 
1998). However, when they wrote a decree ordering police to crack down on protesters, 
Batmunkh opposed it, stating: “I will never sign this. We few Mongols have not yet come 
to the point that we will make each other’s noses bleed” (Enkhtuul and Oyun undated). 
Instead, he declared that he, together with the entire ruling Politbureau, resigned from their 
offices, and in an apparent step toward permitting the country’s first multi-party-elections, 
recommended that the Party hold a special Congress in April 1990 to elect new leaders. 
“To change the party, we should change the leadership (...) by choosing clever, 
constructive people committed to (...) the perestroika” (Reuters 1990a), Batmunkh said177.  
 
On March 15, 1990, three important events took place: the MPRP’s Central 
Committee inaugurated the MPRP’s youngest and most reform-minded Politbureau in 
decades; it summarily retired 13 prominent Committee members that were considered 
strong Conservatives (Wilhelm 1990); and it warned five others about misuse of power 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!177 Other steps proposed by Batmunkh included (a) eliminating a constitutional provision stipulating that the 
MPRP was the leading force in society; (b) revising the Constitution; and (c) rehabilitating people formerly 
labeled as anti-party elements (Holley 1990c). 
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under deposed hard-line President Tsedenbal (Reuters 1990b). At the same time, it 
appointed former Trade Union leader Gombogavin Ochirbat as the Party’s new General 
Secretary; a “kind, theoretical man” who, according to high-ranking Party sources, was 
“reformist and forward looking” (Holley 1990a). “This is the beginning of real change in 
Mongolia," Foreign Ministry spokesman Tepbishiin Chimeddorj told journalists in Ulan 
Bator. Ochirbat admitted that the Communist Party had made “many mistakes” (Holley 
1990b), and that Mongolian society “must be entirely renewed” (Los Angeles Times 
1990). To this end, he announced that the MPRP was dropping “outdated tenets” such as 
the teachings of Marx and Lenin (Deseret News 1991) and promised to hold the country’s 
first free elections. “The MPRP has reached a turning point in its history”, Ochirbat said. 
“Deep and fundamental democratization of our society is the guarantee against a revival of 
Stalinism in our country” (Oka 1990). Finally he reaffirmed the MPRP’s commitment to 
democratization “as fast as possible” (Esteruelas 1990), which was also a sign that he 
recognized the direct impact of opposition activity on the crisis within the Mongolian 
Communist Party. 
 
Resume:  
 
Resisting hardliner pressure to use force on protesters, Mongolian softliners under 
Batmunkh carried through reforms that led to a reformed Communist Party and free 
elections. Hence, we confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis. 
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(23) South Korea 
 
South Korea’s first attempt at democratization during the Third Wave began in 
1979 when the economic decline mobilized protests against long-time ruler Park Chung-
Hee. Responding to opposition demands, Park relaxed the application of laws against 
dissent and released over 1000 political prisoners (US Department of State 1979a), but 
resistance to his repressive Yushin regime grew and even members of the government 
openly began criticizing the Park administration (US Department of State 1979b). In 
August 1979, almost 200 unemployed female workers of Y.H. Industrial Company staged 
a sit-in at the headquarters of the NDP, South Korea’s main opposition party (Lee 1980). 
Emboldened by its success in the 1978 General Election, the NDP had recently elected 
Kim Young Sam as its leader, a hardliner who vowed to “overthrow the Park regime” (US 
Department of State 1979c) and to bring democracy back to South Korea. The government 
responded with a clamp down on opposition, arresting key NDP officials, confiscating 
NDP newspapers and raiding NDP headquarters killing several protestors in the process 
(Keesing’s Worldwide 1980). Additionally, on October 15, 1979, Park obtained the 
exclusion of Kim from the government-controlled National Assembly. The next day more 
than 50.000 protestors rallied in the streets of Busan, Kim’s hometown, and the uprising 
quickly spread to the neighboring Masan area. On October 18, 1979, the Park regime 
declared Martial Law and prepared to quell the uprisings with force. However, before such 
a crack-down could be carried out, Park was shot by his own security chief, Kim Chae 
Kyu, a moderate who claimed that his actions were motivated by a desire to further 
democratization. He later was arrested and executed by soldiers under Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. Chung Seung Hwa. After the assassination, Liberal Prime Minister Choi Kyu Han 
assumed the role of acting President and formed a transitional government. Choi promised 
to reform the Yushin Constitution “to promote democracy” (Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008) 
and to organize new elections. Additionally, he revoked many of the emergency decrees 
issued by Park, released political prisoners and restored the civil liberties of opposition 
politicians such as Kim Dae Jung (Dukhong 1997). On December 12, 1979, the transition 
suffered its first setback when hardliners Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan and Maj. Gen. Roh 
Tae Woo, together with members of their secret military society "Hanahoe", launched a 
palace coup to arrest Gen. Chung Seung Hwa along with 16 other pro—democracy 
officers. Following that coup Chun became chief of staff of the ROK military, and on April 
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14, 1980, he also took over control of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). 
From that moment on, Chun had become the de facto ruler of South Korea, reducing Choi 
and the other civilian members of the transitional government to a set of figureheads 
(Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008, 3). When another round of violent student demonstrations 
shook the street in May 1980, Chun pressured Choi into declaring Martial Law, suspended 
all political activity and deployed troops throughout the country. In Kwangju, where an 
uprising had taken control of the city from government forces, a brutal assault by 20.000 
soldiers caused between 600 and 2000 deaths and marked the end of any effective 
resistance to Chun’s regime (Gi-Wook and Moon 2003). Following the Kwangju massacre, 
President Choi resigned and Chun ordered the National Assembly to be dissolved. On 
August 27, 1980, the National Conference for Unification elected Chun as his successor; 
he was officially inaugurated as South Korea’s 5th President on September 1, 1980.  
 
In South Korea’s first attempt at democratization, we conclude that there was no 
crisis of the authoritarian regime, even though there was a division among the regime elite 
into hardliners and softliners. According to the testimony of regime insider and Park-
murderer Kim Chae Kyu, the proliferation of resistance to the regime’s policies caused a 
split within the innermost circle of the regime, pinning those who advocated a policy of 
conciliation toward the pro-democracy movement against those who favored even greater 
repression (Kihl 1984, 76; Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008, 9). The hardline military led by 
Chun Doo Hwan had the goal of maintaining the authoritarian regime, whereas the 
mainstream military led by Chung Sung-Hwa and the Choi government could be classified 
as reformers. However, the pro-reform forces were quickly marginalised and eventually 
purged from the regime, which shifted the power relationship within the ruling bloc in 
favor of hardliners.  
 
The first and possibly fatal weakness of regime softliners was their lack of 
cohesion, evidenced by their treatment of Park-murderer Kim Chae Kyu. For many years 
there was confusion about Kim’s true motives for the murder. On one hand, hardliners did 
their best to paint Kim in a negative light, claiming the murder was a reaction to Kim’s 
growing marginalization within the KCIA in favor of Park’s bodyguard Cha Ji-Chul 
(Breen 2012) and Kim’s own ambitions to become President (Keesing’s Worldwide 1980). 
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On the other hand, there is much evidence that Kim was indeed a convinced reformer178 
who was appalled by the Busan/Masan massacres and killed Park in order to avoid greater 
bloodshed (Lee 1980)179. The assassination of Park by Kim Chae Kyu constituted a unique 
chance for pro-reform forces within the Park government to seize the initiative and present 
a united front for change that hardliners might have found difficult to brush aside. 
However, in the aftermath of Park’s murder, the moderate members of the regime, and 
particularly the military, failed to support Kim. In fact, an overwhelming majority of South 
Korean Generals favored an opening of the regime and a disengagement of the Armed 
Forces from the daily political struggles (Warner 1995)180. Therefore, when Kim asked 
the Army Chief of Staff and martial Law Commander Gen. Chung Song-Hwa to execute a 
coup the evening of the murder, he was within reason to believe that Chung, who was 
praised by the US as “more moderate than most of his fellow Generals” (Young 2003, 60), 
would support the move. However, Chung refused in the name of Law and Order and 
proceeded to arrest Kim, who later was tortured and executed (Kihl 1984, 78).  
 
The second fatal blow to the strength of regime softliners was dealt on December 
12, 1979, when hardliners General Chun Doo Hwan, the Commander of the Defense 
Security Command General Roh Tae Woo, and “a group of men very close to President 
Park” (US Department of State 1979d) arrested Chung along with 16 other high-ranking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!178 Many reports prove that Kim indeed favored democracy. After his arrest calligraphy about freedom and 
democracy were found in his house (MBC TV 2004). The American Ambassador considered him an 
untypical intelligence chief, citing his apparent support for democracy and improvements in the Human 
Rights department (Breen 2012). For instance, he is said to have criticized the formation of Hanahoe, a 
fraternity of young military graduates loyal to Park. He also opposed the Yushin Constitution and tried to get 
it amended by asking Roman Catholic Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan to intervene with Park, comparing the 
President to a “sick patient” (Breen 2012). He also made contact with opposition leader Jang Jun-Ha who 
allegedly called him 'a patriotic soldier' and voiced hope they'd one day work together to achieve democracy 
(Kahm 2005). When Kim realized that Park wouldn’t change his authoritarian ways, he first planned to arrest 
him and force his resignation on one of Park’s visits to Kim’s Army base. (Kyung-Ae 2011a). Later, he 
resolved to assassinate Park, with the date for the assassination originally set for April 1979 and later 
changed to October because of Park’s heightened security presence. 179 Until his last moments Kim maintained that he “shot the heart of Yushin like a beast. I did that for 
democracy of this country. Nothing more, nothing less” (Kyung-Ae 2011b). He claimed that on the evening 
Park died he briefed Park on the Busan rioters, telling him they were angry citizens and not the “impure 
elements” that the regime used to blame. He also warned that discontent could turn into a nationwide revolt 
and destroy the regime (Warner 1995). Park allegedly said that he would give the order to shoot 
demonstrators if the situation worsened, and received support from Cha who said that it wouldn’t matter if 
one or two million Koreans were killed (Breen 2010).  
180 In a secret meeting held after Park’s assassination, Chung, along with other “mainstream” officers, 
allegedly opposed the intervention of the military in politics and expressed a “moderate” political view 
favoring civilian rule based on a new and more moderate Constitution. In contrast, young Generals led by 
Chun Doo Hwan opposed civilian rule and a transition to democracy, but since Chung still maintained 
control over the military, their objections were ignored (Chung 1987, 98 – 99 and 239). 
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officers, and initiated a purge of reformers at all levels of the military (Yang 1994, 429). 
The coup-plotters, also known as “Shingunbu” (“the New Military”), all belonged to 
Hanahoe, a politicised segment of the officer corps that had accumulated vast powers 
under President Park (Kim 2004) and were therefore in a particularly influential position 
after his death. Chun ordered the arrest of Chung on allegations of the latter’s involvement 
in Park’s murder (Sue-Young 2010), but later testimonies of fellow Generals181 revealed 
that Roh and Chun, in a meeting on Dec 7, 1979, had already decided to overthrow the 
government (WuDunn 1995) and mobilized their troops to that effect (Jameson 1987). US 
Commander John Wickham described the coup as “an illegal power grab by an insurgent 
group of Generals”, lamenting that Chun and his co-conspirators were fueled more by 
personal ambition than by the national interest. Chun himself might also have been intent 
on preventing his potential marginalisation from power, as Chung had allegedly planned 
on demoting the General (The Korea Herald 2012).  
 
After the neutralization of Chung and the purging of fellow reformers from the 
military, the moderate transitional government of Choi Kyu Han was surrounded by 
hardliners who subsequently dislocated the civilian leadership to take over control of the 
transition. Some observers blamed this development at least partly on Choi’s personality, 
citing his lack of “political experience and leadership qualities” (Kihl 1984, 77)182. Indeed, 
before his election to the presidency on December 6, 1979, Choi had never been a political 
figure and had neither an independent political base nor an independent support base in the 
military (Lee 1980). As US Secretary of State Vance famously remarked, it was “obvious 
to even the most unsophisticated observer that the focus of power in South Korea remained 
with the military” (Young 2003, 60). Even though Choi was the titular head of the Armed 
Forces, many doubted he was strong enough to keep the military in check (Christian 
Science Monitor 1980), especially after the Shingunbu won the three core Cabinet 
positions of Defense, Home and Justice within the Choi government (Nam 1989, 186 - 
187).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Former Brig. Gen. Kim Chin Ki described the Dec 12, 1979 coup as “a thoroughly pre-planned, unsavory 
mutiny by junior officers against the Army leadership that completely demolished the command structure” of 
the Armed Forces (Jameson 1987). 182 In leaked cables US Ambassador William Gleysteen revealed that he was so pessimistic about Choi’s 
ability to run the government that he began to focus on other men within the regime such as Prime Minister 
Shin (US Department of State 1979e- h). 
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In our opinion, the brutal repression of the Kwangju uprisings shows most clearly 
that from December 1979 on, Chun, and not Choi, was in control of the South Korean 
regime. After enacting Martial Law on May 17, 1980, the government paratroopers of the 
21st Division killed between 600 and 2000 protestors in an indiscriminate and premeditated 
show of strength designed to prove that the new military would treat individuals or groups 
who challenged the military with maximum brutality (Yang 1994, 429 - 431). Shortly 
afterwards, Choi resigned from the government and Chun ushered the country in another 
seven years of dictatorship. In sum, the demise of Park did not result in the demise of 
military rule in South Korea’s first attempt at democratization; rather, what was toppled 
was an individual ruler, and not the system itself (Kim 2004, 124).  
 
Resume:  
 
South Korea’s transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime, 
as regime softliners were weak and divided. By consequence, hardliners were free to purge 
reform-minded elements from the military and to slowly eclipse the moderate civilian 
leadership.  
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(24) Philippines 
 
The Philippines set off on the road to democracy in the early 1980s. At that time, 
the country experienced a prolonged economic crisis and a growing Communist 
insurrection, but Marcos, the Philippine’s longtime dictator, refused to adopt the economic 
stabilisation measures proposed by the IMF and other international lenders. Instead, 
widespread government corruption and serious electoral fraud during the 1981 presidential 
elections alienated large parts of the population and favored the development of a growing 
opposition movement to Marcos’ rule. In 1983, the government-approved assassination of 
Benino Aquino, a popular politician who had spent the last three years in exile, was the 
match that lit the fire on the Marcos regime. According to Aquino’s wife Cory who would 
later become the leader of the pro-reform movement, “the nation was awakened by that 
deafening shot” (Ulgi Tavaana 2014). When Marcos banned TV coverage of the Aquino 
funeral, rallies and other forms of resistance sprang up in cities all over the Philippines. 
The sham trial183 of the officials suspected of the Aquino murder only served to further the 
growing loss of legitimacy of the government (Binnendijk 1987). In November 1985, 
yielding to domestic and international pressure, Marcos announced his decision to hold a 
“snap” presidential election on an American television talk show, “This Week with David 
Brinkley”. Threatening “to jail any foreign observers who come within 50 meters of the 
poll” (New York Times 1986), he believed the elections set for February 7, 1986 would 
solidify international support for his regime and prove he still had the support of the 
Philippine populace184. Despite an election process marred with blatant fraud185, the 
Marcos-dominated National Assembly proclaimed him the official winner on February 15, 
1986. The Filipino people, however, refused to accept the results, asserting that Aquino 
was the real victor (Caouette 2012). Encouraged by the defection of two of Marcos’ senior 
military commanders, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel 
Ramos, masses of protesters started pouring onto Manila’s main thoroughfare, the Epifanio !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Despite an eyewitness testifying she saw one of Aquino’s escorts, a Metropolitan Command trooper under 
the authority of two of the country’s most senior Generals, Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas, 
shoot Aquino as he exited the plane, the accused were finally acquitted (Quinn-Judge 1985). 
184 When asked how the opposition might do in a special election, Marcos boasted: “If they can get 30 to 40 
percent of the vote, I will be disappointed” (Reaves 1985). 
185 COMELEC vote tabulators even walked out in protest because the results of the polls were rigged in favor 
of the incumbent Marcos (PHVote 2013), stating they “did not want (...) to be used in any way that violates 
fundamental professional ethics”. US Senator John Kerry, visiting from the US, remarked later that “these 
people are angry enough that they’ve walked out”.!
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de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). When Marcos sent in tanks to clear the street, the soldiers 
refused to shoot, prompting one of the most iconic images of the rebellion: nuns standing 
in front of the tanks, offering flowers (McGeown 2011; Ulgi Tavaana 2014). Finally, the 
coup de grace to the Marcos regime was dealt by US President Reagan through Senator 
Paul Laxalt, who called up Marcos to withdraw his support and suggested he should “cut 
and cut clean” (Briscoe 2011). On the evening of February 25, the day both Aquino and 
Marcos had held separate inauguration ceremonies to underline their right to the 
Presidency, Marcos and his close entourage left the country for exile in Hawaii.  
 
 Our analysis of the Marcos government actors shows that the Philippine transition 
is indeed characterized by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. The decisive split took place 
between Marcos and his immediate family on one hand, and major parts of his coercive 
apparatus on the other hand. In fact, whereas certain civilian parts of Marcos’ regime also 
broke with the ageing dictator, the Army emerged as the principal softliner and was strong 
enough to force Marcos and remaining hardliner loyalists out of the country.  
 
 By the early 1980s, a number of elite divisions within the Marcos regime were 
manifest (Wurfel 1988), most importantly with regards to the economic business elite who 
felt eclipsed by Marcos' “cronies” (Kline 1992). In 1981, the Makati Business Club was 
formulated as one of the first official responses to the new political situation, marking a 
shift from covert to overt opposition to the regime (Schock 1999). Later in the mid-1980s, 
Carlos Romulos, Marcos’ loyal Foreign Minister, complained to a visitor that the Marcoses 
“are stealing us blind” (New York Times 1986). Whereas Romulos didn’t express his 
frustration with the regime by overtly defecting, several high-rank politicians switched to 
the opposition during the years leading up to Marcos’ removal from office. Among them 
were for example Salvador Laurel, an assemblyman of Marcos’ New Society Movement 
Party186; Ernesto Maceda187 who was a former presidential executive secretary; and Luis 
Villafuerte, former Trade Minister until 1982 (The Nevada Daily Mail 1986). Finally, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Laurel deserted Marcos in 1980 when the dictator decided to eliminate all political parties in favor of the 
Single Party Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).  He founded the United Nationalists Democratic 
Organization (UNIDO) that became the main voice of opposition in the 1980s and later announced he would 
run for the Presidency against Marcos in 1986. He eventually abandoned his candidacy in favor of Cory 
Aquino. 
187 Maceda broke with Marcos over the Martial Law Declaration in 1977 and eventually became the advisor 
of Benigno Aquino. Following the latter’s assassination, Maceda became one of the leaders of the opposition 
during the 1984 Batasan Pambansa Campaign and the 1986 snap elections.!
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several hours before Marcos fled the country, a number of Foreign Ministry personnel, 
among them nine of the country’s ambassadors and Ernesto Pineda, the Consul General in 
New York, issued a statement of loyalty addressed to Cory Aquino (Reaves and Cawley 
1986). 
 
Divisions in the military were decisive for the transition. They developed gradually 
throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to Marcos’ personalization of the 
Armed Forces188, his inability to end the Communist insurgency, and frustration among 
the younger officers about the corruption and lack of professionalism in the military (May, 
Lawson and Selochan 2004). The most significant rivalry within the Armed Forces was 
between General Fidel Ramos189 and General Ponce Enrile190 on one hand, and General 
Fabian Ver191, whose rise to power was the result of personal loyalty to Marcos, on the 
other hand. By 1984 Ramos and Enrile were spearheading the Reformed Armed Forces 
Movement (RAM)192, which claimed a following of some 70 percent of the officer corps 
(Cunning-Bruce 1986). When Ver and 25 other Marcos loyalists were acquitted from the 
murder of Benigno Aquino after a trial that many considered a travesty, the divisions 
within the military became visible. In the run-up to the 1986 snap elections, members of 
the RAM publicly announced plans for holding an election education program throughout !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 Among other things, officers resented Marcos’ despotism and disrespectful treatment of the Armed 
Forces. For instance, US diplomatic cables of 1973 reveal that Marcos forced his military chiefs to parade in 
women’s’ clothes during a birthday party for his wife Imelda in front of high-ranking diplomats (South China 
Morning Post 2013)!
189 Ramos, a reform-minded West Point graduate, often complained that he was hamstrung in his effort to 
eliminate corruption and violence against civilians by Philippine soldiers. He added that while Marcos had 
assigned him to ensure clean elections, “he [Marcos] and some of his leaders were doing just the opposite” 
(Ellison 1986) 
190 Enrile had been distancing himself from Marcos for several years, sensing that the President’s loyalty to 
him was waning. One year before the special election was called, Enrile spoke of his ambition to run for 
President if it turned out that neither Marcos nor his wife Imelda were interested. When it turned out that 
Marcos had decided to run again and Gen. Ver had been nominated to be his Vice President, Enrile 
supposedly told friends that he planned to leave the government because of his dissatisfaction with the 
Marcos regime. Then-Foreign Minister Castro, on the other hand, said Enrile was only “sulking” because he 
had not been chosen as Marcos’ Vice President (Ellison 1986). 191 Ver was part of a new military structure created by Marcos which was designed to marginalise the 
traditional military and further the Presidential Guard. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, were viewed by 
most observers as being at “an all-time low: demoralized, factionalized, and seriously underequipped”. A 
Western military attaché described the situation of ordinary soldiers as “wretched” and stated he was 
surprised they hadn’t mutinied yet (Quinn-Judge 1986) 
192 The Movement consisted mostly of younger officers led by graduates of the Philippine Military Academy 
Class of 71, Lt. Col. Gringo Honasan, Lt. Col. Victor Batac, and Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan. They were 
united by a desire to restore some of the honor, integrity and public respect they felt the Marcos dictatorship 
drained away (Cunning-Bruce 1986). 
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the country to explain to the Armed Forces the need for “clean, fair and honest elections” 
(Quinn-Judge 1986). Expecting a thoroughly fraudulent election, reformists later said they 
had already prepared plans to withdraw their support from Marcos (Cunning-Bruce 1986). 
Indeed, by 1986 the US knew of the coup plans against Marcos and had expressed 
support193 (Schock 1999). The initial plan included a transitional government led by a 
military junta that would eventually evolve into a democratic one (PCIJ 2006). However, 
later Enrile admitted that the turnover of authority to Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel 
was only their third, and least preferred, option (Positively Filipino Magazine 2013)194. 
 
After Enrile's and Ramos’ defection to the opposition, they both made several 
appeals for Marcos to resign. Claiming he ”could not serve a government that is not 
expressive of the sovereign will” (Government of the Philippines 1986), Enrile told 
Marcos “the matter [of stepping down] was no longer negotiable”, and that “the people 
want change of leadership.” There are ways he [Marcos] can depart peacefully quietly and 
enjoy his remaining years in retirement.”195 Finally, the increasing defection of Army units 
and their refusal to obey orders to shoot sealed the fate of Marcos and the remaining 
hardliners. Ramos told American TV that all 13 regional Army commanders had pledged 
their support196; a claim corroborated by the defection, on February 24, of seven helicopter 
gunships sent by Marcos to crush the rebels (BBC On This Day 2014; Asiaweek 1986). 
“We followed our conscience”, said Col. Antonio Sotelo of the Air Force 15th Strike Wing; 
a cry echoed by the ground troops on EDSA who neither used tear gas nor ammunition to 
suppress the rebellion because they did not want to attack fellow Filipinos (Briscoe 2011). 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
193 Enrile later admitted that they “were thinking of protecting [themselves] because of the growing fissures 
in the Marcos government” and because they “felt that it was time to really dismantle the martial-law 
machinery” (PCIJ 2006). 
194 Asked why they didn’t stick to their original plan, Enrile explained that “it would have been awkward (...) 
for the military to assert itself and assume power when there was a group, a democratic group that contested 
the right of Marcos to govern” (PCIJ 2006)!195 In fact, on a phone conversation with Marcos Enrile ensured that they would “provide a ring of protection 
around him and his family”. He said they didn’t have any intention to harm him but requested “that we can 
settle this so that we can now start working for the interest of the people” (The Courier 1986) 196 In a press conference Enrile confirmed the split in the military, explaining that the commanders of the 
Armed Services still remained loyal to Marcos whereas the elements in the lower ranks were almost entirely 
on the side of the opposition (Government of the Philippines 1986). 
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 Resume:  
 
 When mass protests shook the Philippines, progressive elemets in the government 
and the Army decided to no longer support Marcos – a turn of events that sealed the fate of 
the regime. We therefore confirm the existence of an authoritarian regime crisis.  
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(25) Indonesia197 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the sociopolitical environment in Indonesia had 
slowly been changing. Alarmed by the country’s worsening economic situation, a de facto 
anti-Suharto coalition combining a new generation of middle-class democratic activists 
with dissident Nationalists, traditional Muslims, Marxists, Human Rights workers, labor 
activists, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, and even East Timorese freedom 
fighters had formed that opposed Suharto’s three-decades long “New Order” (Liddle 1996; 
2002). By early 1998, however, the most influential voice of criticism came from students 
(Noble 2009). Several months into the devastating Asian economic crisis and just a few 
months away from the General Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MRP) in 
which Suharto was preparing for his fifth consecutive “reelection”, students and opposition 
groups organized petitions calling for “reformasi damai” (peaceful reform) and Suharto’s 
resignation as president. When Suharto ignored these calls and accepted a fifth mandate on 
March 10, 1998, student protests defying the government’s orders to stay confined to 
campus grounds took to the street. They were joined by swells of Indonesian citizens after 
a government-announced 70 percent increase in fuel prices in early May 1998. The turning 
point of these demonstrations was the twilight of May 12 when security forces shot dead 
six student protesters at Jakarta’s Trisakti University and triggered what Asiaweek 
magazine called “Ten Days that Shook Indonesia” (Bird 1999) Between 500 and 2000 
people died and many more were raped in the most violent and massive riots that Indonesia 
had ever seen (Richburg 1998; Noble 2009). Politically, the riots and the ensuing looting 
had grave consequences on the cohesion of Suharto’s ruling group: political leaders who 
had supported Suharto’s reelection were reconsidering their allegiances, and fractions of 
the military sided with the protesters, permitting them to organize and operate against the 
regime. When students finally marched to Parliament vowing to oust Suharto, the 
embattled dictator spoke on national TV on May 19 and vowed to leave office, but not 
until he had named a “reform council” to organize a phased transition to democratic rule. 
By Wednesday evening, however, most of his Cabinet had resigned, and the speaker of the 
Indonesian Parliament and head of the ruling GOLKAR party, Harmoko, announced that if 
Suharto did not step down by Friday, the People’s Consultative Assembly would impeach !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197 Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4 
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him (CNN 1998). At the same time, the military, allegedly with orders to shoot, moved 
into the center of Jakarta and set up barriers, which caused panic in many observers who 
feared the outbreak of a civil war. But on May 21 Suharto gave in, resigned and handed his 
office to his Vice President B.J. Habibie in a nationally televised ceremony (Mydans 
1998). A technocrat and relatively weak President, Habibie guided the country through the 
transition from the autocratic New Order to the genuinely fair presidential elections of 
October 1999, in which Megawati Sukarnoputri won office (Thompson 1999). 
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